Kashanian v. Vanderwege CASE NO. 112CV236766
DATE: 6 June 2014 TIME: 9:00 LINE NUMBER: 11
This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.882.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 5 June 2014. Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 6 June 2014, the motions of plaintiffs Demey Kashanian (“Kashanian”) and Kristina Ravo (“Ravo”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) to compel defendant Jamye Harms Vanderwege (“Defendant”) to provide further responses to special interrogatories, set one (“SI”), requests for admission, set one (“RFA”), and requests for production of documents, set two (“RPD”), and for awards of monetary sanctions, was argued and submitted. Defendant filed formal oppositions to Plaintiffs’ motions to compel further responses to the SI and RPD. Defendant did not file a formal opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to the RFA.

Statement of Facts

This action arises out of an altercation between Plaintiffs’ dog, Rosa Parks, and Defendant’s dogs, Bella and Penny, as well as Defendant’s alleged assault and battery of Kashanian.

Plaintiffs and Defendant live with their dogs in the Cedar Terrace Condominiums, an 80-unit development that is managed by defendant Cedar Terrace Homeowners’ Association (“HOA”).

On the evening of 30 May 2012, Kashanian took Rosa Parks out through the fenced-in rear patio of Plaintiffs’ residence to bring Rosa Parks to a designated grass bathroom area for dogs. In route, Kashanian heard dogs barking and, out of the corner of his eye, saw Bella and Penny running towards him, off-leash. Bella and Penny attacked Rosa Parks and, when Kashanian attempted to pick up Rosa Parks, Bella knocked him to the ground, causing him to injure his back and drop Rosa Parks’ leash. Rosa Parks then ran back to Plaintiffs’ residence and was pursued by Bella and Penny.

Ravo had come outside after she heard Rosa Parks squealing. As Rosa Parks ran through the fence and into the patio, Ravo attempted to block Bella and Penny from entering the patio. Bella charged Ravo and knocked her to the ground, causing her to tip over a glass patio table. Kashanian entered the patio and attempted to grab Bella, who bit his hand. When Penny began to attack Rosa Parks, Kashanian picked Penny up and threw her over the patio fence.

Defendant then entered the patio, yelled at Kashanian, and punched him in the left eye. Defendant attempted to hit Kashnaian again, but Kashanian grabbed her hands to stop her from striking him. Ravo then managed to gain control of Bella, who let go of Rosa Parks. Rosa Parks ran away and was pursued by Ravo. Bella then ran away and both Kashanian and Defendant left the patio area. Kashanian and Rosa Parks received medical treatment for their injuries, and Kashanian was allegedly terminated from his employment due to his extended recovery period.

On 12 December 2013, Plaintiffs filed the operative second amended complaint (“SAC”), which alleges the following causes of actions: (1) strict liability under Civil Code section 3422, subdivision (a) (against Defendant); (2) strict liability under San Jose Municipal Ordinance section 7.40.060 (against Defendant); (3) strict liability under common law (against Defendant); (4) negligence (against Defendant); (5) private nuisance (against Defendant); (6) private nuisance (against Defendant); (7) assault (against Defendant); (8) battery (against Defendant); (9) negligence (against HOA); (10) breach of contract (against HOA); and (11) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (against HOA).

Discovery Dispute

On 24 October 2013, Plaintiffs served Defendant with the SI, RFA, and RPD via U.S. mail. (Mem. Ps & As. Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFA, p. 4:20-23; Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 1:19-20; Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to SI, p. 1:17-18.)

Plaintiffs granted Defendant an extension of time to respond to the discovery requests to 19 December 2013. (Mem. Ps & As. Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFA, p. 4:23-25; Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p.1:20-21; Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to SI, p. 1:20-21.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel had not received Defendant’s responses to the discovery requests as of 23 December 2014. (Mem. Ps & As., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFA, p. 4:26-27, 5:1-2; Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to SI, p. 1:22-24; Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 1:22-24.) Plaintiffs’ counsel therefore emailed and called Defendant’s counsel on 23 December 2014, regarding the status of Defendant’s responses, but was informed that Defendant’s counsel was on vacation through early January 2014. (Id.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel did not receive any response to his email or voice messages and on 4 February 2014, sent another email requesting Defendant’s responses to the discovery requests and an explanation for the delay in service of Defendant’s responses to the discovery requests. (Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 1:22-24, Ex. 1, p. 1.) Plaintiffs’ counsel advised Defendant’s counsel that absent a response to his correspondence, Plaintiffs would file a motion to compel responses. (Id.)

