Case No.: 1-14-CV-265917

This is an action is for misappropriation of trade secrets and conversion brought by plaintiff Ariba, Inc. (“Ariba”) against defendants Coupa Software Inc. (“Coupa”) and its employees Steven Sovik, Ravi Thakur, Gabriel Perez, Joe Rex Robertson, and Ashish Deshpande (“Deshpande”) (collectively “Defendants”).

The action was originally filed on May 30, 2014. On October 10, 2014, Ariba filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In the FAC, Ariba alleges that it is a competitor with Coupa in the e-procurement industry. Ariba alleges that it has spent time and effort creating and compiling confidential, proprietary information about pricing, products, services, competitive strategy, and customer accounts, referred to as the “Ariba Trade Secrets.” Ariba also alleges it has spent considerable time and effort creating and compiling confidential or proprietary documents (whether or not they contain Ariba Trade Secrets), referred to as the “Ariba Converted Documents.” To maintain the secrecy of the Ariba Trade Secrets and Ariba Confidential Documents, Ariba uses non-disclosure agreements, license agreements, employee contracts, employee training and/or other internal measures to minimize the circulation of sensitive information about Ariba’s products and services. In the course of employment, Ariba employees gain access to Ariba Trade Secrets and Ariba Confidential Documents. Ariba employees who have such access are bound by a confidentiality agreement signed as a condition of employment that prohibits disclosure to third parties except as permitted by company policy and requires an employee to return all Ariba confidential, proprietary documents (whether marked or not) upon termination. Ariba alleges that in recent years, Coupa has hired a significant number of employees who previously worked at Ariba. Ariba alleges on information and belief that Coupa has extracted Ariba Trade Secrets and Ariba Converted Documents from these employees.

The FAC asserts two causes of action against all Defendants for: (1) misappropriation of trade secrets; and (2) conversion.

On December 2, 2014, Coupa filed a Cross-Complaint against Ariba for unfair competition and tortious interference with contractual relations.

On October 24, 2014, Ariba filed its trade secrets disclosure statement pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.210. Ariba filed an amended disclosure statement on November 7, 2014.

On April 7, 2015, the Court sustained Ariba’s demurrer to Coupa’s Cross-Complaint with leave to amend. On April 17, 2015, Coupa filed its First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FACC”) for unfair competition and tortious interference with contractual relations.

Before the Court now are the following motions: (1) Ariba’s motion to seal portions of Coupa’s FACC; (2) Ariba’s demurrer to Coupa’s FACC; (3) Coupa’s motion to compel further responses to requests for production nos. 9 and 31 and special interrogatory no. 12; and (4) Ariba’s motion to compel further responses and for sanctions.

I. Motion to Seal

Ariba moves to seal portions of Coupa’s unredacted FACC, including the attached Exhibits A and B. Ariba argues the portions to be sealed constitute confidential and proprietary business information, including trade secret information, describing Ariba’s competitive intelligence program. Ariba contends that Exhibits A and B to the FACC describe Ariba’s internal competitive intelligence program from February and October of 2011, respectively, including proposed strategies and methods for gathering intelligence about Ariba’s competitors’ activities in the marketplace. Ariba further argues that Exhibit A contains detailed analysis of the perceived weaknesses of Ariba’s historical competitive intelligence programs, together with a step-by-step proposal for how to enact a proposed new program, and it also sets forth what Ariba has done to develop competitive intelligence in the past, with a proposal for specific new procedures and policies to follow when gathering competitive intelligence in the future. Ariba argues that Exhibit B provides details about a similar proposal, including identification of specific sources of information and methods for retrieving this information for use in competitive intelligence gathering. Ariba argues it would be severely harmed if such information became public because Ariba’s competitors would have visibility into Ariba’s competitive intelligence program operations and potential plans, enabling them to exploit the information to better compete against Ariba. The motion is supported by the declaration of Landon Edmond, Ariba’s General Counsel and Cloud Legal Center of Excellence Co-Lead.

“Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(c).) “A record must not be filed under seal without a court order. The court must not permit a record to be filed under seal based solely on the agreement or stipulation of the parties.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(a).)

“The court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish: [¶] (1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; [¶] (2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record; [¶] (3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; [¶] (4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and [¶] (5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d).)

Where some material within a document warrants sealing, but other material does not, the document should be edited or redacted if possible, to accommodate the moving party’s overriding interest and the strong presumption in favor of public access. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d)(4), (5).) In such a case, the moving party should take a line-by-line approach to the information in the document, rather than framing the issue to the court on an all-or-nothing basis. (In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 309.)

“[V]arious statutory privileges, trade secrets, and privacy interests, when properly asserted and not waived, may constitute overriding interests.” (In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 298 fn. 3; NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV) vs. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1222, fn. 46.) Financial information involving confidential matters relating to the business operations of a party may be sealed where public revelation of the information would interfere with the party’s ability to effectively compete in the marketplace and there is a substantial probability that their revelation would prejudice the foregoing legitimate interests of the party. (Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1285-1286.)

The portions of the FACC that Ariba moves to seal are identical to the portions of the original Cross-Complaint ordered sealed by the Court on January 30, 2015. Ariba and Mr. Edmonds establish that these portions of the FACC relating to Ariba’s competitive intelligence program are not shared outside of Ariba and divulge Ariba’s strategies to obtain intelligence for competing in the marketplace. The Court finds that Ariba sufficiently demonstrates an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record and supports sealing the unredacted FACC and Exhibits thereto. The Court further finds that a substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed. The proposed sealing as set forth in the redacted exhibits to the Edmond declaration is narrowly tailored and no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.

The motion to seal is GRANTED.

