Case Name: Alireza Mikailli, et al. v. Phillip Sydney Langton, et al.
Case No: 18CV332114

I. Background

Alireza Mikailli and Mahnaz Kalanaki (collectively “the Buyers”) initiated this action against David Langton (“David”) and Micah Langton (“Micah”). David and Micha are the testate or intestate successors of decedent Phillip Langton (“Phillip”).

According to the allegations in the complaint, the real property at issue is located at 448 North San Pedro Street in San Jose, California (“Subject Property”). (Complaint, ¶¶ 3, 10.) Phillip, along with John Langton (“John”) and Sara Langton (“Sara”), owned the Subject Property as joint tenants. (Complaint, ¶ 12.) In 1990, John and Sara changed the character of their interest in the Subject Property to community property via an inter-spousal transfer deed. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) Then, in 1996, they conveyed their interest in the Subject Property to themselves as trustees of the John and Sara Langton Jr., 1996 Living Trust (“Living Trust”). (Complaint, ¶ 14.) In 2017, following John’s death, the Buyers purchased the Subject Property from Sara as the surviving trustee of the Living Trust. (Complaint, ¶¶ 10-11, 15.)

The Buyers allege that David and Micah, as Phillip’s heirs and testate or intestate successors, claim some right or interest in the Subject Property that is adverse to or creates a cloud on their title. (Complaint, ¶ 4-5.) They assert causes of action against David and Micah for: (1) quiet title and (2) declaratory relief. (Complaint, Cover Sheet.)

In turn, David and Micah filed a cross-complaint against the Buyers. The operative first amended cross-complaint (“FACC”) asserts causes of action for: (1) partition of real property; (2) accounting; and (3) declaratory relief. (FACC, Cover Sheet.) David and Micah claim “they are currently the owners or have a combined undivided 33 & 1/3% interest” in the Subject Property. (FACC, ¶ 2.) The seek to partition the Subject Property by sale; an accounting of assets and liabilities related to the Subject Property; and a judicial determination of their interest in the Subject Property and entitlement to partition. (FACC, ¶¶ 11, 14-15, 17, 20-23.)

The Buyers presently demur to the FACC. David and Micah (collectively “the Langtons”) oppose the demurrer.

II. Merits of Demurrer

The Buyers demur to each cause of action in the FACC on the grounds of uncertainty and failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).)

A. Uncertainty

Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and will be sustained only where the allegations of the pleading are so unintelligible the defendant cannot reasonably respond them, i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.; see also Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 fn. 2.) Therefore, a demurrer for uncertainty “should not be sustained if the allegations are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues that must be met, even if the allegations of the complaint may not be clear and as detailed as might be desired.” (Merlino v. West Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co. (1956) 90 Cal.App.2d 106, 108.)

Here, with respect to the first cause of action, the Buyers assert it is ambiguous as to whether the Langtons have the required interest in the Subject Property to maintain a partition action. (Mem., p. 6.) The Buyers conclude it is impossible to intelligently respond. (Mem., p. 6.) In essence, they are arguing the Langtons failed to incorporate sufficient facts to adequately allege a claim for partition of real property. A demurrer for uncertainty does not address whether the pleading fails to “incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading but is directed at the uncertainty existing in the allegations actually made.” (Butler v. Sequeira (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 143, 145-146.) Thus, the demurrer to the first cause of action fails.

Regarding the second and third causes of action for accounting and declaratory relief, the Buyers do not specifically address why these claims are purportedly uncertain. Thus, the demurrer to the second and third causes of action is unsubstantiated.

Accordingly, the demurrer to each cause of action on the ground of uncertainty is OVERRULED.

B. Failure to State Sufficient Facts

“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurer, we are guided by long settled rules. ‘[Courts] treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Courts] also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading. It admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint; the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213–214.)

1. First Cause of Action

The Buyers first argue the Langtons fail to allege they have the requisite property interest to maintain their partition claim. (Mem., p. 6.) In opposition, the Langtons argue they have an equitable interest in the Subject Property that was transferred to them when Phillip died intestate. (Opp., p. 4.)

