Case Number: 19STCP01571 Hearing Date: January 21, 2020 Dept: 85

Samuel J. Cross, et al. v. City of Redondo Beach Housing Authority, et al., 19STCP01571

Tentative decision on petition for writ of mandate: granted in part

Petitioners Samuel J. Cross (“Cross”) and K’Tiste Bradshaw (“Bradshaw”) petition the court for a writ of mandate compelling Respondents City of Redondo Beach Housing Authority and Bill Brand, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Housing Authority (collectively “Housing Authority”), to set aside its decision denying Petitioners Section 8 housing benefits.

The court has read and considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply, and renders the following tentative decision.

A. Statement of the Case

1. Petition

Petitioners commenced this proceeding on April 29, 2019, alleging a cause of action for administrative mandamus. The Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows.

Petitioners are participants in a Redondo Beach (“City”) Section 8 Rental Assistance voucher program (“Program”). Bradshaw sporadically works at Hammer and Nails, a salon in West Hollywood, CA, with gaps between shifts as large as 12 days and little notice before new shifts.

On November 7, 2019, Petitioners participated in an eligibility interview with Housing Specialist Angelica Zavala (“Zavala”) and Housing Inspector Tony Clarke (“Clarke”) regarding participation in the Program. Petitioners provided information regarding their annual income and on January 9, 2019 informed the Housing Authority of changes to the household income. The changes included additional pay checks from Hammer and Nails.

On February 7, 2019, the Housing Authority formally notified Petitioners that their voucher benefits were being terminated due to fraud and violation of family obligations. Bradshaw requested an informal hearing, which the Housing Authority scheduled and held on March 13, 2019.

The Housing Authority’s hearing officer upheld the termination, effective April 30, 2019. As a result of the unlawful termination of their benefits, Petitioners will be unable to pay their rent and evicted from their rental unit, thereby suffering irreparable harm. The Housing Authority’s determination is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The decision stems from factual and legal errors and is inconsistent with federal regulations, guidance issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), and the Housing Authority’s own implementing regulations.

2. Course of Proceedings

Petitioners initially acted pro per in filing the Petition and seeking an ex parte application for a stay of the administrative decision. The court denied the application without prejudice on procedural grounds on April 30, 2019.

On June 17, 2019, Attorney Paul John Estuar (“Estuar”) filed a substitution of attorney for Petitioners.

B. Standard of Review

Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1094.5 is the administrative mandamus provision which structures the procedure for judicial review of adjudicatory decisions rendered by administrative agencies. Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, (“Topanga”) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514-15.

CCP section 1094.5 does not in its face specify which cases are subject to independent review, leaving that issue to the courts. Fukuda v. City of Angels, (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 811. In cases reviewing decisions which affect a vested, fundamental right the trial court exercises independent judgment on the evidence. Bixby v. Pierno, (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143. See CCP §1094.5(c). In administrative mandamus actions to review decisions terminating welfare assistance, the trial court exercises independent judgment on the evidence. Frink v. Prod, (1982) 31 Cal.3d 166, 171.

The Housing Authority asserts that the independent judgment standard of review should not apply because Petitioners did not legitimately acquire the benefit, and the right in question was not vested. Opp. at 7. This argument is bootstrapping. Petitioners received Section 8 benefits and then they were terminated. This case concerns whether the termination was proper. The court cannot decide that the termination was proper and then conclude that the standard of review is substantial evidence.

Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” Id. at 143. The court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners, (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 860, 868. In short, the court substitutes its judgment for the agency’s regarding the basic facts of what happened, when, why, and the credibility of witnesses. Guymon v. Board of Accountancy, (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 1010, 1013-16.

However, “[i]n exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 817. Unless it can be demonstrated by petitioner that the agency’s actions are not grounded upon any reasonable basis in law or any substantial basis in fact, the courts should not interfere with the agency’s discretion or substitute their wisdom for that of the agency. Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d 130, 150-151; Bank of America v. State Water Resources Control Board, (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 198, 208.

The agency’s decision must be based on a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing. Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Superior Court, (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 860, 862. The hearing officer is only required to issue findings that give enough explanation so that parties may determine whether, and upon what basis, to review the decision. Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d 506, 514-15. Implicit in section 1094.5 is a requirement that the agency set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order. Id. at 115.