II. Demurrer

Ariba demurs to each of the two causes of action in Coupa’s FACC on the ground that they fail to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action.

Ariba asserts that the Court sustained Ariba’s prior demurrer to Coupa’s first cause of action for tortious interference with contractual relations and second cause of action for unfair competition in the Cross-Complaint on the basis that the causes of action are preempted by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”) because they are based on allegations that Ariba induced ex-Coupa employees to provide Coupa confidential information, i.e., trade secrets. Ariba contends that Coupa’s FACC does not cure the defect and the causes of action are still preempted.

Coupa alleges in the FACC that “Ariba solicited Coupa Company Information from former Coupa employees since at least September 2013 as part of a broader plan and business practice by Ariba to obtain confidential and proprietary information, including Coupa Company Information, from employees and others in violation of contractual confidentiality agreements relating to non-disclosure and non-use.” (FACC, ¶ 11.) “Company Information” in the FACC refers to “trade secrets, confidential knowledge, data, or other proprietary information.” (FACC, ¶ 8, emphasis omitted.) From Coupa’s allegations, it can be seen that the information allegedly obtained by Ariba includes both trade secrets and other confidential, non-trade secret information.

The “CUTSA provides the exclusive civil remedy for conduct falling within its terms, so as to supersede other civil remedies ‘based upon misappropriation of a trade secret.’” (Silvaco Data Systems v. Intel Corp. (2010) 184 Cal. App. 4th 210, 236, citing Civ. Code, § 3426.7.) Further, Civil Code “section 3426.7, subdivision (b), preempts common law claims that are ‘based on the same nucleus of facts as the misappropriation of trade secrets claim for relief.’” (K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of America Technology & Operations, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 939, 958, citing Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2005).) In this case, both the first and second causes of action are based on allegations that Ariba attempted to obtain Coupa’s Company Information. (FACC, ¶¶ 23, 29.) Since the alleged misappropriation of the Company Information includes the misappropriation of trade secrets based on the definition of “Company Information” in the FACC, the misappropriation of any other confidential, non-trade secret information also necessarily arises out of the same nucleus of facts. Consequently, Coupa’s claims are preempted.

Coupa cites to Angelica Textile Services, Inc. v. Park (2013) 220 Cal. App. 4th 495, 506 for the proposition that the CUTSA “does not displace noncontract claims that, although related to a trade secret misappropriation, are independent and based on facts distinct from the facts that support the misappropriation claim.” As discussed above, however, there is no distinction made between the facts that support the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets and the misappropriation of confidential, non-trade secret information.

Ariba makes the additional argument that the first and second cause of action fail because Coupa has not alleged an “actual breach of disruption of the contractual relationship,” as required for a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations. While Coupa’s allegations in this regard appear to be somewhat conclusory, it is unnecessary for the Court to reach this argument given the above discussion concerning preemption.

In sum, for the reasons stated, Ariba’s demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

III. Coupa’s Motion to Compel Further Responses

a. Discovery Dispute

On December 5, 2014, Coupa propounded its Request for Production (“RFP”) Set One on Ariba. After an extension of time, Ariba served responses on February 5, 2015. The parties met and conferred over the responses but were unable to reach any agreement with respect to RFP 9 and 31. The parties participated in an Informal Discovery Conference (“IDC”) on March 11, 2015, during which the Court instructed Ariba to provide supplemental responses identifying each document produced in response to each RFP. During the IDC, Coupa’s counsel Betty Chen offered to narrow the scope of RPF 31 to documents that are of the same type and/or subject matter category as identified in Ariba’s section 2019.210 statement, and the Court granted Coupa leave to file the instant motion to compel further responses to RFP 9 and 31. On April 14, 2015, Ariba served supplemental responses to RPF 9 and 31.

Coupa propounded Special Interrogatories (“SI”) Set One on October 29, 2014. After an extension of time, Ariba served responses on December 17, 2014. With respect to SI 12, Ariba referred to a Table A attached to the response. Thereafter, the parties met and conferred over Ariba’s response, and Ariba served a supplemental response on February 19, 2015 referring to a Supplemental Table A attached to the response. After participating in the March 11, 2015 IDC, the Court granted Coupa leave to file a motion to compel.

b. Legal Standards

“Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220, subd. (a).) “If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.” (Id., subd. (b).) “If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” (Id., subd. (c).) “On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: [¶] (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. [¶] (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. [¶] (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

“The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following: [¶] (1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities. [¶] (2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item. [¶] (3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a).) “A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.” (Id., § 2031.220.) “A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.” (Id., § 2031.230.)

If a party demanding a response to an inspection demand deems: (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete; (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive; or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general, that party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) It is the moving party’s burden to show good cause for the demand, e.g., relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. (Id., subd. (b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Once good cause is shown, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections. (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)

c. RFP 9 and SI 12

RFP 9: “For each alleged trade secret, all documents and things reflecting every communication, disclosure, publication or availability of the alleged trade secret – or any portion, version, iteration or manifestation thereof – to any individual, entity or group inside or outside of Ariba, including all emails, presentations or other communications, and any online resources, databases, websites or shared drives, whether restricted or unrestricted, internal or external.”

SI 12: “Separately for each alleged trade secret, identify all persons including employees and third parties to whom Ariba has ever disclosed or provided a copy of the alleged trade secret, the date and circumstances of the disclosure, and identify any documents referencing or related to the disclosure.”

