Debbie Garcia, et al. v. Mark A. Brown, M.D., et al.		CASE NO. 114CV263042
DATE: 16 January 2015	TIME: 9:00	LINE NUMBER: 12

This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.882.2310 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 15 January 2015.  Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 16 January 2015, the motion by defendants Mark A. Brown, M.D. (“Dr. Brown”), Robert Weiss, M.D. (“Dr. Weiss”), and Fidere Anesthesia Consultants (“Fidere”) to compel plaintiff Debbie Garcia (“Plaintiff”) to provide answers to depositions questions and for an award of monetary sanctions was argued and submitted.  Ms. Garcia filed a formal opposition to the motion.

1. Statement of Facts

This is an action for medical malpractice.  Plaintiff alleges that “[p]rior to, on, and after May 24, 2013, [she], was a patient of [Dr. Brown, Dr. Weiss, Fidere, defendant Shahin Fazilat, M.D., and defendant El Camino Hospital]” and consulted with them regarding her “medical care, treatment, diagnosis, and other healthcare needs.”  (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶ 6.)  “On and after May 24, 2013, including, but not limited to May 29, 2013, the defendants … were negligent and careless in and about their examination, testing, assessment, diagnosis of, care for, and treatment of [Plaintiff], and in particular, said defendants … negligently and carelessly cared for, treated, examined, assessed, and diagnosed [Plaintiff] during and after a reconstructive procedure for a left calf leiomyosarcoma.”  (FAC, ¶ 7.)

As a result of the defendants’ negligence, Plaintiff experienced low blood pressure during the procedure and suffered neurological damage to her spinal cord, requiring further medical treatment.  (See FAC, ¶ 8.)  Due to her injuries, Plaintiff “has been unable to perform her usual household services and her customary services to the family unit” and “it became necessary for [Plaintiff] to incur expenses for medical treatment, attendant care, home modifications, and related costs and expenses.”  (FAC, ¶¶ 9, 11.)  Plaintiff also sustained “economic damage in the form of wage loss and loss of earning capacity.”  (FAC, ¶ 10.)

On 22 May 2014, Plaintiff and her husband, Joe Garcia, filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) against the defendants, alleging causes of action for: (1) medical negligence; and (2) loss of consortium.

1. Discovery Dispute

Counsel for Dr. Brown, Dr. Weiss, and Fidere (collectively “Defendants”) deposed Plaintiff on 10 September 2014.  At the deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel objected to and instructed Plaintiff not to answer questions pertaining to: rent paid by those living on her property; the salary and health insurance benefits received by her adult daughter, Crystal Avila (“Ms. Avila”), through her company, Oliveira Fence; whether her mother, Phyllis Holmes (“Ms. Holmes”), referred her to an attorney; and the amount of her out-of-pocket expenses and the credit card she used to pay those expenses.  (See Kanter Dec., Ex. A, pp. 22:5-10, 24:7-25:3, 39:19-41:8, 66:9-13, 104:20-22, 105:1-4, and 144:7-11.)  Plaintiff’s counsel objected to those questions on various grounds, including relevance, privacy, attorney-client privilege, and work product doctrine.  (See id.)

Following the deposition, on 20 October 2014, Defendants’ counsel sent Plaintiff’s counsel a detailed meet and confer letter regarding the questions that Plaintiff refused to answer at her deposition.  (See Kanter Dec., Ex. B.)

Plaintiff’s counsel sent Defendants’ counsel a reply letter on 11 November 2014, indicating that the objections to the subject deposition questions were appropriate and Defendants were not entitled to the discovery sought.  (See Kanter Dec., Ex. C.)  Specifically with respect to the issue of out-of-pocket expenses, Plaintiff’s counsel advised that Plaintiff provided documentation regarding all of her “out of pocket expenses for medical bills” that were in her possession, but there might “be additional copay amounts paid in cash reflected in the medical bills that [Defendants’ counsel] … subpoenaed.”  (Id.)  Plaintiff’s counsel also inquired whether there was “any outstanding issue” with respect to Plaintiff’s out-of-pocket expenses.  (Id.)

On 13 November 2014, Defendants filed the instant motion to compel Plaintiff to provide answers to the questions that she refused to answer at her deposition.  Plaintiff filed papers in opposition to the motion on 5 January 2015.  Defendants filed a reply on 9 January 2015.

