Juan Corona v. James Cai, et al.		CASE NO. 114CV269024
DATE: 16 January 2015	TIME: 9:00	LINE NUMBER: 17

This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose.  Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.882.2310 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 15 January 2015.  Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 16 January 2015, the motion of defendant James Cai (“Cai”) to compel further responses to form interrogatories and requests for admission, and for monetary sanctions, was argued and submitted.  Plaintiff Juan Corona (“Corona”) filed a formal opposition to Cai’s motion.

1. Statement of Facts

Corona brings this action against his former attorney, Cai, and Cai’s law firm, defendant Schein & Cai LLP (collectively, “Defendants”).  He alleges that he hired Defendants to save his home from foreclosure, but they failed to obtain a loan modification on his behalf or have him declared bankrupt as they had promised.  Instead, Defendants filed multiple unsucccessful bankruptcy petitions, and submitted an unsuccessful application for a loan modification to Corona’s lender 8 months after Corona hired them.  Corona’s home was sold in foreclosure proceedings on 10 July 2013, and Corona was evicted on 10 January 2014.

On 19 March 2014, Corona, who is self-represented, filed this action for: (1) negligence, (2) legal malpractice, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

1. Discovery Dispute

On 12 September 2014, Cai served first sets of requests for admissions (the “RFA”s) and form interrogatories (the “FI”s) on Corona.  Cai’s counsel received Corona’s unverified responses, which had been improperly served, on 22 October 2014.  On 31 October 2014, Cai’s counsel sent a meet and confer letter to Corona, in which he requested that Corona provide verifications to the RFAs and FIs and raised a number of substantive issues with Corona’s responses.  Counsel stated that Cai would treat the responses as having been timely served despite the problems with service, but requested that Corona provide further responses by 15 November 2014, addressing the substantive issues raised.  Corona did not respond to this correspondence, although he acknowledges in his opposition papers that he received it.

On 2 December 2014, Cai filed the instant motion to compel further responses to the RFAs and FIs.  On 5 January 2015, Corona filed papers in opposition to Cai’s motion.  As of 13 January 2015, no reply papers had been filed.

III.     Discussion

1. Legal Standard

A party propounding interrogatories and requests for admission may move for an order compelling further responses if that party deems an answer is evasive or incomplete and/or an objection is without merit or too general.  (Code Civ. Proc. (“CCP”), §§ 2030.300, subd. (a) and 2033.290, subd. (a).)  The statutes do not require any showing of good cause in support of a motion compelling further responses to interrogatories or requests for admission.  (See CCP, §§ 2030.300 and 2033.290; see also Coy v. Super. Ct. (Wolcher) (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)  The burden is on the responding party to justify any objections or failure to fully answer.  (Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221.)

1. Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further responses to interrogatories or requests for admission shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration “showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.”  (CCP, §§ 2016.040, 2030.300, subd. (b), 2033.290, subd. (b).)  A reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than argument with opposing counsel.  (Townsend v. Super. Ct. (EMC Mortgage Co., et al.) (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, 1439.)  It requires that the parties present the merits of their respective positions with candor, specificity, and support.  (Id.)  The level of effort at informal resolution that satisfies the “reasonable and good faith attempt” standard depends upon the circumstances of the case.  (Obregon v. Super. Ct. (Cimm’s, Inc., et al.) (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)  Where there has been a failure to meet and confer, “[j]udges have broad powers and responsibilities to determine what measures and procedures are appropriate in varying circumstances.”  (Id.)  The court’s discretion includes the possibility of denying discovery altogether absent efforts to meet and confer.  (See Townsend v. Super. Ct., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1439; Obregon v. Super. Ct., supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 434 [court has discretion to deny discovery absent meet and confer].)

Corona contends that Cai failed to adequately meet and confer because he made only one attempt to contact Corona before filing the present motion.  However, Cai’s counsel sent Corona a letter on 31 October 2014, in which he detailed the asserted problems with Corona’s responses with specificity and support and requested further responses within a reasonable 15 days.  Corona admits that he received this correspondence, but he apparently did not respond to it.  He offers no explanation for his failure to respond in his opposition papers.  Cai delayed filing the instant motion until 2 December 2014, more than a month after sending the meet and confer letter.  In light of these circumstances, it appears that Corona had ample time to reach out to Cai regarding the issues he raised, and additional efforts by Cai to meet and confer with the unresponsive Corona likely would not have been fruitful.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Cai’s meet and confer efforts were sufficient.

