Fernando Rios v. Progressive Transportation Services, LLC

2017-00223633-CU-OE

Fernando Rios vs. Progressive Transportation Services, LLC

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Order to Stay Action

Filed By: Crosner, Ryan H.

Defendant Progressive Transportation Services, LLC’s motion to stay action is denied.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is granted.

In this action Plaintiff Fernando Rios filed a complaint in December 2017 alleging claims for penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) based on

alleged labor code violations. On March 9, 2018, Guillermo Posada filed a class action complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court (“Posada”) against Defendant alleging labor code violations similar to the violations on which Plaintiff’s PAGA claims are based. Defendant now moves to stay this action while the Posada action is pending so that the underlying labor code claims could be resolved before reaching the PAGA penalties in this action. On December 11, 2018, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a First Amended Complaint in which he added direct class claims based on the underlying labor code violations.

Here, Defendant cites no statute in support of its motion for stay but argues that the Court must use its inherent authority to control the proceedings before it and stay this proceeding so that the Los Angeles Posada action can proceed and resolve the underlying Labor Code claims on which Plaintiff’s PAGA claims are based. The Court notes that “[t]rial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.” (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1489.) Generally, an application for a stay is addressed to the “sound discretion” of the trial court.

According to Plaintiff, the essential premise of Defendant’s motion has been mooted. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant argued that the instant action only involves PAGA claims and that Plaintiff would be required to first establish an underlying Labor Code violation to get PAGA penalties but this Court cannot make such a determination because the underlying Labor Code claims are pending in the Posada action. However, Plaintiff points out that he has filed the First Amended Complaint which adds direct claims for the Labor Code violations in addition to the PAGA claims.

Defendant argues that even with the presence of the First Amended Complaint, a stay is still appropriate because the underlying Labor Code claims would be nearly identical with those in the Posada action because each action involves the issue of whether Defendant misclassified drivers as independent contractors and as a result failed to pay minimum wages, etc. Defendant reasons that allowing this case to proceed would require duplication of Court resources, would burden Defendant, result in piece meal litigation and could create a risk of inconsistent verdicts. The Court declines to issue a stay at this time pursuant to its inherent authority. Indeed, now that the First Amended Complaint has been filed, both this action and the Posada action contain class wide claims for labor code violations. Further, given that this action was filed before the Posada action, the class period potentially includes an additional three months and also involves potentially larger damages. Allowing Defendant to get a stay of this action would essentially allow Defendant to pick and choose which of the two cases it desires to litigate, even though the instant action was the earlier filed action.

In any event, as seen from the opposition, and important to resolution of this motion, Plaintiff has filed a petition for coordination with the Judicial Council seeking to coordinate this matter with the Posada action. (Ardestani Decl. ¶ 5, Ehx. C.) Further, Counsel for Posada is joining in the petition. (Id. ¶ 6.) Civil actions pending in different courts may be coordinated when they share a common question of law or fact and when coordination is deemed to be appropriate after considering specified standards [see Code Civ. Proc. § 404]. These standards are set out in Code Civ. Proc. § 404.1.

The petition could address the very concerns raised by Defendant here, specifically duplication of work, inconsistent rulings, etc. The Court sees no reason Defendant would oppose the coordination petition. Defendant’s complaint that it will face a

substantial hardship in the interim because it could take up to 90 days for the coordination petition to be ruled upon and it will be forced to respond to duplicative discovery and litigation in the interim is not persuasive. Defendant has made no showing in this regard and in any event, as it recognizes in reply, “[p]ending any determination of whether coordination is appropriate, the judge making that determination may stay any action being considered for, or affecting an action being considered for, coordination.” (CCP 404.5; see also CRC Rule 3.515.) Accordingly, Defendant can raise this issue with the Judge assigned the coordination petition.

The motion is denied.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.

Copy the code below to your web site.
x 

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *