Case Number: 19PSCV00625 Hearing Date: January 21, 2020 Dept: O

Defendants Juan Manuel Aguilar and Esperanza Flores’s demurrer to complaint is OVERRULED as to causes of action 1, 3, and 5; and SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend as to causes of action 2, 4, and 6.

Defendants Juan Manuel Aguilar and Esperanza Flores’s (collectively “Defendants”) demur to all causes of action on the ground that they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Breach of Contract (1st Cause of Action)

The elements for a breach of contract cause of action are: (1) the contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) resulting damages. (Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822, 830.) In alleging a breach of contract cause of action, it is necessary to specify whether the contract is written, oral or implied by conduct. (CCP § 430.10(g).) In order to plead a written contract (the first element listed above), a plaintiff must, in addition to alleging the making of the contract, do one of the following: (1) set forth the contract in haec verba; or (2) plead the contract’s legal effect by alleging the substance of its relevant terms. (4 Witkin, California Procedure 4th Edition, 479-481.) In order to plead an oral contract, a plaintiff must plead its legal effect, i.e., allege the substance of the contractual terms. (Id., at 483.)

Paragraph 26 alleges that Defendants orally agreed to transfer legal title back to Plaintiff Rogelio Aguilar (“Plaintiff”) for the property located at 310 W. 11th Street, Pomona, California (the “Property”) after Plaintiff repaid the entire $127,000.00 amount borrowed from Defendants (the “Agreement”).

Defendants contend the Agreement violates the Statute of Frauds because it relates to the transfer or modification of an interest in real property. (CCP § 1971 (“No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any power over or concerning it, or in any manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering, or declaring the same, or by the party’s lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.”).)

In opposition, Plaintiff contends the Statute of Frauds does not apply because the oral agreement contained a note or memorandum that satisfies the statute of frauds. Thus, according to Plaintiff, the Statute of Frauds does not apply to this oral agreement. However, the alleged writing does not memorialize the alleged Agreement, only stating that Plaintiff is the resident of the house, that the property is not a rental property, and that he is paying a loan off to recover his home. (Complaint ¶ 14, Ex. 4.) The alleged writing does not memorialize what the loan amount was or that the loan was made for the purposes of re-purchasing the Property.

Plaintiff alternatively argues that equitable estoppel applies. “Equitable estoppel may preclude the use of a statute of frauds defense. The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds has been consistently applied by the courts to prevent fraud that will result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in certain circumstances. Such fraud may inhere in the unconscionable injury that will result from denying enforcement of a contract after one party has been induced by the other seriously to change position in reliance on the contract. Whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied in a given case is generally a question of fact.” (Byrne v. Laura (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1068.)

Paragraphs 12-16 allege that Plaintiff borrowed $127,500.00 from Defendant Juan Aguilar for the re-purchase of the Property. The Property was re-purchased under, inter alia, Defendant Juan Aguilar’s name, but it was agreed that Plaintiff was the true owner of the Property and the other named individuals simply held title for the benefit of Plaintiff until Plaintiff repaid the loan. Plaintiff nearly made all the payments due on the loan, but Defendants have since indicated that they will not transfer title back to Plaintiff unless Plaintiff met new additional conditions that were not originally part of the agreement. The Court finds that the Complaint sufficiently allege circumstances supporting equitable estoppel. Demurrer is OVERRULED.

Quiet Title (2nd Cause of Action)

In a cause of action for Quiet Title, the complaint shall be verified and shall include all of the following:

A description of the property that is the subject of the action. In the case of tangible personal property, the description shall include its usual location. In the case of real property, the description shall include both its legal description and its street address or common designation, if any;

The title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title. If the title is based upon adverse possession, the complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession;

The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought;

The date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought;

A prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.

(CCP § 761.020.)

It is established that a cause of action to quiet title may be pleaded in general terms. If the complaint alleges that the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the described property, that each defendant claims some interest in the property, that each claim is wrongful and that no defendant has any interest in the property, then allegations such as these are ordinarily sufficient to state a cause of action to quiet title. (See Hyatt v. Colkins (1917) 174 Cal. 580.) They are insufficient only if the rest of the complaint reveals a defect in the plaintiff’s title. (See Martin v. Hall (1933) 219 Cal. 334; Carlson v. Lindauer (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 292.)

Ordinarily an action to quiet title will not lie in favor of the holder of an equitable title as against the holder of a legal title. The reason for the rule is that if the owner of equities could sue to quiet title he might obtain a judgment based upon his adversary’s fraud without setting up, in his pleadings, the facts constituting such fraud. This would be manifestly unfair. (Bacon v. Bacon (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 540.) Where the plaintiff seeks to have his title to property quieted as to an instrument which is attacked on the ground of fraud, then, as in all other cases when fraud is the basis for relief, the defrauded party must plead the pertinent facts relied upon as grounds for setting aside said instrument. (Burris v. Adams (1892) 96 Cal. 664, 667.)

The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud fail for lack of specificity.

Here, the complaint is verified and provides a description of the Property. (Complaint, ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleged Defendants’ adverse interest (Id. at ¶ 12), and that Plaintiff owns title in the Property (Id. at ¶ 32). The complaint also contains a prayer for determination of title. However, the claim for quiet title is based on an equitable ownership of title. Furthermore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud/wrongdoing fail for lack of specificity. It is uncertain from the whether Plaintiff’s claim is based on the alleged contract for the loan of $127,500.00, or the invalidity of the quitclaim deed he signed under alleged undue influence in March 2009.

Demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Cancellation of Instrument and Elder Abuse (3rd & 5th Causes of Action)

Defendants contend that the Court should sustain the demurrers to these causes of action because they are predicated on a defectively pled breach of contract claim. However, as discussed above, the allegations were adequate and the demurrer to the breach of contract claim was overruled.

Thus, demurrers to these causes of action are also OVERRULED.

Constructive Trust and Declaratory Relief (4th & 6th Causes of Action)

Defendants contend that the Court should sustain the demurrers to these causes of action because they are predicated on a defectively pled quiet title claim, namely that the allegations lack specificity. As discussed above, the allegations of wrongdoing are not specifically pled.

Thus, demurrers to these causes of action are also SUSTAINED with leave to amend.