Case Name: Ana Villalta v. Royal Trucking, Inc., et al.
Case No.: 2016-CV-289915

Motion for Summary Judgment to the Complaint and Cross-Complaint by Defendants Royal Trucking, Inc. and Robert Rios

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a motor vehicle accident case. On February 25, 2014, plaintiff Ana Villalta (“Plaintiff”) was travelling southbound on US 101 in the vicinity of Rengstorff Avenue in Mountain View, California. Plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision with a tractor trailer operated by defendant Robert Rios (“Rios”) and a Volvo driven by defendant Thomas Anderson (“Anderson”). Rios is an employee of defendant Royal Trucking, Inc. (“Royal Trucking”).

On January 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Judicial Council Form Complaint against defendants Rios, Royal Trucking, and Anderson alleging a single claim for negligence.

On September 6, 2016, Anderson filed a Cross-Complaint against Rios and Royal Trucking asserting causes of action for comparative equitable indemnity, implied indemnity, and declaratory relief.

Motions for Summary Judgment

Currently before the Court are the motions for summary judgment to the Complaint and Cross-Complaint by defendants/cross-defendants Rios and Royal Trucking (collectively, “Royal Defendants”). (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.) Plaintiff did not file opposition to the motion. Defendant/Cross-Complainant Anderson filed opposition and evidentiary objections. The Royal Defendants filed reply papers and evidentiary objections. No trial date has been set.

Anderson’s Evidentiary Objections

The Court declines to rule on Anderson’s evidentiary objections as they are not material in resolving issues raised by the motion for summary judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q) [“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion. Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion shall be preserved for appellate review.”].)

The Royal Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections

The Royal Defendants’ evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is properly granted when no triable issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant moving for summary judgment has met his or her burden of showing a cause of action has no merit if the defendant has shown that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “[T]he defendant bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. [Citation.] If the defendant carries the burden of production, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make his or her own prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of fact.” (McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [fn. omitted].) The evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion must be liberally construed, and all doubts concerning the evidence must be resolved in favor of that party. (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460.)

Negligence

The Complaint alleges a single claim for negligence. The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: the “defendant had a duty to use due care, that he [or she] breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. [Citation.]” (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 292-293.) “[E]very [negligence] case is governed by the rule of general application that all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct.” (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46.) The existence of a legal duty to use reasonable care in a particular factual situation is a question of law for the court to decide. (Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 265.) However, the elements of breach of that duty and causation are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury’s determination. (Andrews v. Wells (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 533, 538.)

Here, all of the causes of action set forth in the Complaint and Cross-Complaint are predicated on Rios’ alleged negligence in the operation of the tractor trailer. (See Royal Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts at No. 17.) On summary judgment, the Royal Defendants argue that defendant Rios was not negligent and did not cause the subject collision.

Breach of Duty

In moving for summary judgment, the Royal Defendants argue that defendant Rios did not act negligently in this case. The Court construes this argument as one based on the issue of breach of duty.

The question whether an act or omission will be considered a breach of duty necessarily depends upon the scope of the duty imposed. (Federico v. Super. Ct. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1211.) Generally, whether a defendant was negligent constitutes a question of fact for the jury. (Biles v. Richter (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 325, 332; Osborn v. Hertz Corp. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 703, 712-713 (Osborn).) However, where reasonable jurors could draw only one conclusion from the evidence presented, lack of negligence may be determined as a matter of law, and summary judgment granted. (Osborn, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at pp. 712-713.)

Here, the duty of care is presumably one undertaken by defendant Rios to operate his tractor trailer in a safe and reasonable manner on the highway. The Royal Defendants claim that Rios did not breach this duty because he was driving straight in his lane at a speed of approximately 55 miles per hour at the time of the accident. (See Royal Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts at Nos. 11-12; Rios Depo at p. 59:3-9; Jeffery Anderson Depo at p. 18:3-8; Eric Hanna Depo at pp. 15:6-16:2, 23:2-6.) However, at least some of the deposition testimony submitted by the moving parties suggests that defendant Rios may not have been driving reasonably at the time of the accident. For example, Jeffrey Anderson, a witness to the accident, testified that he believed “the truck clipped the left rear corner of the car.” (See Jeffrey Anderson Depo at p. 18:10-12.) Also, Eric Hanna, another witness, testified that he saw “the Volvo being pushed by the truck” even though he did not see any swerving by the truck. (See Eric Hanna Depo at p. 23:6-8.) Finally, the opposition provides a declaration from V. Paul Herbert (“Herbert”), an expert in the field of commercial trucking safety. Based on his review of the case, Herbert contends that Rios was driving his truck below the proper standard of care as he should have been aware of the Volvo in his vicinity and driven in a manner so as to be alert to possible lane changes from other vehicles. (See Herbert Declaration at ¶ 9.) Such evidence raises a factual issue as to whether defendant Rios was driving within the standard of care at the time of the accident. Therefore, the breach of duty issue cannot be resolved on this motion for summary judgment.

Causation

“California has adopted the ‘substantial factor’ test for cause-in-fact determinations.” (Lawrence v. La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 11, 33.) “A defendant’s negligent conduct may combine with another factor to cause harm; if a defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm, then the defendant is responsible for the harm; a defendant cannot avoid responsibility just because some other person, condition, or event was also a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm; but conduct is not a substantial factor in causing harm if the same harm would have occurred without that conduct.” (Yanez v. Plummer (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 180, 187.)

“In California, the causation element of negligence is satisfied when the plaintiff establishes (1) that the defendant’s breach of duty (his negligent act or omission) was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm and (2) that there is no rule of law relieving the defendant of liability.” (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 481.)

“Like breach of duty, causation also is ordinarily a question of fact which cannot be resolved by summary judgment. The issue of causation may be decided as a question of law only if, under undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.” (Nichols v. Keller (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1687.)

Here, the Royal Defendants provide evidence showing that a black car, presumably the Volvo driven by Anderson, was swirling and spinning around at the time of the accident. (See Royal Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts at Nos. 7-8; Jeffrey Anderson Depo at pp. 17:4-18:21; Plaintiff’s Depo at pp. 37:25-38:5.) However, this evidence does not demonstrate that Anderson caused the collision. In fact, the Royal Defendants do not submit any affirmative evidence showing that Anderson actually caused the collision. In addition, as stated above, the deposition testimony given by Jeffrey Anderson and Eric Hanna may suggest that defendant Rios played a part in causing the collision. (See Jeffrey Anderson Depo at p. 18:10-12; see also Eric Hanna Depo at p. 23:6-8.) Finally, in opposition, Herbert states in his declaration that “Mr. Rios’ lack of awareness of the presence and actions of the Volvo in his ‘blind spot’ more likely than not contributed to the subject accident.” (See Herbert Declaration at ¶ 9.) Taken together, such evidence raises a factual issue as to whether defendant Rios caused the subject collision. Consequently, the issue of causation cannot be resolved on this motion for summary judgment.

Disposition

As Plaintiff did not file any opposition, the motion for summary judgment to the Complaint is GRANTED.

As triable issues of fact remain with respect to breach of duty and causation, the motion for summary judgment to the Cross-Complaint is DENIED.