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties (Ev. Code §664), and the petitioner therefore has the burden of proof. Steele v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 129, 137. “[T]he burden of proof falls upon the party attacking the administrative decision to demonstrate wherein the proceedings were unfair, in excess of jurisdiction or showed prejudicial abuse of discretion. Afford v. Pierno, (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 691.

C. Section 8 Law

1. The Program

The federal government provides rental assistance for low and moderate income families, the elderly, and the disabled through what is known as “the Section 8 program.” Congress added the Section 8 program to the United States Housing Act of 1937 in 1974 by enacting the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-333, §20 1(a), (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14370). The express purpose of the Section 8 program is “aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and promoting economically mixed housing.” 42 U.S.C. §1437f(a). The program is managed federally by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), and administered locally by public housing authorities (“PHA”).

Section 8 tenants must sign a lease and pay a portion of their income toward rent. The remainder of the rent charge is paid by PHA pursuant to a housing assistance payment (“HAP”) contract between PHA and the owner, which mandates that a lease “shall be for a term of not less than [one] year” (42 U.S.C. § 1437f (o)(7XA)), shall “contain terms and conditions that are consistent with State and local law,” (42 U.S.C. §1437f(o)(7)(B)(ii)(I)), and “shall provide that during the term of the lease, the owner shah not terminate the tenancy except for serious or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the lease, for violation of applicable Federal, State, or local law, or for other good cause.” 42 U.S.C. §1437f(o)(7)(C).

HUD enters into annual contracts with its PHAs and provides the PHAs funds to subsidize rental payments to private landlords for eligible tenants. Administration of Respondent’s program is governed by Title 24 C.F.R. PHAs are required to adopt a written administrative plan that establishes local policies for administration of the program in accordance with HUD requirements. 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(a)-(b).

The participant’s voucher is portable. The participant/tenant may choose to live in any property if the landlord agrees to accept the voucher and comply with the applicable regulations. The government subsidy is limited to the difference between the amount the family is required to contribute and the payment standard established by PHA based on fair market rents for the area. 42 U.S.C. §1437f(o)(1)(B), (o)(2)(A)-(B).

HUD regulations identify the obligations of each Section 8 participant, referred to as “Family Obligations.” See 24 CFR §982.551. Included in the list of Family Obligations is the requirement that the family supply any information that the PHA or HUD determines is necessary in the administration of the program. 24 C.F.R. §982.551(b)(1); §982.551(k). Violation of any of the Family Obligations is grounds for termination of Section 8 benefits. 24 C.F.R. §982.552(c)(1)(i).

Participants are required to report a change of family composition immediately. 24 C.F.R. § 982.516(e); 982.551(h)(2). The amount of rental subsidy, which is paid by voucher, is based on the number of family members who will reside in the rental unit. Participants are required to report that a family member has left the household in writing within 30 days of the occurrence. The failure to do so is a basis to terminate Section 8 benefits.

The government’s rental assistance payment can be terminated for a variety of reasons. Among them are repeated violations of the lease (24 C.F.R. §982.55 1(a) & (e), §982.552(a)), failure to provide information to the PHA (24 C.F.R. § 982.551(b), 982.552(a)), and fraud. 24 C.F.R. §982.552(c)(1)(iv). PHAs have a duty to consider whether a reasonable accommodation is required with regard to a termination decision when the family includes a person with disabilities. 24 CFR §982.552(c)(2)(iv).

2. The Due Process Requirements for Termination

A subsidy for housing through the Section 8 program is a property interest of the recipient entitled to due process protection meeting the requirements of Goldberg v. Kelly, (“Goldberg”) (1970) 397 U.S. 254; United States v. Robinson, (Dist. R.I.) 721 F.Supp. 1541, 1542.

In Goldberg, the Supreme Court recognized that due process mandates several safeguards prior to the government’s termination of welfare benefits. In order to comply with due process, the individual must be given a meaningful pre-termination hearing including the following safeguards: (1) timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for termination; (2) an opportunity to appear personally at the hearing, present evidence and oral arguments and confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (3) the right to be represented by counsel; (4) a right to a decision rendered by an impartial decision-maker; (5) a right to have that decision based solely on rules of law and the evidence presented at the hearing; and (6) a right to a statement by the decision-maker setting forth the reasons for the decision and the evidence upon which it was based. However, the decision need not amount to a comprehensive judicial opinion with formal findings of fact and legal conclusions. 397 U.S. at 271; 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) (requiring “a written decision, stating briefly the reasons for the decision”). The purpose of the pre-termination hearing is to produce an initial determination of the validity of the agency’s grounds for terminating benefits. 397 U.S. at 267.

