Thomas E. Stephens vs. DMV, Legal Affairs Division

2012-00134568-CU-MC

Thomas E. Stephens vs. DMV, Legal Affairs Division

Nature of Proceeding:       Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Filed By:   Palma, Neli N.

Defendant State of California, By and Through the Department of Motor
Vehicles’ (“DMV”) unopposed motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.

DMV’s request for judicial notice is granted.

Plaintiff asserts claims for negligence, intentional tort and other (“DMV/IRP registration
also suspension of driver’s license”).  His causes of action were the subject of two
government tort claims, one related to registration of his commercial vehicle for the
years 2007, 2008, and 2009 and the other regarding the suspension of his driver’s
license on June 11, 2011.  The lawsuit was filed on October 13, 2012.

Pursuant to the Government Claims Act, presentation of a timely claim is a condition
precedent to bringing suit against a public entity.  (Gov’t Code § 945.4.)  A claim must
be filed with the appropriate public entity within six months from the date of accrual if
the claim is one for death, injury to person or personal property or growing crops, or
one year for any other claim.  (Id. § 911.2.)  “[F]ailure to present a timely claim bars
th
suit against the entity.”  (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4   730, 734.)
Here, Plaintiff’s claims with respect to his truck registration accrued no later than 2009
and his claim regarding his license suspension accrued on June 11, 2011.  While he
alleges compliance with Government Claims Act, as seen from the materials properly
subject to judicial notice, Plaintiff’s claim regarding his registration issues was dated
April 17, 2012 and received by Defendant on April 20, 2012.  (RJN Exh. A.)  In addition
the claim regarding the suspension of his driver’s license was dated June 20, 2012,
and received on June 25, 2012.  Thus, his claims were presented later than one year
after they accrued and are thus untimely.  On this basis alone, the motion is granted.

In addition to the above, the motion is granted on the basis that Plaintiff failed to plead
any statutory basis for liability against DMV as to any of his claims.  Government Code
§ 815(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute…A public entity is not
liable for injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity
or a public employee or any other person.”  Here, Plaintiff has failed to identify any
statutory basis for liability against DMV.  While he cites to Government Code § 815.6,
in connection with his request for punitive damages, that statute merely provides that
“where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is            designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is
liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty
unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge
the duty.”  However, Plaintiff must identify an enactment that imposes an obligatory,
non-discretionary duty to rely upon this statute as to nay of his causes of action.  (
Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498.)  He has not done so.  The
motion therefore is granted on this additional basis.

Given the above, the Court need not reach the additional arguments asserted in
connection with the motion, specifically that the breach of contract cause of action is
deficient and that the prayer for punitive damages is improper.  Indeed, while DMV
argues that the breach of contract cause of action is uncertain, there does not appear
to be a specific breach of contract cause of action alleged in the complaint.  Further,
the Court notes that a motion to strike is the proper way to challenge punitive
damages.

Given this is the first challenge to the complaint, the motion is granted with leave to
amend.  Where leave was given Plaintiff may file and serve an amended complaint no
later than February 21, 2014.  Defendant shall file and serve its response within 10
days thereafter, 15 days if the amended complaint is served by mail.  (Although not
required by any statute or rule of court, Plaintiff is requested to attach a copy of the
instant minute order to the amended complaint to facilitate the filing of the pleading.)

The minute order is effective immediately.  No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule
3.1312 or other notice is required.

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