III.     Discussion

Defendants move to compel Plaintiff to provide answers to the following eight deposition questions:

(1) “Do they [(i.e., persons including Ms. Avila)] pay rent for that guest house?”  (Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 22:5-10);

(2) “What is [Ms. Avila’s] annual salary?”  (Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 104:20-22);

(3) “Does [Ms. Avila] have health insurance benefits through [Oliveira Fence]?”   (Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 105:1-4);

(4) “Did your mother refer you to this law firm?”  (Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 24:7-9);

(5) “Did your mother refer you to an attorney?”  (Kanter Dec., Ex. A, pp. 24:24-25:3);

(6) “Did your mother refer you to [your counsel,] Mr. Kelly?”  (Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 144:7-11);

(7) “Do you have an estimate as to how much more than $2,000 those out-of-pocket expenses were?”  (Kanter Dec., Ex. A, pp. 39:19-41:8); and

(8) “What credit card did you use to pay those bills?”  (Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 66:9-13.)

1. Meet and Confer

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff argues that Defendants failed to adequately meet and confer with respect to the deposition questions regarding her out-of-pocket expenses because, “[p]rior to the filing of this motion, [her] counsel asked what information remained outstanding, and defense counsel ignored the question.”  (Opp’n., p. 2:21-25.)

A motion to compel deposition answers shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration “showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.”  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2025.480, subd. (b).)  A reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than argument with opposing counsel.  It requires that the parties present the merits of their respective positions with candor, specificity, and support.  (See Townsend v. Super. Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, 1439.)  The level of effort at informal resolution that satisfies the “reasonable and good faith attempt” standard depends upon the circumstances of the case.  (See Obregon v. Super. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)

Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants failed to adequately meet and confer regarding the questions pertaining to her out-of-pocket expenses lacks merit.  Defendants’ counsel’s 20 October 2014 meet and confer letter addressed those questions and Plaintiff’s objections to the same in detail.

While Plaintiff may have provided Defendants with documents containing responsive information at some later date and time, this would not relieve Plaintiff of her obligation to provide an answer to the question regarding her out-of-pocket expenses posed to her at her deposition and Plaintiff’s counsel never indicated that Plaintiff was willing to provide an answer to the same.  Therefore, it was appropriate for Defendants to file the instant motion without further ado.

1. Legal Standard

If a deponent fails to answer a question at his or her deposition, the party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (a).)  There is no requirement that the moving party show good cause to compel answers at a deposition.  (Compare Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.450, subd. (b)(1) [showing of good cause required where motion pertains to production of documents described in deposition notice] with 2025.480 [no good cause requirement where motion pertains to oral testimony].)  A deponent who has objected to a question and refused to answer bears the burden of justifying such refusal.  (See Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)  If the court determines that the answer sought is subject to discovery, it shall order that the answer be given on the resumption of the deposition.  (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.480, subd. (i).)    

1. Questions 1-3

Questions 1-3 asked Plaintiff to state whether the persons living in her guest house, including Ms. Avila, pay rent (see Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 22:5-10), Ms. Avila’s annual salary (see Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 104:20-22), and whether Ms. Avila receives health insurance benefits through her employment with Oliveira Fence.  (See Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 105:1-4.)  At the deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel objected to each of the questions on the ground of privacy and instructed Plaintiff not to answer.

In her opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff attempts to justify her privacy objections, arguing that the questions invade Ms. Avila’s right to privacy in her financial information.  Plaintiff contends that Ms. Avila’s private financial information is not a proper subject of discovery because the amount of rent that Ms. Avila pays, Ms. Avila’s salary, and Ms. Avila’s health insurance benefits are irrelevant to the calculation of her damages in this litigation, citing Hanif v. Housing Authority of Yolo County (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 635.  Plaintiff further contends that disclosure of Ms. Avila’s financial information is improper because Ms. Avila has not been provided with notice and an opportunity to object to the disclosure of her private information, citing Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (Barkett) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652 and Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640.