1. The Requests for Admissions

Cai seeks to compel further responses to RFAs 2-3 and 6-12.

1. RFAs 2-3 and 6

RFAs 2-3 and 6 ask Corona to admit that, contrary to his allegations, Defendants told him that he would need to make all payments pursuant to his October 2012 and April 2013 bankruptcy plans, and the filing of his Chapter 7 bankruptcy case had no impact on his bank’s ability to foreclose on his home. In his responses to RFAs 2-3, Corona rested upon objections to the undefined term “payment” and to the relevance of the RFAs.  In his response to RFA 6, he rested upon objections to the terms “Chapter 7 case” and “no impact.”

In his opposition papers, Corona defends his objections that the disputed terms are vague and ambiguous, arguing that Cai appears to use “payment” differently that Corona does in his complaint, and should be required to specify whether the other terms have the same meaning as they do in the complaint .  However, the meanings of these terms are clear within the context of this action without the need for additional definition.  Further, asserted nuances regarding the definitions of terms do not excuse Corona’s failure to respond to the RFAs.  (See Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.)  Corona must admit so much of each RFA as is true, although he may employ a reasonable and clear qualification regarding the definition of a term if necessary.  (CCP, § 2033.220, subd. (b)(1).)

Corona’s objections to these terms are consequently overruled, and his undefended relevance objections are also overruled.  Further substantive responses to these RFAs are thus warranted.

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2. RFAs 7-9

RFAs 7 and 8 seek admissions that Corona did not have the ability to pay the arrearage on his mortgage that existed at the time he filed for bankruptcy in 2012 and 2013, respectively.  Corona responded by resting upon objections that various terms are vague, ambiguous, and overly burdensome and the RFAs “seek[] information which relies on an evaluation and legal assessment by Defendant.”  RFA 9 asks Corona to admit that the value of his home at the time of foreclosure was less than he owed on his mortgage.  In response, Corona rested upon an objection to the term “the foreclosure.”

Corona defends his objections to the terms at issue with the same argument discussed above with respect to RFAs 2-3 and 6.  Corona’s argument fails for the same reasons, and his objections to the terms used in RFAs 7-9 are overruled.  Corona’s undefended objections to RFAs 7-8 are also overruled.  Accordingly further substantive responses to RFAs 7-9 are warranted.

3. RFAs 10-12

RFAs 10-12 ask Corona to admit that none of Defendants’ actions were fraudulent, constituted despicable conduct, or were intended to cause Corona injury.  In his responses, Corona again interposed objections to various terms, but responded “[n]otwithstanding these objections” by unequivocally denying each of these RFAs.  Cai argues that Corona’s objections to RFAs 10-12 lack merit.  However, given that Corona has fully and substantively responded to these RFAs, further responses thereto are unwarranted.

1. The Form Interrogatories

Cai moves to compel further responses to FIs 2.5., 2.7, 9.1-9.2, 12.1, 12.3, and 17.1.

1. FI 2.5

FI 2.5 asks Corona to state (a) his present residence address, (b) his addresses for the last five years, and (c) the dates he lived at each address.  In response, Corona rested upon a relevance objection to subpart (a), and responded to subparts (b) and (c) by, respectively, providing a single residence address and stating that “Plaintiff has lived in the current residence since he was evicted from his residence in Manteca as a result of Defendants actions which is the focus of this litigation.”  (Sic.)

In his opposition papers, Corona defends his relevance objection to subpart (a).  He does not address his failure to fully respond to subparts (b) and (c) by providing a complete history of his residence addresses over the past five years.  With respect to the relevance objection, Cai is entitled to discover Corona’s present address in order to facilitate serving him with documents and communicating with him during this lawsuit.  Corona’s relevance objection is accordingly overruled.  Further, Corona’s response as a whole must be full and complete.  (See CCP, § 2030.220.)

In light of the above, a further response that fully addresses each subpart of FI 2.5 in substance is warranted.

2. FI 2.7

FI 2.7 seeks information regarding Corona’s educational history.  In response, Corona rested upon an objection to the relevance of this FI, and he defends his objection in his opposition papers.  Cai argues that Corona’s educational history is “reasonable background information,” but does not explain its relevance to this legal malpractice case, which does not appear to the Court.

Accordingly, Corona’s relevance objection to FI 2.7 is sustained, and a further response is unwarranted.

3. FIs 9.1-9.2

FIs 9.1-9.2 request information concerning the damages that Corona seeks in connection with the “INCIDENT” at issue in this action.  Corona responded by resting upon objections that the term “INCIDENT” is not defined and is vague, ambiguous, and overly burdensome, and he repeats but does not defend these objections in opposition to Cai’s motion.  “INCIDENT” is defined by the FIs, using the standard definition approved by the Judicial Council of California, to mean the circumstances and events surrounding the occurrence giving rise to this action.  This definition is clear and appropriate in its scope.  Again, Corona is obligated to respond to these FIs as fully as possible.  (See CCP, § 2030.220.)

Consequently, Corona’s objections to FIs 9.1-9.2 are overruled, and further substantive responses are warranted.

4. FI 12.1

FI 12.1 instructs Corona to provide information concerning any witnesses to the “INCIDENT.”  Corona responded by resting upon objections to the terms and phrases “INCIDENT,” “any statement(s),” and “who heard any statements made about the INCIDENT by any individual at the scene.”  Corona defends these objections in his opposition papers with the same argument discussed elsewhere.

Corona’s objections to the term “INCIDENT” are without merit for the reasons already discussed, and the Court similarly finds that the other Judicial Council-approved language to which Corona objects is clear and appropriate.  Consequently, Corona’s objections to FI 12.1 are overruled, and a further substantive response is warranted.

5. FI 12.3

FI 12.3 queries whether Corona has obtained a written statement from any individual concerning the “INCIDENT,” and includes a number of follow-up questions regarding any statement that Corona has obtained.  Corona responded to FI 12.3 by interposing objections and providing a substantive response of “no” notwithstanding these objections.  Cai challenges Corona’s objections, but given that the objections do not impact Corona’s complete, substantive response, a further response to FI 12.3 is unwarranted.

 

6. FI 17.1

FI 17.1 asks Corona to provide certain information in support of any of his responses to the RFAs that are not unqualified admissions.  In response, Corona objected that the term “unqualified” is vague, ambiguous, and overly burdensome, and that the interrogatory attempts to acquire information protected by the work product doctrine.  In his opposition papers, Corona defends his objections to the term “unqualified” only.

Again, the Court finds that this Judicial Council-approved term is clear and straightforward, and Corona’s objections to FI 17.1 are overruled.  A further substantive response to FI 17.1 is warranted.

1. Verifications

Finally, Cai moves to compel Corona to verify his responses to the RFAs and FIs as required by the CCP.  (See CCP, §§ 2030.250, 2033.240.)  Corona does not indicate that he has provided verifications to his responses.  Consequently, he will be ordered to do so now.

1. Request for Monetary Sanctions

Cai makes a code-compliant request for $1,250 in monetary sanctions against Corona pursuant to CCP sections 2030.300 and 2033.290.

CCP sections 2030.300, subdivision (d) and 2033.290, subdivision (d) provide that the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party or attorney who unsuccessfully opposes a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories and requests for admission, unless the party or attorney acted with substantial justification or other circumstances make the imposition of a sanction unjust.

Here, Corona’s opposition to Cai’s motion to compel was almost entirely unsuccessful, Corona was not substantially justified in his failure to respond fully to the discovery at issue, and no other circumstances make the imposition of sanctions unjust. Therefore, the Court will award monetary sanctions against Corona.

Cai’s counsel declares that he spent at least 5 hours preparing the instant motion, at a rate of $250 per hour.  Counsel’s time spent and hourly rate are reasonable, and the Court will accordingly award the full $1,250 in sanctions requested (5 hours x $250/hr. = $1,250).

 

 

 

 

 

1. Conclusion and Order

Cai’s motion to compel further responses is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.  The motion is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to compel Corona to provide further responses to RFAs 2-3 and 6-9 and FIs 2.5., 9.1-9.2, 12.1, and 17.1 and verifications to Corona’s responses to the RFAs and FIs.  Corona shall serve verified, code-compliant further responses to RFAs 2-3 and 6-9 and FIs 2.5., 9.1-9.2, 12.1, and 17.1, without objections, within 20 calendar days of the filing of the Court’s order.  Corona shall also provide verifications to his initial responses to the FIs and RFAs within the same time period.  Cai’s motion is DENIED insofar as it seeks to compel Corona to provide further responses to RFAs 10-12 and FIs 2.7 and 12.3.

Cai’s request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED.  Corona shall pay $1,250 to Cai’s counsel within 20 calendar days of the filing of the Court’s order.

 

 

________________­­­____________ DATED:

_________________________­­­________________________ HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN Judge of the Superior Court County of Santa Clara