Victor Carreon v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc.

Case Number: BC528985    Hearing Date: October 20, 2014    Dept: 32
CASE NAME: Victor Carreon, et al. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc.
CASE NO.: BC528985
HEARING DATE: 10/20/14
DEPARTMENT: 32
SUBJECT: Motion to Compel Further Responses to Document Requests
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Victor Carreon and Alicia Carreon
RESP. PARTY: Defendant Hyundai Motor America, Inc.

TENTATIVE RULING

Motion to Compel Further Responses to Document Requests:

GRANTED as to RFPs 9, 11, and 18.

GRANTED IN PART as to RFPs 25 and 26. The Court limits the scope of these RFPs to documents that evidence, describe, refer or relate to technical service bulletins or recalls which have been issued for vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle and that relate to “transmission, electrical, engine, and HVAC defects.” (See Compl. ¶ 8.)

DENIED as to RFPs 31 and 32.

GRANTED as to RFP 33.

Plaintiffs’ Request for Monetary Sanctions DENIED.

Defendant’s Request for Monetary Sanctions DENIED.

Analysis

Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice

Exhibits 1-2 – GRANTED. The Court may judicially notice the pleadings in this action.

Exhibits 3-9 – DENIED. These trial court orders or transcripts of proceedings in different lawsuits are not relevant.

Motion to Compel Further Responses

The moving party on a motion to compel further responses to RFPs must submit “specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.” (CCP § 2031.310(b)(1).) If the moving party has shown good cause for the RFPs, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.)

Meet and Confer

Plaintiffs’ counsel met and conferred with Defendant’s counsel regarding the RFPs by written correspondence in March and April 2014. (Ortiz Decl. ¶¶ 6-10, Exh. C-F.) Defendant argues that it had granted Plaintiffs an extension of time to file the motion, and that Plaintiffs filed the motion before meet and confer was complete. However, the written correspondence reflects that the parties reached an impasse and were unlikely to resolve the dispute in further discussions. Accordingly, the Court will consider the merits of the motion.

RFPs 9, 11, and 18

These RFPs seek Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the issuance of refunds to buyers or providing replacement vehicles under the
Song-Beverly Warranty Act. These requests also seek any policies relating to the handling of consumer complaints, and responding to consumer complaints of failure to repair vehicles under warranty.

Defendant objected that the RFPs are overbroad and relevant; that they seek privileged information; and that they seek confidential or trade secret information.

Plaintiffs have shown good cause for these RFPs. The requested documents could help Plaintiffs obtain evidence regarding the criteria that Defendant uses to determine whether a vehicle is a “lemon” in compliance with the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and subject to a buyback or replacement. A manufacturer’s policies and procedures are relevant to determine whether it complied with the Song Beverly Act and whether any violation was willful. (See Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (1995)
90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104.)

Defendant has not justified its objections to these RFPs. (Oppo. 15-16.) Defendant fails to show that the requested documents include trade secrets or confidential information. Defendant fails to show that the attorney-client privilege or work product privilege apply to the responsive documents. Moreover, because Defendant has not supported its privilege objections, a privilege log is required insofar as Defendant contends that any responsive documents are privileged. (Best Products, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1189, 1191.)

Defendant argues that there is no responsive written policy and thus no documents to produce. However, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, Defendant did not provide a statement of inability to comply, including a specification of the reason Defendant cannot comply. (See CCP § 2031.230.)

The motion is GRANTED as to these RFPs.

RFPs 25 and 26

These RFPs seek “all documents which evidence, describe, refer or
relate to technical service bulletins [and recalls, for no. 26] which have been issued for vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle.” Defendant responded that it would produce the bulletins and recalls relevant to the issues/components alleged to be problematic in this case. Defendant also objected that the RFPs are unduly burdensome, irrelevant, and seek private or confidential information.

Plaintiffs have shown good cause for these RFPs, but only as to documents related to the defects and nonconformities alleged for Plaintiffs’ vehicle. The complaint alleges that the subject vehicle was delivered to Plaintiffs with serious defects and non-conformities to warranty and developed other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty including, but not limited to, transmission, electrical, engine, and HVAC defects. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs fail to show the relevance of service bulletins or recalls for other defects.

Plaintiffs cite to Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138. In Donlen, the Court of Appeal addressed a manufacturer’s argument that evidence of other vehicles was prejudicial. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the manufacturer, as follows: “We disagree with Ford. Hughes’ “other vehicle” testimony was not unduly prejudicial. It did not concern simply other vehicles. It was limited to the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles. Hughes described what Ford itself had done to notify dealers and technicians about problems with this transmission model. Thus, everything about which he testified that applied to other vehicles applied equally to plaintiff’s vehicle. Such evidence certainly was probative and not unduly prejudicial.”

