Case Number: BC678506 Hearing Date: January 10, 2019 Dept: A

# 5. Armando Martinez, et al. v. Maan Parampareet Singh, et al.

Case No.: BC678506

Matter on calendar for: motion to quash service of summons

Tentative ruling:

I. Background

This wrongful death and personal injury action arises from a motor vehicle collision on November 18, 2016. Plaintiffs Armando and Maria Martinez are the parents of Jose Juan Martinez, a minor, and the parents and successors in interest of Elizabeth Martinez, who was fatally injured in the collision.

Armando Martinez was driving a 2015 Nissan Versa; Maria, Jose Juan, and Elizabeth were passengers. The alleged incident occurred when defendant Maan Parampareet Singh, the driver of a 2012 Volvo semi-truck and trailer, rear-ended the Martinez vehicle. Singh also rear-ended a 2009 Holiday Scepter motorhome that was towing a 2012 Honda CR-V. Defendant Masao Miyake was the driver of the motorhome.

The operative complaint is the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). It alleges the following causes of action:

(1) Negligence/reckless conduct;

(2) Products liability-negligence;

(3) Products liability-failure to warn;

(4) Products liability-strict liability;

(5) Products liability-breach of warranties;

(6) Products liability-misrepresentation and concealment;

(7) Negligent infliction of emotional distress (bystander);

(8) Survival action; and

(9) Declaratory relief

Specially appearing defendant Nissan Mexicana, S.A. de C.V. (“NMEX”) moves to quash service of the summons and FAC. Plaintiffs oppose.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court orders grants NMEX’s motion to quash service of the summons and FAC.

II. Analysis

a. Timeliness

Plaintiffs have conceded timeliness. This motion is timely and properly before the Court.

b. Declarations and objections

Plaintiffs’ objections to the declaration of Armando Sanchez are overruled. Nissan Mexicana’s objections 1–3 are sustained.

c. Personal jurisdiction

California’s courts “may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” (C.C.P., § 410.10.) Code of Civil Procedure § 410.10 is coextensive with the limits of due process. (Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd. (Fed.Cir. 2009) 566 F.3d 1012, 1017.) Due process requires a defendant to have “certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” (International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 [66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95].)

There are two forms of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. (International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at 318.) It is undisputed that Nissan Mexicana is not “at home” in California as to allow general jurisdiction under Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 133 [134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed2d 624]. At issue is specific jurisdiction, also known as case-linked jurisdiction. “In order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.’ [Citation.]” (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County (2017) 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1781 [198 L.Ed.2d 395].)

Specific jurisdiction must satisfy a three-pronged test: “(1) the non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some acts by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. [Citation.]” (Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co. (9th Cir. 2004) 374 F.3d 797, 802.)

“When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. [Citation.] Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. [Citation.]” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449.)

Here, plaintiffs include several webpage printouts that are insufficient to establish minimum contacts. At most they show that NMEX participates in a global “Nissan” conglomerate. The submitted declarations are more relevant. The declaration of Shiho Kobayashi, submitted in support of Nissan Motor Co.’s motion to quash, states that NMEX is a separate entity that is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nissan Motor Co. (Decl. Haselhoff, Exh. 15, ¶ 8.) Armando Sanchez, general counsel for NMEX, declares that NMEX manufactured the subject vehicle and “received instructions from [Nissan North America] regarding shipping the subject vehicle to the final rail point, which was in Milpitas, California . . . . Title for the subject vehicle passed from NMEX to [Nissan North America] on the Mexican side of the border. [Nissan North America], not NMEX, determined where and to whom the vehicle would be sold to customers.” (Decl. Sanchez ¶ 13.)

“The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state.” (Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 112 [107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92].) Plaintiffs have not shown anything more than NMEX’s injection of a product into the stream of commerce. Nissan North America, a separate entity, purchased the vehicle from NMEX and then distributed it nationally. That the vehicle in question was sold in California is not sufficient, on its own, to show NMEX purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities in California. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Falco v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2015) 96 F.Supp.3d 1053 is unavailing; plaintiffs fail to make a showing similar to the one in that case.

The motion to quash is granted.

III. Ruling

NMEX’s motion to quash is granted.