| Gorrostieta v. Fremont Hills Country Club | CASE NO. 114CV266957 | |
| DATE: 19 December 2014 | TIME: 9:00 | LINE NUMBER: 27 |
This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 18 December 2014. Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.
On 19 December 2014, the motion of Plaintiff Yolanda Gorrostieta to compel further responses to special interrogatories, set one and for monetary sanctions was argued and submitted.
Defendant Fremont Hills Country Club filed formal opposition to the motion.[1]
- Statement of Facts.
This case arises from an employment dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants Fremont Hills Country Club (“FHCC”), Agnes Xavier (the complaint wrongly named “Roma Javier” as a co-defendant, but an amended complaint filed on 6 August 2014 correctly names Agnes Xavier), and Scott Domnie. Plaintiff Gorrostieta worked in the custodial and maintenance department of Defendant FHCC for sixteen years from January of 1998 until May of 2014. Beginning in early 2013, Plaintiff started complaining about alleged harassment in the workplace by co-worker and Defendant Xavier.
According to the complaint, Xavier regularly harassed and threatened the Plaintiff for over a year. The alleged treatment consisted of: “calling Plaintiff profane names and expletives;…telling Plaintiff and other employees that she was “too old” to perform her job duties; intentionally interfering with Plaintiff’s work, including but not limited to messing up things that Plaintiff was in the middle of cleaning, physically hitting Plaintiff with bags knocking her to the floor, discriminating against Plaintiff, and constantly taunting and belittling Plaintiff by treating her with the utmost disrespect.[2]”
Plaintiff alleges she repeatedly complained to Defendant FHCC and reported the abuse multiple times to her supervisor Defendant Scott Domnie. However, Plaintiff contends Defendants failed to take corrective action and instead instructed her to overlook Xavier’s behavior.
In addition, the complaint states that in February of 2014, Plaintiff suffered a work-related injury forcing her to go on disability. When she sought to return to work, Plaintiff claims Defendant FHCC failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations for her disability. Plaintiff contends that Defendants FHCC and Domnie’s failure to take corrective action against Defendant Xavier and unwillingness to accommodate her disability forced Plaintiff to terminate her employment with FHCC on 13 May 2014.
On 24 June 2014, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants alleging five causes of action. These included: constructive discharge in violation of public policy; wrongful termination and age/disability discrimination in violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a) and the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); failure to accommodate a disability in violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12926, et seq., 12940 et seq., and Cal. Code Regulations Title 2 § 12940(i); and harassment.
On 25 July 2014, Defendants FHCC and Domnie filed an answer to the complaint denying each allegation and asserting eighteen affirmative defenses. On 10 September 2014, Defendant Xavier filed an answer to the complaint denying each allegation and asserting eleven affirmative defenses.
- Discovery Dispute.
On 11 July 2014, Plaintiff served Defendant FHCC with requests for answers to special interrogatories, set one. On 29 August 2014, Defendant FHCC served responses.
Special interrogatories numbers 8 and 9 and material to this motion.
Special interrogatory No. 8 requested that Defendant,
“IDENTIFY each EMPLOYEE(S) (“EMPLOYEE(S)” refers to a person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the employer has the power or right to control and direct the employee in the material details of how the work is to be performed) working for YOU, who worked with PLAINTIFF during the WORK PERIOD (“WORK PERIOD” and/or “TIME PERIOD” refers to the four years preceding the filing of the complaint to the present.)[3]”
Defendant objected, claiming no. 8 was both overbroad in scope and time and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence.[4] Despite the objection, Defendant provided the names of five of Plaintiff’s former co-workers in the maintenance department.
Special Interrogatory No. 9 requested Defendant,
“IDENTIFY each of YOUR EMPLOYEES who worked during the WORK PERIOD.[5]”
Defendant again objected to no. 9 on grounds that it was both overbroad in scope and time, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence.[6]
Unsatisfied with the responses received, on 9 September 2014, Plaintiff’s attorney Parviz Darabi sent a letter to Defendant FHCC’s attorney Steven Werth requesting amended responses and outlining the reasons why further responses should be provided.
On 22 September 2014, Mr. Werth sent a letter in response. The letter argued Plaintiff failed to show a particularized need for the names of any employees in addition to the one’s already provided by Defendant. The parties exchanged two more letters, but were unable to come to an agreement over the discoverable information.
