CIV530285 RENEE GLOVER CHANTLER VS. FARIN NAMDARAN YEGANEH

DLA PIPER LLP FARIN NAMDARAN YEGANEH
AMANDA FITZSIMMONS

DEFENDANT RAMIN YEGANEH’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION TENTATIVE RULING:

The Motion for Summary Adjudication by Plaintiff Renee Glover Chantler is DENIED as to Issues 1, 2, 3 and 4. A. Objections.

As to the Declaration of Yeganeh, the Court sustains Chantler’s Objections 2, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 and overrules Objections 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20. As to the Declaration of Gilg, the Court overrules Chantler’s Objection 1 and sustains Objection 2.

The Court exercises its discretion to not rule on Yeganeh’s Objections since none of the matter to which Yeganeh objects was necessary or material to the Court’s analysis of the present motion. (See Code of Civ. Proc. Sect. 437c, subd. (q).) B. Issue 1 (Sixth Cause of Action)

Plaintiff Chantler’s claim for action on a judgment is timely filed. (Code of Civ. Proc. §§337.5 & 683.50.) Triable issues of fact, however, exist as to the amount of judgment. The principal amount of judgment was $4,831,567.21 (UMF 10), and Plaintiff owned a 22.56% share of the amount of the renewed judgment (UMF 19). Therefore, Plaintiff’s share is 22.56 percent of the principal judgment or $1,090,001.56.

It is undisputed that Chantler has obtained several awards of post-judgment enforcement attorney’s fees and costs in the Ingram matter:

$666,570.30 ($670,560.30 reduced by $3,990 (UMF 22 & 23)) $2,744.90 in appellate costs (UMF 28) $58,240 in costs incurred re: Yeganeh’s contempt (UMF 29) $95,270 in attorney’s fees related to Yeganeh’s appeals (UMF 30) Total fees and costs: $822,825.20.

Adding these costs to Chantler’s share of the principal judgment, the total amount is $1,912,516.46. Chantler, however calculates the amount to be $2,512,930.20 (Moving P&A at 10:18), which appears to include interest on the principal of $1,090.001.56.

Under an April 2006 Settlement Agreement, however, the Ingram plaintiffs agreed to waive interest until the Court ruled on Yeganeh’s motion to vacate judgment. (Decl. Gilg, Exhibit 2 at 1, para. D.) Chantler contends that the Court denied the motion to vacate on January 7, 2005 (Id. at 2, para. H), which would permit interest to run beginning on that date. The record does not support the statement in Paragraph H.

The Court takes judicial notice of the minutes in the Ingram matter, which states that the motion to vacate was “ordered off calendar” because “the court does not have jurisdiction on the motion.” Further, the Court ruled that the motion to vacate “should be heard in front of pro-tem Judge Blackman.” (Minutes, January 7, 2005, CIV 410586.) A triable issue exists about what date, if any, the Court denied Yeganeh’s motion to vacate the 2004 judgment, which means that a triable issue exists about the amount of postjudgment interest to which Chantler is entitled.

Chantler also argues that Yeganeh is collaterally estopped from raising this argument because he raised it in the Ingram Action, the trial court ruled against him and the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal of that ruling. (Reply at 7.) The evidence does not support the argument. Chantler cites her own Exhibit 17, which is Yeganeh’s Notice of Motion. The Notice does not raise the argument against interest accrual. Further, neither the Court’s ruling on Yeganeh’s motion nor the Court of Appeal’s Order dismissing Yeganeh’s appeals address the issue of waiver of interest. (Chantler Exhibits 18 & 20.)

Therefore, a triable issue of fact exists about whether interest should accrue on the principal amount of Chantler’s judgment and in what amount, if any. The judgment to which Chantler is entitled is either $1,912,516.46 or some larger amount. The amount needs to be established at trial.

C. Issue 2 – Fifth Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief)

This declaratory relief action appears to be moot. Chantler contends that Yeganeh owns an “interest” in the 47 Properties; Yeganeh contends that he owns no interest in the properties. The purpose behind this cause of action is that Chantler wants to enforce her Ingram judgment by executing on the properties. (See FAC para. 207.)

Chantler has submitted copious evidence that the 47 Properties were fraudulently transferred from Yeganeh to his parents. However, Fran Yeganeh settled with former DLA Piper, whereby she agreed to transfer all 47 Properties to DLA Piper (UMF 34), and she transferred the properties. (See Moving P&A at 4:21-23.) Since the 47 Properties are now in the hands of DLA Piper, there is no need for a judicial declaration that Yeganeh has no interest in the properties. The declaratory relief action is moot.

Instead, Chantler’s motion asks for a judicial declaration that Yeganeh previously “had” an interest in the properties “as of the date this action was filed.” (Moving P&A at 11:1718.) The Complaint, however, seeks a declaration that Yeganeh presently “has” an interest in the properties. Since issues for a summary adjudication motion are framed by the pleadings, a party may not move for summary adjudication on a theory not pleaded. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) A declaration of Yeganeh’s former interest in properties is not part of the fifth cause of action.

