Case Name: Lara v. Regional Medical Center of San Jose
Case No.: 2016-1-CV-303572

This is a slip and fall action. According to the allegations of the complaint, on December 8, 2014, plaintiff Alfredo Lara (“Plaintiff”) slipped on a liquid substance on the floor at defendant Regional Medical Center of San Jose (“Defendant”), and was thereby injured. (See complaint, Prem L-1.) On December 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed a form complaint against Defendant, asserting causes of action for premises liability and negligence.

Defendant moves for summary judgment.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant’s burden on summary judgment

“A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. … The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of material fact on that issue.” (Alex R. Thomas & Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 66, 72; internal citations omitted; emphasis added.)

“The ‘tried and true’ way for defendants to meet their burden of proof on summary judgment motions is to present affirmative evidence (declarations, etc.) negating, as a matter of law, an essential element of plaintiff’s claim.” (Weil et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2007) ¶ 10:241, p.10-91, citing Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334; emphasis original.) “The moving party’s declarations and evidence will be strictly construed in determining whether they negate (disprove) an essential element of plaintiff’s claim ‘in order to avoid unjustly depriving the plaintiff of a trial.’” (Id. at § 10:241.20, p.10-91, citing Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.)

“Another way for a defendant to obtain summary judgment is to ‘show’ that an essential element of plaintiff’s claim cannot be established. Defendant does so by presenting evidence that plaintiff ‘does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence’ (because plaintiff must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to oppose the motion.) Such evidence usually consists of admissions by plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he or she has discovered nothing to support an essential element of the cause of action.” (Id. at ¶ 10:242, p.10-92, citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854-855.)

Defendant fails to meet its initial burden as to knowledge

Defendant argues that “plaintiff cannot set forth any evidence that REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER OF SAN JOSE had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition.” (Def.’s memorandum of points and authorities in support of motion for summary judgment (“Def.’s memo”), p.3:27-28.) In support of its argument, Defendant presents Plaintiff’s discovery responses regarding Defendant’s actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. In a case cited by Defendant, the California Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t is well established in California that although a [business property] owner is not an insurer of the safety of its patrons, the owner does owe them a duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.) “Because the owner is not the insurer of the visitor’s personal safety [citation], the owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability.” (Id. at p.1206.)

Here, Defendant only presents Plaintiff’s discovery responses regarding Defendant’s actual knowledge; Defendant fails to present any evidence that it lacked constructive knowledge and instead only argues without citing to any evidence that “there is no evidence as to how long the condition existed prior to Plaintiff’s fall… [t]herefore, Plaintiff has no evidence that Defendant had actual or constructive notice that ‘liquid’ was a dangerous condition….” (Def.’s memo, p.9:1-10 (also stating that “[c]onstructive notice is only relevant where an unreasonably dangerous condition is present for a substantial period of time so as to provide the defendant with reasonable opportunity to discover and remedy the condition… Plaintiff cannot establish that a dangerous condition existed and REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER OF SAN JOSE knew of the condition”) (emphasis original).) Accordingly, Defendant fails to meet its initial burden as to whether it had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition.

Defendant also fails to meet its initial burden as to the existence of a dangerous condition; however, even if it met its initial burden, there is a triable issue of material fact.

Defendant also argues that “[t]here is no evidence that there was ‘liquid’ on the floor or that REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER OF SAN JOSE did anything which caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries.” (Def.’s memo, p.7:3-5.) “Thus, there is no evidence that any dangerous condition existed upon REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER OF SAN JOSE’S premises. (Id. at p.7:7-8.) In support of this argument, Defendant generally cites to Plaintiff’s discovery responses. (See Def.’s separate statement of undisputed material facts, no. (“UMF”) 2, citing to “Exhibits B and C to Fish declaration.”)

As a preliminary matter, Defendant’s general citation in its separate statement to the whole of Plaintiff’s discovery responses is not compliant with Rule of Court 3.1350, subdivision (d). (See Rule of Court 3.1350, subd. (d) (stating “[c]itation to the evidence in support of each material fact must include reference to the exhibit, title, page, and line numbers”).) Regardless, after review of each of the discovery responses, it appears that only the first interrogatory is relevant to the issue of the existence of a dangerous condition, as it seeks the identification of the dangerous condition that Plaintiff contends caused his fall on December 8, 2014. (See Fish decl. in support of motion for summary judgment, exh. B, special interrogatory no. (“SI”) 1.) In response, Plaintiff plainly identifies the dangerous condition, stating “Liquid that was allowed to accumulate on the floor of the hospital.” (Fish decl. in support of motion for summary judgment, exh. C, Pl.’s response to SI 1.) This evidence does not demonstrate that “there is no evidence that any dangerous condition existed upon [Defendant]’s premises.” Accordingly, Defendant likewise fails to meet its initial burden as to the existence of a dangerous condition. Even if Defendant met its initial burden, Plaintiff’s response to SI 1 demonstrates a triable issue of material fact as to the existence of such a dangerous condition. Moreover, in opposition, Plaintiff also presents evidence with regards to the existence of a dangerous condition (see evidence cited by Pl.’s separate statement in opposition to Def.’s motion for summary judgment, undisputed material fact no. 2; see also Lara decl., ¶¶ 2-5; see also Lara depo, pp.24:4-25, 25:1-19, 28:24-25, 29:1-22); thus, further demonstrating that even if Defendant had met its initial burden, there is a triable issue of material fact.

In reply, Defendant presents additional evidence. This evidence has not been considered. (See Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537-38; see also Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 (stating that evidence submitted with a reply is not generally allowed); San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 316 (stating that considering evidence in connection with a reply violated the opposing parties due process rights because the opposing party was “not informed what issues it was to meet in order to oppose the motion”).)

As Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s objection is not the basis for the Court’s ruling.

The Court will prepare the Order.