On 6 October 2014, Defendant served Plaintiff with amended responses to Plaintiff’s special interrogatories, set one. For purposes of this motion, the only relevant difference between the amended responses and original responses is the amended responses contained the address and phone numbers for the five names originally provided in response to special interrogatory no. 8.
Following service of the amended responses, attorneys for both Plaintiff and Defendant exchanged seven more letters in an attempt to informally resolve the discovery dispute over special interrogatories numbers 8 and 9, but were unable to come to a compromise.
On 29 October 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories, set one, numbers 8 and 9, and Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions. The motion included: a notice of motion, memorandum of points and authorities, separate statement, and supporting declaration of Parviz Darabi.
Plaintiff contends she needs complete answers to interrogatories 8 and 9 in order to adequately investigate the case. In the moving papers, Plaintiff specifically requests the names, addresses, and phone numbers of fifteen individuals Plaintiff worked with, as well as all individuals employed by FHCC since June of 2010. In a meet and confer letter dated 22 October 2014, Defendant offered to provide the contact information for the fifteen names if Plaintiff would agree to limit the special interrogatories to those fifteen people and the five already provided. Plaintiff rejected this proposal in a letter dated 27 October 2014.
Plaintiff argues each person requested could be a potential witness and may need to be deposed prior to trial. The moving papers state the burden is on the Defendant to justify its objections, and FHCC lacks a substantial justification to refuse to comply with the requests.
Plaintiff also argues special interrogatory no. 9 is relevant to this matter because the employees provided might show Defendants were abusive to other employees, and these individuals could shed light on how Defendants have handled similar complaints.
In response to any privacy objections, Plaintiff claims that on balance, any privacy interest is outweighed by the public interest in obtaining just results in litigation. Moreover, Plaintiff contends any privacy concerns could easily be addressed via a protective order.
On 8 December 2014, Defendant FHCC filled opposition papers to Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses. In the papers, Defendant requests monetary sanctions. The opposition papers included: a memo of points and authorities, a response to Plaintiff’s separate statement, and supporting declarations of Steven Werth and Scott Domnie.
In the opposition papers, Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to provide any basis for why she needs the names of all of Defendant FHCC’s employees dating back to July of 2014. In support of this argument, Defendant points out that: the alleged harassment did not commence until 2013, the Plaintiff admitted during deposition that no co-workers outside the maintenance department ever witnessed the alleged harassment, and FHCC has employed 175 people since 2010 and not all these individuals are relevant to the present action. Defendant also contends Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a sufficiently compelling need for special interrogatory no. 9 that outweighs the privacy rights contained in the private records of the 175 FHCC employees.
III. Analysis.
- Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories.
A motion to compel further responses to interrogatories is proper when the propounding party deems the responses given to be improper. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300.) A notice of motion must be served within 45-days after service of the initial responses or any supplemental responses. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300(c).) A separate statement must accompany the notice in accordance with California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1345(c).
The motion to compel must also contain a declaration stating facts that show a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to resolve the matter informally before filing the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2016.040, 2030.300(b).) The attempt to resolve informally may be made either by meeting in person, or by conferring over the phone or by letter with the opposing party or attorney. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010(i).)
The party to whom the interrogatories are served is under a duty to respond to each question separately, under oath, and within the time limits prescribed by law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.210(a).) This obligation may be excused by a valid protective order. (Id.) Appropriate responses contain an answer, objection, or election to allow inspection and copying of records. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.210(a).)
If a responding party serves an objection instead of an answer, the objection must be stated separately, and defined with specificity. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.210(a)(3), 2030.300(a)(3); Korea Data Systems Co. Ltd. v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516.) If a timely motion to compel further responses is filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objections or failure to fully answer interrogatories. (Coy v. Sup. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)
A party propounding interrogatories may move for an order compelling further responses if that party deems an objection is without merit or too general or a response is incomplete. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 2030.300(a).) The statute does not require any showing of good cause in support of a motion. (See Code of Civil Procedure, § 2030.300; see also Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.) The burden is on the propounding party to obtain a judicial determination of the validity of any objection by moving to compel a further response. However, the responding party has the burden to justify any objections or failure to fully answer. (Coy v. Superior Court, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221.)