Further, Chantler requests a declaration that Yeganeh’s disavowals of ownership had the effect of rendering unenforceable Yeganeh’s interest in the resulting trust in the 47 Properties “as of the date of his admissions.” This relief is not part of the pleadings. The First Amended Complaint was filed in July 2015; Yeganeh did not disavow his interests until April 2016 when he challenged the settlement between Fran Yeganeh and DLA Piper/Chantler. Plaintiff never amended her complaint to include allegations of events occurring after the complaint was filed. Therefore, a judicial declaration concerning facts that occurred after the complaint was filed (and other facts that are not pleaded in the complaint) is beyond the scope of the pleadings and not proper for a motion for summary adjudication.

D. Issue 3 – Fourth Cause of Action (Civil RICO).

Chantler moves for summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action “as pled.” (Notice of Motion at 1:4-5.) Summary adjudication may be granted only if the motion disposes of the entire cause of action. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(1). The motion fails to dispose of the entire fourth cause of action.

The motion offers evidence that Yeganeh engaged in 3 acts of bankruptcy fraud and 10 acts of mail fraud. (Moving P&A at 15-19.) However, the 4th cause of action also alleges that the RICO claim is based on wire fraud, witness tampering, extortion, obstruction of justice, money laundering, tax fraud, and bank fraud (FAC paras. 170-197). The present motion does not address any claims other than bankruptcy fraud and mail fraud.

Even if the undisputed facts established that Yeganeh committed mail fraud and bankruptcy fraud, the motion offers no evidence showing what portion of damages are attributable to those RICO violations, but not by the other alleged violations. Presumably, Chantler contends that damages flowed from the violations other than mail and bankruptcy fraud, otherwise the Complaint would not devote 27 paragraphs (para. 170-197) to alleging the violations. Those alleged damages are not disposed of in this motion.

Chantler explains why her motion does not address the entire 4th cause of action (Moving P&A at 20:3-9), but does not explain why her motion may obviate the statutory requirement that the motion must dispose of the “entire” cause of action. (DeCastro W. Chodorow & Burns, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 410, 419.) A motion for summary adjudication purporting to establish “some but not all” grounds for liability is improper and cannot be granted. (Hindin v. Rust (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1259.)

E. Issue 4 – Third Cause of Action (Civil Conspiracy)

Civil conspiracy is a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in the perpetration of a tort, but do not actually commit the tort themselves. (Kesmodel v. Rand (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1141.) The conspiracy claim against Yeganeh is for the purpose of imposing liability against him for the wrongful acts of others. Here, the alleged conspiracy was to “hinder, delay, and defraud Plaintiffs in the collection of the Ingram Judgment.” (See FAC para. 143; see Civ. Code § 3439.04 (transfer is voidable when made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor”).)

1. Fran Yeganeh Does not Fall within the Scope of Section 3439.04.

The motion fails to establish a prima facie case against Yeganeh regarding conspiracy to transfer the 47 Properties. The Voidable Transfers Act imposes liability only on the “debtor” of a creditor. (Civ. Code sect. sect. 3439.04, subd. (a).) The only debtor to Chantler is Ramin Yeganeh. Since Fran Yeganeh was not a debtor to Chantler, she does not fall within the scope if section 3439.04. Further, the 47 Properties were transferred by Ramin Yeganeh to Fran Yeganeh. Since Defendant Fran Yeganeh was not a “debtor” to Chantler, and since she did not transfer any properties, Fran Yeganeh cannot be liable under Section 3439.04.

Liability for civil conspiracy is not possible if the underlying tort is not possible. Since Fran Yeganeh as a non-debtor cannot be directly liable under section 3239.04, Ramin Yeganeh cannot have conspired with Fran to commit any fraudulent transfer by Fran. (This ruling does not suggest that Ramin Yeganeh cannot be directly liable for his own acts under section 3439.04.)

2. Fraudulent Transfers of Deeds of Trust.

The Complaint alleges Fran Yeganeh executed numerous deeds of trust to Ken Yeganeh for the purpose of encumbering some of the 47 Properties in order to hinder collection of the Ingram judgment. (FAC para. 131 – 136.) These acts were allegedly committed by Fran Yeganeh, not Ramin Yeganeh. Therefore, Ramin potentially could be liable for Fran’s actions if a conspiracy is shown. The motion does not address the deeds of trust; Chantler fails to meet her moving burden. For failure to address the claims arising from the fraudulent deeds of trust, the motion fails to dispose of the entire cause of action.

Finally, Fran Yeganeh is not a debtor to Chantler and therefore does not fall within Civil Code section 3439.04 (defining fraudulent transfer). Therefore, any wrongful acts pertaining to her executing deeds of trust do not fall within section 3439.04. Since they do not constitute fraudulent transfers, Ramin Yeganeh cannot conspire to commit fraudulent transfer based on the deeds of trust. F. Ruling.

The motion for summary adjudication of issues is DENIED as to Issues 1, 2, 3, and 4.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, counsel for Defendant shall prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.