3. The Termination Hearing

These due process requirements are codified in 24 C.F.R. Upon notice of intent to terminate Section 8 assistance, the participant is entitled to an informal hearing. 24 C.F.R. §982.555(e), (a)(1)(v). The notice must contain a brief statement of reasons for the decision to terminate. 24 C.F.R. §982.555(c)(2)(i).

The hearing may be conducted by any person designated by the PHA, other than a decision-maker on the matter under review or a subordinate of that decision-maker. 24 C.F.R. §982.555(e)(4). The family must be permitted to examine before the hearing any directly relevant documents to be used by the PHA. If the document is not made available, the PHA may not rely on it at the hearing. 24 C.F.R. §982.555(e)(2)(i).

At the hearing, both sides may present evidence and question any witnesses. 24 C.F.R. §982.555(e)(5). The hearing officer may consider all evidence without regard to the rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. Id. The purpose of this rule is to free administrative agencies from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate an administrative order. But the assurance of flexibility does not justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational force, and uncorroborated hearsay and rumor are not substantial evidence. Edison v. National Labor Relations Board, (1938) 305 U.S. 197, 217.

The PHA must show the termination is appropriate based on a preponderance of the evidence. 24 C.F.R. §982.555(c). The hearing officer must issue a written decision, stating briefly the reasons for it. 24 C.F.R. §982.555(e)(6).

4. The Housing Authority

Respondent Housing Authority is a PHA that administers the Section 8 rent subsidy program in the City.

Housing Authority’s Administrative Plan states that it will generally use current circumstances to project anticipated income for the coming 12-month period. Pet. RJN Ex. A, p.6-7. An exception exists where it is not feasible to anticipate a level of income over a 12-month period, such as seasonal or cyclical income. Ex. A, p.6.

“Temporary, nonrecurring, or sporadic income” is income that is not received periodically and cannot be reliably predicted. For example, the income of an individual who works occasionally as a handyman would be sporadic if future work could not be anticipated and no historic, stable pattern of income existed. Housing Authority will consider the family’s total income in determining whether to count other sporadic income. If, for instance, the family reports little or no other income, Housing Authority may include this income once a pattern of work is established. Pet. RJN Ex. A, p.6-9.

D. Statement of Facts[1]

1. Background and Application

On October 11, 2018, Petitioners applied for the Program by submitting a Tenant Information Form stating that they received $2,800 per month from Cross’s work for Apple One and $577 per month from Bradshaw’s CalFresh/Works food stamp benefits. AR 41.

On November 7, 2018, Petitioners attended an Eligibility Interview for participation in the Program with Housing Specialist Zavala and Housing Inspector Clarke. AR 21. Based on their income disclosures, Petitioners’ combined annualized income was found to be $38,768, below the Program’s $43,650 income limit for a family of three. See AR 21. Thus, Petitioners qualified for housing assistance. AR 21.

At the November 7 meeting, Petitioners received and signed both the Agreement to Comply with the Regulations of the Housing Authority and the Housing Authority’s Family Obligations form. AR 93-95. Both the agreement and form required Petitioners to report all new sources of household income within two weeks. AR 92, 93.

On January 9, 2019, Petitioners submitted two household income adjustments, one reflecting that Cross was no longer receiving income from Apple One, and the other declaring that Bradshaw began working for Hammer and Nails in October 2018 and received an income source increase in November. AR 21, 92. Bradshaw also stated that her job was not consistent and she skipped working for weeks and then picked it back up. See AR 21, 92.

At the Housing Authority’s request, Petitioners submitted proof of Cross’s termination and Bradshaw’s employment with Hammer and Nails on January 23, 2019. AR 22, 57. Bradshaw provided one pay stub showing gross pay of $247.59 and year-to-date pay of $2036.15. See AR 22.

