2013-00150122-CU-PT

In Re: Joshuah Gentry

Nature of Proceeding: Petition for Approval for Transfer of Structured Settlement Payment

Filed By: Eason, Matthew R.

The petition for approval of transfer of structured settlement payment rights is
DENIED.

At the outset, the Court notes the following: (1) The present petition is virtually
identical to the one which was filed on 7/31/2013 in Sacramento Superior Court Case
No. 34-2013-00147718 and which was set for hearing on 8/28/2013; (2) petitioner’s
counsel claims to have submitted to the Court on or about 8/5/2013 a request for
dismissal of the petition filed on 7/31/2013 but the dismissal was not actually entered
prior to the hearing on 8/28/2013; and (3) petitioner’s counsel has now filed a motion to
set aside the Court Order generated after the hearing on 8/28/2013 and this motion is
now set to be heard on 11/8/2013.

Mr. Gentry is a single man with one minor child for whom he owes child support.
According to prior petitions filed on Mr. Gentry’s behalf, he owes roughly $550 per
month for child support. Mr. Gentry states that he is currently unemployed but he
desires to transfer the remaining $70,195 from his final lump sum payment due in
November 2018 ($117,195 before previous transfers) in exchange for $39,000. He
states that he will use at least $25,000 of the proceeds to upgrade his “family’s
construction and landscape consulting business,” specifically its computer equipment,
and use the remainder of the proceeds to pay overdue child support in an unspecified
amount and to find a new place to live. The structured settlement payment rights at
issue here were obtained in connection with a wrongful death claim which was settled
in 1986.

In 2007, the Court approved Mr. Gentry’s transfer of structured settlement rights for
which he received $98,000 that was to be used as follows:

$5,000 to pay off delinquent child support;
$3,500 to pay off miscellaneous utility bills;
$8,000 to pay off outstanding legal expenses;
$6,000 to pay off medical bills;
$8,000 to pay off a personal loan;
$21,900 to pay off credit card debt;
$15,000 to buy “a reliable means of transportation” to commute to and from
work;
$30,400 for a down payment on a home in Citrus Heights.

In 2011, Mr. Gentry received an additional roughly $92,400 which he said would be
used for the following: $20,000 for the outright purchase of late model car;
$70,000 for the down payment on a loft or condominium in Sacramento;
$2,400 for an emergency savings account.

Aside from using $35,000 for the purchase of at least two automobiles between 2007
and 2011, Mr. Gentry also received over $100,000 which he stated under penalty of
perjury would be used to purchase a home, actually two homes. But according to his
subsequent 2012 petition as well as the present petition, Mr. Gentry currently resides
in an apartment on Q Street in Sacramento, making it clear he failed to use the
proceeds from his 2007 and 2011 transfers consist with what he represented to the
Court.

In any event, based in part on the above-cited discrepancies, the Court required
additional information from Mr. Gentry in connection with his 2012 petition. In
response, Mr. Gentry disclosed that the bulk of the $190,000-plus proceeds from the
transfers in 2007 and 2011 was not used in the manner he originally represented but
rather was used to pay legal expenses for 3 separate DUI charges (nearly $70,000);
the purchase, repair and replacement of automobiles along with other unspecified
transportation expenses (nearly $58,000); rent for a townhouse ($18,000); credit card
bills ($23,000); delinquent child support ($10,000); personal loans ($8,000); medical
bills ($7,000); and utilities ($3,500). However, despite the Court’s request, Mr. Gentry
failed to provide any details on how he spent or invested the initial $117,195 lump sum
payment which was due in November 2004.

In light of the above, Mr. Gentry’s 2012 petition was denied outright. The Court
explained that his admitted failure to use the majority of the proceeds for his prior
sizeable transfers on the stated purposes and use of the money to defend multiple DUI
charges and replacing the $30,000 Audi he totaled, made it difficult to believe Mr.
Gentry would actually use the proceeds from the 2012 proposed transfer (roughly
$22,000) to start his own small business, “Solid Rock Management.” The Court further
stated, “[I]t is abundantly clear from Mr. Gentry’s past track record of squandering
large sums of money and making poor decisions that his proposed investment in [Solid
Rock Management] will not be in his best interest” and “the Court declines to aid in Mr.
Gentry’s repeated and notable failure to exercise good judgment in numerous aspects
of his life.” The Court’s August 2012 ruling concluded with the following language:

“Mr. Gentry is strongly discouraged from requesting oral argument as the Court
is unlikely to reconsider its tentative ruling.”

Undaunted by this history, Mr. Gentry now petitions the Court to approve the transfer
of $70,195 due to be paid in November 2018 in exchange for $39,000. Mr. Gentry
claims at least $25,000 will be used to upgrade his “family’s construction and
landscape consulting business,” with the remainder to pay overdue child support in an
unspecified amount and to find a new place to live.

