2013-00146665-CU-DF

Brian Detrick vs. Constance V. Conley

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for New Trial

Filed By: Daniel S. Strouder

Plaintiff Brian Detrick’s Motion for New Trial is GRANTED. C.C.P., sec. 657(6).

Plaintiff moves for an order granting a new trial on the grounds that this Court’s
decision in the April 17, 2014 Minute Order granting defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion is
“against the law,” pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 657(6).

A decision is “against the law” when the evidence is legally insufficient or a question of
law is adverse to the verdict. Marriage of Beilock (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 713, 728;
Tortorella v. Castro (2006) 140 Cal. App. 4th 1, 3.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges two separate defamatory statements made by Defendant
to a charity, Courageous Connection, about Plaintiff Brian Detrick. Plaintiff alleges that
the essence of those statements was that Mr. Detrick was violating the law by
performing commercial fundraising services on Courageous Connection’s behalf in
April of 2013 .

Defendant brought two successive anti-SLAPP motions in this action. The second
motion, the “Renewed Special Motion to Strike,” was granted by this Court in its April
17, 2014 Minute Order. In that Minute Order this Court concluded that each of the
individual statements made by Defendant were true, and that, consequently, Mr.
Detrick could not show prima facie evidence of the statements’ falsity or the
Defendant’s lack of reasonable care.

Plaintiff contends that the Court applied the incorrect legal standard when interpreting
the meaning of the defamatory statements and thereby determining their truth or
falsity. Defamatory statements can be implied and must be interpreted in context and
under the totality of the circumstances. The statements need only be reasonably
susceptible to a defamatory meaning in order for their interpretation to become a
factual issue for the jury. To survive an anti-SLAPP motion, the allegedly defamatory statements need only be
“reasonably susceptible” to an interpretation which states or implies a false assertion
of fact. Bently Reserve LP. v. Papaliolios (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 418, 428.

It is a question of law for the court whether a challenged statement is reasonably
susceptible of an interpretation which implies a provably false assertion of actual fact.
If that question is answered in the affirmative, the jury may be called upon to determine
whether such an interpretation was in fact conveyed.” Id.

Here, the Court now must conclude that the Defamatory Statements are reasonably
susceptible to an interpretation which states or implies that Brian Detrick was illegally
fundraising as an unregistered commercial fundraiser for Courageous Connection in
April of 2013.

As Jones of Courageous Connection cut his professional ties with Detrick as a result of
the allegedly defamatory statements (and Jones was not involved in Detrick’s 2011
work), given the totality of the circumstances it could appear to the finder of fact that
defendant stated that Detrick was breaking the law by operating as a commercial
fundraiser for Courageous Connection in April 2013.

Thus, plaintiff’s prima facie evidence of the falsity of this assertion remains a disputed
issue of material fact for determination at the time of trial by the finder of fact and is
sufficient to defeat the anti-SLAPP motion.

The Court’s decision to the contrary in its April 17, 2014 Minute Order on the anti-
SLAPP motion was an error of law, and a new trial is therefore granted.

Of significance to the Court’s determination here, the letter from the Attorney General
stating that Detrick was required register for the year 2011 does not conclusively
establish that plaintiff was required to register for his 2013 work on Courageous
Connection’s behalf. The Attorney General’s office is an enforcement agency, not a
quasi-judicial body, and therefore its interpretation of the law that Detrick was required
to register in 2011 is not legally conclusive of the falsity element of defamation,
particularly in reference to the 2013 work.

The motion for a new trial is granted, and this Court’s Minute Order of April 17, 2014 is
ordered VACATED.

The prevailing party shall prepare a formal order for the Court’s signature pursuant to
C.R.C. 3.1312.

Item 9 2013-00146665-CU-DF

Brian Detrick vs. Constance V. Conley

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Attorney Fees

Filed By: Kravitz, Jeffrey S.

Defendant Constance Conley’s Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs is
DENIED. C.C.P., sec. 425.16(c). The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as
required by with C.R.C., Rule 3.1308 and Local Rule 1.06(D). Local Rules for the
Sacramento Superior Court are available on the Court’s website at
Counsel for moving party is
ordered to notify opposing party immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be
available at the hearing, in person or by telephone, in the event opposing party
appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

Concurrently herewith the Court has granted the moving party plaintiff’s Motion for a
New Trial, and vacated the granted of the anti-SLAPP motion, therefore the defendant
is no longer the prevailing party on the anti-SLAPP motion and therefore not entitled to
an award of attorneys’ fees under C.C.P., sec. 425.16(c).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule
3.1312 or further notice is required.