Defendants argue that the subject deposition questions are proper because Plaintiff “will seek to recover the reasonable value of [Ms. Avila’s] nursing services” and they “are entitled to explore what financial arrangements there may be between plaintiffs and [Ms. Avila] (eg. free rent), despite her claimed privacy interest, and provide this information to [their] economist expert who can then provide an opinion as to how such financial arrangements may be an offset to the claimed value of her services[,]” citing Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379.  (Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:23-28.)  Defendants further argue that “if [Ms. Avila] is ultimately designated as plaintiff’s attendant, [they] anticipate plaintiff will claim [Ms. Avila] is entitled to salary and health benefits” and, “[t]o the extent [Ms. Avila] is already receiving health benefits through her employment, plaintiff would not be entitled to claim a double recovery for health benefits related to her role as an attendant.”  (Mem. Ps & As., pp. 3:28, 4:1-3.)  Defendants also contend that Ms. Avila’s salary “may have some bearing on whether the amount plaintiff claims [Ms. Avila] should be paid as an attendant is reasonable.”  (Mem. Ps & As., p. 4:4-5.)

The right of privacy established by the California Constitution protects an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.”  (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370 (Pioneer), citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 40.)  Where a serious invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy is shown, the proponent of discovery must demonstrate that information sought is “directly relevant” to a claim or defense, and “essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.”  (Britt v. Super. Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859; see also Harris v. Super. Ct. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665 (Harris).)  Discovery will not be ordered if the information sought is available from other sources or less intrusive means.  (See Allen v. Super. Ct. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 447, 449.)  If direct relevance is shown, the court must “carefully balance” the right of privacy, on the one hand, and the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts, on the other.  (See Valley Bank of Nevada v. Super. Ct., (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 657; see also Pioneer, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 371.)

It is well-established that the right to privacy extends to a person’s financial affairs.  (See Cobb v. Super. Ct. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 543, 550; see also Fortunato v. Super. Ct. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480; see also Valley Bank of Nevada v. Super. Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656-657.)

Since disclosure of information regarding the rent paid by Ms. Avila, Ms. Avila’s salary, and Ms. Avila’s health insurance benefits would constitute a serious invasion of Ms. Avila’s right to privacy in her financial information, Defendants must demonstrate that the information sought is directly relevant and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.  (See Britt v. Super. Ct., supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 859.)

Defendants fail to make such a showing.  First, the only legal authority cited by Defendants, Tylo v. Superior Court  (“Tylo”) (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379, does not support their position that Ms. Avila’s financial information is directly relevant to the litigation because Tylo has nothing to do with the calculation of the value of attendant care services and whether certain financial arrangements may be used to offset that amount.  Tylo is an employment discrimination case brought by an actress who was terminated after her employer learned of her pregnancy.  (See Tylo, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1382-1383.)  The defendants in Tylo brought a motion to compel answers to deposition questions because actress refused to answer, on the basis of relevance and the right to privacy, deposition questions about her emotional distress arising out of her marriage and her attempts to become pregnant.  (See id. at pp. 1383-1384.)  On appeal, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandate that directed the trial court to set aside parts of its order that granted the motion to compel on questions that related to emotional distress caused by the plaintiff’s marriage because the actress did not waive her right to privacy. The court allowed other aspects of the order to stand because certain related issues, although personal, were discoverable.  (See id. at p. 1388-1392.)  Tylo does not address the factors that are relevant to the calculation of personal injury damages or whether a third party’s financial information may be discovered to offset the value of attendant care provided by family members.

Second, there is no indication that Ms. Avila’s salary or health insurance benefits that she receives in connection with her employment with Oliveira Fence or the amount of rent that she pays is relevant to the calculation of Plaintiff’s damages.  “The reasonable value of nursing services required by the defendant’s tortious conduct may be recovered from the defendant even though the services were rendered by members of the injured person’s family and without an agreement or expectation of payment.  Where services in the way of attendance and nursing are rendered by a member of the plaintiff’s family, the amount for which the defendant is liable is the amount for which reasonably competent nursing and attendance by others could have been obtained.”  (Hanif v. Housing Authority (1988) 200 Cal. App. 3d 635, 644.)  The jury is entitled to calculate the reasonable value of that care based on the wage ordinarily paid to those who provide such services.  (See Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 626, 661-662; see also Hanif v. Housing Authority, supra, 200 Cal. App. 3d at p. 645 [“the recognized measure for such attendant care is the prevailing market rate for those who perform such services.”].)  There is no indication that the salary or health benefits received by the family member providing the attendant care services is relevant to establishing the market rate of the attendant care services that they provided.