Unlike in Donlen, Plaintiffs do not seek service bulletins and recalls for similar problems in the subject vehicle or in other vehicles made by Defendant. Rather, Plaintiffs seek all service bulletins and recalls related to the subject vehicle regardless of the defect. Although the RFPs are reasonably limited to the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle, the RFPs could result in a “fishing expedition” if not limited to the defects at issue in the complaint. Plaintiffs seem to concede this when they argue that the “requests are limited to similar incidences of the same components that were defective in Plaintiff’s vehicle.” (Sept. St. 16.) Accordingly, Defendant’s relevance and overbroad objections have merit, to an extent.

The motion is GRANTED IN PART as to RFPs 25 and 26. The Court limits the scope of these RFPs to documents that evidence, describe, refer or relate to technical service bulletins or recalls which have been issued for vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle and that relate to “transmission, electrical, engine, and HVAC defects.” (See Compl. ¶ 8.)

RFPs 31-33

These RFPs seek (1) all documents relating to complaints by owners of the same year, make, and vehicle model as Plaintiffs’ vehicle regarding the defects or nonconformities of which Plaintiffs have complained (RFP 31); (2) all surveys, reports, summaries, or other documents in which owners of the same vehicle model reported problems with similar defects as alleged by Plaintiffs (RFP 32); and (3) all documents which refer to the numbers of owners that have made such complaints (RFP 33).

Defendant objected that the RFPs are unduly burdensome, overbroad, and relevant; that they seek privileged information; and that they seek confidential or trade secret information. Defendant also objected that the RFPs constitute an invasion of privacy.

Plaintiffs contend that the RFPs are relevant to prove the “scale and profitability of Defendant’s misconduct” and the amount of civil penalties necessary to punish or deter such conduct. (See Sep. St. 21.) The civil penalty under the Song Beverly Act “is imposed as punishment or deterrence of the defendant, rather than to compensate the plaintiff. In this, it is akin to punitive damages. [Citations.] Neither punishment nor deterrence is ordinarily called for if the defendant’s actions proceeded from an honest mistake or a sincere and reasonable difference of factual evaluation.” (Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 184.) “A defendant’s recidivism is relevant to the reprehensibility of its conduct. To the extent the evidence shows the defendant had a practice of engaging in, and profiting from, wrongful conduct similar to that which injured the plaintiff, such evidence may be considered on the question of how large a punitive damages award due process permits.” (Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1191, 1213.)

Based on these authorities, Plaintiffs have shown good cause for limited discovery as to the general nature of complaints made regarding the same defects alleged by Plaintiffs. For instance, evidence that numerous other consumers had made similar complaints could help establish recidivism that could warrant a higher civil penalty under the Song Beverly Act.

Plaintiff also contends that the RFPs are relevant, as in Donlen, to prove that a non-conformity existed. Donlen permitted expert testimony regarding similar transmission problems from other lines of vehicles made by the defendant. Donlen suggests complaints of other consumers regarding similar defects could be admitted into evidence.

Defendant’s responses to these two arguments are not persuasive at the discovery stage. (Oppo. 6-10.) Defendant contends that evidence of similar complaints from consumers is “never relevant,” but the authorities cited do not expressly state that position. (See Paduano v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1468, fn. 9.) Defendant also argues evidentiary objections to the use of other customers’ complaints at trial. (See Oppo. 14-15.) However, whether such evidence is unduly prejudicial cannot be determined prior to production; moreover, admissibility is not the test for discoverability.

Although Plaintiffs have good cause for this general line of discovery (with reasonable limitations), Defendant has persuasively justified its objections to the RFPs 31 and 32 as presently worded. These RFPs have no limitation in time or scope. The vehicle at issue is a new 2011 Hyundai Sonata. Defendant argues that there were tens of thousands of Hyundai Sonata vehicles sold in the United Stated in 2011. And that HMA is a very large comp;any with offices spread over several locations, with thousands of employees and contractors spread over multiple locations with multiple databases, Defendants have reasonably shown that the burden on Defendants to search through and produce all documents responsive to RFPs 31 and 32 outweighs the necessity for this information in this single vehicle lemon law lawsuit.

The complaints also could contain private information of the consumers, including names and contact information. When the right to discovery conflicts with a privileged right, the court is required to carefully balance the right of privacy with the need for discovery.” (Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1387.) Discovery may be compelled only upon a showing of a compelling need. (Id.) Plaintiffs have not shown a compelling need for all complaints made by individual consumers.

Rather, Plaintiffs have shown good cause for general information about the nature of similar complaints. RFP 33 strikes a reasonable balance for Plaintiffs’ need for such information, and Defendant’s burden and privacy objections. This RFP is limited in scope to documents summarizing the numbers of owners of the same vehicle model who have complained of similar defects as Plaintiffs. This RFP does not require Defendant to make a compilation if one does not exist. If Plaintiffs obtain information in this more limited inquiry that shows good cause for production of individual complaints, Plaintiffs may pursue such discovery at that time.

The motion is DENIED as to RFPs 31 and 32. The motion is GRANTED as to RFP 33.

Monetary Sanctions

Because the motion was granted in part and denied in part, the Court declines to award monetary sanctions to Plaintiffs or to Defendant.

The requests for monetary sanctions of Plaintiffs and Defendant are DENIED.

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