Defendant’s counsel replied via email on the same day and indicated that she had not received Plaintiffs’ counsel’s previous email or voice messages. (Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 2:2-5, Ex. 1, p. 2-3.) Defendant’s counsel advised that Defendant’s responses to the SI, RFA, and RPD had been served on 20 December 2013, and attached a copy of the responses to the SI, including a proof of service dated 19 December 2013, but no verification. (Id.)

On 5 February 2014, Defendant’s counsel and Plaintiffs’ counsel engaged in a telephone conversation during which Defendant’s counsel advised that she was unable to produce copies of Defendant’s responses to the RFA and RPD because her firm was experiencing a computer virus and she could not locate the hard copies. (Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 2:6-8, Ex. 1, p. 4-6.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel sent an email to Defendant’s counsel on the same day, memorializing the telephone conversation. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that the parties had agreed to a 20-day extension of time for Plaintiffs to file a motion to compel further responses and Defendant’s counsel’s assistant would attempt to locate Defendant’s responses to the RFA and RPD and provide them to Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Id.) Later that day, Defendant’s counsel responded via email, acknowledging receipt of the email and agreeing with the characterization of the parties’ agreement. (Id.)

On 20 February 2014, Defendant’s counsel’s assistant emailed Plaintiffs’ counsel copies of Defendant’s responses to the RFA and RPD, which did not contain any verifications. (Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 2:9-13, Ex. 1, p. 11.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel sent Defendant’s counsel a detailed meet and confer letter on 4 March 2014, outlining perceived deficiencies in Defendant’s responses to the SI, RFA, and RPD and requesting that Defendant provide verifications for her substantive responses. (Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 2:14-19, Ex. 2.) The parties agreed to extend Defendant’s time to provide further responses to 13 March 2014, and Plaintiffs’ time to file a motion to compel further responses to 20 March 2014. (Id.)

On 13 March 2014, Plaintiffs’ counsel and Defendant’s counsel engaged in a telephone conversation. (Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 2:20-25, Ex. 1, p. 21-22.) Defendant’s counsel advised that Defendant would need additional time to provide further responses to the discovery requests because the file was being transferred to another attorney, Edward Cullen (“Mr. Cullen”). (Id.) The parties agreed to extend Defendant’s time to provide further responses to the discovery and Plaintiffs’ time to file a motion to compel further responses. (Id.)

Defendant’s counsel sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a letter memorializing the telephone conversation on 14 March 2014, indicating that Defendant had agreed to provide supplemental responses by 22 April 2014, and Plaintiffs would be granted an extension of time of 30 days from that date to file a motion to compel further responses. (Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, Ex. 3.) Defendant’s counsel and Plaintiffs’ counsel exchanged emails on 15 March 2014, confirming their understanding that Plaintiffs would have 30 days from 22 April 2014, to file a motion to compel further responses to the discovery requests. (Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 2:20-25, Ex. 1, p. 25-29.)

Subsequently, Mr. Cullen informed Plaintiffs’ counsel that Defendant was traveling out-of-state and her amended responses to the discovery requests might be one or two days late. (Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 2:26-28, 3:1-6, Ex. 1, p. 32-36.) Mr. Cullen advised Plaintiffs’ counsel that Defendant would be working on her responses during her trip and was scheduled to come into his office over the weekend. (Id.)

On 23 April 2014, Defendant served Plaintiffs with her initial responses to special interrogatories, set two and requests for production of documents, set three, but did not serve Plaintiffs with any amended responses to the SI, RFA, and RPD. (Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 3:7-9, Ex. 1, p. 37-39.)

Mr. Cullen called Plaintiffs’ counsel on 28 April 2014, and advised that Defendant had not come into his office during the past weekend as scheduled and that she was not returning his calls. (Charchian Dec., Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 3:9-12.)

On 14 May 2014, Plaintiffs filed the instant motions to compel further responses to the SI, RFA, and RPD, and for awards of monetary sanctions. On 27 May 2014, Defendant filed formal oppositions to Plaintiffs’ motions to compel further responses to the SI and RPD. Defendant did not file a formal opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to the RFA.

Discussion

I. Timeliness of the Motions

As a threshold matter, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ motions to compel further responses to the SI and RPD are untimely and, therefore, should be denied.

Motions to compel further responses to interrogatories and demands for production must be filed within 45 days after the responses were served, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, or the requesting party waives any right to compel further responses. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (c) [interrogatories], 2031.310, subd. (c) [requests for production of documents].) The time to file a motion to compel further responses is extended by 5 calendar days if the responses are served by mail within California. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1013, subd. (a).) The deadline by which a party must file a motion to compel further responses and is mandatory and quasi-jurisdictional, such that the court has no authority to grant a late motion. (See Sexton v. Super. Ct. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

In her opposition papers, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ motions “should have been brought with [sic] 45 days of December 19, 2013,” and since they were not brought until 14 May 2014, they are untimely.

Defendant’s argument is without merit. First, there is legitimate dispute as to whether the SI and RPD were actually served on Plaintiffs on 19 December 2013.

Defendant provides the Court with copies of the proofs of service for her responses to the SI and RPD, which indicate that her responses were served via U.S. mail on 19 December 2013. A valid proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that papers were properly served by mail and therefore received. (See Dill v. Berquist Construction Co., Inc. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4thh 1426, 1441-1442.) The rebuttable presumption can only be dispelled by contradictory evidence. (See Craig v. Brown & Root (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 421.) Here, the proofs of service are valid because they comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1013, subdivision (a) and, therefore, create a rebuttable presumption that Defendant’s responses to the SI and RPD were served on 19 December 2013.

Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that he did not receive a copy of Defendant’s responses to the SI until they were emailed to him by Defendant’s counsel on 4 February 2014, and did not receive a copy of Defendant’s responses to the RPD until they were emailed to him by Defendant’s counsel’s assistant on 20 February 2014. In addition, the Court notes that Defendant’s counsel’s firm could not locate an electronic version of the RPD due to a computer virus and also had difficulty locating hard copies of Defendant’s responses, which indicates that the responses may not have been served on 19 December 2013. Thus, the presumption is rebutted by contrary evidence.

Second, even assuming arguendo that Defendant served the SI and RPD on 19 December 2013, the instant motions are timely. As documented in the numerous emails and letters between Defendant’s counsel and Plaintiffs’ counsel, the parties agreed on several occasions to extend Plaintiffs’ time to file a motion to compel further responses to the discovery requests.

The most recent agreement between the parties was memorialized in Defendant’s counsel’s letter dated 14 March 2014, and the emails between Defendant’s counsel and Plaintiffs’ counsel dated 15 March 2014. As reflected in the 14 March 2014 and 15 March 2014 correspondence, the parties agreed that Plaintiffs had 30 days from 22 April 2014, to file a motion to compel further responses to the discovery requests. This written agreement was sufficient under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, subdivision (c) and 2031.310, subdivision (c) to extend Plaintiffs’ time to file a motion to compel further responses to 22 May 2014.

Since Plaintiffs filed the instant motions on 14 May 2014, well before the 22 May 2014 deadline, the Court finds that their motions are timely.

II. Motion to Compel Further Responses to the SI

Plaintiffs move to compel further responses to SI Nos. 1-58, without objections, and request that the Court order Defendant to provide a verification for her initial responses to SI Nos. 11 and 12.

