Case Name: Hooked Media Group, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., et al.
Case No.: 1-14-CV-265819

This is an action for misappropriation of trade secrets. Defendant Chandrasekar Venkataraman (“Venkataraman”) is the former Chief Technology Officer (“CTO”) of plaintiff Hooked Media Group, Inc. (“Plaintiff”). (First amended complaint (“FAC”), ¶ 13.) After defendant Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) and Plaintiff began discussing a possible acquisition of Plaintiff in May 2013, Venkataraman improperly disclosed confidential information of Plaintiff to Apple, and refused to disclose any information to other potential acquirers of Plaintiff. (See FAC, ¶¶ 15-29.) Further, instead of acquiring Plaintiff, Apple instead hired away Venkataraman and Plaintiff’s core engineering team who took Plaintiff’s proprietary intellectual property on their computers with them, including Plaintiff’s entire code base, and deleted or destroyed Plaintiff’s copies so that it could not operate. (See FAC, ¶¶ 30-49.)

On October 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against defendants Apple and Venkataraman (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting causes of action for: misappropriation of trade secrets; interference with contract; interference with prospective economic advantage; fraud; negligent misrepresentation; violations of the California Computer Data Access and Fraud Act; breach of fiduciary duty; aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty; breach of contract; unjust enrichment/restitution; and, unfair business practices.

On January 8, 2015, Plaintiff moved to compel further responses to requests for production of documents (“RPDs”), form interrogatories (“FIs”) and special interrogatories (“SIs”). Later that day, counsel for Venkataraman provided amended unverified responses to form interrogatories, set one.

The inspection of Venkataraman’s personal computer

RPD 3 seeks “[e]ither an inspection OR a bit-by-bit physical copy of” Venkataraman’s laptop computer used while in the employ of Plaintiff. In opposition, Venkataraman asserts that his privacy objections outweigh any basis for such an inspection. (See Venkataraman’s opposition to motion to compel, pp.7:18-25, 8:1-28, 9:1-28, 10:1-25, 11:1-3.) Venkataraman does not proffer any other arguments regarding the discovery request.

Venkataraman relies principally on TBG Ins. Svcs. Corp. v. Super. Ct. (Zieminski) (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443 (hereafter “TBG”), a case that is not particularly helpful to Venkataraman. In TBG, the appellate court determined that the former employee “voluntarily waived whatever right of privacy he might otherwise have had in the information he stored on the home computer” and additionally stated that “even assuming that [the former employee] ha[d] some lingering privacy interest in the information he stored on the home computer, we do not view TBG’s demand for production as a serious invasion of that interest.” (Id. at p.454.) Accordingly, the appellate court determined that the trial court erred in denying production of the former employee’s computer.

Where a serious invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy is shown, the proponent of discovery must demonstrate that information sought is “directly relevant” to a claim or defense, and “essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Britt v. Super. Ct. (San Diego Unified Port Dist.) (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859; see also Harris v. Super. Ct. (Smets) (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665 (stating that “[t]he proponent of discovery of constitutionally protected material has the burden of making a threshold showing that the evidence sought is ‘directly relevant’ to the claim or defense”).) If direct relevance is shown, the court must “carefully balance” the right of privacy, on the one hand, and the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts, on the other. (See Harris, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p.665 (stating that “[w]hen the right to discovery conflicts with a privileged right, the court is required to carefully balance the right of privacy with the need for discovery”); see also Valley Bank of Nevada v. Super. Ct. (Barkett) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 657.)

Here, Plaintiff demonstrates that the information sought is directly relevant to its claims. The information contained on the computer is at the heart of the claims. There is no other means to obtain the information sought by the discovery request. Plaintiff submits evidence that Plaintiff reimbursed Venkataraman for the laptop, and used the laptop with Plaintiff’s complete codebase and all of Plaintiff’s trade secrets. There is a protective order in place. Carefully balancing the right of privacy on one hand, and the right of Plaintiff to discover relevant facts, the factors favor disclosure in this instance. Accordingly, the motion to compel a further response to RPD 3 is GRANTED. Venkataraman’s objections based on privilege are preserved; Venkataraman’s remaining objections are overruled.

Boilerplate objections to interrogatories

Venkataraman prefaces his responses to form interrogatories (“FIs”), sets one and two and special interrogatories (“SIs”), sets one and two, with three pages of boilerplate objections. On the evening of January 8, 2015, after Plaintiff filed the instant motion, counsel for Venkataraman sent amended, unverified responses to set one of the FIs. However, unverified responses are tantamount to no responses at all. (See Appleton v. Super. Ct. (Cook) (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636 (stating that “[u]nsworn responses are tantamount to no responses at all”); see also Melendrez v. Super. Ct. (Special Electric Co., Inc.) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1348 (stating that “case law provides that an unverified response is tantamount to no response at all”); see also Steven M. Garber & Associates v. Eskandarian (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 813, 817, fn.4 (stating same).)

In opposition, Venkataraman argues that although the Court has previously found that objections were waived as to the first set of FIs, the Court has made no such ruling as to the second set of FIs or the SIs. Although it is true that the Court has not made any ruling as to the second set of FIs or the SIs, the law is still the same: parties may not incorporate comprehensive boilerplate objections into each response; objections must be tailored to each discovery request. (See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Spyglass Homeowners Assn.) (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 275 (stating that “specific responses and objections must be made to each item listed in a request… [as opposed to the assertion of] blanket objections”); see also Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 406 (stating that “[s]ection 2030.210, subdivision (a) requires a responding party to respond ‘separately to each interrogatory’”); see Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.210, subd. (a)(3); 2030.220, subd. (a).) These objections, except those based on attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, are overruled. (See Best Products, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (Granatelli Motor Sports, Inc.) (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1181,1189-1190 (stating that although a propounding party may compel further responses due to boilerplate responses lacking specificity to each interrogatory, if objections based on attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine are asserted, they are not waived).)

