Case Number: NC061916 Hearing Date: January 21, 2020 Dept: S27
FACTS
The underlying action involves a dispute between patient and dependent adult, Plaintiff Wendy J. Iverson (“Plaintiff”) and medical institutions and a medical professional for the alleged negligent care she received.
Defendants Long Beach Memorial Medical Center and Community Hospital Long Beach (jointly, “Long Beach Defendants”) entered into a settlement agreement with Plaintiff, wherein Plaintiff will accept a payment and a mutual waiver of costs of suit and attorneys’ fees in exchange for a dismissal with prejudice as a full and final resolution of Plaintiff’s claims against the Long Beach Defendants.
GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT
The court must approve any settlement entered into by less than all joint tortfeasors or co-obligors. (CCP § 877.6.) This requirement furthers two sometimes competing policies: (1) the equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault, and (2) the encouragement of settlements. (Erreca’s v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1487.)
If the settlement is made in good faith, the court “shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor… for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (CCP § 877.6(c).) The non-settling tortfeasors or obligors bear the burden of demonstrating the absence of good faith in the settlement. (CCP § 877.6(d).)
In order to demonstrate a lack of good faith, the non-settling party must show that the settlement is so far “out of the ballpark” as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of Section 877.6. (Nutrition Now, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 209, 213.) The court will typically consider: (1) the plaintiff’s (roughly) approximated total recovery; (2) the settlor’s share of liability; (3) the size of the settlement at issue; (4) the distribution of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (5) the usual discount value when plaintiff settle before trial; the settlor’s financial condition and insurance policy limits; and (6) whether there is evidence of “collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 (Tech-Bilt).) These factors will be evaluated accordingly to what information is available at the time of settlement. (Ibid.)
“A plaintiff and a cross-defendant may enter into a good faith settlement, even if the plaintiff’s claims against the cross-defendant are time-barred. [Citation.] However, in such a situation, the proffered good faith settlement must be subjected to particular scrutiny to ensure the settlement amount is reasonable and that there is no collusion aimed at injuring the interests of the non-settling cross-complainant.” (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1354.)“If a cross-defendant without legal liability to the plaintiff settles with the plaintiff in an amount within the reasonable range of what the cross-defendant’s liability would be, the interests of the non-settling cross-complainant are protected, and both the policies of encouraging settlements and equitable financial sharing are served. However, when such a cross-defendant enters into a disproportionately low settlement with plaintiff solely to obtain immunity from the cross-complaint, the inference that the settlement was not made in good faith is difficult to avoid.” (Id.)
Long Beach Defendants deny any liability or wrongdoing and contend there is no causation. (Murphy Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff had pre-existing medical conditions that would go to Long Beach Defendants’ case of disputing liability. (Murphy Decl. ¶ 6.) The settlement is a product of back and forth arms-length negotiation between parties’ counsel. (Murphy Decl. ¶ 8.) There has been no collusion, fraud, or other tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of non-settling defendants. (Murphy Decl. ¶ 10.) Most importantly, the motion is unopposed. As it is the burden of the non-settling tortfeasors or obligors to demonstrate the absence of good faith in the settlement and there is no opposition, the settlement is presumed to have been made in good faith.
Based on the foregoing, Long Beach Defendants’ motion is granted.
MOTION TO SEAL
Long Beach Defendants have also brought before the court a petition to file the confidential declaration of Robert Murphy, associated with the motion for determination of good faith settlement, under seal.
CRC 2.550(d) requires the court to make the following findings:
(d)Express factual findings required to seal records. The court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish:
(1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record;
(2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record;
(3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed;
(4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and
(5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.
The settlement discussed above is “confidential.” The court and parties are aware of the settlement amount.
The court finds there is an overriding interest which overcomes the public access to the details of settlement. Settlements area favored resolution and the general public has no particular interest is settlement amounts when a case resolves short of trial. The overriding interest supports sealing the record. The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored – a single declaration in support of a good faith settlement motion. There is no less restrictive means to support the overriding interest of a confidential settlement.
The petition is granted, and the clerk shall maintain the declaration of Robert Murphy under seal.