A. Legal Standard

The party propounding interrogatories may move for an order compelling a further response if that party deems: (1) an answer is evasive or incomplete; (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents is unwarranted or inadequate; and/or (3) an objection is without merit or too general. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) The party objecting to a discovery request bears the burden of explaining and justifying the objections. (See Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

B. Verification

Plaintiffs request that the Court order Defendant to provide a verification for her initial responses to SI Nos. 11 and 12.

Substantive responses to interrogatories must be verified. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.250, subd. (a).) Objections need not be verified. (See Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651, 657-658 [there is no need to verify the portion of a discovery response containing objections].) Where a hybrid response is served, a verification is required only for the substantive portion of the response. (See id.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that Defendant’s responses to the SI were served without a verification. Defendant does not dispute that she has not served Plaintiffs with a verification for her responses to the SI.

In response to SI No. 11, Defendant asserted objections and, without waiving the same, stated that she had not suffered “any injury related to a dog.” (Cullen Dec., Ex. A, p. 6:7-14.) In response to SI No. 12, Defendant asserted objections and, without waiving the same, stated “[n]one.” (Cullen Dec., Ex. A, p. 6:15-21.)

Defendant’s responses to SI Nos. 11 and 12 are hybrids which do not require a verification for the objections asserted, but do require a verification for the substantive portions of her responses.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for a verification is GRANTED and Defendant is ordered to provide Plaintiffs with a verification for her initial substantive responses to SI Nos. 11-12.

C. Objections and Substantive Responses

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s objections to SI Nos. 1-58 are without merit.

In her opposition, Defendant provides a single conclusory sentence in support of her objections which states that “all of defendant’s objections were well founded and plaintiff provides no argument to the contrary.” (Opp’n. Motion to Compel Further Responses to SI, p. 2:2-3.) As the objecting party, Defendant bears the burden of justifying her objections and the single conclusory sentence provided in her opposition is insufficient to meet that burden.

Accordingly, all of Defendant’s objections are overruled.

Plaintiffs do not argue that Defendant’s substantive responses to SI Nos. 11-12, which are the only SI to which substantive responses were provided, are evasive or incomplete. Thus, further responses are not warranted to SI Nos. 11-12.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to SI Nos. 1-10 and 13-58. The motion is DENIED as to SI Nos. 11-12.

III. Motion to Compel Further Responses to the RFA

Plaintiffs move to compel further responses to RFA Nos. 1-16, 18, 45, 48, 54, 56-57, 61, and 65, and request that the Court order Defendant to provide a verification for her initial responses to RFA Nos. 17, 19-44, 46-47, 49-53, 55, 58-60, 62-64, and 66.

A. Legal Standard

The party propounding requests for admissions may move for an order compelling a further response if that party deems: (1) an answer is evasive or incomplete; and/or (2) an objection is without merit or too general. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2033.290, subd. (a).) The party objecting to a discovery request bears the burden of explaining and justifying the objections. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.)

B. Verification

Plaintiffs request that the Court order Defendant to provide a verification for her initial responses to RFA Nos. 17, 19-44, 46-47, 49-53, 55, 58-60, 62-64, and 66.

Substantive responses to requests for admission must be verified. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.240, subd. (a).) Objections need not be verified. (See Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651, 657-658 [there is no need to verify the portion of a discovery response containing objections].) Where a hybrid response is served, a verification is required only for the substantive portion of the response. (See id.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that Defendant’s responses to the RFA were served without a verification. Defendant has not filed an opposition to Plaintiffs motion to compel further responses to the RFA and does not dispute that she has not served Plaintiffs with a verification for her responses to the RFA.

In response to RFA Nos. 17, 19-20, 23-24, 34-35, 58, 60, and 64, Defendant asserted objections and, without waiving the same, provided an admission or qualified admission. In response to RFA Nos. 21-22, 25-33, 36-44, 46-47, 49-53, 55, 59, 62-63, and 66, Defendant asserted objections and, without waiving the same, provided a denial or qualified denial.

Defendant’s responses to the RFA are hybrids which do not require a verification for the objections asserted, but do require a verification for the substantive portions of her responses.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for a verification is GRANTED and Defendant is ordered to provide Plaintiffs with a verification for her initial substantive responses to RFA Nos. 17, 19-44, 46-47, 49-53, 55, 58-60, 62-64, and 66.