Coupa argues that RFP 9 and SI 12 are relevant to disproving elements of Ariba’s claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, including the secrecy of the alleged trade secrets, whether there were reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy, and whether the alleged trade secrets derive independent economic value from not being generally known. Coupa also argues that RFP 9 and SI 12 are relevant to its affirmative defenses, including whether the alleged trade secrets were readily ascertainable. Coupa argues that Ariba’s supplemental response to RFP 9 is insufficient because (1) Ariba unilaterally narrowed the request to documents that “show actual or intended recipients” of the alleged trade secrets; and (2) Ariba produced one spreadsheet that only identified individuals who “accessed” 10 of Ariba’s 211 alleged trade secrets, without showing all of the instances and ways in which Ariba has disclosed or made its alleged trade secrets available to individuals and entities.

Coupa argues Ariba’s supplemental response to SI 12 is inadequate because Ariba has provided a long table that is simply a reiteration of its efforts to maintain the secrecy of its trade secrets, not identification of all persons and third parties to whom Ariba has disclosed its alleged trade secrets. Coupa argues that Ariba fails to address disclosures of alleged trade secrets for categories of information were likely shared with customers or prospective customers (e.g., Ariba’s alleged trade secrets 22-33 and 108-111). Coupa argues that Ariba’s discussion of non-disclosure policies and agreements is non-responsive because it does not identify disclosures of the alleged trade secrets. Coupa argues that Ariba’s objections based on third-party confidentiality are unfounded because (1) Ariba waived such objections in response to SI 12; (2) the discovery seeks information related to Ariba’s disclosure and the availability of Ariba’s information, not third-party information; and (3) to the extent third-party confidential information is implicated, notice can be given, and the information can be protected under the parties’ Protective Order.

Ariba argues RFP 9 is overbroad and imposes an undue burden because Ariba does not routinely track employee or customer access to most of the trade secrets documents. According to Ariba, it only tracks employee or customer access to those documents maintained on its Ariba Knowledge sites, and Ariba produced a spreadsheet of such access information for the 10 asserted trade secrets that are maintained on the Ariba Knowledge site. Ariba contends that it is not aware of any unauthorized or unintended access of its trade secrets, so there are no such documents to produce. Ariba argues it would be unduly burdensome and implicate third-party privacy to produce every employee agreement and customer non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”) and every instance or record of transmittal of the asserted trade secrets.

Ariba argues its response to SI 12 sufficiently identified on a trade-secret-by-trade-secret basis the groups/types/categories of people within and outside of Ariba to whom the trade secrets were disclosed. Ariba argues the parties reached an agreement on January 6, 2015 to allow Ariba to limit its response to “groups/types/categories” of people, but Coupa now reneges on the agreement by insisting that Ariba identify names of individuals and customers.

Analysis: Ariba does not dispute the general relevance of RFP 9 and SI 12 to the instant action. The California Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: (1) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” (Cal. Civ. Code, § 3426.1, subd. (d)(1)-(2).) The documents and information sought by Coupa through RFP 9 and SI 12 would allow Coupa to investigate whether Ariba has disclosed its alleged trade secrets in a manner that is inconsistent with trade secret protection under the law.

Coupa’s point is well-taken that Ariba’s response and supplemental response to RFP 9 do not address the entirety of the demand. RFP 9 seeks more than just documents showing “actual or intended recipients” of the alleged trade secrets; it broadly seeks all documents “reflecting every communication, disclosure, publication or availability of the alleged trade secret – or any portion, version, iteration or manifestation thereof – to any individual, entity or group inside or outside of Ariba, including all emails, presentations or other communications, and any online resources, databases, websites or shared drives, whether restricted or unrestricted, internal or external.” Furthermore, to the extent the spreadsheet produced by Ariba only pertains to 10 of Ariba’s claimed trade secrets, it does not provide the requested documents “[f]or each alleged trade secret[.]” Ariba’s production of documents and information related to non-disclosure agreements and policies is not fully responsive to RFP 9 because although it pertains to the conditions upon which Ariba generally communicates or discloses trade secrets to employees and customers, it does not reflect any actual disclosure or communication itself in a way that allows Coupa to determine whether secrecy was maintained as intended.

Ariba claims that it does not keep track of employee and customer access to trade secrets other than the 10 trade secrets maintained on Ariba Knowledge, and these are the trade secrets reflected in the spreadsheet. However, Ariba did not make this assertion in its actual responses to RFP 9. Ariba’s responses did not, as the Code of Civil Procedure requires, state that Ariba’s document production in response to RFP 9 was only “in part” (§ 2031.220) or that it was unable to fully comply with RFP 9 because responsive documents (e.g., documents showing customer/employee access of trade secrets not maintained on Ariba Knowledge) do not exist (§ 2031.230). Thus, at the very least, Ariba should serve a further response that complies with the Code in this way.

The Code of Civil Procedure also requires Ariba to affirm that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry were made in an effort to comply with the demand. (§ 2031.230.) Here, Ariba’s original response only affirmed that a reasonable search “sufficient to show the actual or intended recipients of the TRADE SECRETS” would be made, but again, this unilateral narrowing of the scope of RPF 9 was improper. Ariba’s supplemental response did not affirm that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry was made to comply with the demand. In opposition to the instant motion, Ariba argues that it would be unduly burdensome to produce every employee agreement, customer NDA, and record of transmittal of the asserted trade secrets. While RFP 9 is admittedly quite broadly worded, an objection based on undue burden requires the objecting party to make a showing that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of the discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020.) “The objection of burden is valid only when that burden is demonstrated to result in injustice.” (See West Pico Furn. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (Pacific Finance Loans) (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 418.) Ariba suggests that it would have to interview every employee and customer to comply with RFP 9. While it may constitute an undue and unjust burden to require Ariba to interview every employee and customer in order to reconstruct every instance when Ariba’s trade secrets were accessed, Ariba does not satisfactorily justify its undue burden objection without discussing in detail what other ways responsive documents could be found, or whether a search for responsive documents can be performed more narrowly than through individual interviews. Since Ariba failed to adequately justify the objection, the Court finds that a further response is warranted.