The decision of whether to grant or deny a motion to compel is solely in the Court’s discretion. (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2013) P 8:1180, p. 8F-74.) In ruling on the motion, the Court typically considers the following factors: the relationship of the information sought to the issues framed in the pleadings; the likelihood that disclosure will be of practical benefit to the party seeking discovery; the burden or expense to be encountered by the responding party in furnishing the information sought. (Id.; Columbia Broadcasting System v. Sup. Ct. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 19.)
In the instant case, all papers submitted by counsel are compliant with the California Rule of Court and Code of Civil Procedure. In addition, this Court believes both parties satisfied their meet and confer requirement prior to submitting this motion. Both partied exchanged numerous letters in an attempt to resolve the matter informally, but were unable to reach a compromise. With the procedural requirement for filing and opposing this motion met, the Court will consider the validity of the objections raised by the responding party.
- Special Interrogatory No. 8
Special interrogatory no. 8 seeks the names of every employee who worked with the Plaintiff over the past four years. In response to this request, Defendant objected on grounds that the request is overbroad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiff has narrowed the request to the names of fifteen identifiable individuals. In the 22 October 2014 meet and confer letter, Defendant acknowledged the ability to provide the information for these fifteen individuals.
During discovery, information is relevant if it could reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) Further, information is relevant if it could reasonably assist in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement discussions. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal App. 4th 1539, 1546.) These rules are liberally applied in favor of discovery. (Id.)
The fifteen employees identified by the Plaintiff as former co-workers in the maintenance department may be able to reasonably assist the Plaintiff in evaluating her case. These individuals may have information regarding: the nature of co-worker relations in the maintenance department of FHCC, potential incidents of employee harassment in the FHCC maintenance department, and management’s response to maintenance employee complaints and misconduct allegations. Thus, the information requested in special interrogatory no. 8 is directly relevant to the issues raised in the pleadings, and could reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendant’s objection that special interrogatory no. 8 is overbroad is overruled. The burden and expense on Defendant in producing the full names, addresses, and phone numbers for these fifteen individuals is minimal since Defendant previously stated an ability and willingness to do so in their 22 October 2014 letter to Plaintiff’s attorney.[7]
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to special interrogatory number 8 is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to provide the names, addresses, and phone numbers of the fifteen individuals specifically requested by the Plaintiff in her moving papers.
- Special Interrogatory No. 9
Special interrogatory no. 9 seeks the names and contact information of every employee who worked at FHCC over the past four years.
According to Defendant Domnie’s declaration, this includes the names and contact information of over 175 people. The declaration makes no statement about the amount of work that would be necessary to obtain the contact information for all of these individuals. Defendant objected to this request claiming it is overbroad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. In Defendant’s meet and confer letters and opposition papers, Defendant also asserts this information is protected by the constitutional right to privacy.
As previously mentioned, the burden is on the Defendant to justify their objections. (Coy v. Sup. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) In the opposition papers, Defendant relies heavily on Plaintiff’s 19 September 2014 deposition to support the claim that the information sought by special interrogatory no. 9 is not relevant. In the deposition, Plaintiff admits the first time Defendant Xavier ever harassed her was in 2013.[8] Plaintiff cannot point to any individuals outside of the maintenance department who witnessed the alleged harassment or other inappropriate interactions between the Plaintiff and Defendant Xavier. Defendant argues Plaintiff is not entitled the names of every employee since 2010 because no showing has been made as to why these individuals could assist Plaintiff in the investigation of her claim.
This Court agrees with the Defendant that the request made in special interrogatory no. 9 is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this case. Plaintiff claims they need the names of all FHCC employees since 2010 because the information might show other employees who filed similar complaints and how Defendant’s handled those complaints. However, this information is not relevant to whether Plaintiff was wrongfully discharged, harassed, or discriminated against by FHCC. Plaintiff has made no showing that employees outside of the maintenance department would have any knowledge of facts relevant to Plaintiff’s claim. Moreover, Plaintiff admits none of the alleged mistreatment occurred prior to 2013. Thus, requesting the names of every FHCC employee dating back four years is not likely to help Plaintiff evaluate her claim, prepare for trial, or facilitate settlement discussions. Disclosure of this information is not of practical benefit to the Plaintiff. Defendant’s objection to special interrogatory no. 9 is sustained.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to special interrogatory no. 9 is DENIED. This Court will not address the issue of privacy because Defendant’s objection is sustained on other grounds.