C. Objections

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s objections to RFA Nos. 1-16, 18, 45, 48, 54, 56-57, 61, and 65 are without merit. Defendant did not provide substantive responses to RFA Nos. 1-16, 18, 45, 48, 54, 56-57, 61, and 65.

In her responses to RFA Nos. 1-16, 18, 45, 48, 54, 56-57, 61, and 65, Defendant asserted objections on the following grounds: vagueness; ambiguity; over breadth; irrelevance; compound; lack of foundation; argumentative; and calls for speculation. Defendant did not oppose the motion to compel further responses to the RFA and, therefore, does not meet her burden to justify her objections.

Thus, all of Defendant’s objections are overruled and Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses is GRANTED as to RFA Nos. 1-16, 18, 45, 48, 54, 56-57, 61, and 65.

IV. Motion to Compel Further Responses to the RPD

Plaintiffs state in their separate statement that they “seek only an order that Defendant verify her answers” to RPD Nos. 1-21. (See Sep. Stmt. Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD, p. 2:10.)

Substantive responses to requests for production of documents must be verified. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.250, subd. (a).) Objections need not be verified. (See Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651, 657-658 [there is no need to verify the portion of a discovery response containing objections].) Where a hybrid response is served, a verification is required only for the substantive portion of the response. (See id.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that Defendant’s responses to the RPD were served without a verification. Defendant does not dispute that she has not served Plaintiffs with a verification for her responses to the RPD.

In response to RPD Nos. 1-9, 11-12, and 14-21, Defendant asserted objections and, without waiving the same, stated that she does not have any responsive documents. In response to RPD No. 10, Defendant asserted objections and, without waiving the same, stated that she diligently searched for training records, but thus far has been unable to locate any such records. In response to RPD No. 13, Defendant asserted objections and, without waiving the same, stated that she was attaching a copy of a photograph of herself.

Defendant’s responses to the RPD are hybrids which do not require a verification for the objections asserted, but do require a verification for the substantive portions of her responses.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED and Defendant is ordered to provide Plaintiffs with a verification for her substantive responses to RPD Nos. 1-21.

V. Plaintiffs’ Requests for Sanctions

Plaintiffs request monetary sanctions in connection with each of their motions.

A. Motion to Compel Further Responses to the SI

Plaintiffs request monetary sanctions against Defendant or Defendant’s counsel in the amount $6,060.00 under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d).

Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (d) states that the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

Here, Plaintiffs were largely successful on their motion. In addition, Defendant did not act with substantial justification and there are no circumstances making the imposition of sanctions unjust. Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of monetary sanctions.

Plaintiffs’ counsel, Daniel Cantor (“Mr. Cantor”), declares that he spent 6.3 hours researching and preparing the motion and his hourly rate is $450.00. Mr. Cantor anticipates spending 4 hours reviewing Defendant’s opposition and preparing a reply. Plaintiffs’ counsel, Arthur Charchian (“Mr. Charchian”), declares that he spent 0.4 hours reviewing the motion and his hourly rate is $350.00. Mr. Charchian anticipates spending 3.5 hours traveling to and from the hearing. In addition, Mr. Charchian requests reimbursement for the $60 filing fee for this motion.

The Court does not award sanctions for expenses not yet incurred. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (a); Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1551.) Consequently, the anticipated attorney fees are not compensable. The Court finds counsels’ hourly rates to be reasonable, but the 6.3 hours spent by Mr. Cantor preparing the motion is excessive. The Court finds that a reasonable amount of time to have spent preparing the motion is 3 hours. The $60.00 filing fee constitutes a reasonable expense.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $1,550.00.

B. Motion to Compel Further Responses to the RFA

Plaintiffs request monetary sanctions against Defendant or Defendant’s counsel in the amount of $1,605.00 under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290, subdivision (d).

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290, subdivision (d) states that the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a request for admission, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

Here, Plaintiffs were successful on their motion. In addition, Defendant did not act with substantial justification and there are no circumstances making the imposition of sanctions unjust. Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of monetary sanctions.

