Case Number: BC536662    Hearing Date: July 22, 2014    Dept: 93

Defendants Matthew David Newhall and David Newhall’s unopposed Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Prayer for Punitive Damages is GRANTED without leave to amend.
Discussion
Civil Code § 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases “where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied . . . . ” Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or “malice,” or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton. Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890, 894; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.
In Taylor, the California Supreme Court held that driving while intoxicated can, under certain circumstances, support an award of punitive damages because it evidences malice. 24 Cal.3d at 892. Specifically, the complaint in Taylor alleged that
[Defendant ]Stille is, and for a substantial period of time had been, an alcoholic “well aware of the serious nature of his alcoholism” and of his “tendency, habit, history, practice, proclivity, or inclination to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol”; and that Stille was also aware of the dangerousness of his driving while intoxicated.

Id. The complaint further alleged that Stille had previously caused a serious automobile accident while driving under the influence of alcohol; that he had been arrested and convicted for drunken driving on numerous prior occasions; that at the time of the accident herein, Stille had recently completed a period of probation which followed a drunk driving conviction; that one of his probation conditions was that he refrain from driving for at least six hours after consuming any alcoholic beverage; and that at the time of the accident in question he was presently facing an additional pending criminal drunk driving charge. Id. at 893.
Furthermore, in Dawes v. Superior Court (Mardian), the Court of Appeals noted that facts on this level are distinguishable from facts that merely allege driving while intoxicated. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 89-90. “Ordinary intoxicated driving” may create a risk of injury to others that is foreseeable, but not necessarily probable. Id. In Dawes, the defendant was alleged to have made a “decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June.” Id. at 89. These allegations also support a claim for punitive damages. Id. at 89-90.
Here, Plaintiffs alleges that Defendant Mathew David Newhall was driving while intoxicated, as follows:
Defendant Matthew David Newhall owed Plaintiffs Aura Hooker and Cheyenne Price a duty to use reasonable care to prevent harm to others. Matthew David Hall breached this duty in failing to exercise reasonable care in operating a motor vehicle, specifically, by driving under the influence of alcohol, driving at unsafe speed, and failing to stop his vehicle for slowing and stopped traffic causing a 3 car collision. As a result of the breach, Defendant Matthew Newhall collided with the vehicle in which Aura Hooker was the driver and Cheyenne Price was the passenger, causing both to sustain significant injuries. Defendant Matthew Newhall’s breach of duty of care and other negligent acts are the legal and proximate cause of each of Plaintiffs’ injuries.

Complaint, p. 6. These allegations are predominately generalized and conclusory statements that Defendants were aware of the obvious and apparent consequences of their conduct unsupported by any specific facts regarding their conduct. These allegations simply allege ordinary intoxicated driving, and do not rise to the level of malicious conduct as articulated in Dawes and Taylor. There is no allegation in the Complaint that demonstrates Defendant Matthew David Newhall’s conduct rises to a level of malice, as required by case law to seek punitive damages. Therefore, the Motion to Strike is GRANTED. Given that the motion is unopposed, the court does not believe leave to amend is appropriate.
Defendants are ordered to give notice.