Case Number: BC530805 Hearing Date: June 09, 2014 Dept: 92

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

NANCY A. BARAJAS VILLAFRANCO, ET AL.,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
RAYMOND MARTIN BELL, ET AL.,
Defendant(s).

Case No.: BC530805

[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE

Dept. 92
1:30 p.m. — #36
June 9, 2014

Defendant’s Motion to Strike is Denied. Defendant is ordered to file an answer to the complaint within ten days.

1. Facts
Plaintiffs, Nancy A. Barajas Villafranco and Yolanda Guerra Villafranco filed this action against Defendant, Raymond Martin Bell for damages arising out of an automobile accident.

2. Motion to Strike
Plaintiff’s complaint contains a prayer for punitive damages based on the allegation that Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the subject accident. Plaintiffs’ complaint includes the following allegations against Defendant in this regard:
11. Plaintiff is informed and believes that at approximately 10:40 p.m. on February 21, 2013, Defendant was travelling northbound on Crenshaw Boulevard approaching 120th Street in an unsafe manner while under the influence of alcohol in violation of California Vehicle Code §23152(a), 23152(b), and 22350.
12. Plaintiff is informed and believes that as Defendant approached l20 Street and stopped traffic ahead, Defendant’s level of intoxication made it difficult for Defendant to negotiate a safe stop and resulted in Defendant’s vehicle colliding with VEI-IICLE 1, which then collided with Plaintiffs vehicle, and caused Plaintiffs vehicle to collide with VEHICLE 2.
13. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant was cited at the scene of the accident for California Vehicle Code § 22350, driving at an unsafe speed, and was arrested and charged with California Vehicle Code § 23152(a), driving while under the influence of alcohol, as evidenced in California Highway Patrol Collision Report #2013-2214.
14. At all times herein mentioned, Defendant willfully and knowingly consumed great quantities of alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication and drunkenness that sharply impaired his physical and mental faculties knowing that he would be driving his car immediately thereafter. Defendant then drove Defendant’s vehicle in an intoxicated condition. Defendant was aware that driving in this intoxicated condition would likely result in a collision that could cause great bodily injury and/or death to those involved in such a collision. Defendant disregarded the probable consequences of driving while intoxicated, resulting in the collision, causing great personal injuries to the Plaintiffs as herein alleged. Defendant’s conduct of driving while intoxicated, resulting in an automobile accident and injuries to Plaintiffs, showed a conscious and deliberate disregard for the rights and safety of others such that his conduct was wanton, willful, despicable and malicious.
15. Defendant was fully aware of the dangers of driving while intoxicated and continued to do so willfully and knowingly. Defendant, prior to this accident, was convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol on two separate occasions. On or about 1991, in the California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, Compton Court, Case Number 91M14349, Defendant was convicted of California Vehicle Code §23152(b), driving while having registered a Blood Alcohol Content of .08 or above. Dunng the guilty plea advisement, Defendant was warned about the dangers of driving while intoxicated and put on notice that continuing to do so is dangerous and may cause injury or death. On or about 1995, in the California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, Torrance Court; Case Number 95M05649, Defendant was once again convicted of California Vehicle Code §23152(b), driving while having registered a Blood Alcohol Content of .08 or above. Once more, Defendant was given an advisement that driving while intoxicated is dangerous to human life.

Allegations that a defendant exhibited a conscious disregard for the safety of others are sufficient to show malice. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-96.) The Taylor court concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of “malice” under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences. “One who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others.” (Id., at p. 897.)

To properly allege punitive damages in a motor vehicle accident action, a plaintiff simply needs to “establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Id., at p. 896.) If the essential gravamen of the complaint is that “Defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby” then this is sufficient to allege punitive damages. (Id.) While a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases. (Id.)

Taylor justified imposing punitive damages upon the ¿deliberate¿ drunk driver for many reasons, including the high degree of foreseeability of injury and damage flowing from driving while intoxicated. The court says the essential allegation is that defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby. The decision also discusses the grave havoc wrought by intoxicated drivers nationwide and equates the act of deliberately driving while under the influence with a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others which may be described as willful or wanton. Such conduct, the court said, has traditionally been a basis for awarding punitive damages. (Herrick v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 787, 790.)

¿There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. [Citation.] One who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or nor the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.¿ (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896-897.) ¿¿[T]he fact of common knowledge that the drinking driver is the cause of so may of the more serious automobile accidents is strong evidence in itself to support the need for all possible means of deterring persons from driving automobiles after drinking, including exposure to awards of punitive damages in the event of accidents.¿¿ (Id., at p. 897.)

Taylor fell short, however, of holding that punitive damages are always appropriate in cases involving driving while intoxicated. The Court noted, “we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under §3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” Id. at 892. Emphasis added.

Notably, a subsequent decision held that driving while intoxicated does not always give rise to a claim for punitive damages. “[W]e do not agree that the risk created generally by one who becomes intoxicated and decides nevertheless to drive a vehicle on the public streets is the same as the risk created by an intoxicated driver’s decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June. The risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable. The risk of injury to others from Mardian’s conduct under the circumstances alleged was probable.” Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82.

Further complicating the matter, in 1987 the legislature amended Civil Code §3294 to include a requirement that conduct in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others be “despicable” in order to support imposition of punitive damages. Absent additional allegations, the Court cannot find Defendant’s alleged behavior to meet the standard for imposition of punitive damages.

The Court finds Plaintiffs’ allegations herein are sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. The fact that Defendant had twice previously been convicted of driving under the influence is sufficient, at the pleading stage, to allege that Defendant acted despicably in driving under the influence a third time, and such act was with a conscious disregard of the health and safety of others. The motion to strike is therefore denied.

Dated this 9th day of June, 2014

Hon. Elia Weinbach
Judge of the Superior Court