On January 24, 2019, Hammer and Nails salon confirmed that Bradshaw had begun work for them on September 29, 2018. She received paychecks on October 15, November 1, and November 15, for a total of 44 hours worked at $17 per hour. AR 55-57, 96. Hammer and Nails also verified that Bradshaw had worked for it consistently, albeit not a lot of hours. See AR 22, 96.

2. The Termination Notice

On January 24, 2019, the Housing Authority sent Petitioners a letter informing them that their Program assistance would terminate on March 31, 2019 due to their violation of the family obligations and commitment of fraud in failing to report Bradshaw’s employment with and income from Hammer and Nails. AR 43-47. The Housing Authority noted that the information Bradshaw submitted with her household income adjustment showed that she started working for Hammer and Nails in October 2018 and had been paid a total of $2,036.15 over 12 weeks, averaging $169.68 per week and an annualized total of $8,823.36. AR 45. The Housing Authority had contacted Hammer and Nails, which confirmed that Bradshaw worked and received paychecks consistently despite working few hours. AR 47.

The letter noted that Bradshaw did not declare this income during Petitioners’ initial interview. Had Bradshaw disclosed it, Petitioners would have been ineligible for assistance. AR 47. The Housing Authority noted that failure to report income is a terminable offense. In addition, Petitioners were not eligible for the Program in the first place. AR 47. The Housing Authority found that this failure constitutes fraud and a violation of the Program’s family obligations. AR 47. The Housing Authority letter informed Petitioners that a pre-termination hearing was scheduled for February 4, 2019. AR 43, 47.

Petitioners attended the February 4 pre-termination hearing with Housing Specialist Zavala and Housing Inspector Clarke. See AR 22. Bradshaw stated she did not report her income from Hammer and Nails because she felt it was not consistent and because someone at work informed her that she was not going to be put on “the schedule”. See AR 22. This was contradicted by the Hammer and Nails’ statement that Bradshaw worked consistently and received consistent paychecks. See AR 22.

On February 11, 2019, Bradshaw submitted her time sheets for the period of October 27, 2018 to December 27, 2018. See AR 23. The paychecks were consistent with the Housing Authority’s previous information. See AR 23. Bradshaw’s year-to-date gross pay totaled $2,036.15, with an average semi-monthly pay of $339.36 and an annualized income of $8,144. See AR 22. Hammer and Nails confirmed that Bradshaw does not work a lot of hours but works and received paychecks consistently. See AR 22. The addition of Bradshaw’s annualized income to Petitioners wages would have exceeded the maximum limit of $43,650 for Program assistance and they would not have been entitled to assistance had she reported it. See AR 22-23.

On February 7, 2019, the Housing Authority sent Petitioners a letter notifying them of the termination of their assistance effective March 31, 2019 for violation of income limits, failure to accurately report income, and fraud. AR 19-23. The notice informed Petitioners that they owed the Housing Authority a total of $3,862 for receiving assistance to which they were not entitled. AR 23.

Petitioners requested an informal hearing, which the Housing Authority scheduled on March 5, 2019. AR 4. The hearing was rescheduled for March 13, 2019 at Petitioners’ request. AR 5.

3. The Hearing and Decision

The informal hearing was held on March 13, 2019 before Hearing Officer Lance Widman (“Hearing Officer”). AR 2.

On March 15, 2019, the Hearing Officer issued his decision, finding that the preponderance of the evidence showed that Petitioners failed to completely and accurately report family income during their November 7, 2018 eligibility interview and on their October 11, 2018 Tenant Information Form. AR 2. Petitioners acknowledged this failure at the hearing. AR 2. As a result, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioners owe the Housing Authority $3,862 for over-payment of rental assistance and that their assistance would be canceled effective April 30, 2019. AR 2-3.

On March 19, 2019, the Housing Authority informed Petitioners of the Hearing Officer’s decision, that their housing assistance would be terminated effective April 30, 2019, and of their obligation to repay the Housing Authority $3,862. AR 1.

E. Analysis

Petitioners seek a writ of administrative mandate compelling the Housing Authority to set aside its decision upholding the termination of their Section 8 housing assistance benefits.

Petitioners’ Section 8 housing benefits were terminated on the grounds that Bradshaw did not report her income in connection with her employment with Hammer and Nails, which would have made Petitioners ineligible for housing benefits. The Housing Authority considered this failure to be fraudulent and a violation of family obligations under the Program. AR 21.