Ariba’s third-party privacy objection is not justified given that what is sought is evidence of the disclosure of Ariba’s trade secrets to third parties, not the disclosure of third-party confidential or proprietary information. To the extent Ariba contends a third party has a right of confidentiality against simply being identified as the recipient of Ariba’s trade secret information, Ariba has the burden to justify that objection with more detail.

For these reasons, the motion is GRANTED as to RFP 9. Ariba shall provide further responses to RFP 9 within 30 days.

As for SI 12, Ariba’s response and supplemental response included tables identifying groups, types and categories of persons within and outside Ariba who accessed Ariba’s trade secrets. Ariba contends that it does not track the names of every employee or customer who received each document, and thus, the parties agreed in January 2015 to allow Ariba to respond to SI 12 by identifying groups/types/categories of people.

Coupa argues that the tables are insufficient because they do not identify specific employees. However, Coupa does not dispute that the parties agreed to allow Ariba to respond to SI 12 by identifying groups, types and categories of persons. The parties’ meet and confer correspondences support Ariba’s position that Coupa accepted the terms of this agreement. In its reply brief, Coupa argues that Ariba has failed to comply with this agreement by not identifying certain individuals listed in a document produced by Ariba showing actual accesses to 10 of the alleged trade secrets. However, if the agreement was to allow Ariba to respond by identifying groups, types and categories of persons, Ariba’s failure to identify these individuals is not a breach. Coupa further argues that in any event, it never agreed that Ariba’s proposed supplementation would be sufficient, and Ariba’s counsel agreed that the parties’ agreement “would not preclude Coupa from seeking to obtain more detailed information.” However, this phrase is reasonably interpreted as allowing Coupa to obtain more detailed information through further discovery, not as a basis for allowing Coupa to disregard the parties’ agreement on a motion to compel further responses.

Coupa further argues that the tables fail to address the disclosures with sufficient specificity. It is true that SI 12 requires Ariba to identify the date and circumstances of the disclosures. However, since the basis of the parties’ January 2015 agreement was the fact that Ariba does not track every instance of accessing the trade secrets, it would make little sense to permit Ariba to identify trade secret recipients by group, type and category of persons, but then require Ariba to identify specific dates and circumstances of each and every disclosure.

As an example of the tables’ insufficiency, Coupa argues that with respect to Ariba’s trade secrets 1-9, the tables provide only generic information and fail to identify specific employees who have been given access to the alleged trade secrets. Again, Ariba’s failure to identify specific employees does not render its responses deficient in light of the parties’ January 2015 agreement permitting Ariba to identify groups and categories of employees rather than individual names. The tables identify categories of employees who would have had access to trade secrets 1-9, as well as where the information is stored. In some instances, the tables identify individual employees and specific documents (e.g., trade secret 19), as well as the names of knowledgeable persons who may be deposed for more specific information.

The Court finds that Ariba’s responses to SI 12 are sufficiently complete and straightforward in light of the parties’ January 2015 agreement. The motion to compel further responses to SI 12 is DENIED.

d. RFP 31

RFP 31: “All confidential or proprietary documents or information of any Ariba competitor in Ariba’s possession, and any documents or communications including emails that refer or relate to such documents or information.” Pursuant to the March 11, 2015 IDC, Coupa only moves to compel responsive documents that are of the same type and/or subject matter category identified in Ariba’s 2019.210 statement.

In its original response, Ariba interposed various objections and stated that “it will produce non-privileged, non-work product documents, if any, identified after a reasonable search that are Coupa confidential/proprietary and in Ariba’s possession without authorization.” In its supplemental response, Ariba stated that “[s]ubject to and without waiving the foregoing objections and limitations, Ariba responds that, after having conducted a reasonable search, Ariba is not aware of any responsive documents.”

Coupa argues that Ariba’s unilateral narrowing of the RFP to “Coupa confidential/proprietary” documents obtained “without authorization” is improper because the RFP seeks documents from any Ariba competitor in Ariab’s possession, regardless of whether Ariba deems the possession authorized or not. Coupa argues that the documents sought by this RFP are relevant to (1) Coupa’s defenses of bad faith, unclean hands, comparative fault, and offset; (2) Coupa’s cross-claims for intentional interference with contractual relations and unfair competition; (3) disproving the trade secret status of Ariba’s alleged trade secrets because they would show that the very same kind of information Ariba has claimed as trade secret in this case is regularly gathered and shared by Ariba as a matter of industry-wide practice; and (3) raising doubts about the reasonableness of Ariba’s reliance on NDAs to protect its trade secrets. For support, Coupa relies on Silicon Image v. Analogix (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96073. Coupa argues that Ariba’s third-party privacy concerns lack merit because (1) they are irrelevant to any Coupa documents that Ariba possesses; and (2) “Ariba cannot purloin a competitor’s confidential and proprietary information and then feign generic concern over that competitor’s unspecified confidentiality rights.”

Ariba argues that non-Coupa documents sought by this RFP are not relevant to Coupa’s cross-claims because those claims are predicated on Ariba’s alleged interference with Coupa employee confidentiality agreements, and Coupa does not have standing to assert an interference claim on behalf of third parties. Ariba argues that non-Coupa documents sought by this RFP are not relevant to Coupa’s affirmative defenses because those defenses revolve around a claim that Ariba has brought this litigation for an improper purpose or is guilty of harming Coupa, not third parties. Ariba further argues that even assuming Ariba has misappropriated competitor trade secrets, this has no bearing on whether Coupa has misappropriated Ariba’s trade secrets. Ariba argues that Silicon Image is distinguishable on its facts.

Analysis: Since this is a document demand, it is Coupa’s initial burden to show good cause (e.g., relevance, specific facts justifying discovery). (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.) Here, Coupa does not demonstrate good cause for production of any competitor documents in Ariba’s possession other than Coupa documents, and Ariba makes a code-compliant response that after conducting a reasonable search, Ariba is not aware of any responsive documents.

Regarding Coupa’s bad faith/unclean hands defense, Ariba’s possession of third party competitors’ confidential documents and information would not relate directly to the misconduct and injuries claimed by Ariba in this action so as to render inequitable Ariba’s right against Coupa, nor would any misconduct by Ariba as to other third parties prejudice Coupa in its defense to Ariba’s claims. (See Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 979 [discussing unclean hands].) Nor would Ariba’s possession of third party competitor information pertain to comparative fault or offsets between Ariba and Coupa, or to Coupa’s cross-claims for Ariba’s interference with Coupa employee confidentiality agreements.

Coupa argues that Ariba’s treatment of third party confidential documents of the same nature, type, and subject matter claimed by Ariba to be trade secrets in this case would disprove the trade secret status of Ariba’s alleged trade secrets. This argument is not very persuasive. Ariba’s possession and treatment of third party confidential documents, even documents similar to Ariba’s claimed trade secrets, would say nothing about the fact-specific manner in which Ariba (or the third party) maintains and safeguards its own proprietary information.

Citing Silicon Image, Coupa argues that Ariba’s possession of competitor documents of a similar nature, type and subject matter as Ariba’s claimed trade secrets would demonstrate Ariba’s acceptance of an industry-wide practice of accessing and sharing this information. In Silicon Image, the defendant argued that because some of the plaintiff’s HDMI register maps were available on the Internet, this was evidence of a widespread, accepted practice in the HDMI industry that companies access each others’ confidential information without penalty, and the plaintiff accepted this practice by accessing the datasheets of its competitors, including defendant’s. (See Silicon Image, supra, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 21.) Yet, the U.S. District Court was still not persuaded that the evidence proved a sufficiently widespread publication of the plaintiff’s proprietary information over the Internet to destroy the information’s status as a trade secret. (Id. at *45-46.) Thus, it is questionable how Silicon Image can support Coupa’s position that evidence of Ariba’s access to other competitors’ publicly available information would undermine Ariba’s own claim to trade secret protection. Coupa claims that it has found many of the same or similar types of information claimed by Ariba as trade secrets on the Internet. Certainly, widespread publication of Ariba’s information over the Internet could destroy the information’s status as a trade secret, but it does not follow that Coupa is entitled to a broad production of all competitor documents in Ariba’s possession.

Coupa further argues that Ariba’s possession of competitor documents would cast doubt on whether Ariba’s reliance on NDAs is a reasonable measure for maintaining the secrecy of its trade secrets. In Silicon Image, the U.S. District Court questioned whether NDAs were sufficiently reasonable means of maintaining the secrecy of the claimed trade secrets, not as a matter of law, but based on “evidence that customers provided [the plaintiff] with the confidential documents of competitors (albeit unsolicited) as early as 2004.” (Silicon Image, supra, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96073, at *48-49.) Here, Coupa cites one instance of Ariba’s possession of competitor information and another instance where Ariba was pursuing competitor information. However, unlike in Silicon Image, Coupa does not demonstrate that the competitor information found in Ariba’s possession was given to Ariba by someone in violation of an NDA to support the broad inference that NDAs are not sufficiently reasonable means of keeping secrecy. Without establishing this threshold fact, Coupa fails to demonstrate good cause for a broad production of all competitor documents in Ariba’s possession.

Finally, Coupa’s dismissal of third party privacy concerns is not well-taken. Coupa argues that Ariba cannot feign to protect the confidentiality of third party competitors from whom Ariba has stolen. However, if we assume that Ariba has indeed misappropriated confidential information from third party competitors, it is likely that they would not want further dissemination of that information to Coupa, another competitor in the procurement industry.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Coupa does not sufficiently demonstrate good cause for RFP 31 either in terms of relevance or specific facts justifying the discovery. The motion to compel a further response to RFP 31 is DENIED.

IV. Ariba’s Motion to Compel Further Responses and for Sanctions

a. Discovery Dispute

Ariba moves to compel Coupa to respond further to SI 1, 2, and 5. Ariba also moves for monetary, issue and/or terminating sanctions.

SI 1: “Identify with particularity the source of each Ariba Confidential Document in Coupa’s possession, including without limitation the steps Coupa took to obtain such Documents.”

SI 2: “Identify with particularity the source of each Document and Communication containing or constituting Ariba Trade Secrets in Coupa’s possession, including without limitation the steps Coupa took to obtain such Documents and Communications.”

SI 5: “Identify all Persons currently or previously employed by Coupa who possessed, reviewed, or used any Ariba Confidential Documents and/or any Documents or Communications containing or constituting Ariba Trade Secrets during their employment at Coupa.”

“Ariba Confidential Documents” is defined in the interrogatories as “any Document bearing, in whole or in part, Ariba Confidentiality Markings, and/or obtained from Ariba without Ariba’s implicit or explicit consent.” “Ariba Trade Secret” is defined as “any information, data, or facts identified in Ariba’s Identification of Trade Secrets, served pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 2019.210 on October 24, 2014, and in any supplemental Identification of Trade Secrets.”

On October 24, 2014, Ariba served its first set of SI on Coupa, as well as its section 2019 trade secrets disclosure statement.