Moreover, Plaintiff submits a declaration in support of her opposition, in which she declares that the amount of rent that Ms. Avila pays to her is not in any way dependent on or related to the assistance that Ms. Avila provides to her at home.  (See Garcia Opp’n. Dec., ¶  2.)  Plaintiff further declares that the salary that Ms. Avila is paid and the health insurance benefits that she receives from Oliveira Fence “are not dependent on or in any way related to the assistance [Ms. Avila] provides to [her] because of [her] injury” and “[t]he amount of [Ms. Avila’s] salary and benefits from Oliveira Fence have not changed as a result of the assistance [Ms. Avila] provides to [her] due to [her] injuries.”  (Garcia Opp’n. Dec., ¶ 3.)

Furthermore, even if Ms. Avila’s rent, salary, and health insurance benefits were somehow connected to the attendant care services that she provides to Plaintiff, Defendants do not cite any legal authority indicating that they are entitled to an offset for those benefits.

Thus, Plaintiff’s privacy objection to Questions 1-3 is sustained and answers to those questions are not warranted.

1. Questions 4-6

Questions 4-6 asked Plaintiff to state whether Ms. Holmes referred her to her counsel’s law firm (see Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 24:7-9), an attorney (see Kanter Dec., Ex. A, pp. 24:24-25:3), or to her counsel, Michael Kelly (“Mr. Kelly”).  (See Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 144:7-11.)  At the deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel objected to each of the questions on the grounds of attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine and instructed Plaintiff not to answer.

In her opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff attempts to justify only her objection based on the attorney-client privilege.  Plaintiff asserts that after her surgery Ms. Holmes searched for, researched, and conducted initial interviews with potential attorneys on her behalf and essentially acted as her agent.  Plaintiff states that Ms. Holmes then conveyed information that she obtained from attorneys to her and her husband, Joe Garcia, and, based upon that information, retained her current counsel to represent her in this case.  Plaintiff argues that Questions 4-6 “seek to obtain the content of the confidential information that was conveyed by Ms. Holmes to the plaintiffs, namely whether she told them to contact an attorney, the Walkup firm, or Michael Kelly, Esq.” and “[t]he problem is that this communication was made from an attorney to Ms. Holmes to provide to the plaintiffs ….” (Opp’n., p. 7:20-25.)

“The [attorney-client] privilege authorizes a client to refuse to disclose, and to prevent others from disclosing, confidential communications between attorney and client.”  (Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal. 3d 591, 599; see also Evid. Code, § 952 [defining the term “confidential communication between client and lawyer” as “information transmitted between a client and his lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted, and includes an opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in the course of that relationship”].)  “In California the privilege has been held to encompass not only oral or written statements, but additionally actions, signs, or other means of communicating information.”  (Id. at p. 600 citing Ex Parte McDonough (1915) 170 Cal. 230, 234 and Estate of Kime (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 246, 255.)

Here, Questions 4-6 do not call for the disclosure or otherwise appear to involve an attorney-client communication.  Questions as to whether Ms. Holmes referred Plaintiff to any attorney or her current counsel do not presuppose the existence of an attorney-client communication or reveal the substance of any attorney-client communication that may have occurred.  (See Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 210, 219-220 [noting that questions that merely refer to an attorney-client relationship are not within the purview of the attorney-client privilege]; see also Mitchell v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal. 3d at p. 601 [“Each of these questions presuppose a communication between attorney and client, in which the attorney warned the client about the effects of DBCP, and cannot be answered without impliedly affirming that such conversation occurred. Thus, these questions clearly involved information transmitted between Ms. Mitchell and her attorney in the course of their relationship as client and lawyer, as well as advice given by Mr. Kramer to his client in the course of such professional relationship.”].)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s objection based on the attorney-client privilege lacks merit and answers are warranted to the subject questions.[1]

1. Questions 7-8

Question 7 asked Plaintiff whether she had “an estimate as to how much more than $2,000 [her] out-of-pocket expenses were.”  Before Plaintiff had an opportunity to respond to the question, her counsel asked her if she needed to review any documents and instructed her to tell Defendants’ counsel if she needed to do so.  In response, Defendants’ counsel asserted that Plaintiff’s counsel was improperly coaching Plaintiff.  Defendants’ counsel subsequently asked his question again and Plaintiff responded: “I can only make a guess, because I don’t – I didn’t – I reviewed this, but I didn’t review all that because I’ve given everything to her.  So I had totals, but I didn’t review them. So I don’t know actual totals unless I reviewed my documents.”  (Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 41:1-8.)