1. Whether Petitioners’ Omission was Fraudulent

Petitioners argue that the Housing Authority cannot terminate Petitioners’ housing assistance on the basis of fraud because Petitioners did not act with an intent to deceive. Pet. Op. Br. at 6.

HUD regulations define “fraud” as a single act or pattern of actions that constitutes false statement, omission, or concealment of a substantive fact, made with intent to deceive or mislead. 24 C.F.R §792.103. To terminate Section 8 benefits for fraud, a misrepresentation must be made with fraudulent intent and involve information that is material to a participant’s benefits. Crooks v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App.5th 893, 903–04. The statement and the intent for that statement are factually distinct. Id. at 900. A concealment or misrepresentation is material if it has a tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed. Id. at 906. Any false material statement is enough, it doesn’t have to actually affect the benefits. Id. at 906. Finally, a Housing Authority has discretion to terminate a participant from the program for an intentional misrepresentation even if it does not amount to fraud. Id. at 903-04.

Petitioners argue that no evidence in the records supports a conclusion that Bradshaw had the requisite intent to commit fraud when she failed to report her wages from Hammer and Nails. Pet. Op. Br. at 6-7. Petitioners assert that Bradshaw’s subsequent disclosure of her employment and speed in correcting her error evidences her lack of deceptive intent. Pet. Op. Br. at 7.

Contrary to Petitioners’ representation, Bradshaw did not correct her omission with speed. In the Tenant Information Form signed on October 11, 2018, Petitioners were informed that they must list income for all family members. AR 41. On November 7,2019, Petitioners also signed the Housing Authority Family Obligations form and the Agreement, both of which affirmatively required that they would report within two weeks any new income source by a household member. AR 93-95. There is no evidence that Petitioners did not read and understand these obligations.

Yet, Bradshaw first reported her income from Hammer and Nails three months after the October 11, 2018 application and two months after the November 2018 eligibility interview. AR 87, 92. As the Housing Authority notes, the timing of this voluntary disclosure supports a conclusion of fraud. Opp. at 9. The volume of Bradshaw’s work at Hammer and Nails in November was the same as in December. Petitioners waited until January 2019 — when Cross was no longer receiving income from Apple One — to report Bradshaw’s work for Hammer and Nails. At that time, Petitioners reported Bradshaw’s income from Hammer and Nails and also reported Cross’s reduction in income.

There was no legitimate reason for Bradshaw to wait until January 9, 2019 to report three months of her Hammer and Nails income. Bradshaw’s scheduled work during November and December following Petitioners’ November 7 Eligibility Interview had the same pattern with no major variations in hours worked. AR 52-54. The plain inference is that when Petitioners initially applied for Section 8 assistance and reported their income on October 11, 2018, they wanted to ensure eligibility by remaining under the maximum income limit of $43,650. Therefore, they omitted Bradshaw’s Hammer and Nails income in their application and only reported it in January 2019 when it could be offset by Cross’s decreased income. This is fraud, or at least intentional misrepresentation.

The evidence is sufficient to support a finding of fraud as a basis for the termination of Petitioners’ housing assistance.[2]

2. Whether Petitioners Violated Their Family Obligation

Violation of a family obligation includes a failure of a participant to supply any information that the PHA or HUD determines is necessary in the administration of the program. 24 C.F.R. §982.551(b)(1).

a. Anticipated Future Income

HUD regulations define annual income as including any income anticipated to be received from a source outside the family during the 12-month period following admission to the voucher program. 24 C.F.R. §5.609(a)(2). The PHA will generally use current circumstances to determine anticipated income for the coming 12-month period. Pet. RJN Ex. A, p.6-7.

