Case Name: Robert Flowers, et al. v. Vidyut Gopal, et al.
Case No.: 2014-1-CV-266515

Currently before the Court is plaintiff Kumaran Santhanam’s (“Santhanam”) motion for judgment on the pleadings.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This is an action arising from a dispute among neighbors concerning the activities of defendant Minor, the son of defendants Vidyut Gopal and Parul Agrawal (collectively, “Defendants”). In their complaint, plaintiffs Marci Flowers, Robert Flowers, Bindu Pothen, and Santhanam (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege the following: Plaintiffs are next-door neighbors of Defendants. (Compl., ¶ 12.) From 2007 until 2014, Minor, a developmentally challenged child, engaged in a course of violent and aggressive conduct toward Plaintiffs and their children which his parents did nothing to prevent. (Compl., ¶¶ 21, 23-25, 31-34, and 38.)

On June 12, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, asserting eight causes of action against Minor and Defendants for: (1) abatement of public nuisance; (2) abatement of private nuisance; (3) negligence; (4) trespass; (5) battery; (6) negligence – parental liability; (7) willful misconduct; and (8) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On August 18, 2014, Defendants filed their answer, asserting a general denial, alleging nine affirmative defenses, and requesting attorneys fees and costs.

Santhanam, a self-represented party, filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings on June 3, 2016. On June 15, 2016, Defendants filed their opposition. Santhanam filed his reply on June 21, 2016.

II. Request for Judicial Notice

Santhanam asks the Court to take judicial notice of the following: (1) an order filed on September 3, 2015 in case no. 2014-1-CV-265039; (2) his interpretation of the allegation in the complaint that “the behavior of Defendant [Minor] as ratified and permitted by his parents constitutes a nuisance;” and (3) the Court’s findings of fact and order re: preliminary injunction in this action.

“Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.” (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117, internal citations omitted.) Judicial notice acts as “a [s]ubstitute for proof, a judicial shortcut, a doing away with the formal necessity for evidence because there is no real necessity for it.” (Gravert v. Deluse (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 576, 580; see also Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564 [stating that “[i]t is the consequence of judicial notice that the fact noticed is, in effect, treated as true for purposes of proof”].) “The fundamental theory of judicial notice is that the matter that is judicially noticed is one of law or fact that [c]annot reasonably be disputed.” (Post v. Prati (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 626, 633.) Thus, a court may not take judicial notice of a finding of fact made after a contested adversary hearing because “[t]aking judicial notice of the truth of a judge’s factual finding would … be tantamount to taking judicial notice that the judge’s factual finding must necessarily have been correct and that the judge is therefore infallible.” (Sosinsky, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1568.) In addition, since taking judicial notice acts as a substitute for evidence, any matter judicially noticed must be relevant to the issue before the court. (Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 296, 301.)

Procedurally, a party requesting judicial notice in connection with a motion must make the request in a separate document and provide the court and each party with a copy of the material to be noticed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1113(l), 3.1306.) A court may, but is not required to, deny a request for failing to comply with the California Rules of Court. (Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Associates, Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, 934.)

As an initial matter, the request for judicial notice fails to comply with the California Rules of Court because Santhanam did not make his request for judicial notice in a separate document or provide a copy of the September 3, 2015 order to Defendants or the Court in violation of California Rules of Court, rules 3.1113(l) and 3.1306. Accordingly, the request is subject to denial on this basis alone.

In any event, Santhanam’s request for judicial notice is substantively improper. First, the request for judicial notice of the September 3, 2015 order is not relevant to the instant proceeding because an order issued by another trial court has no precedential effect. (See Pereira-Goodman v. Anderson (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 864, 872, fn. 5 [stating that “[t]he decisions of other superior courts … do not have precedential value”]; Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 282 [providing that “[t]rial courts make no binding precedents”].) Second, the Court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of Santhanam’s interpretation of the facts alleged in his complaint and the findings of fact at the injunction hearing because they are reasonably subject to dispute. (See Fremont Indem. Co., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 113 [stating that the proper interpretation of a document is not subject to judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable]; Sosinsky, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1568 [providing that a court may not take judicial notice of findings of fact].) Finally, the Court’s order re: preliminary injunction is not relevant to the instant motion because such a ruling is not a determination of the merits of this case. (See Upland Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Upland (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300 [stating that “[a] request for temporary equitable relief pending the determination of a case on its merits is an entreaty to the court to exercise its discretion and a ruling thereon is not a determination of the merits of the case”].)

