Mobile Monitor Technologies v. PricewaterhouseCoopers		CASE NO. 114CV263253
DATE: 14 November 2014	TIME: 9:00	LINE NUMBER: 18

This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose.  Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 13 November 2014.  Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 14 November 2014, the following motions were argued and submitted: (1) the motion of defendant Hewlett-Packard Company (“HP”) for “compliance with CCP § 2019.210 and for ancillary relief,” in which defendant PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC (“PwC”) joins, and (2) the motion of plaintiff Mobile Monitor Technologies, LLC (“MMT”) to compel HP and PwC to provide further responses to form interrogatories, set one (“FI”) and for monetary sanctions. MMT, HP and PwC filed formal oppositions to the respective motions. In their oppositions, MMT and HP request monetary sanctions.

1. Statement of Facts

This is a trade secret misappropriation action. In its complaint, MMT alleges the following: In November 2009, MMT designed the world’s first, full-sized portable computer monitor. (Compl., ¶ 1.) As part of its strategy to market the monitor to the accounting industry, MMT worked exclusively with PwC to ensure that the monitors were responsive to its needs. (Compl., ¶ 1.) At this time, PwC entered into a close business relationship with HP. (Compl., ¶ 1.) In 2011, MMT successfully introduced its monitor to the market. (Compl., ¶ 1.) In order to expand production, MMT approached HP in April 2011 and proposed a joint venture. (Compl., ¶ 2.) Over the next four months, MMT and HP engaged in negotiations. (Compl., ¶ 2.)

At this time, both MMT and HP entered into a mutual non-disclosure agreement. (Compl., ¶ 32.) During the negotiations, MMT disclosed virtually every facet of its business, including its current sales, future sales projections, product designs, marketing strategy, and client lists. (Compl., ¶ 43.) In June 2011, HP broke off the negotiations. (Compl., ¶ 40.) A few weeks later, MMT discovered that HP had begun reaching out to manufacturers to produce its own portable computer monitor based on MMT’s confidential and proprietary information. (Compl., ¶ 41.)

Meanwhile, MMT provided 40 pilot monitors to PwC for its accounting staff in April 2011. (Compl., ¶ 21.) In September 2012, PwC informed MMT that it had decided to provide 15,000 portable monitors to its employees as holiday gifts and it was considering MMT’s product. (Compl., ¶ 22.) A month later, in October 2014, PwC advised MMT that it was leaning towards selecting its monitor and requested an assurance that MMT could provide the monitors by the end of the year. (Compl., 23.) A week later, PwC informed MMT that it was now leaning towards purchasing the monitors from another company unless MMT was willing to sharply reduce its prices. (Compl., ¶ 25.)

The following month, PwC informed MMT that it had decided to purchase the monitors from another company. (Compl., ¶ 26.) MMT is informed and believes that PwC convinced HP to manufacture a portable monitor and deliver the product to PwC at below-cost pricing. (Compl., ¶ 28.) Two years later, in April 2013, HP and PwC released a marketing video indicating that HP had worked with PwC to develop the first portable monitor targeted to the accounting industry. (Compl., ¶ 48.)

On 3 April 2014, MMT filed its complaint against PwC and HP, asserting eight causes of action for (1) unfair competition, (2) false advertising, (3) misappropriation of trade secrets, (4) fraud/concealment, (5) civil conspiracy, (6) intentional interference with prospective business advantage, (7) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, and (8) promissory estoppel.

1. Discovery Disputes

On 9 June 2014, MMT served the FI on PwC and HP. During a teleconference shortly after PwC and HP’s receipt of the FI, PwC and HP informed MMT that it had yet to serve a trade secret designation and, as such, its discovery was premature. MMT agreed to serve a trade secret designation in the next few weeks.

After receiving no trade secret designation from MMT, on 11 July 2014, HP’s counsel sent a meet and confer letter, indicating that HP would object to the FI and move for a protective order unless MMT served a trade secret designation. On 13 July 2014, MMT agreed to extend the time for HP and PwC to provide responses to the FI until 21 July 2014.

On 21 July 2014, HP and PwC each served unverified responses to the FI, consisting of both objections and substantive responses.

Seven days later, on 28 July 2014, MMT served its trade secrets designation on both PwC and HP. On 11 August 2014, HP’s counsel sent a meet and confer letter to MMT’s counsel, indicating that the trade secrets designation was not reasonably particularized. MMT’s counsel sent a meet and confer letter in response on 14 August 2014, in which she indicated that the trade secret designation was sufficiently particularized and, as such, further responses to the FI were necessary. Counsel further stated that, should HP fail to serve further responses by 20 August 2014, MMT would file a motion to compel further responses. The following day, 15 August 2014, MMT sent a similar meet and confer letter to PwC requesting further responses to the FI by 20 August 2014.