Petitioners argue that Bradshaw did not violate a family obligation because she did not expect any future employment with Hammer and Nails, and therefore did not fail to report anticipated income. Petitioners interpret HUD regulations and the Guidelines to mean that they were not required to report Bradshaw’s Hammer and Nails income if she in good faith did not believe she would have further employment with Hammer and Nails. They note that when they filled out their October 11, 2018 Tenant Information Form, Bradshaw did not have any scheduled shifts. Therefore, she reasonably believed that she was not employed. Pet. Op. Br. at 8

This argument is unavailing. As the Housing Authority correctly notes (Opp. at 13-14), Petitioners were informed on numerous occasions that they were required to report all income and timely report changes in income. The Tenant Information Form completed by Petitioners specifically instructed them to list income information for all family members 18 or older, including without limitation, wages/salaries. AR 41. The Housing Authority Family Obligations form and the Agreement both required Petitioners to report within two weeks any new income source by a household member. AR 93-95. These forms did not ask Petitioners to list anticipated income from future employment; they were directed to report all income. Petitioners were therefore obligated to report Bradshaw’s Hammer and Nails income, even if she did not anticipate any future income.

Bradshaw’s representation that she honestly did not anticipate further employment with Hammer and Nails also is unsupported by the weight of the evidence. The sole evidence supporting this position is Bradshaw’s statement that she “was told by someone working with her [that] she wasn’t going to be put on the schedule” for Hammer and Nails. AR 22. This vague statement lacks foundation and is contradicted by a statement from Hammer and Nails stating that Bradshaw worked and received paychecks consistently.[3] AR 22. The statement is corroborated by the fact that Bradshaw returned to work at Hammer and Nails on November 17, 2018, ten days after the eligibility interview. AR 52.

b. Sporadic Income

Housing Authority’s Administrative Plan states that it will generally use current circumstances to project anticipated income for the coming 12-month period. Pet. RJN Ex. A, p.6-7. An exception exists where it is not feasible to anticipate a level of income over a 12-month period, such as seasonal or cyclical income. Ex. A, p.6.

“Temporary, nonrecurring, or sporadic income” is income that is not received periodically and cannot be reliably predicted. For example, the income of an individual who works occasionally as a handyman would be sporadic if future work could not be anticipated and no historic, stable pattern of income existed. Housing Authority will consider the family’s total income in determining whether to count other sporadic income. If, for instance, the family reports little or no other income, Housing Authority may include this income once a pattern of work is established. Pet. RJN Ex. A, p.6-9.

Petitioners argue that Bradshaw’s income from Hammer and Nails was sporadic and she therefore properly excluded it when reporting her income. Petitioners note that, at the time of the eligibility interview, Bradshaw had no upcoming shifts scheduled and only worked nine of the preceding 39 days for a total of 44 hours. AR 67-72. Petitioners allege that there is no way to reliably predict future income based on this information and Bradshaw accurately declared her income as required by law. Pet. Op. Br. at 9; Reply at 4-5.

This is a red herring. Assuming arguendo that that Bradshaw’s income from Hammer and Nails qualifies as sporadic – the Housing Authority argues that it does not – that fact is irrelevant. Petitioners are obligated to report all income. The applicable regulation only states that sporadic income is excluded from the Housing Authority’s determination of a household’s annual income; it does not relieve the applicant from his/her obligation to report all income. 24 C.F.R. §5.609(c)(9). The Guidelines also support this conclusion, noting that the PHA may include such income after establishing a pattern of work. Pet. RJN Ex. A, p.6-9. Sporadic or not, all income must be reported in order for Housing Authority to determine eligibility.

c. Conclusion

Regardless of whether Bradshaw thought her job at Hammer and Nails had ended or that her income was sporadic, Petitioners were required to report it. Their failure to do so constitutes a violation of their family obligations under the Program.

3. Whether the Housing Authority Failed to Proceed in the Manner Required by Law

Petitioners argue that the Housing Authority’s February 7, 2019 pre-termination notice, the March 15, 2019 Hearing Officer decision, and the March 19, 2019 final termination letter are impermissibly vague and do not meet “the required standard to support termination of Petitioners’ federal housing benefits.” Pet. Op. Br. at 11-12. Petitioners’ moving papers do not explain what that standard is. In reply, Petitioners rely on Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at 515 to conclude that these documents do not bridge the analytical gap between the raw evidence and the decision. Reply at 6-7.

The court may swiftly dispose of Petitioners’ arguments concerning the February 7, 2019 pre-termination notice and the March 19, 2019 final termination letter.