Question 8 asked Plaintiff to state what credit card she used to pay her medical bills.  (See Kanter Dec., Ex. A, p. 66:9-13.)  Plaintiff objected to the question on the ground of privacy and instructed Plaintiff not to answer.

In her opposition papers, Plaintiff argues that Questions 7-8 are an improper fishing expedition and intrusion into her private financial affairs because she has provided “a verified discovery response containing the documents demonstrating the out of pocket expenses” and she “signed a declaration confirming that the only out of pocket expenses for which she is seeking recovery are reflected in her discovery responses and cash payments which would not be shown on her credit card statements.”  (Opp’n., p. 9:16-22.)  Plaintiff further argues that her counsel was not coaching her, but was merely attempting to “move through the deposition process efficiently.”  (Opp’n., p. 10:7-8.)

Defendants assert that they are entitled to a further answer to Question 7 because Plaintiff’s counsel coached her response and Plaintiff refused to provide a straightforward response to the question.  Defendants further assert that they are entitled to a response to Questions 8 because Plaintiff testified that she used her medical billing records and her credit card information to compile a total or her out-of-pocket expenses and they are entitled to verify the information that she relied upon by subpoenaing her credit card records.

With respect to Question 7, the Court finds that an order compelling an answer is not warranted because Plaintiff did not refuse to answer the question and, in fact, provided a direct response to the inquiry.  As articulated above, Plaintiff told Defendants’ counsel that she could not provide him with an estimate as to how much more than $2,000 her medical expenses were because she would need to review documentation that she previously turned over to her attorney.

Moreover, the statement made by Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the possible need to review records does not appear to be improper coaching.  At an earlier point in the deposition, Defendants’ counsel reviewed with Plaintiff her response to interrogatory number 42, stating that her out-of-pocket medical expenses exceeded $2,000.  When asked if her response to the interrogatory was truthful, Plaintiff stated: “Well, I’m sure I paid way over $2,000. I just don’t know the exact number. We did get all the medical records together, and I did give them to her. But I – I don’t remember the calculation.”  (Polcari Dec., Ex. 4, p. 34:1-8.)  Thus, Plaintiff’s counsel’s statement that Plaintiff should advise Defendants’ counsel if she needed to review records before providing an estimate does not appear to suggest an answer and is in line with Plaintiff’s prior testimony.

With respect to Question 8, Plaintiff fails to justify her privacy objection.  Plaintiff appears to concede that the information sought is directly relevant to the issue of damages and argues only that Defendants do not need information about the credit card that she used to pay her medical bills because she has provided them with discovery responses and a declaration containing the same information.  Moreover, Defendants may seek to discover financial information pertaining to Plaintiff’s medical bills by way of a business records subpoena even if it has also obtained that information by way of requests for production do documents.  (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2019.010 &  2025.280, subd. (b); see also Carter v. Super. Ct. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997 [“[n]othing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under the other”].)  Thus, an answer is warranted to Question 8.

1. Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.  The motion is DENIED as to Questions 1-3 and 7.  The motion is GRANTED as to Questions 4-6 and 8.

1. Defendants’ Request for Monetary Sanctions

Defendants request an award of monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel in the amount of $1,385 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, subdivision (j).[2]

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, subdivision (j) provides that “[t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

The Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to monetary sanctions because 1) they were only partially successful on their motion and it would be unjust to award monetary sanctions under the circumstances and 2) Plaintiff acted with substantial justification.

Accordingly, Defendants’ request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

 

 

 

 

 

1. Conclusion and Order

Defendants’ motion is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.  The motion is DENIED as to Questions 1-3 and 7.  The motion is GRANTED as to Questions 4-6 and 8.  Accordingly, within 20 days of the date of the filing of this Order, at a date and time mutually agreed upon by the parties, Plaintiff shall appear for further deposition and answer Questions 4-6 and 8.  Defendants may also pose reasonably related follow-up questions, subject to Plaintiff’s right to assert any applicable, justifiable, and legally valid objections to any such follow-up questions.

Defendants’ request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

 

 

________________­­­____________ DATED:

_________________________­­­________________________ HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN Judge of the Superior Court County of Santa Clara

[1] Should this matter proceed to a hearing, this Court might ask what relevance, if any, would be provided by the answers to these questions.

[2] The Court notes that Defendants mistakenly cite to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, subdivision (f) in their papers, but this appears to be a typographical error as they correctly quote from subdivision (j).