Despite further meet and confer efforts between the parties, no informal resolution of the disputes was reached. On 21 October 2014, MMT served sets of requests for production of documents on PwC and HP. The following day, on 22 October 2014, HP filed its motion for “compliance with CCP § 2019.210 and for ancillary relief” and PwC filed a notice of joinder in HP’s motion.[1] That same day, MMT filed its motion to compel further responses to the FI. MMT, HP and PwC filed their respective oppositions on 31 October 2014. On 6 November 2014, MMT, HP, and PwC filed their respective reply briefs.

III.         Discussion

1. Motion for Protective Order

HP and PwC (collectively, “Defendants”) move for a protective order requiring MMT to identify its trade secrets with reasonable particularity and staying any trade-secret related discovery by MMT against Defendants and all third parties in the meantime.[2] Defendants contend that MMT’s trade secret disclosure does not comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.210, which provides, in part, that a party must identify a trade secret with reasonable particularity before commencing discovery relating to the trade secret, because MMT has not identified the trade secrets at issue with reasonable particularity.

1. Legal Standards

In general, “[a]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter … if the matter is either itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) For good cause shown, a court may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other natural person from unwanted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.090, subd. (b). 2031.060, subd. (b).)

2. Timeliness of Motion

As a threshold matter, MMT contends Defendants failed to promptly move for a protective order as they did not file this motion until three months after the service of the trade secret designation.

Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.090 and 2031.060 provide that a motion for protective order must be filed “promptly,” but provides no specific deadline by which such a motion must be filed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.090, subd. (b). 2031.060, subd. (b).) As such, the determination of whether a motion for a protective order has been promptly filed is a fact specific inquiry entrusted to the discretion of the Court. (See Nativi v. Deutsch Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 316.)

Here, the information submitted to the Court indicates that Defendants promptly filed this motion. Defendants assert that they were prepared to file a motion for a protective order in July, but agreed to continue to meet and confer in the hope that the parties could informally resolve the dispute. Once it became clear on 8 September 2014 that further meet and confer efforts would not be fruitful, the parties agreed that 14 November 2014 was the first available hearing date for all counsel and the Court. As such, Defendants filed the motion for a protective order so that it could be heard on that date. Based on the above facts, the Court finds that the motion was promptly filed.

1. Sufficiency of Trade Secret Designation

“A trade secret is ‘information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.’ [Citation].” (Perlan Therapeutics, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1342-1343.) In an action alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret, the party alleging the misappropriation must identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity before commencing discovery related thereto. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.210.) “Trial courts, charged with managing and seeing cases through the discovery process to trial, are best suited to determining whether a trade secret statement is ‘reasonably particular’ under the circumstances of the case.” (Perlan Therapeutics, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.)

A trade secret must be identified with sufficient particularity to distinguish it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or special knowledge of those persons who are skilled in the trade. (Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 826, 835.) “The degree of ‘particularity’ that is ‘reasonable’ will differ, depending on the alleged trade secrets at issue in each case.” (Id. at p. 836.) Where the alleged trade secrets consist of advances in a highly specialized and technical field, a more exacting level of particularity may be required. (Id.)

Nevertheless, even if the alleged trade secret consists of an advance in a highly specialized field, reasonable particularity does not require the party alleging misappropriation to define every minute detail of its claimed trade secret,. (Id.) Instead, it merely requires some showing that is “reasonable, i.e., fair, proper, just and rational under all of the circumstances” to identify the alleged trade secrets in a manner that advances the underlying purposes of the designation. (Id. at pp. 835-836.) In this regard, a trade secret designation is treated similarly to a pleading in that it is “to be liberally construed, and reasonable doubts regarding its adequacy are to be resolved in favor [of] allowing discovery to go forward.” (Brescia v. Angelin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 133, 143; see also Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 835.)

Here, MMT identifies the following three claimed trade secrets: (1) its confidential customer list, (2) its unique marketing strategy, and (3) its confidential pricing and sales figures. (Hostage Decl. in support of HP’s Mot., Ex. G.)