Venkataraman also asserts that his objections regarding the definitions of terms “does nothing beyond limiting the scope of discovery to information that is relevant to the subject matter of this litigation.” (Opposition, p.13:1-13.) However, this does not change the fact that these blanket objections are not made to a particular interrogatory and are not complete and straightforward. The motion to compel further responses to remove those boilerplate objections to form interrogatories, sets one and two, and special interrogatories, sets one and two—except those based on attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine—is GRANTED.

FIs 16.3, 16.6, 16.7,

FIs 16.3, 16.6 and 16.7 seek information regarding the injuries claimed by Plaintiff as disclosed in discovery proceedings. Venkataraman’s response to each of these FIs is that “[n]o injuries or extent of injuries have been disclosed in discovery proceedings by plaintiff… Plaintiff has not claimed any loss of earnings in discovery proceedings to date… [and] Plaintiff has not claimed any property damage in discovery proceedings to date.” Venkataraman’s opposition asserts that when Venkataraman “first responded to these interrogatories, Hooked had not yet disclosed or claimed any damages in discovery proceedings thus far.” (Opposition, p.14:14-15.) However, Venkataraman asserts that he has since provided an amended response on January 8, 2015. (Opposition, p.14:15-18.) As stated above, Venkataraman’s responses are not verified, and unverified responses are tantamount to no response at all. Accordingly, the motion to compel a further response to FIs 16.3, 16.6 and 16.7 is GRANTED.

SIs 1 and 2

SIs 1 and 2 seek information regarding persons who have knowledge of the subject claims and Venkataraman’s defenses, including addresses, job titles, and employers of those persons. Venkataraman’s responses merely identify 8 names. In opposition, Venkataraman asserts that those persons are “either a current or former Hooked employee or contractor” and that phone numbers and business addresses for two of the eight individuals were provided in his unverified responses.
Again, as stated above, unverified responses are tantamount to no response at all. Moreover, the responses are not as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party—Venkataraman—permits. Accordingly, the motion to compel a further response to SIs 1 and 2 is GRANTED.

RPDs

As with the interrogatories, Venkataraman includes four pages of boilerplate objections to the requests for production of documents (“RPDs”) that include objections as to certain definitions. However, Venkataraman is required to respond separately to each item or category of item pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210. (See also Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Spyglass Homeowners Assn.) (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 275 (stating that “specific responses and objections must be made to each item listed in a request… [as opposed to the assertion of] blanket objections”).) Accordingly, the objections regarding the definitions are overruled and the motion to compel a further response to remove these objections to the RPDs is GRANTED.

As to RPDs 3, 5, 6, 8, 19, and 21-23, Venkataraman limits any production to those documents that “relate to Hooked or the trade secrets identified in the Hooked Trade Secrets ID.” In opposition to the motion, Venkataraman asserts that this limitation is reasonable and appropriate as it would limit materials to those concerning the subject matter of the instant litigation. However, Venkataraman’s limitation is too narrow. Here, the FAC alleges that Venkataraman breached his fiduciary duty to Plaintiff by conspiring with Apple to hire away Plaintiff’s core engineering team and interfering with Plaintiff’s negotiations for acqui-hiring away certain employees. (See FAC, ¶¶ 29-38, 50-51, 93.) The FAC also alleges misrepresentations. (See FAC, ¶¶ 72-90.) Accordingly, the motion to compel a further response to RPDs 3, 5, 6, 8, 19, and 21-23 is GRANTED.

As to RPDs 17, 20, and 27-36, Venkataraman acknowledges that his response representing an inability to comply pursuant to section 2031.230 does not contain a statement that “a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made,” but that responses pursuant to section 2031.230 “implicitly affirms that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry has been made.” (Opposition, p.14:26-28.) Venkataraman does not offer any legal authority for this position, and the Court is not aware of any authority that allows a responding party to base responses on assumed facts that are not affirmatively stated.

Venkataraman also points to a paragraph from his blanket objections in which he states that his “agreement to produce documents responsive to a request is not an agreement that such documents exist, only that a reasonable, good faith search for such documents will be or has been made….” However, again, Venkataraman is required to provide to “respond separately to each item or category of item.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210, subd. (a); see also Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Spyglass Homeowners Assn.) (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 275.) Moreover, a statement that a search will be made is not the same as a statement that “affirms that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with the demand.” (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.230.) Accordingly, the motion to compel a further response to RPDs 17, 20, and 27-36 is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions

In connection with the motion, Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions against Venkataraman. However, the motion is not accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanctions sought. Instead, Plaintiff submits a declaration seeking $18,499.20 with its reply brief. This is improper, as the purpose of section 2023.040 is to allow the party against whom sanctions are sought to respond to the request for sanctions. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to FIs, sets one and two, and SIs, sets one and two, is GRANTED. Venkataraman shall provide verified, code-compliant responses without objections to the FIs, sets one and two, and SIs, sets one and two, within 20 calendar days of the filing of this order.

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to RPDs 3, 5, 6, 8, 17, 19, 20-23, and 27-36 is also GRANTED. Venkataraman shall produce all documents responsive to RPDs 3, 5, 6, 8, 17, 19, 20-23, and 27-36, as well as verified code-compliant further responses without objections sto RPDs 3, 5, 6, 8, 17, 19, 20-23, and 27-36, within 20 calendar days of the filing of this Order.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

The Court will prepare the order.