However, in light of Mr. Gentry’s admission in connection with his 2012 petition that a
majority of the $190,000-plus proceeds received in 2007 and 2011 was not used in
conformity with his representations to the Court, it is highly doubtful that the $39,000 in
proceeds contemplated by the present petition would be used for the purposes stated.
In fact, given the dearth of details provided about “the family business,” the Court
presently questions whether such a business actually exists but even if it does, it
remains unclear how a $25,000-plus investment in the “construction and landscape
consulting” business’ “IT department” could be considered in Mr. Gentry’s best interest
as required by Insurance Code §10139.5. Additionally, while Mr. Gentry indicates he
intends to use some of the proceeds from the present transfer to pay child support
already owing, the petition is completely silent as to the actual amount owed and the
actual amount he intends to pay. But even with this information, the Court cannot help
but doubt that any of the proceeds from this proposed transfer would be used to satisfy
his support obligations.

The Court notes that at 3:01 p.m. on 10/8/2013 Mr. Gentry filed a “Supplemental
Declaration.” Although this document was not timely filed or served in advance of the
scheduled hearing date, it was reviewed and considered by the Court. In pertinent
part, the “Supplemental Declaration” indicates that in 2004 Mr. Gentry received a lump
sum payment of over $117,000, $50,000 of which was spent on a Lincoln Navigator
and roughly $10,000 of which was spent on ‘upgrading a condo’ he apparently did not
even own, as he states he planned to purchase it but decided not to. The
“Supplemental Declaration” does not explain or attempt to explain how the remainder
of the 2004 payment, roughly $57,000, was spent.

The “Supplemental Declaration” also identifies the “family construction and landscape
consulting business” in which he currently wants to invest by upgrading its computer
equipment as “Solid Rock Management.” This appears to be the very same business
Mr. Gentry sought in his 2012 petition to invest in. In Paragraph 11 of his
“supplemental declaration” filed on 8/10/2012, Mr. Gentry stated the following:

“I am currently experiencing a financial hardship. If approved, I will use the
money received from the proposed settlement to invest in Solid Rock
Management a company that specializes in professional consultation,
engineering and design. Attached is a copy of a breakdown of the average
budget for tools and supplies along with an overall synopsis of the part I will
play in this investment.” (Emphasis added.)

The attachment referred to above then states in pertinent part:

“I plan to invest in Solid Rock Management a company started back in 2011
which specializes in professional consultation, engineering & design,
construction management, custom concrete, landscaping, and maintenance.
They plan to expand there [sic] business but to do so they need my capital to
pay for additional advertising, tools and supplies,…” (Emphasis added.)

Interestingly, the other attachments to Mr. Gentry’s 8/10/2012 “supplemental
declaration” (relating to Solid Rock Management’s application for a contractor’s license
and City of Lincoln business license) are identical to several of the attachments to
“supplemental declaration” filed on 10/8/2013 in connection with the present petition.
Additionally, it remains unclear to this Court why the computers, software and other
technology at a company which, according to Mr. Gentry, started just two years ago in
2011 would be “so old and extremely outdated” but even if they were, it is uncertain
why a $25,000-plus upgrade would be necessary to ‘more quickly communicate with
its customers’ and to obtain more updated software. The lack of details and
documentation about the proposed IT upgrades simply highlights the dubious nature of
the present petition. Aside from Mr. Gentry’s 2012 petition not being entirely forthright with regard to “Solid
Rock Management” which has only now been revealed as a “family business,” Mr.
Gentry is attempting to justify the transfer proposed by the present petition on
essentially the same ground which was rejected outright by the Court in its ruling on
Mr. Gentry’s 2012 petition and the Court need not here reconsider the denial of the
2012 petition. Regardless, as detailed above, this Court very much doubts that Mr.
Gentry would in fact use any of the proceeds from this proposed transfer to upgrade
Solid Rock Management’s purported “IT department” but even if he did, this Court
cannot find that this use of the proceeds would be in Mr. Gentry’s best interest given
the unique circumstances here.

For all of these reasons, the Court denies the present petition in its entirety.

The Court notes that the “Supplemental Declaration” filed on 10/8/2013 indicates Mr.
Gentry is currently obligated to provide child support in the amount of $500 per month
(although Mr. Gentry previously declared it was as much as $550 per month) and the
total amount now owed is nearly $4,100. The Court will consider approving a transfer
of future payment rights solely to permit Mr. Gentry to bring his child support
obligations current provided that the entirety of the proceeds from the transfer be
distributed directly to the child’s mother or other current legal guardian.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required.
(Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)