Case Name: Katherine Decker v. El Camino Hospital, et al.
Case No.: 1-13-CV-257027

This action arises from the termination of plaintiff Katherine Decker’s (“Plaintiff”) employment as a registered nurse with defendant El Camino Hospital (“El Camino”). (See Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ¶ 1.)

On December 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed the SAC against El Camino and individual defendants including S.J. Salfen, M.D. (“Salfen”). According to Plaintiff’s allegations, Salfen is a doctor affiliated with El Camino and another hospital, Good Samaritan, where Plaintiff was previously employed. (SAC, ¶¶ 4, 22.) Salfen asked the manager who had hired Plaintiff why she had done so, and improperly influenced El Camino to treat Plaintiff differently than similarly situated co-workers. (SAC, ¶ 29.) Salfen would glare at Plaintiff while speaking with the hiring manager, and this was “quite intimidating” for Plaintiff, especially given that she previously had to “write [Salfen] up for inappropriate behavior” at Good Samaritan. (SAC, ¶ 30.) On December 22, 2013, Plaintiff was terminated from her employment based on her age and disabilities. (SAC, ¶¶ 34-35.) She is informed and believes that Salfen “played a role and influenced the decision to have her terminated.” (SAC, ¶ 36.)

In the SAC, Plaintiff asserts claims against Salfen for: harassment in violation of Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j) (the second cause of action); invasion of privacy—false light (the sixth cause of action); and intentional interference with contractual/economic relationship (the seventh cause of action). Salfen demurs to each of these claims on the grounds that it is uncertain and fails to state a claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e)-(f).) In addition, Salfen demurs to the seventh cause of action on the ground that it cannot be ascertained whether the contract at issue in that claim is written, oral, or implied by conduct. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (g).)

I. Uncertainty

As an initial matter, the demurrer to each claim on the ground of uncertainty is OVERRULED. Uncertainty is a disfavored ground for demurrer and a demurrer on this ground is typically sustained only where the pleading is so unintelligible that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. (See Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 [“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”].) Here, Plaintiff’s claims are alleged clearly enough to enable a response.

II. The Second Cause of Action for Harassment

The demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim. To fall within the ambit of Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j), harassment must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” (Rehmani v. Super. Ct. (Ericsson, Inc.) (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 945, 951.) Here, Plaintiff alleges only that she was intimidated when Salfen glared at her. (SAC, ¶ 30.) These actions do not rise to the level of harassment.

III. The Sixth Cause of Action for Invasion of Privacy

The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is also SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim. To state a claim for false light, “the tort must be accompanied by publicity in the sense of communication to the public in general or to a large number of persons as distinguished from one individual or a few.” (Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 828.) In support of her sixth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Salfen complained to a single individual, which does not constitute publicity under this standard. In her opposition papers, Plaintiff suggests that the sixth cause of action also states a claim for a different invasion of privacy: intrusion upon her physical solitude or seclusion. (See Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharms. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 365, 372 [“The definition of the intrusion tort consists of two elements: ‘(1) the intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.’”].) However, Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting either element of this claim. Her and Salfen’s shared workplace is not private, and Salfen’s alleged actions are not highly offensive.

IV. The Seventh Cause of Action for Intentional Interference

Finally, the demurrer to the seventh cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim. “[T]o recover for a defendant’s interference with an at-will employment relation, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant engaged in an independently wrongful act—i.e., an act ‘proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.’” (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1152-1153.) As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to plead any independently wrongful act by Salfen here.