Case Name: Haberman v. Petras, et al.
Case No.: 1-14-CV-271786

Plaintiff Howard Haberman (“Plaintiff”) alleges that defendant Michael V. Petras (“Defendant”) breached a promissory note (“the Note”) by failing to make payments, attaches the Note to the complaint, and asserts claims for breach of contract and common counts. Defendant, a self-represented litigant, demurs to the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See CCP, § 430.10, subd. (a) [authorizing a demurrer on the ground that the “court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action”].) Specifically, Defendant argues that since the Note identifies San Francisco County as a proper venue, this Court lacks jurisdiction and should dismiss the case.
Defendant confuses subject matter jurisdiction with venue. Subject matter jurisdiction is a court’s authority to deal with the case, and a demurrer on this ground may only be sustained where it appears from the face of the complaint or judicially noticed matters that the court lacks such authority. (Varian Med. Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 196; Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1421.) The Court has general subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. (See Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 121-122 [“Barquis”] [jurisdiction over contract-related claims].) Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, the Note does not limit jurisdiction; rather, it indicates that California has subject matter jurisdiction. (Compl., Ex. A.) In any event, parties cannot agree to limit jurisdiction. (Miller-Leigh LLC v. Henson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1149 [“Miller-Leigh”].) Thus, the complaint does not show a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Venue, in contrast, is not jurisdictional, is not a ground for demurrer, and pertains to whether the court is the proper county within the jurisdiction for the matter to be litigated. (Barquis, supra, at pp. 121-122; Alexander v. Super. Ct. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th, 723, 726-727 [“Alexander”].) Thus, the demurrer cannot be sustained based on improper venue. Since Defendant takes issue with venue, the demurrer may be treated as a motion to change venue. (See CCP, § 397, subd. (a) [authorizing change of venue]; see also Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125 [authorizing requested relief where the moving papers “make clear the grounds for the relief sought”].) Venue may be changed only if the case “was not commenced in the proper court.” (CCP, § 396b, subd. (a).) Venue is proper in the county where: (1) a defendant resides at the start of litigation; (2) the contractual obligation at issue is to be performed; or (3) the subject contract was executed. (CCP, § 395, subd. (a).) Here, venue is proper because Defendant resides in Santa Clara County. (Compl., ¶ 7(c) & Ex. A; Defendant’s Demurrer, p. 1:1-3.) Defendant insists venue is only proper in San Francisco County pursuant to a venue selection clause in the Note. While the Note states that Defendant agrees that venue is proper in San Francisco County, i.e. Plaintiff’s county of residence, it does not suggest that venue is improper in any other county. (Compl., Ex. A.) Furthermore, a clause that fixes venue in a county not otherwise authorized by statute as a proper venue is void. (Alexander, supra, at pp. 731-732.) Nothing suggests that venue in San Francisco County is authorized by statute, and thus, the venue clause is unenforceable. Accordingly, venue is proper in this county and Defendant’s argument lacks merit.

Lastly, to the extent Defendant requests a dismissal, Plaintiff persuasively argues that there is no legal basis for a dismissal based on improper venue. That being said, it is possible that Defendant takes issue with forum, as he refers to jurisdiction, dismissals, and “venue shopping.” (See Alexander, supra, at pp. 726-727 & 731 [forum is a place of jurisdiction distinct from venue]; see also Miller-Leigh, supra, at p. 1149 [forum allows courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction]; see also CCP, §§ 410.30 & 418.10 [dismissal for inconvenient forum]; see also, e.g., Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 762 [“forum shopping”].) A party cannot challenge forum or otherwise seek to enforce a forum selection clause by a demurrer for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the demurrer may be treated as a motion to dismiss for inconvenient forum under CCP section 410.30. (Miller-Leigh, supra, at pp. 1149-1150.) However, California is a convenient forum because California law governs the Note and the parties reside—and agreed to adjudicate matters—in this state. (Compl., Ex. A.) A venue clause “is purely an intrastate issue involving the selecting of a county” that does not justify a dismissal for inconvenient forum. (Alexander, supra, at pp. 726-727; Ferreira v. Ferreira (1973) 9 Cal.3d 824, 832 [dismissal for inconvenient forum adjudicates not only that the selected venue in California is inconvenient, but that California cannot offer a convenient forum].) Therefore, Defendant’s assertion that the case should be dismissed is unavailing.

In light of the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED.