2016-00191170-CU-PO

Angela Andrews vs. Ding Zhang

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Summary Judgment

Filed By: Harris, Arthur J.

Defendant Ding Zhang’s (Zhang) motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Zhang’s request for judicial notice of court documents and judicial acts is GRANTED.

The case presents a landlord/tenant dispute. Zhang is the landlord. The plaintiffs-tenants are Angela Andrews (Andrews) and Alexandrea Andrews Haggerty, through Andrews as guardian ad litem (collectively “Plaintiffs”).

According to Plaintiffs, they occupied the subject premises with a Section 8 HUD voucher. They allege a toxic mold infestation as well as other violations of housing laws, and they further allege that there were no timely attempts to repair despite their initial complaints. When repairs were attempted, the premises were left in shambles, and Plaintiffs were exposed to mold as well as rodent droppings. Plaintiffs allegedly suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result.

The operative fourth amended complaint (4AC) contains causes of action against Zhang for premises liability, violation of CC § 1942.4 [collection of rent for untenantable dwelling], tortious breach of warranty of habitability, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, negligence, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, retaliatory eviction/retaliation under CC § 1942.5, retaliatory eviction/retaliation under the Unified Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, breach of contract, fraud and civil conspiracy to “purloin government money.” Zhang moves for summary judgment on grounds the parties’ settlement of a prior unlawful detainer action bars Plaintiffs’ current legal claims. Plaintiffs oppose.

Discussion

Zhang filed an unlawful detainer action against Andrews in 2014. The tenancy at issue there is the same tenancy in this case. The unlawful detainer action was entitled Zhang v. Andrews, Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 14UD04517 (the “UD Action”). (See Werking Decl., Exh. B; Harris Decl., Exh. 8.) Andrews’ answer in the UD Action contains averments that the unit contained toxic mold and required repairs. (Werking Decl., Exh. D.) The answer also contains references to the warranty of habitability, retaliation, breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Id.)

There is no evidence the parties actually and fully litigated any of the claims and defenses in the UD Action. Instead, the case was resolved through a stipulation and order (the “Settlement”) executed in August 2014. (Harris Decl., Exh. 8.) The parties

settled their dispute “[w]ithout admitting fault” and “to avoid the time, risks and expenditures associated with continued litigation.” (Id., p. 1.) Andrews agreed to vacate the property, and Zhang agreed to return her security deposit and dismiss the case. (Id.) The Settlement, however, does not contain a further release of claims. In fact, the Settlement provides that “the parties reserve all claims not expressly addressed in this Stipulation.” (Id., ¶ 8.) Andrews’ defenses are not expressly addressed. Zhang nonetheless argues the Settlement bars both Plaintiffs’ current legal claims against him.

In Zhang’s view, the Settlement and dismissal entered in the UD Action have res judicata and collateral estoppel effect in this case. He asserts his understanding was that the Settlement was intended to dispose of all the averments in Andrews’ UD answer. (See Zhang Decl., ¶ 10.) He cites Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750 for the proposition that a stipulated judgment resolving an unlawful detainer case can have res judicata effect. In that case, however, the tenant waived claims in any way relating to the tenancy. (See 239 Cal.App.4th at 754.) There is no such waiver in this case.

Landeros v. Pankey (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1167 is instructive if not on point. Like Andrews in the case at bench, the tenant in Landeros raised several affirmative defenses in the face of an unlawful detainer complaint. The case settled by stipulated judgment. The stipulation did not contain language expressing an intent to bar claims arising out of the affirmative defenses. Nor had the parties actually litigated any claims or defenses. As a result, the stipulated judgment had no res judicata effect. Not only the does the Settlement in the instant case fail to express an intent to bar future claims other than those Zhang was required to dismiss, but it actually preserves claims not “expressly addressed.”

Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1557, is similarly instructive:

Because an unlawful detainer action is a summary procedure involving only claims bearing directly upon the right of immediate possession, a judgment in unlawful detainer has very limited res judicata effect. Legal and equitable claims — such as questions of title and affirmative defenses — are not conclusively established unless they were fully and fairly litigated in an adversary hearing. [Citation.] Here, the unlawful detainer action was resolved by stipulated judgment which made no mention of a relinquishment by the Pelletiers of claims arising from a retaliatory eviction. The retaliation defense was not fully and fairly litigated in an adversary hearing, and thus was not conclusively established. [Citation.] The [lower] court erred in dismissing the cause of action for retaliatory eviction.

Despite the clear language of the Settlement, Zhang asserts that he understood the Settlement to bar all claims related to the UD Action. Extrinsic evidence can reveal a latent ambiguity in a written instrument. (See George v. Automobile Club of So. Calif. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126; see also Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1252 [“Stipulations are construed according ‘to the ordinary rules employed to interpret contracts… [a] court’s paramount consideration in construing the stipulation is the parties’ objective intent when they entered into it’”].) Here, however, evidence of Zhang’s understanding does not reveal such an ambiguity. The Settlement

unambiguously reserves for another day legal claims not “expressly addressed.” Because the Settlement does not expressly address the averments in Andrews’ answer, it does not bar Plaintiffs from advancing the same averments in this case.

Zhang did not meet his initial burden of demonstrating the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. Consequently, the burden never shifted to Plaintiffs, and the motion must be denied.

Because Zhang did not meet his initial burden, his objection that Plaintiffs did not submit a separate statement is overruled.

The court need not rule and does not rule on Zhang’s objections to evidence. (CCP § 437c(q).)

Disposition

The motion is denied.