1. Right to Amend Designation

As a threshold matter, Defendants contend that MMT’s designation is not reasonably particularized because MMT reserves the right to amend its designation. They assert that “MMT must make its designation and live with it, and cannot present defendants and the Court with a moving target for the duration of this litigation.” (HP’s Mem. Ps & As., p. 8:20-21.) This argument lacks merit. While a plaintiff does not have an unrestricted right to amend its trade secret designation, it may do so if it uncovers information suggesting a defendant misappropriated additional trade secrets. (See Perlan, 178 Cal.App.4th at p.1350.) Here, MMT’s designation states: “Plaintiff identifies only those trade secrets that it presently knows have been misappropriated. Plaintiff reserves its right to identify other trade secrets, or further elaborate on or modify the trade secret descriptions identified below, as discovery in this case proceeds.” (Hostage Decl. in support of HP’s Mot., Ex. G., p. 2:5-8.) This statement does not indicate that MMT is claiming an unrestricted right to amend its trade secret designation. Instead, it merely reserves the right to amend if it uncovers information through discovery suggesting that Defendants misappropriated additional trade secrets. Accordingly, MMT’s reservation of the right to amend does not render the designation imprecise.

2. Confidential Customer List

With regard to its confidential customer list, MMT explains in its designation that, during joint venture negotiations, it provided HP with a list itemizing more than 500 companies by name and location. Due to centralized billing, the list represents over 1,000 customers. In addition to the list itself, MMT provided confidential financial information about individual customers, their purchasing history, their pre-orders and their projected portable monitor needs.

Defendants contend that this trade secret is not reasonably particularized because it does not state when the list was created, precisely which companies are on it, what information it contains about these companies, and how this information was provided to HP. Defendants’ argument lacks merit. As previously indicated, the primary purpose of a trade secret designation is to allow both the Court and Defendant to distinguish the alleged trade secret from matters of general knowledge. (See Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 835.)  Here, MMT’s designation fully accomplishes this purpose. It indicates the approximate number of customers and companies on the list, the type of confidential information on the list, and the time frame for the disclosure of the list to HP. The information Defendants request consists of the type of minute details not required at this stage of the proceedings. (See id. at p. 836.)  Accordingly, the designation of the confidential customer list is sufficiently particularized under the circumstances of this case.

3. Unique Marketing Strategy

With regard to its unique pricing strategy, MMT’s designation states, in pertinent part: “Plaintiff researched, developed and implemented its proprietary and confidential marketing, advertising, and distribution strategy so as to target the accounting vertical. Prior to Plaintiff’s implementation of its confidential accounting vertical strategy, no one in the hardware industry had focused on this consistently overlooked, but potent, segment of the economy. Nor had any hardware companies negotiated and achieved an exclusive distribution relationship with a reseller anxious to make inroads into that industry – a partnership that incentivized both partners. The only third party to which Plaintiff shared its accounting vertical strategy was HP which solicited this strategy in the context, or under the pretense, of its highly confidential partnership negotiations with Plaintiff.” (Hostage Decl. in support of HP’s Mot., Ex. G., p. 3:2-10.)

Defendants contend that this designation is not reasonably particularized because MMT does not provide sufficient information to permit Defendants or the Court to discern what the specific marketing, advertising and distribution strategy actually is or how it is unique. Defendants further suggest that if MMT’s strategy is nothing more than a generic concept to sell certain products to accountants or auditors, it does not meet the statutory definition of trade secret. Defendants’ arguments are not persuasive. First, liberally construed, the designation indicates that MMT’s strategy consisted of the creation of monitors specifically designed and customized for an industry previously overlooked by general hardware manufacturers. As such, the designation identifies the dimensions of the alleged trade secret so as to distinguish it from matters of general knowledge. (See Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 835.) Second, with regard to Defendants’ argument that this strategy does not meet the statutory definition of a trade secret, Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.210 does not create a procedural device to litigate the merits of a purported trade secret before discovery may commence. (See Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 835; Brescia, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 149.) It merely functions to define the scope of a dispute, but not resolve it. (See Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 836.) As MMT identifies the dimensions of the alleged trade secret, the designation is sufficiently particularized under the circumstances of this case.

4. Confidential Pricing and Sales Figures

With regard to its confidential pricing and sales figures, MMT’s designation states, in pertinent part: “Plaintiff compiled and confidentially maintained its annual sales figures (current), projected annual sales, annualized profit margin, costs of production, pricing, pricing concessions, promotional discounts, volume rebates, marketing concessions, payment terms and rebate concessions (‘internal financials’). Plaintiff relied on these internal financials to develop pricing policies that were unique to the hardware industry. [¶] The only third party to which Plaintiff shared its internal financials was HP which solicited them in the context, or under the pretense, of its highly confidential partnership negotiations with Plaintiff.” (Hostage Decl. in support of HP’s Mot., Ex. G., p. 3:14-21.)