The motion of Plaintiff to compel further responses to special interrogatories numbers 8 and 9 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant shall provide the names, addresses, and phone numbers of the fifteen people identified by Plaintiff in the moving papers without objection and within 20 days of the date of the filing of this Order.
- Sanctions.
Both Plaintiff and Defendant make a request for monetary sanctions.
Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.040 states: “A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. The notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.” (See Rule of Court 2.30.)
The Court may impose monetary, evidentiary, contempt or terminating sanctions where a party is engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process. (See Code Civ. Pro. § 2023.030.) Misuses of the discovery process include but are not limited to: persisting, over objection and without substantial justification, in an attempt to obtain information or materials outside the scope of permissible discovery; making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery; making or opposing, unsuccessfully and without substantial justification, a motion to compel or limit discovery. (Code Civ. Pro. § 2023.010.)
In support of the request for sanctions, Plaintiff correctly cites Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2023.030(a), 2023.010(e), 2030.300(d) in the notice of motion. However, Plaintiff incorrectly cites Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.290(c), 2031.310(h), and 2031.320(b) in the supporting memorandum of points and authorities. Section 2030.290(c) permits a court to grant monetary sanctions for failure to provide initial responses to interrogatories. Sections 2031.310(h) and 2031.320(b) authorize monetary sanctions for failure to provide further responses to inspection demands and failure to permit inspection. Plaintiff’s motion to compel is only for further responses to interrogatories, not inspection demands or initial responses.
Defendant also incorrectly cites Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.090(c) in the opposing papers. Section 2030.090(c) involves motions for protective order and states, “if the motion for protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may order that the party provide or permit the discovery against which protection was sought on terms and conditions that are just.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.090(c).) The correct citation is section 2030.300(d), authorizing monetary sanctions against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300(d).)
The California Code of Civil Procedure states that the Court shall impose monetary sanctions in many different situations. However, where the Court “finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust” no monetary sanctions shall be imposed. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.060(h).)
Sanctions are inappropriate in the present case. The motion to compel was granted in part and denied in part. Thus, both parties were successful and unsuccessful in this motion to compel. The parties also made a good faith and reasonable effort to resolve this dispute informally before filing this motion. Given the circumstances, it would be unjust to impose sanctions upon one party but not the other.
Accordingly, both Plaintiff and Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions are DENIED.
- Order.
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Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to special interrogatory no. 8 is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to provide the names, addresses, and phone numbers of the fifteen individuals specifically requested by the Plaintiff in her moving papers within 20 days of this order without objection.
Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to special interrogatory no. 9 is DENIED.
Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.
Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.
| ____________________________
DATED: |
_________________________________________________
HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN Judge of the Superior Court County of Santa Clara this is its |
[1] “The failure to file a written opposition or to appear at a hearing or the voluntary provision of discovery shall not be deemed an admission that the motion was proper or that sanctions should be awarded.” Rule of Court 3.1348(b).
[2] Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, Pg. 2, Lns. 3-14 (“Plaintiff’s Memo of P&A”.)
[3] Declaration of Parviz Darabi in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (“Darabi Decl.”), Exhibit 1 (Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set One), Pg. 3, Ln. 1-6.
[4] Darabi Decl., Exhibit 2 (Defendant’s Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One), Pg. 5, Lns. 22-27.
[5] Darabi Decl., Exhibit 1, Pg. 3, Ln. 7-8.
[6] Darabi Decl., Exhibit 2, Pg. 6, Ln. 3-5.
[7] “In short, as Justice Murphy said for the court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, ‘discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries.’” (Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1968) 263 Cal. App. 2d 12, 19.)
When asserting undue burden in response to a motion to compel, respondent has the burden of providing detailed evidence of how much work is required to answer the question. (West Pico Furn. Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 407, 418.) For example, a discovery request was held “oppressive” where uncontradicted declarations showed that response would require review of over 13,000 insurance claims files, requiring 5 claims adjusters working full time for 6 weeks each. Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Sup.Ct. (City of Laguna Beach) (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 313, 318–involving document demand; see Weil & Brown, ¶8:1475.1]
[8] Declaration of Steven Werth in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (“Werth Decl.”), Exhibit A (Gorrosieta Deposition), Pg. 27, Ln. 11-15.
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