17-CIV-05904 MARK WOLFE vs. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

MARK WOLFE EDWARD W. CHOI, ESQ

UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Motion for judgment

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant UNITED AIRLINES, INC.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Code Civ. Proc. § 438.

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice of certain admissions made by Plaintiff in a prior filed action, San Mateo County Superior Court Case No. 17-CIV-05246 (RJN Exhibit A). The Court further GRANTS judicial notice of the Fleet Service Employees 2016-2021 Agreement (RJN Exhibit B). Evid. Code § 452(h); see Theiler v. Ventura Community College District (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 852, 854 (taking judicial notice of collective bargaining agreement).

Plaintiff’s Complaint in this action alleges a violation of Labor Code § 204(a). However, Labor Code § 204(c) expressly provides that “when employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provides different pay arrangements, those arrangements shall apply to the covered employees.” Here, Plaintiff admits he was employed by Defendant as a ramp services employee from February 2014 – January 8, 2017. (RJN Exhibit A.) Ramp services employees are a classification covered by the Fleet Service Employees Agreement (RJN Exhibit B, p. 1-1). Thus, the Agreement applies to Plaintiff.

The Agreement specifically states, “Employees will be paid bi-weekly on the second Thursday following the close of the pay period, with each week for payroll purposes starting on Sunday and ending on Saturday.” (Id. at p. 3-1(A)(1).) As the Agreement provides for different pay arrangements pursuant to Labor Code § 204(c), Plaintiff cannot state a claim for violation of Labor Code § 204(a).

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the Agreement does not apply to him because he was not a member of any union. In Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co. (1944) 323 U.S. 192, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “The labor organization chosen to be the representative of the craft or class of employees is thus chosen to represent all of its members, regardless of their union affiliations or want of them.” Id. at 200.

Further, as this case necessarily involves the analysis of a collective bargaining agreement between an air carrier and its employees, Plaintiff’s claim is preempted by the Railway Labor Act. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (original RLA for railroads); 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (amendments covering airlines). Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams (1987) 482 U.S. 386, 394. Rather than pursuing a state court action, Plaintiff must go through the mandatory dispute resolution procedures set forth in the RLA.