Dee Vu v Thomas Truc Nguyen

Case Name: Vu v. Nguyen, et al.
Case No.: 16CV302134 (consolidated with 16SC064423/17SC070444)

The admitted facts in this case are that defendant Thomas Truc Nguyen (“Defendant”) approached plaintiff Dee Vu (“Plaintiff”) in early September 2014 to ask Plaintiff to rent him two bedrooms located at 1025 Rankin Drive in Milpitas for him, his wife and daughter to live. Defendant orally agreed to pay $1,200 per month in rent for the bedrooms, and to pay for all utilities over and above the normal usage by the current resident. Defendant’s lease agreement was for a period of one year. Defendant concealed from Plaintiff that he also intended to have his son, Calvin, and his friend additionally live in the two bedrooms. Defendant is Plaintiff’s uncle, and because of the familial relationship and trust between parties, Defendant was provided a pre-signed rental agreement form for him to complete with the terms of the oral rental agreement. However, Defendant altered the rental agreement to be for a term of two years, and for five persons, and omitting the terms regarding utility expenses. Calvin was a painkiller addict, and caused public disturbances at the subject property such that the Milpitas Police Department needed to intervene at least five times from October 1, 2014 to November 15, 2015, including one occasion where Calvin was taken to a mental hospital and held there for 72 hours. Calvin also verbally and physically threatened the current resident on several occasion, and thus, in September 2015, Plaintiff’s husband, Henry Ngo, requested that Defendant and his family move out due to the number of disturbances and threats Calvin made against the current resident, Henry Ngo’s mother. However, Defendant initially refused to move out when asked, but later agreed in a telephone call to vacate the premises by December 31, 2015.

In early November 2015, Defendant informed Plaintiff that he had found a place and would move out of the subject property by November 15, 2015. Defendant owes Plaintiff the sum of $2,254.30 in unpaid water and utility expenses he agreed to pay, and a total of $555.30 in cleaning expenses. Defendant admits that the written agreement signed by him did not contain accurate terms and conditions that were agreed upon by parties. On May 15, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to have these facts be deemed admitted. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, asserting causes of action for rescission of the written lease agreement, breach of contract, and fraud. Defendant filed a small claims action, which was appealed after judgment by Plaintiff. This action and the small claims appeal were consolidated. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to all causes of action.

Plaintiff’s burden of proof for summary judgment

The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact—one sufficient to support the position of the party in question that no more is called for. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850-851.) Plaintiffs moving for summary judgment bear the burden of persuasion that each element of the cause of action in question has been proved, and hence that there is no defense thereto. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c.) Plaintiffs, who bear the burden of proof at trial by preponderance of evidence, therefore “must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying material fact more likely than not—otherwise he would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but would have to present his evidence to a trier of fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p.851.)

Plaintiff meets her initial burden.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to her causes of action and the now consolidated small claims action. Here, Plaintiff has presented facts that have been deemed admitted. As a general rule an admission is conclusive in the action as to the party making it. (Murillo v. Super. Ct. (People) (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 730, 736, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.410 (stating that “[a]ny matter admitted in response to a request for admission is conclusively established against the party making the admission in the pending action, unless the court has permitted withdrawal or amendment of that admission under Section 2033.300”); see also Monroy v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 248, 260 (stating that “[i]f a response to a request for admission is unambiguous, and is not subject to different meanings, the matter admitted is conclusively established”); “Matters that are admitted or deemed admitted through [request for admissions] discovery devices are conclusively established in the litigation and are not subject to being contested through contradictory evidence.” (Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 30.)

Here, Plaintiff demonstrates that the written lease agreement filled out by Defendant should be rescinded because Plaintiff’s consent was obtained through fraud of Defendant. (See Civ. Code § 1689, subd. (b)(1); see also Civ. Code §§ 1688 (stating that “[a] contract is extinguished by its rescission”), 1692; see also Sharabianlou v. Karp (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1144-1148 (discussing bases and elements of rescission cause of action).) Plaintiff also demonstrates that Defendant made misrepresentations regarding the terms of the contract, with knowledge of the falsity of those misrepresentations, Defendant intentionally chose not to disclose the falsity of those misrepresentations, and Plaintiff justifiably relied on Defendant’s misrepresentations, resulting in damages of at least $2,254.30 in unpaid utility expenses and $555.30 in cleaning expenses. (See Lazar v. Super. Ct. (Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.) (1996) 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (stating elements for fraud cause of action).) Plaintiff also demonstrates the existence of the oral contract, Plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, Defendant’s breach and damages resulting therefrom. (See Acoustics, Inc. v. Trepte Construction Co. (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 887, 913 (stating elements for breach of contract cause of action).) As Plaintiff has demonstrated that the written lease agreement is invalid, Plaintiff also demonstrates that the small claims action that is dependent on that agreement is without merit. Accordingly, Plaintiff meets her initial burden to demonstrate that she is entitled to judgment as to all causes of action.

In opposition, Defendant fails to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

In opposition, Defendant argues that the parties failed to agree as to basic terms of the lease, such that there can be no breach of any contract by Defendant. (See Def.’s opposition to motion for summary judgment (“Opposition”), pp.4:26-27, 5:1-26, 6:1-1-27, 7:1-27, 8:1-5.) However, the admissions by Defendant are conclusive and state that the parties did agree on all terms necessary to form a residential lease. This argument lacks merit. Defendant does not present any evidence that he sought to amend or withdraw his admissions deemed admitted, and does not argue that the admissions should be withdrawn or admitted. In fact, Defendant apparently agrees that the written lease agreement is unenforceable. (See Opposition, p.8:23-25 (stating “[w]ith respect to Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for rescission, the Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied because there is no enforceable contract to rescind”).) Defendant apparently attempts to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact through his own declaration which is cited in the separate statement, and argues that “[t]he terms and existence of such a lease are questions for the trier of fact.” (Opposition, p.9:8-9.) However, again, Defendant’s admissions are conclusively established in the litigation and are not subject to being contested through contradictory evidence. (See Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 30.) Defendant fails to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in its entirety, including that judgment shall be entered in favor of the Defendant Dee Vu in the small claims appeal (Case No. 17SC070444) that was consolidated.

The Court will prepare the Order. After presenting it to Defendant’s counsel for approval as to form in compliance with Rule of Court 3.1312, Plaintiff shall present a proposed judgment to the Court.

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