Bridget Bryden v. City of Santa Barbara
Case No: 17CV01529
Hearing Date: Mon Jun 24, 2019 9:30

Nature of Proceedings: Motion Bifurcation

Bridget Bryden v. City of Santa Barbara (Judge Sterne)

Case No. 17CV01529

Hearing Date: June 24, 2019

HEARING:

Motion of Defendant City of Santa Barbara to Bifurcate Trial

ATTORNEYS:

For Plaintiff Bridget Bryden: Jonathan D. Miller, Holly C. Blackwell, Nye, Stirling, Hale & Miller, LLP

For Defendant City of Santa Barbara: Ariel Pierre Calonne, Tom R. Shapiro, Office of the City Attorney; Eugene P. Ramirez, G. Craig Smith, Nicole M. Threlkel, Manning & Kass Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester LLP

TENTATIVE RULING:

Counsel for all parties are to appear, in person or by telephone, for the hearing on this motion.

Background:

Plaintiff Bridget Bryden filed her complaint against defendant City of Santa Barbara (City) on April 7, 2017, asserting in her complaint five causes of action: (1) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; (2) violation of Labor Code section 6310; (3) violation of title 42 United States Code section 1983; (4) violation of Civil Code section 52.1; and, (5) violation of Government Code section 3303 et seq. All of these claims arise out of plaintiff’s allegations of wrongful termination and retaliation as a result of whistleblowing activities.

On May 10, 2017, City filed its answer to the complaint, generally denying the allegations thereof and asserting 24 affirmative defenses.

On December 10, 2018, the court heard City’s motion for summary judgment or alternatively for summary adjudication. By order after hearing filed on January 31, 2019, the court denied the motion in its entirety.

City now moves to bifurcate the section 1983 claim from the remaining claims.

Plaintiff opposes the motion.

Trial is now set for August 5, 2019.

Analysis:

“The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order, no later than the close of pretrial conference in cases in which such pretrial conference is to be held, or, in other cases, no later than 30 days before the trial date, that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case, except for special defenses which may be tried first pursuant to Sections 597 and 597.5.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 598; accord, § 1048, subd. (b).)

The section 1983 claim is discussed by the parties as a Monell claim after Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York (1978) 436 U.S. 658 [98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611]. “Local governments have no liability under section 1983 simply because their employees may have violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights; the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply. [Citation.] No punitive damages can be awarded against a public entity. [Citation.] [¶] The United States Supreme Court has carved out a limited area of direct municipal responsibility ‘if the deprivation of rights was caused by an official policy or custom of the county, set by the county’s lawmakers or by an official who speaks with final policymaking authority for the county.’ [Citation.] At most, Monell liability adds an additional defendant, a municipality, to the universe of actors who will be jointly and severally liable for the award.” (Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 328 (Choate).)

“Entity liability may arise in one of two forms. The municipality may itself have directed the deprivation of federal rights through an express government policy. This was the situation in Monell, where there was an explicit policy requiring pregnant government employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were medically required. [Citation.] [¶] Alternatively, the municipality may have in place a custom or practice so widespread in usage as to constitute the functional equivalent of an express policy. Pattern or practice lawsuits involve far-reaching inquiries into how police departments train and discipline their officers. The Supreme Court has viewed them skeptically: ‘Rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied’ to ensure that the municipality, through culpable misconduct, was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. [Citation.]” (Choate, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 328.) Perhaps not surprisingly, most Monell litigation appears to involve police excessive use of force claims, and hence the comment that Monell litigation involve far-reaching inquiries regarding police training and discipline.

In section 1983 actions for damages, there is no authority for an “award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm. If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.” (City of Los Angeles v. Heller (1986) 475 U.S. 796, 799 [106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806], italics omitted.)

City argues that trial of the Monell cause of action requires both a determination that there was a constitutional violation causing harm and a determination of custom and practice. The determination that there was a constitutional violation causing harm to plaintiff is an individual determination for which evidence should generally be limited to plaintiff-specific acts and omissions. The determination of custom and practice requires evidence of claims of retaliation for whistleblowing by persons other than plaintiff. Evidence of alleged other bad acts would be prejudicial to City where such evidence is not admissible to prove plaintiff’s own claims against City. By bifurcating the Monell cause of action (or, more specifically, the existence of a constitutional violation as to plaintiff) from the remaining claims, City asserts that the prejudice would be avoided. To the extent that the jury finds no constitutional violation, the later trial of the Monell issues would be avoided.

Plaintiff argues that little time would be saved by bifurcation because plaintiff’s counsel is “reasonably certain that I will not need to call more than three witnesses to address Deputy Chief Mannix’s history of retaliating against whistleblowers” and estimates “that these witnesses will involve no more than approximately two hours of trial time.” (Miller decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also argues that plaintiff would be prejudiced by bifurcation because retaliation evidence involves circumstantial evidence that overlaps with evidence to show custom or practice for the Monell claim and because evidence as to Mannix’s credibility overlaps evidence to show custom or practice for the Monell claim.

City responds that plaintiff does not point to any evidence of past claims of retaliation that are relevant to plaintiff’s claims of retaliation against her.

The resolution of this motion depends upon the resolution of the issue of the relative overlap of evidence and the inherent prejudice to City of presenting evidence of other alleged bad acts. The court requires counsel to appear for the hearing on this motion. All counsel are to be prepared to discuss this motion further and the evidentiary limitations that would be caused by bifurcation. Counsel are also to be prepared to discuss that issues would be addressed in each phase of trial if the court determines to bifurcate trial.