Case Number: EC065161 Hearing Date: October 19, 2018 Dept: B

# 6

union adjustment, co.,

Plaintiff,

v.

zee law group, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: EC065161

Related Case No.: BC645196

Hearing Date: October 19, 2018 (continued from September 28, 2018)

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

plaintiff’s Motion for an order awarding attorney fees

Background

In this action, Plaintiff Union Adjustment, Co. (“Plaintiff”) alleges that it entered into a series of attorney-client retainer agreements with Defendants Zee Law Group (“ZLG”) and Tappan Zee (“Zee”) (collectively, “Zee Defendants”) from 2004 to February 9, 2011. Plaintiff alleges that Zee Defendants failed to perform their obligations under the retainer agreements by failing to provide case status reports, timely costs billings, and accounting. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed March 2, 2017, alleges causes of action for: (1) accounting; and (2) declaratory relief.

The action proceeded to a bench trial. On June 29, 2018, the Court issued its Final Statement of Decision, which found in favor of Plaintiff, and the Judgment After Bench Trial.

Plaintiff now moves for an order awarding attorney’s fees as the prevailing party on the contract under Civil Code, §1717. Total, Plaintiff seeks $189,967.50 in reasonable attorney’s fees. Zee Defendants oppose the motion.

The matter initially came for hearing on September 28, 2018. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to this hearing date of October 19, 2018 in order to give Plaintiff additional time to file a supplemental declaration of counsel’s billing records or itemized list/spreadsheet of time spent by each counsel on the various tasks performed by Plaintiff’s counsel. On October 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed the declarations of Guy Jamison and Clark Rivera. On October 10, 2018, Zee Defendants filed a supplemental opposition.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of Exhibit A, which is the Statement of Decision for this action. The request is granted pursuant to Evidence Code, §452(d).

LEGAL STANDARD

Civil Code, §1717 states in relevant part:

(a) In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.

. . .

(b)(1) The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section, whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section.

(Civ. Code § 1717(a)-(b).)

The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095.) The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered and the trial judge’s decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong, i.e., that it abused its discretion. (Id.)

The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar,” i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Id.) California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award. (Id.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Id.) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id.)

No specific findings reflecting the Court’s calculations are required. (Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 254-255.) The record need only show that the attorney fees were awarded according to the ‘lodestar’ approach. (Id.)

DISCUSSION

Timely Motion

In the supplemental opposition, Zee Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motion is untimely because they filed their evidence in support of the motion on October 5, 2018. However, the motion was initially filed by Plaintiff on August 22, 2018. It was not until the Court’s hearing on September 28, 2018, that the Court requested Plaintiff to file additional documents in order for the Court to ascertain the proper amount of attorney’s fees that should be awarded to Plaintiff.

Further, the Court notes that “[i]t is not necessary to provide detailed billing timesheets to support an award of attorney fees under the lodestar method. [Citations.] Declarations of counsel setting forth the reasonable hourly rate, the number of hours worked and the tasks performed are sufficient. [Citations.] Although a fee request ordinarily should be documented in great detail, it cannot be said … that the absence of time records and billing statements deprive[s] [a] trial court of substantial evidence to support an award…. [Citation.]” (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1324 [omitting internal citations and quotation marks].) Thus, it was not necessary for Plaintiff to file these additional briefs. Rather, in order to ensure that the proper amount of fees were awarded to Plaintiff, the Court requested the supplemental declarations of Plaintiff’s counsel, and the Court gave Zee Defendants the opportunity to file a supplemental opposition in case certain fees should not be awarded.

Thus, the motion will be considered timely filed.

Prevailing Party

Neither party disputes that Plaintiff is the prevailing party on the contract in this action. Accordingly, pursuant to Civil Code, §1717, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees as an element of costs of suit. (See Civil Code, §1717; CCP §1033.5(a)(10)(A).)