Plaintiffs’ counsel, Daniel Cantor (“Mr. Cantor”), declares that he spent 2.2 hours researching and preparing the motion and his hourly rate is $450.00. Mr. Cantor anticipates spending 1 hour reviewing Defendant’s opposition and preparing a reply. Plaintiffs’ counsel, Arthur Charchian (“Mr. Charchian”), declares that he spent 0.3 hours reviewing the motion and his hourly rate is $350.00. In addition, Mr. Charchian requests reimbursement for the $60 filing fee for this motion.

The Court does not award sanctions for expenses not yet incurred. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (a); Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1551.) Consequently, the anticipated attorney fees are not compensable. The Court otherwise finds the hourly rates and time spent to be reasonable. Furthermore the $60.00 filing fee constitutes a reasonable expense.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $1,155.00.

C. Motion to Compel Further Responses to the RPD

Plaintiffs request monetary sanctions against Defendant or Defendant’s counsel in the amount of $2,135.00 under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (h).

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (h) states that the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand for production of documents, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

Here, Plaintiffs were successful on their motion. In addition, Defendant did not act with substantial justification and there are no circumstances making the imposition of sanctions unjust. Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of monetary sanctions.

Plaintiffs’ counsel, Daniel Cantor (“Mr. Cantor”), declares that he spent 3.8 hours researching and preparing the motion and his hourly rate is $450.00. Mr. Cantor anticipates spending 1.5 hours reviewing Defendant’s opposition and preparing a reply. Plaintiffs’ counsel, Arthur Charchian (“Mr. Charchian”), declares that he spent 0.4 hours reviewing the motion and his hourly rate is $350.00. In addition, Mr. Charchian requests reimbursement for the $60 filing fee for this motion.

The Court does not award sanctions for expenses not yet incurred. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (a); Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1551.) Consequently, the anticipated attorney fees are not compensable. The Court finds the hourly rates and time spent to be reasonable. The $60.00 filing fee constitutes a reasonable expense. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $1,910.00.

Conclusion and Order

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to and a verification for the SI is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to SI Nos. 1-10 and 13-58 and Plaintiffs’ request that Defendant provide a verification for her responses to SI Nos. 11-12. The motion is DENIED as to SI Nos. 11-12. Accordingly, within 20 calendar days of the filing of this Order, Defendant shall provide code-compliant further responses to SI Nos. 1-10 and 13-58, without objections, and shall serve Plaintiff with a verification for her original responses to SI Nos. 11-12.

Plaintiffs’ request for monetary sanctions in connection with their motion to compel further responses to the SI is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $1,550.00. Accordingly, within 20 calendar days of the date of the filing of this Order, Defendant or Defendant’s counsel shall pay $1,550.00 to Plaintiffs’ counsel.

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses to and a verification for the RFA is GRANTED. Accordingly, within 20 calendar days of the filing of this Order, Defendant shall provide code-compliant further responses to RFA Nos. 1-16, 18, 45, 48, 54, 56-57, 61, and 65, without objections. In addition, Defendant shall serve Plaintiff with a verification for her original responses to RFA Nos. 17, 19-44, 46-47, 49-53, 55, 58-60, 62-64, and 66.

Plaintiffs’ request for monetary sanctions in connection with their motion to compel further responses to the RFA is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $1,081.50. Accordingly, within 20 calendar days of the date of the filing of this Order, Defendant or Defendant’s counsel shall pay $1,155.00 to Plaintiffs’ counsel.

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendant to provide a verification to her responses to the RPD is GRANTED. Accordingly, within 20 calendar days of the filing of this Order, Defendant shall serve Plaintiff with a verification for her original responses to the RPD Nos. 1-21.

Plaintiffs’ request for monetary sanctions in connection with their motion to compel further responses to the RPD is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $1,910.00. Accordingly, within 20 calendar days of the date of the filing of this Order, Defendant or Defendant’s counsel shall pay $1,910.00 to Plaintiffs’ counsel.