The February 7 pre-termination notice (AR 19-23) may be subject to criticism, but the issue would be governed by due process and Petitioners would have no remedy unless they raised the issue to the Hearing Officer. See Pet. RJN Ex. B (Guidebook), p. 15-7 (notice of termination must state reason for termination, effective date, and family’s right to request a hearing). There is no evidence that Petitioners objected to the notice, and they were able to defend their position at the informal hearing.

The March 19, 2019 final termination letter is, as Petitioners’ argue, a cover letter that confirms termination is based on the Hearing Officer decision. AR 1. Reply at 7. The legitimacy of this letter depends on the Hearing Officer decision it attaches.

This leaves the Hearing Officer decision. AR 2-3. Topanga requires decisionmakers to provide a rationale and sufficient findings to support their decisions. The decision-maker must issue findings that give enough explanation so that the parties and the court may determine whether, and upon what basis, to review the decision. Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at 514-15. This Topanga requirement must be tempered by federal law, which requires the hearing officer to issue a written decision, stating briefly the reasons for it. 24 C.F.R. §982.555(e)(6). Combining these requirements, the Hearing Officer’s decision must issue findings that bridge the analytic gap between the evidence and the findings, but may do so in relatively brief form.

Despite this relaxed standard, the Hearing Officer’s decision is defective. It is wholly devoid of any analysis and only makes the conclusory finding that, “based on the preponderance of evidence,” Petitioners failed to completely and accurately report their income to the Housing Authority. AR 2. The Hearing Officer’s decision does not address the issue of fraud, does not explain whether Petitioners would have been eligible had the income been reported, does not explain whether termination is based solely on a violation of family obligations, and most importantly, does not explain what evidence supports his conclusions and why. The Hearing Officer’s decision therefore fails to meet the requirements of Topanga and 24 C.F.R. section 982.555(e)(6).

The Hearing Officer’s failure to make any supported findings is a failure to proceed in the manner required by law and an abuse of discretion. The matter must be remanded for the Hearing Officer to make proper findings. See Usher v. County of Monterey, (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 210, 220.

F. Conclusion

The petition for writ of mandate is granted in part. A writ shall issue for the Hearing Officer can make findings sufficient to bridge the analytical gap between the evidence and his findings.

Petitioners’ counsel is ordered to prepare a proposed writ and judgment, serve them on the Housing Authority’s counsel for approval as to form, wait ten days after service for any objections, meet and confer if there are objections, and then submit the proposed judgment along with a declaration stating the existence/non-existence of any unresolved objections. An OSC re: judgment is set for February 27, 2019 at 9:30 a.m.

[1] Petitioners request judicial notice of: (1) Chapter 6 of the Housing Authority’s Administrative Plan for the Program (“Administrative Plan”) (Ex. A); and (2) Chapter 15 of the HUD’s Housing Choice Voucher Guidebook (“Guidebook”) (Ex. B). Respondents object to judicial notice of the Guidebook, because it is not a federal regulation or rule binding on HUD or Housing Authority. See Crooks v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles, (“Crooks”) (2019) 40 Cal.App. 5th 893, 908. The fact that the Guidebook is not binding has no bearing on whether it can be judicially noticed. It simply means that the Guidebook is just that – a guide. The requests are granted. Evid. Code §452(c).

Respondents request judicial notice of Chapters 1 through 11 of the Housing Authority’s Administrative Plan (Ex. A). The request is granted. Evid. Code §452(b).

[2] Petitioners argue that the Housing Authority used Bradshaw’s paystub showing that she earned $2,036.15 over 13 weeks to estimate her annual income at $8,144. AR 22. Petitioners argue that this is contrar to the Administrative Plan, which does not permit the use of quarterly wages to project annual income. Pet. RJN, Ex/ A. p. 6-8. Pet. Op. Br. at 11. The Housing Authority responds that the Administrative Plan prohibits projection of quarterly wages to estimate annual income for eligibility purposes. It estimated Bradshaw’s annual income to determine fraud, not eligibility. Opp. at 17. There is no rule or regulation prohibiting the Housing Authority from doing so.

[3]Petitioners challenge the Housing Authority’s reliance on the Hammer and Nails statement, suggesting that it is unreliable due to corporate changes at the business in January 2019. Pet. Op. Br. at 10. As the Housing Authority correctly notes, this allegation of unreliability is unsupported by any evidence, and the hearsay statement meets all requirements of reliability. Opp. at 15-16.