Amount of Attorney’s Fees Awarded

Plaintiff seeks $189,967.50 in reasonable attorney’s fees. Zee Defendants oppose, arguing that the fees requested are not adequately supported by any evidence.

In support of its request, Plaintiff provides the declaration of counsel, Guy E. Jamison. Mr. Jamison states that Plaintiff incurred attorney’s fees in the amount of $189,967.50, which represents 759.87 in total attorney hours spent over 1.5 years of litigation, multiplied by the hourly rate of $250 an hour. (Jamison Decl., ¶8.)

Mr. Jamison states that he and Clark Rivera were the two attorneys on this case from the Jamison Law Firm. (Id., ¶10.) He states that he has been practicing law for 22 years and has much trial experience and experience in collections claims. (Id., ¶10.) He states that Mr. Rivera has been practicing law for 37 years and has spent a considerable amount of time on this action. (Id., ¶11.) Mr. Jamison states that his typical hourly rate is $350 an hour, but that his firm charged $250 in this action, which he believes is a competitive rate. (Id., ¶9; 10/5/18 Rivera Decl., ¶3.) He also states that the Laffey Matrix indicates that a rate of $796 and $826 per hour is reasonable for an attorney at his experience level. (Jamison Decl., ¶9.) Mr. Jamison’s declaration provides support showing the reasonableness of the hourly rate that he charged his client in this action.

Mr. Jamison states that the 759.87 attorney time that he and Mr. Rivera spent in this action is reasonable given that Plaintiff was being sued for more than $4 million, plus includes time for 7 depositions, various law and motion filings and oppositions (including 2 motions for summary adjudication), rigorous discovery, motions in limine, time spent contacting Zee’s former employees to verify 2,800 pages of billing statements, and an 8-day trial. (Id., ¶8.) Mr. Jamison indicates the time spent during various periods of the action (i.e., 196.3 hours from December 2016 to December 2017; 123.33 hours in February 2018; 134.54 hours in March 2018; and 275.5 hours in April 2018). (Id., ¶¶9, 12.)

Mr. Rivera provides a detailed explanation of the time he spent over the course of this action in his declaration. (See 10/5/18 Rivera Decl., ¶¶6-61.) Mr. Jamison also provides billing records dated October 12, 2016 to September 3, 2018 for the time he and Mr. Rivera spent on this action. (Suppl. Jamison Decl., Ex. 1.) The dates with boxes around them are the times that Mr. Rivera incurred. (Id., ¶4.)

The Court recognizes that this action was commenced over 2 years ago and the parties have engaged in various law and motion practice and a bench trial. However, the Court finds that this approximate 760 hours spent in this action is unreasonably high. The Court has reviewed the billing records provided by Plaintiff and considered the supplemental opposition filed by Zee Defendants.

In light of the circumstances of this case and the amount of litigation required, a reasonable amount of time to spend litigating this case would be not less than 500 hours. The Court will use the $250 per hour rate that Plaintiff’s counsel identified in their declarations, which is a reasonable amount to bill on this litigation. Based on these amounts, the total amount of attorney’s fees the court finds to be reasonable and necessary is the sum of $125,000.00. As stated above, the lodestar amount may be adjusted and no specific finds regarding the Court’s calculations are required. (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal. 4th at 1095; Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at 254-255.) The adjusted hours take into account reductions based on the block-billing in the billing records, the time spent on activities (meetings, discovery responses, law and motion practice, etc.) that appear to be longer than necessary, and the time spent on filing a State Bar Complaint against the opposing party.

As such, the amount of attorney’s fees awardable to Plaintiff’s counsel shall be in the reduced amount of $125,00.00.

Conclusion and order

The motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of $189,967.50 is granted in part and denied in part. The Court will award attorney’s fees to Plaintiff’s counsel in the reduced amount of $125,000.00.

Plaintiff shall give notice of this order.

Posted 10/17/18 at 9:59 a.m.