An action to partition real property is a special statutory proceeding that may be maintained only by a person having an interest described by statute. (Powers v. Powers (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 746, 748.) Code of Civil Procedure section 872.210 provides that an action to partition real property may be maintained by “[a]n owner of an estate of inheritance, an estate for life, or an estate for years in real property where such property or estate therein is owned by several persons concurrently or in successive estates.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 872.210, subd. (a).)

Here, the Langtons merely allege they have a 33 1/3 percent interest in the Subject Property; they do not plead any further details. While they describe their interest as an equitable interest inherited from Phillip in their opposition, no such description appears in the FACC itself. Thus, the Langtons failed to adequately allege they have a requisite interest in the Subject Property to permit a partition action. (See Davaloo v. State Farm Ins. Co. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 409, 415 [plaintiff must allege ultimate facts constituting cause of action that apprise defendant of the factual basis of a claim].) The demurrer is therefore sustainable on this basis.

The Buyers next argue the FACC does not include all the statutorily required allegations for a partition cause of action. (Mem., p. 7.)

A complaint for partition, among other things, must set forth: (1) all interests of record or actually known to the plaintiff that persons other than the plaintiff have or claim in the property and that the plaintiff reasonably believes will be materially affected by the action, whether the names of such persons are known or unknown to the plaintiff; and (2) the estate as to which partition is sought and a prayer for partition of the interests herein. (Code Civ. Proc., § 872.230, subds. (c), (d).)

The Buyers contend the FACC fails to allege a description of all interests in the Subject Property that will be materially affected by the action. (Mem., p. 7.) They do not elaborate any further. But the Langtons allege the Buyers have a possessory interest in the Subject Property. (FACC, ¶ 6.) The Buyers do not explain how or why that allegation is inadequate, and there is no basis for concluding the Langtons otherwise neglected to identify any other interest in the Subject Property. Thus, the demurrer is not sustainable on the basis the Langtons did not sufficiently allege all interests in the Subject Property apart from their own.

Lastly, the Buyers argue the Langtons failed to allege the estate as to which partition is sought. (Mem., p. 7.) In opposition, the Langtons claim they meet this requirement by alleging, “Philip Sydney Langton husband of Cross-Complainant Micah Langton and father of Cross-Complainant David Jacob Langton deceased on or about March 10, 2011.” (FACC, ¶ 5.) That allegation does not suffice because estates in real property include estates of inheritance, for life, and for years (Civ. Code, § 761), but they do not explicitly identify the estate as to which partition is sought. The demurrer is thus sustainable on this basis.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the first cause of action on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action is SUSTAINED, with 20 days’ leave to amend, on the bases the Langtons did not adequately allege they have the requisite property interest to maintain a partition action and did not allege the estate as to which partition is sought.

2. Second and Third Causes of Action

The second and third causes of action are for accounting and declaratory relief, respectively. (FACC, ¶¶ 17-18.) Both are predicated on the same underlying facts as the first cause of action for partition. The Buyers simply state the claims fail because the Langtons have not alleged a prima facie case for partition of real property. (Mem., pp. 7-8.)

Here, the second cause of action for accounting is directly interrelated with the partition action. The Langtons allege an accounting of the tenancy’s common assets and liabilities must be properly accounted for relative to the partition. (FACC, ¶ 14.) Because the Court concluded a cause of action for partition has not been sufficiently pled, it necessarily follows the demurrer to the second cause of action is also sustainable.

Regarding the third cause of action, the Langtons allege an actual controversy has arisen regarding the parties’ respective rights concerning the Subject Property in that they claim an entitlement to partition while the Buyers are not agreeable to such partition. (FACC, ¶ 14.) To state a claim for declaratory relief, a plaintiff must simply allege facts showing there is an actual controversy; he or she need not allege facts showing entitlement to a favorable declaration. (Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 23, 29.) The Buyers do not articulate how the allegations in the third cause of action short of this pleading standard. Thus, the Buyers have not substantiated their demurrer to the third cause of action.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the second cause of action on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action is SUSTAINED, with 20 days’ leave to amend. The demurrer to the third cause of action on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action is OVERRULED.