In light of the foregoing, Santhanam’s request for judicial notice is DENIED.

III. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Santhanam moves for judgment on the pleadings as to Defendants’ answer on the following bases: (1) each affirmative defense does not state sufficient facts to constitute a defense; (2) Defendants’ general denial is not warranted based on the evidence; and (3) the answer impermissibly requests attorneys fees and costs as well as other affirmative relief.

A. Affirmative Defenses

Santhanam moves to strike each affirmative defense in Defendants’ answer under Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (c)(1)(A). Under that statute, a plaintiff may only move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground “that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.” Therefore, to prevail on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing (1) that his or her complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and (2) the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A); see also Barasch v. Epstein (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 439, 440 [providing that “[a] plaintiff may recover judgment on a motion for judgment on the pleadings only if his complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and the answer neither raises a material issue nor states a defense”]; McClain v. City of South Pasadena (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 423, 430 [same].) Here, Santhanam makes no attempt to demonstrate that the instant complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. As such, he fails to make the showing necessary to prevail on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Defendants’ affirmative defenses is DENIED.

B. General Denial

Santhanam moves to strike Defendants’ general denial under Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.7 and 438, subdivision (c)(1)(A). The Court will take each statute in turn.

“Under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, a court may impose sanctions for filing a pleading if the court concludes the pleading was filed for an improper purpose or was indisputably without merit, either legally or factually.… A claim is factually frivolous if it is not well grounded in fact and it is legally frivolous if it is not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. In either case, to obtain sanctions, the moving party must show the party’s conduct in asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable. A claim is objectively unreasonable if any reasonable attorney would agree that [it] is totally and completely without merit.” (Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, 440.) “A party seeking sanctions must follow a two-step procedure. First, the moving party must serve on the offending party a motion for sanctions. Service of the motion on the offending party begins a [21]–day safe harbor period during which the sanctions motion may not be filed with the court. During the safe harbor period, the offending party may withdraw the improper pleading and thereby avoid sanctions. If the pleading is withdrawn, the motion for sanctions may not be filed with the court. If the pleading is not withdrawn during the safe harbor period, the motion for sanctions may then be filed.” (Malovec v. Hamrell (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 434, 440.) A motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 must be filed separately from any other motions or requests. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (c)(1).) Here, Santhanam did not file a separate motion to strike the answer under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 or serve Defendants with notice of the motion 21 days before filing it. As such, to the extent Santhanam moves to strike the general denial under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, the motion is DENIED.

To the extent Santhanam moves to strike the general denial under Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (c)(1)(A), the motion is DENIED for the same reasons articulated in connection with his motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Defendants’ affirmative defenses.

C. Request for Affirmative Relief

Santhanam moves for judgment on the pleadings as to Defendants’ prayer on the ground that it seeks costs, attorney’s fees, and “other and further relief” in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 431.30, subdivision (c), which provides that “[a]ffirmative relief may not be claimed in the answer.” Santhanam’s motion is not well-taken because a plaintiff may not move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that a request for relief is improper. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A) [providing that a plaintiff may only move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that “the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint”]; Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 384 [stating that a motion to strike is the appropriate vehicle to challenge an improper remedy].)

In his reply, Santhanam attempts to cure this deficiency by arguing that the Court should construe his motion as one to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 436. Even if the Court were inclined to do so, the motion would still be procedurally improper. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 435, a motion to strike must be filed “within the time allowed to respond to a pleading.” A plaintiff may only respond to an answer by filing a demurrer, which must be filed within 10 days of the service of the answer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40.) As such, a plaintiff is required to file a motion to strike a portion of an answer no later than 10 days after the service of the answer. Here, Defendants served their answer on August 18, 2014, almost two years ago. Accordingly, even if the Court construed this motion as one to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 436, it would be untimely.

In light of the foregoing, Santhanam’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Defendants’ prayer is DENIED.