According to Ariba, Coupa initially responded to Ariba’s interrogatories with boilerplate objections and first served substantive supplemental responses on February 5, 2015. At a February 25, 2015 IDC, the Court ordered Coupa to supplement its responses to identify all sources for each item identified in the amended disclosure, not to limit the responses to the Coupa management team, and to provide a full and complete list of the employees who possessed or used the information. Thereafter, Coupa served second supplemental responses, and after a March 11, 2015 IDC, the Court gave Ariba leave to file this motion. The parties met and conferred in March and April, and on April 1, 2015, Coupa served third supplemental responses.

According to Ariba, Coupa has not addressed each of the Ariba converted documents and trade secrets identified in Ariba’s 2019 disclosure. Ariba contends there are five Ariba Documents produced by Coupa that Coupa still refuses to provide any responsive information for (Ariba disclosure items 189-193), and Coupa ignores an additional 16 items (17, 23, 28, 33, 47, 67, 87, 89, 101, 107, 108, 113, 114, 117, 196 and 200) in the disclosure statement. Ariba argues that Coupa’s responses only address the Ariba Documents with Bates numbers, not the identified categories of documents (e.g., customer lists, identities of Ariba’s customers, customer contact information), and in all, Coupa only responds to 97 of the 211 identified trade secrets.

Ariba argues that where Coupa does offer responses, they are incomplete and insufficient because in lieu of a response, Coupa cites to documents that are not responsive to the interrogatories. Ariba further argues that Coupa makes improper, non-responsive and sometimes false arguments (e.g., Coupa did not take any steps to obtain a document, the documents are publicly available). Also, Coupa fails to provide individualized responses for each version and the multiple duplicates of each Ariba trade secret and converted document in its document production, even though in some instances, the metadata indicates that the documents were created at different times and under different circumstances or obtained from different sources. Finally, as to SI 5, Ariba contends that Coupa fails to identify any “use” of the Ariba trade secret information and converted documents as demanded in the interrogatory, does not identify Despande as one of the employee who had a “kill sheet” document (even though an e-mail shows the kill sheet was forwarded to Deshpande), and fails to identify all of the employees on an e-mail thread that was sent to a presales distribution list.

Ariba seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $42,683.25. Ariba also seeks issue and/or terminating sanctions for Coupa’s continued discovery misconduct. Ariba argues that although no formal order was issued after the IDC process, the Court directed Coupa to provide complete responses on multiple occasions, and Coupa’s continued failure to do so amounts to willful disobedience justifying issue and/or terminating sanctions. Ariba seeks issue sanctions in the form of an order establishing that Coupa willfully misappropriated the Ariba Documents or terminating sanctions having Coupa’s answer struck.

Coupa argues that it has fully responded to Ariba’s interrogatories as limited in scope by the parties’ January 2015 agreement. According to Coupa, due to deficiencies in Ariba’s amended 2019 statement, the parties agreed to limit the scope of Coupa’s responses to written discovery to the 84 specifically documents cited in Ariba’s 2019.210 statement, and not the subject matter “categories” in the statement. Coupa also contends that five of the documents specifically cited in Ariba’s 2019 statement (176, 181, 189, and 190-193) were later withdrawn by Ariba as trade secrets. Coupa contends that discovery on the remaining 109 general categories of alleged trade secrets was limited to a reasonable search for documents, not further written interrogatory responses, and Coupa conducted a reasonable search for similar documents but found none. Thus, Coupa argues there is nothing further to compel, and it is Ariba who is violating the parties January 2015 agreement by bringing this motion.

Regarding SI 1 and 2, Coupa argues that under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230, it is permissible to answer an interrogatory by specifying the writings from which the answer may be derived or ascertained, and here, Coupa answered the interrogatories regarding the “source” of documents by citing to documents from which Ariba can derive or ascertain the source. Coupa argues that any qualifications in its responses were expressly permitted by the Court at the February 25 IDC, and the qualifications are necessary due to numerous improper assumptions in Ariba’s interrogatories. Regarding duplicative documents, Coupa argues that it sufficiently provided individualized responses by underlining the documents identified as duplicative, and by grouping duplicative documents together.

Regarding SI 5, Coupa argues that Ariba’s complaints are unfounded because: (1) Ariba confirmed in writing that it would not assert items 189-193 as trade secrets; (2) Coupa’s omission of Deshpande from its supplemental response was inadvertent and was corrected in Coupa’s third supplemental response; (3) Ariba never met and conferred on Coupa’s purported failure to address the “use” of documents in its responses, and Coupa did provide information on any uses of documents of which Coupa was aware; and (4) Ariba never met and conferred regarding the failure to identify employees on group distribution lists, and Coupa in fact investigated with its IT department but could not determine the membership of individuals on the presales and execteam distribution lists at the relevant points in time when the documents at issue were transmitted.

Coupa argues that monetary sanctions are not justified because all of Coupa’s objections and responses have been made in good faith, while Ariba has reneged on the parties’ compromise agreement, which was reached after an extensive meet and confer process. Coupa also argues that the claimed fees of $45,683.25 and 92 hours of work are excessive. Coupa argues that terminating and/or issue sanctions absent violation of a court order are improper and without legal authority.

