2018-00237666-CU-OE

Audrey Howard vs. Golden State FC, LLC

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Stay Proceedings

Filed By: Miller, Barbara J.

Defendant Golden State FC, LLC, dba Amazon.com’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Stay Proceedings is GRANTED.

This is a Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”) action, brought by Plaintiff Audrey Howard, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to Labor Code section 2698 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant regularly has Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees at its fulfillment centers work over 10 hours, without providing or compensating for a second meal break or third rest break, as required by

California law. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to pay all wages owed in each pay period, and that in violation of Labor Code § 226(a), Defendant issued false and inaccurate wage statements which fail to account for all Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees’ wages earned.

Defendant now moves to stay this action pending the resolution of a “nearly identical” federal action also filed by Plaintiff’s counsel, Palma v. Golden State FC, LLC No. 1:13 -cv-00121-DAD-BAM (E.D. Cal.) (“Palma”). Defendant argues that the Court should use its discretion to stay this case, which was filed later than Palma. Defendant contends that this action and Palma involve duplicative claims against Defendant for failure to pay premium wages for missed breaks, failure to pay all wages owed in each pay period, and failure to provide timely and accurate wage statements. Defendant notes that both complaints seek any unpaid wages owed to Defendant’s non-exempt fulfillment center employees in California. Defendant asserts that the only difference is that this case is brought by Plaintiff as a putative statewide representative action pursuant to PAGA, whereas Palma was brought by a different employee working at Plaintiff’s fulfillment center, plaintiff Romeo Palma, as a statewide putative class action. Thus, as the two actions involve the same group of non-exempt, hourly employees working at Defendant’s California Fulfillment Centers, and allege generally the same claims, Defendant argues that there is a risk of duplicating efforts, a risk of burdening parties, witnesses, and the judiciary, and a risk of conflicting rulings.

Defendant further asserts that there are numerous other similar actions pending in California, all of which were filed prior to this action. Specifically, there are three related federal cases (Trevino v. Golden State FL LLC et al. No. 1:18-cv-00120-DAD-BAM (“Trevino”); Ward, et al. v. Amazon, et al., No. 1:17-cv-01300-DAD-BAM (“Ward ”); and Palma) pending in the Eastern District of California that involve wage and hour violations against Defendant (“Related Fulfillment Center Cases.”) (MPA at p. 2.) A fourth federal action is pending in the Central District of California (Hagman v. Amazon Fulfillment Services, Inc., et al. No. 5:18-cv-00024-JVS-SHK (“Hagman”). A fifth federal action was recently joined to the Related Fulfillment Center Cases, which was similar to a state action filed by the same plaintiff in Riverside County (Avalos I [federal] and Avalos II [state].) Plaintiff Avalos agreed to stay her state PAGA claim in Avalos II pending resolution of Avalos I. (Purles Decl. ¶5, Ex. D.) Finally, there is a similar action pending in San Bernardino Count (Alvarado v. Amazon.com LLC, et al. No. CIVDS1724072), which has been stayed pending resolution of the Related Fulfillment Center Cases. (Purles Decl. ¶4, Ex. C.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion. She argues that this case does not involve substantially identical parties affecting the same subject matter, and thus should not be stayed. Specifically, she argues that Plaintiff is not a party to any of the actions listed by Defendant. She further argues that this action involves different subject matter than Palma, because Palma does not include a PAGA cause of action. She notes that there is no class certification requirement for a PAGA claim, and thus it is possible that the PAGA claims in the other actions pending in federal rout may not be able to proceed as a representative action, and staying this action would delay aggrieved employees not named as plaintiffs in the federal actions. Finally, she argues that various factors to be considered by the court, including conflicts with other actions, burden or harassment to the parties, availability of witnesses, and the stage of the proceedings, weigh against granting the stay.

The pendency of another earlier action growing out of the same transaction between

the same parties is a ground for abatement of the second action. (See People ex rel. Garamendi v. Am. Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 760, 770.) When a federal action has been filed covering the same subject matter as is involved in a California action, the California court has the discretion but not the obligation to stay the state court action. (Caiafa Prof. Law Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (1993) 15 Cal. App. 4th 800, 804.)

In exercising its discretion the Court should consider the importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed solely to harass an adverse party, and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other jurisdictions. It should also consider whether the rights of the parties can best be determined by the court of the other jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advanced. Another critical factor favoring a stay of the state court action in favor of the federal action is a factor which happens to be present in this case–the federal action is pending in California not some other state. (Ibid.)

Moreover, it is established that where two related lawsuits are pending – one in state court and the other in federal district court of the same state – “the principle of comity may call for a discretionary refusal of the court to entertain the second suit pending determination of the first-filed action.” (Gregg v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 134, 136.) Although the decision to grant a stay in that situation is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, “a court should ordinarily decline to entertain jurisdiction of the issue under the doctrine of comity.” (Simmons v. Superior Court (1950) 96 CalApp2d 119, 124.)

Here, the Court finds in its discretion that a stay is warranted. The Palma action and Related Fulfillment Center Cases currently pending in federal court in California seek the same PAGA penalties and unpaid wages, are based on the same wage and hour violations – specifically the second meal and third rest break violations – and seek relief for the same putative group of employees. While the federal actions may be broader than this action, the relief sought by Plaintiff in this action is subsumed in the federal cases, and specifically, in Palma. Further, to prevail in a PAGA action, whether through the class action procedures of Rule 23 or a different procedural mechanism, a plaintiff must still prove that each individual seeks relief suffered a Labor Code violation. (See, e.g., Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 967, 987.) The same Labor Code violations asserted here are asserted in Palma (and largely in the Related Fulfillment Center Cases.)

Similarly, although Plaintiff is not a named plaintiff in the federal actions, she is a putative class member in each of the Related Fulfillment Center Cases, including Palma. Moreover, a PAGA cause of action is technically brought by the State, with Plaintiff as the real party in interest. (Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC (2014) 59 Cal. 4th 348, 386-87.) And although Palma does not contain a PAGA cause of action, two of the other Related Fulfillment Center Cases – Trevino and Ward – do involve PAGA claims seeking penalties for the harms that Plaintiff alleges she suffered in this action. Thus, her claims on behalf of the State are brought on the State’s behalf in the federal actions. It is clear that the cases involve the same subject matter and “the same or substantially identical” parties. (Caiafa, 15 Cal. App. 4th at 806, n. 5.)

The Court further finds that the Caiafa factors weigh in favor of a discretionary stay. A stay will help discourage multiple harassing lawsuits meant to harass, as the complaint

in this action is largely duplicative – and in some cases, identical – to the Palma, Ward, and Trevino actions. A stay would also help avoid unseemly conflicts with the federal court, given that the same alleged Labor Code violations are involved in this action as in the federal actions. The Eastern District of California can competently determine the rights of the parties, and there is no evidence that the witnesses would be burdened if this case is stayed. Finally, the federal actions were filed before this action, and the Ward and Trevino cases have provided written discovery responses, exchanged documents, taken depositions, and established a class certification schedule. (Purles Decl. ¶¶9-10.) This action, on the other hand, has not conducted discovery or taken any other substantive steps to begin litigation.

In the interests of comity and judicial efficiency, and in the exercise of its discretion, the Court grants the requested stay of this later-filed action.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.