Case Number: BC412887 Hearing Date: July 03, 2014 Dept: 1

#5 – 3192 West 7th Street, LLC v. Bauer, Chris Ryan Legal, dba Occupy Los Angeles, et al. (14 U 01365); Collier v. Paradygm Building Solutions, LLC (BC 412 887)

On May 29, 2014, this court scheduled a July 3, 2014 hearing on an Order to Show Cause (O.S.C.) re why Mr. C.R. Legal/C.R. Tillman should not be compelled to file any future pleadings only under the surname “Legal” and why Mr. Legal/Tillman should not be compelled to seek a pre-filing order before filing any future CCP § 1174.25 prejudgment claim of right to possession. Having received no opposition briefing from Mr. Legal/Tillman, the court tentatively finds and rules as follows:

This court finds that requiring Mr. Legal/Tillman to file any future pleadings only under the surname “Legal” simply amounts to a demand that he be honest in his dealings with the court and prospective defendants. Requiring honesty in litigation is the least that the court can demand from a litigant, especially since much of vexatious litigation is the product of the vexatious litigant’s propensity for dishonesty. See Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 541. Therefore, this court is justified in its demand for honest litigation, and it hereby orders that all of Mr. Legal’s/Tillman’s future pleadings be filed under the surname “Legal” or otherwise face the definite prospect of being stricken.

This court also finds that, pursuant to the language and common law background of CCP §§ 415.46(f), 1174.25(a), and 1174.3(d), a prejudgment claim of right to possession functions as an affirmative claim. A prejudgment claim of right to possession is asserted by any person not named in a writ of possession, in order to obtain a pre-eviction hearing on his/her right to possession. George v. County of San Luis Obispo (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1054. Assertion of the statutory claim was previously envisioned in the common law procedure set out by the California Supreme Court in Huerstal v. Muir (1884) 64 Cal. 450. Arrieta v. Mahon (1982) 31 Cal.3d 381, 390. In Huerstal, the court explained that, when a sheriff is called upon to execute a writ of possession, if he finds persons in possession other than those named in the writ, and those persons are not in privity with the defendant, but claim that they are rightfully in possession, and the circumstances are such that a reasonable doubt exists whether the sheriff has a right to turn them out, the sheriff may refuse to execute the writ against them. Huerstal v. Muir (1884) 64 Cal. 450, 451 – 452. But, the sheriff may still be ordered to execute the writ by the court from which the writ was issued, if the persons in possession cannot overcome the presumption that they entered into possession under the defendant. Id. The persons in possession can overcome the presumption by reasonably satisfactory proof of title adverse to that of the plaintiff, since the right to the possession flowing from such a title was not determined by the plaintiff’s judgment. Id. The offer of proof was, according to Huerstal, originally made by way of an application for injunction, as described by the California Supreme Court in Tevis v. Ellis (1864) 25 Cal. 515. The application for injunction in Tevis was made by persons in possession in order to prevent the sheriff from executing a writ of restitution issued on an ejectment judgment to which the persons in possession were not privy. Tevis v. Ellis (1864) 25 Cal. 515, 518 – 519. These original procedures and their statutory descendants entail that a prejudgment claim of right to possession is not merely a defense to eviction.

Consequently, while the restrictions of the vexatious litigant statutory scheme are not intended to apply to defendants [Mahdavi v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 32, 39], a prejudgment claim of right to possession asserted by an unlawful detainer defendant is genuinely a “new,” “civil action” or “proceeding” that does fall within the purview of the vexatious litigant statutes. CCP §§ 391(a), 391.7(a); In re Bittaker (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1009. Any future prejudgment claim of right filed by Mr. Legal/Tillman, therefore, may be rightly subject to a pre-filing order under CCP § 391.7(a) as a form of “new litigation.”

Accordingly, pursuant to CCP § 391.7(a), this court hereby prohibits Mr. Legal/Tillman from filing any future CCP § 1174.25 prejudgment claims of right to possession without first obtaining a pre-filing order from this court.

Disobedience of these orders may be punished as a contempt of court. CCP § 391.7(a).