Defendants argue that MMT’s claims for protection of its confidential pricing and sales figures are not reasonably particularized because “MMT does not provide any details of this information, preventing defendants and the Court from discerning what it is or how it is different from general knowledge in the trade.” (HP’s Mem. Ps & As., p. 8:8-11.) This argument lacks merit. Here, MMT’s designation fully identifies the different categories of confidential financial information it uses to develop its unique pricing policies. As such, the designation allows the Court and Defendants to distinguish the alleged trade secret from matters of general knowledge in the trade. (See Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 835.) Accordingly, the designation of MMT’s confidential pricing and sales figures is sufficiently particularized under the circumstances of this case.

5. Conclusion

In sum, MMT has identified the trade secrets at issue with reasonable particularity. As such, Defendants’ motion for a protective order is DENIED.

1. MMT’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to the FI

MMT moves to compel Defendants to provide further responses to FI Nos. 4.1, 4.2, 12.1-12.6, 13.1, 13.2, 14.1, and 14.2 on the ground that Defendants’ objection-only responses are without merit. In their respective oppositions, Defendants argue that the motion is untimely and also opposes the motion on substantive grounds.

With respect to the issue of timing, Defendants contend that MMT’s motion to compel further responses to the FI is untimely because it was filed after the 45-day time limit expired.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (c) provides: “Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of service of the verified responses, or any other supplemental verified responses, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories.” For responses served by mail within California, 5 calendar days are added to the time to file the motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1013, subd. (a).) The court lacks jurisdiction to rule on motions to compel further responses that are filed after the deadline provided by law. (See Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410 [45-day limitation is jurisdictional “in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them.”].)

Here, Defendants each served their objection-only responses to FI Nos. 4.1, 4.2, 12.1-12.6, 13.1, 13.2, 14.1, and 14.2 via mail on 21 July 2014. They did not serve any supplemental responses to these particular requests. As such, MMT’s motion to compel further responses to these requests needed to be filed within 45 days, plus 5 for mailing, of 21 July 2014. Thus, MMT’s deadline to file its motion to compel further responses to FI Nos. 4.1, 4.2, 12.1-12.6, 13.1, 13.2, 14.1, and 14.2 was 9 September 2014. As MMT did not file its motion until 22 October 2014, the motion is untimely.

MMT argues that its motion is timely because Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (c) requires the propounding party to file a motion to compel within 45 days of the service of a verified response. As Defendants did not verify their 21 July 2014 responses, MMT asserts that the 45-day time limit does not apply. This argument lacks merit. While Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (c) states that the notice of a motion to compel further responses must be given within 45 days of “the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response,” the Court finds that this does not mean that when an objection-only response is served the time period in which to file such a motion does not begin to run until service of a verification. Objections do not need to be verified, and a party may serve a code-compliant, objection-only response without serving a verification. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.250, subds. (a), (c); Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651, 657-658 [no verification necessary for portion of discovery response containing objections].) Thus, if this Court was to adopt MMT’s interpretation of the statute, a propounding party in receipt of code-compliant, objection-only responses, would have an indefinite amount of time in which to file its motion to compel further responses. Such a result could not have been intended by the Legislature. As the responses to FI Nos. 4.1, 4.2, 12.1-12.6, 13.1, 13.2, 14.1, and 14.2 consist solely of objections, the 45-day time limit as to these responses began to run on 21 July 2014, the day they were served on MMT. Accordingly, MMT’s motion is untimely.

Based on the foregoing, MMT’s motion to compel further responses to FI Nos. 4.1, 4.2, 12.1-12.6, 13.1, 13.2, 14.1, and 14.2 is DENIED.

1. Requests for Monetary Sanctions

MMT seeks monetary sanctions against Defendants and their respective counsel in connection with its motion to compel further responses to the FI. It further requests monetary sanctions against HP and its counsel in connection with MMT’s opposition to HP’s motion for a protective order. HP also seeks monetary sanctions against MMT in connection with its opposition to the motion to compel further responses to the FI.

1. Requests for Monetary Sanctions in Connection with Motion to Compel Further Responses to FI

In connection with its motion to compel further responses to the FI, MMT seeks monetary sanctions against Defendants and their respective counsels of record pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d), which provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

Here, MMT did not prevail on its motion to compel further responses to the FI. As such, MMT’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

In connection with its opposition to MMT’s motion to compel further responses to the FI, HP seeks monetary sanctions against MMT pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d). Here, HP successfully opposed the motion in its entirety. As such, MMT did not act with substantial justification, and no other circumstances make imposition of monetary sanctions unjust. Accordingly, the Court will award monetary sanctions against MMT.