In its reply, Ariba disputes Coupa’s interpretation of the parties’ January 2015 agreement. Ariba argues that Coupa’s interpretation is implausible because it would mean that Ariba intentionally agreed to forego discovery on over half of the trade secrets on its amended 2019 statement. Ariba cites a portion of the parties’ e-mail correspondence in which Ariba’s counsel stated: “Coupa’s stated search parameters will encompass all identified trade secrets on the amended list as well as documents relevant to Ariba’s conversion claims.” According to Ariba, this statement demonstrates that the agreement was for Coupa to supplement its response for all of the asserted trade secrets.

b. January 6, 2015 Agreement

The parties’ January 2015 agreement is rather unclear, but Coupa’s interpretation is not unreasonable. Under a plain reading of the parties’ meet and confer correspondences, Coupa agreed to provide further responses in accordance with certain “search/scope parameters.” Under these “search/scope parameters,” Coupa would to do two things: (1) “investigate specific documents cited in Ariba’s amended 2019.210 statements” and (2) “conduct a reasonable search for similar documents in stated categories.” Under Coupa’s interpretation, “investigat[ing] specific documents” identified in the amended 2019 statement is contrasted with doing a “reasonable search for similar documents” that were identified by category, not Bates number, and Coupa understood that its obligation to provide further interrogatory responses was limited in scope to the specifically-identified documents.

This interpretation is not unreasonable because it is consistent with the parties’ meet and confer correspondences. The relevant dispute during the meet and confer process was based on Coupa’s particularity and scope objections to Ariba’s section 2019.20 statement, particularly the inclusion of “categories” of documents that were not sufficiently identified. Thus, Coupa’s interpretation focuses its further responses on the identified documents and relaxes Coupa’s response obligations on the categories. Importantly, this interpretation would not result in Ariba completely foregoing discovery on over half of its trade secrets, since Coupa would still have to search for documents in its possession that fell within the stated categories. Even if Coupa’s interpretation is not compelling, the ambiguity of the parties’ agreement should excuse Coupa’s lack of written responses relating to the “categories” of documents.

The motion to compel further responses is DENIED without prejudice as the interrogatories pertain to the categories of documents in Ariba’s amended 2019 disclosure.

c. Withdrawn Trade Secrets

Regarding the five documents withdrawn by Ariba as alleged trade secrets, Coupa neglects to mention that Ariba still asserted that the documents were converted. “In response to your request of March 3, 2014, I write to confirm that Ariba will not assert Trade Secret Nos. 176, 181, 189, and 190-193 as Ariba trade secret information that is alleged to be misappropriated by Coupa. Ariba continues to identify each of the documents at Trade Secret Nos. 176, 181, 189, and 190-193 as Ariba converted documents.” There is no definition for “Ariba’s converted documents” in the interrogatories, but “Ariba Confidential Documents” are defined as documents “obtained from Ariba without Ariba’s implicit or explicit consent” which is essentially conversion. (See Angelica Textile Services, Inc. v. Park (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 495, 499, 508 [conversion claim by employer against former employee who retained thousands of pages of documents owned by employer].) Thus, when Ariba withdrew trade secret claims over these documents but maintained they were converted, the documents still fall into the definition of Ariba Confidential Documents for purposes of Coupa’s responses to SI 1 and 5, both of which seek information on Ariba Confidential Documents in Coupa’s possession. Coupa’s attempt to completely extract these documents from the scope of this motion is not well-taken.

d. SI 1 and 2

Regarding the identification of “sources” of the documents in SI 1 and 2, Coupa argues it was permitted under California Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 to specify the writings from which the answer may be derived. That section specifically provides:

If the answer to an interrogatory would necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of or from the documents of the party to whom the interrogatory is directed, and if the burden or expense of preparing or making it would be substantially the same for the party propounding the interrogatory as for the responding party, it is a sufficient answer to that interrogatory to refer to this section and to specify the writings from which the answer may be derived or ascertained. This specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the propounding party to locate and to identify, as readily as the responding party can, the documents from which the answer may be ascertained. The responding party shall then afford to the propounding party a reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect these documents and to make copies, compilations, abstracts, or summaries of them.

(Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.230.) Ariba argues that this section is inapplicable because the interrogatories did not require such a summary, and Coupa’s citation to documents did not identify “the documents from which the answer may be obtained” because the documents Coupa cites provided some but not all of the information Ariba seeks, and the responses were ambiguous.

The Court finds that section 2030.230 is available to Coupa for SI 1 and 2 since the statute applies where an interrogatory would necessitate a “summary…from the documents” of Coupa. SI 1 and 2 seek identification of the “sources” of documents in Coupa’s possession. By identifying the name and Bates stamp number of each “source” document, many of which contain e-mails where the documents in question where forwarded between employees, Coupa identifies the documents from which the “source” may be obtained. Otherwise, Coupa would have to summarize the information from the documents to indicate them as the source of the Ariba documents in Coupa’s possession, but the burden to do so is equal for either party.

Aside from relying on section 2030.230, Coupa also responds to SI 1 and 2 by indicating that certain documents were found on named employees’ computers. This is responsive and complete in that Coupa is disclosing the location of the documents in its possession.

However, Coupa’s responses are deficient in other ways. Although Coupa was entitled to specify documents in lieu of a substantive response pursuant to section 2030.230, Coupa failed to indicate whether a reasonable and diligent search was performed to identify any source of the document further back than the cited document indicates on its face.

Furthermore, even if the Court permitted Coupa to include contextual language in its responses, stating that a document is publicly-available or generally known in the procurement industry is not responsive to a question about the source of that document in Coupa’s possession unless Coupa is implying that it did, in fact, obtain such documents through publicly-available means (in which case, this latter point must be clearly stated in the response). Furthermore, stating that the documents in question are not trade secrets is non-responsive and unnecessary to contextualize Coupa’s response. The interrogatories are not improperly premised on the legal conclusion that the documents in question are trade secrets; rather, “Ariba Trade Secret” is a defined term referring to the “information, data, or facts identified in Ariba’s Identification of Trade Secrets.” Coupa’s insertion of unnecessary statements and legal arguments into its responses – as well as Coupa’s attempt to justify these statements as contextual language – are improper.

SI 1 and 2 also required Coupa to not only identify the source of the documents, but the steps Coupa took to obtain the documents. Coupa responded that it “did not take any steps to obtain these documents.” This is not a straightforward response since the documents were in Coupa’s possession. Coupa argues that Ariba improperly assumes that steps to obtain the documents were undertaken. Coupa also tries to distinguish itself from the individual employees who may have taken steps to obtain the documents. However, because the documents were in Coupa’s possession, in order for Coupa’s response to be complete and straightforward, Coupa should have at least indicated the steps it took to locate and obtain the documents for production.

Regarding the trade secrets set forth in Table 2 of Coupa’s Exhibit E (17, 23, 28, 33, 47, 67, 87, 89, 101, 107, 108, 113, 114, 117, 196 and 200), Coupa responded to SI 1 and 2 by stating that “[a]fter a reasonable investigation of natural persons still employed at Coupa, Coupa is presently unable to respond to this interrogatory as to other documents listed in Ariba’s CCP 2019.210 statement which relate only to persons no longer employed by Coupa.” This response is not complete and straightforward because it does not identify any source for the documents or the steps Coupa took to obtain the documents. The fact that these 16 trade secrets relate to persons no longer employed by Coupa does not excuse Coupa from providing responses based on information in its possession about the former employees in connection with the alleged trade secrets in question.

e. SI 5

Ariba contends that Coupa’s response to SI 5 is incomplete because Coupa fails to address the “use” of the documents. In its first supplemental response, Coupa responded that it “is not aware of any use of any document used in a way that constitutes misappropriation under § 3426.1 – i.e. used by a person who acquired the information through improper means or who knew, at the time of the use, that the information had been acquired through improper means, under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain secrecy, or from a person who owed a duty to maintain secrecy. Except as noted below, Coupa also is not aware of any current or former employee who otherwise used any documents alleged by Ariba to be confidential or trade secret.” Coupa then went on to list several documents by Bates stamp number. Coupa’s second and third supplemental responses listed more documents by Bates stamp number, and with regard to each of these documents, Coupa stated that it “does not otherwise have institutional knowledge whether these former employees possessed or reviewed these documents.” Taken as a whole, Coupa’s responses as to the “use” of the documents are complete and straightforward. Although Coupa did not mention “use” in the more specific second and third supplemental responses listing documents and employee names, Coupa’s first supplemental response still stands as a denial of awareness of any “use” of the documents claimed by Ariba to be confidential or trade secret. That Coupa identifies the presence of specific documents on employee computers does not contradict its statement that it lacks awareness of any “use” of the documents by the employees.

Regarding Coupa’s failure to identify employees on group distribution lists, Coupa argues the issue was not raised during the meet and confer process. However, it is clear that the parties discussed Coupa’s response to SI 5 and its failure to identify all current and former employees who, based on Coupa emails, appear to have possessed and used the alleged trade secrets. Coupa then claims that its IT department could not determine the membership of individuals on the presales and execteam distribution lists at the relevant points in time when the documents at issue were transmitted. In that case however, Coupa should respond that SI 5 cannot be answered completely, and that a reasonable and good faith effort was made, but Coupa could not identify individuals on the distribution lists. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (b), (c).)

Regarding duplicate documents, Coupa identified duplicates by underlining them and then provided the same substantive response for all duplicates. However, Coupa had a duty to investigate whether duplicates were not created or used at different times and circumstances than the specific documents for which Coupa provided a response.

Thus, Ariba’s motion to compel further responses is GRANTED IN PART. Coupa shall provide further responses consistent with the discussion above within 30 days. As previously noted, the motion is DENIED without prejudice as the interrogatories relate to the “categories” of documents in the amended 2019 disclosure.

f. Sanctions

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction…against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).)

Ariba seeks a monetary sanction in the amount of $45,683.25. The request is supported by a declaration of Ariba’s counsel, Amy K. Van Zant.

Coupa argues the request should be denied because Ariba failed to provide billing records. A request for sanctions under the Civil Discovery Act must be “accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.) The Act does not expressly require the submission of billing records, and the Van Zant declaration sets forth facts supporting the amount of monetary sanctions. Ms. Van Zant declares that four attorneys at the Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe firm at varying billing rates ranging from $637.50 to $573.75 worked 92 hours in preparing the motion and accompanying documents.

Granted, Ariba was only partly successful with its motion, and several of Coupa’s objections to the motion – including the scope of the motion under the parties’ January 6, 2015 agreement – were well-taken. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that Coupa’s objections rise to the level of substantial justification for purposes of denying sanctions outright. “[T]he phrase ‘substantial justification’ has been understood to mean that a justification is clearly reasonable because it is well grounded in both law and fact. [Citations.]” (Doe v. United States Swimming (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1434.) Coupa’s successful arguments in opposition, such as its interpretation of the parties’ January 2015 agreement, were not necessarily well-grounded in both law and fact; rather, Coupa benefited from the ambiguity of the parties’ agreement, resulting in a denial without prejudice of the motion. Thus, the Court finds that Coupa was not substantially justified in opposing the motion, and Ariba is entitled to monetary sanctions under section 2030.300 subdivision (d).

Coupa argues the claimed fees and hours are facially excessive. The Court agrees and will reduce the sanctions award to reflect a more reasonable expenditure of time, and also to reflect partial success on the motion, since a full award would be unreasonable in light of the partial success. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a) [“reasonable expenses”].) The request for sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $18,000.00.

Ariba also seeks terminating and/or issue sanctions. However, because Coupa has not been shown to have violated a court order, and Ariba was only partly successful on the motion, such severe sanctions are unjustified. The request for terminating and/or issue sanctions is DENIED.