HP’s counsel, Sean M. Callagy, declares that he spent 8 hours, his associate, Ryan Light, spent 20 hours, and lead attorney, James DiBoise, spent 3 hours in preparing the opposition to the motion to compel further responses. In addition, Mr. Callagy states that his hourly rate is $387, Mr. Light’s hourly rate is $297 and Mr. DiBoise’s hourly rate is $720. Thus, HP requests a total of $11,190 in monetary sanctions for opposing this motion.

While the hourly rates sought are reasonable, the amount of time spent preparing the opposition to the motion to compel is not. The Court finds 5 hours a reasonable time to draft the opposition. The Court apportions the number of hours reasonably incurred as follows: 1.25 hours for Mr. Callagy, 3.25 hours for Mr. Light, and 0.5 hours for Mr. DiBoise. Accordingly, HP’s request for monetary sanctions against MMT is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $1,809.

 

 

2. MMT’s Request for Monetary Sanctions in Connection with HP’s Motion for Protective Order

In connection with its opposition to HP’s motion for a protective order, MMT requests monetary sanctions against Defendants. However, in its opposition, MMT does not identify a statutory basis for its request. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040 [“A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. The notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.”]; see also Cal. Civil Discovery Practice, (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2014) § 15.46a, pp. 15-33 to 15-34 [“As a practical matter, the motion and notice of motion are usually combined into one document entitled ‘Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel.’ The motion, an application to a court to make an order (CCP §1003), must contain all of the following (Cal Rules of Ct 3.1112(d)): [¶] Identity of the party or parties bringing the motion; [¶ Name of the parties to whom the motion is addressed; and [¶] Brief statement of the basis for the motion and the relief sought, including whether the moving party requests sanctions, against whom the sanction is sought and the type of sanctions (CCP §2023.040).The notice of motion must contain all of the following information (CCP §1010): [¶] Date, time, and place of the hearing; [¶] Grounds on which the motion is being made, including whether the moving party requests sanctions, against whom the sanction is sought, and the type of sanctions (CCP §2023.040); and [¶] Papers and other items supporting the motion. In addition, the notice of motion must state ‘in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order. Cal Rules of Ct 3.1110(a). All relief sought by the motion, including whether the moving party requests sanctions, should be stated in the notice of motion and, if possible, identified in the title of the motion, not just argued in the supporting memorandum.”].) Accordingly, MMT’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

1. Conclusion and Order

HP’s motion for a protective order is DENIED.

MMT’s request for monetary sanctions in connection with its opposition to the motion for protective order is DENIED.

MMT’s motion to compel further responses to the FI is DENIED.

MMT’s request for monetary sanctions in connection with its motion to compel is DENIED.

HP’s request for monetary sanctions against MMT in connection with its opposition to the motion to compel is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $1,809. Accordingly, MMT shall pay $1,809 to HP’s counsel within 20 calendar days of the filing of this Order.

 

 

 

________________­­­____________ DATED:

_________________________­­­________________________ HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN Judge of the Superior Court County of Santa Clara

[1] Although it is not apparent from the title of the motion, HP is asking for a protective order. In this regard, the sole statutory basis for the motion is Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.090 and 2031.060, which permit a party responding to interrogatories or requests for documents to move for a protective order. In addition, in its memorandum of points and authority, HP affirmatively states that it is seeking a protective order. (See HP Mem. Ps & As., p. 6:21-24.)

[2] As part of its motion, “HP respectfully requests that the Court enter a Protective Order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.090 and 2031.060 compelling MMT to provide defendants with a trade secret statement with the reasonable particularity required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.020.” (HP Mem. Ps & As., p. 12:9-12.) Such a request for relief does not fall within the scope of protective order relief and there is no independent statute authorizing a motion to compel the production of a trade secret statement.

Instead, when a motion for a protective order is granted due to the failure to adequately identify a trade secret, the appropriate remedy is to stay discovery pending the identification of the trade secret with reasonable particularity. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.210 [plaintiff must identify trade secret before commencing discovery]; Brescia v. Angelin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 133, 149 [plaintiff’s inability to adequately describe trade secret precludes discovery].) As such, the Court will not consider HP’s request for a protective order compelling MMT to provide a trade secret statement.