Glenridge Pharm. v. Questcor Pharm. CASE NO. 111CV203554
DATE: 6 June 2014 TIME: 9:00 LINE NUMBER: 2
This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 5 June 2014. Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 6 June 2014, the following motions were argued and submitted, (1) the motion of defendant Questcor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Questcor”) for a protective order limiting the deposition of its President and Chief Executive Officer Donald M. Bailey (“Bailey”) and for monetary sanctions, (2) the motion of plaintiff Glenridge Pharmaceuticals LLC (“Glenridge”) to compel the deposition of Bailey and for monetary sanctions, and (3) the motion of Questcor to seal certain documents lodged with the Court.

Glenridge filed a formal opposition to the motion to seal and also a formal opposition to the motion for protective order, in which it requests monetary sanctions. Questcor filed a formal opposition to the motion to compel Bailey’s deposition, in which it requests monetary sanctions.

Statement of Facts

This action arises from a contract dispute between Glenridge and Questcor. In late December 1999, Glenridge identified a promising pharmaceutical product known as Acthar Gel (“Acthar”). At the time, the rights to Acthar were owned by Aventis Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. (“Aventis”). Aventis was interested in selling its rights to Acthar to a company which could more successfully produce, market, and sell the product. In June 2000, Glenridge and Aventis reached an agreement “in principle” by which Glenridge would purchase Acthar from Aventis. In July 2000, Glenridge informed Questcor about Acthar’s potential if Glenridge’s regulatory and manufacturing strategy was pursued. Questcor and Glenridge agreed that Questcor would substitute in for Glenridge in the agreement with Aventis. Questcor and Glenridge further agreed that if Questcor and Aventis consummated the deal already negotiated by Glenridge, Questcor would pay a royalty to Glenridge based on any future sales of Acthar. In July 2001, Questcor and Aventis entered into an asset purchase agreement by which Questcor acquired the rights to Acthar.

In January 2002, Questcor and Glenridge entered into a Royalty Agreement providing a royalty to Glenridge based on net sales of Acthar. Until December 2010, Questcor made royalty payments to Glenridge using a cash-basis accounting method when calculating the net sales for which royalties were due. In early 2011, Questcor told Glenridge that it intended to switch to an accrual accounting method, instead of cash-basis accounting. Glenridge asserts that Questcor breached the Royalty Agreement by using accrual accounting, failing to timely make payments, and improperly deducting payments to the National Organization of Rare Disorders (“NORD”) when calculating net sales.

Questcor filed an action against Glenridge (Case No. 1-12-CV-237225), which has been consolidated with this action. Questcor alleges that the Royalty Agreement is invalid because Ken Greathouse (“Greathouse”), a former Questcor officer and owner of Glenridge, secretly assisted his Glenridge partners in negotiating the terms of the transaction after representing to Questcor that he would recuse himself from the process.

Discovery Dispute

In June 2012, Glenridge’s counsel requested available dates for Bailey’s deposition.

In response, on 23 July 2012, Questcor’s counsel indicated that, as Bailey was Questcor’s CEO, the apex witness rule applied. Therefore, he requested that Glenridge “describe the unique relevant knowledge you believe [Bailey] has which is not otherwise available through another witness or other less intrusive discovery[.]” (Kohli Decl., Ex. 4.) That same day, Glenridge’s counsel sent an email in reply. He stated that the apex witness rule is inapplicable because Bailey has unique or superior knowledge of a number of matters relevant to the issues in the action.

On 3 August 2012, Glenridge noticed Bailey’s deposition for 6 September 2012. Between August 2012 and September 2012, the parties continued to meet and confer concerning the propriety of the deposition, as well as the date the deposition would be scheduled.

On 5 October 2012, Glenridge renoticed the deposition for 18 October 2012.

Questcor served an objection to the notice of deposition on 15 October 2012. That same day, Questcor’s counsel sent an email to Glenridge, indicating that it would not produce Bailey for deposition until Glenridge exhausted all less intrusive discovery methods. Counsel further warned that Questcor would file a motion for a protective order should Glenridge fail to withdraw the notice of deposition.

On 18 October 2012, Bailey did not appear for his deposition. After further meet and confer efforts between the parties, and in an effort to avoid motion practice, on 1 November 2012, Glenridge agreed to conduct further discovery before deposing Bailey.

Almost one year later, on 24 October 2013, Glenridge again requested dates for Bailey’s deposition.

After substantial meet and confer efforts concerning the propriety and scope of the deposition, Questcor offered to produce Bailey for deposition if the deposition took place in Orange County near Questcor offices, and the scope of the deposition was limited to discoverable information of which Bailey has unique or superior personal knowledge that had not already been obtained through less intrusive discovery. If these conditions were not met, Questcor indicated that it would file a motion for a protective order. That same day, Glenridge’s counsel sent an email in reply, agreeing to take the deposition in Orange County, but refusing to limit the scope of the deposition.

After further meet and confer efforts, on 30 December 2013, Questcor agreed to produce Bailey for his deposition, but reserved its right to move for a protective order if necessary.

On 2 January 2014, Glenridge noticed Bailey’s deposition for 4 February 2014. On 31 January 2014, Questcor served objections to the notice of deposition. On that same day, Questcor’s counsel sent an email to Glenridge’s counsel, indicating that Bailey was unavailable on 4 February 2014 due to a last minute scheduling conflict.

To accommodate Bailey’s schedule, on 7 February 2014, Glenridge renoticed the deposition for 13 March 2014 in Orange County. Questcor served objections to the notice of deposition on 10 March 2014.

On 13 March 2014, Bailey appeared at his deposition and testified for approximately 2.5 hours, at which time the deposition was suspended for lunch. During lunch, Bailey received an urgent phone call and returned to Questcor’s headquarters for the remainder of the day. After informing Glenridge’s counsel that Bailey had been called away, Questcor’s counsel apologized, agreed to reimburse Glenridge for its reasonable costs and fees incurred in connection with the deposition, and promised to meet and confer concerning an additional date to complete the deposition.

At the deposition and in several subsequent meet and confer letters, Glenridge’s counsel asked Questcor’s counsel to explain in detail why Bailey had been called away. In response, Glenridge’s counsel stated that he was not at liberty to provide additional detail.

On 20 March 2014, Glenridge unilaterally renoticed Bailey’s continued deposition for 26 March 2014 at its counsel’s office in downtown Los Angeles. On 26 March 2014, Questcor filed objections to the notice of deposition, and Bailey chose not to appear for his deposition.

On 7 April 2014, Questcor’s counsel sent a detailed meet and confer letter to Glenridge’s counsel concerning Bailey’s deposition. As an initial matter, counsel explained that Bailey had to leave his deposition in order to complete negotiations related to a $5.6 billion merger with Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals. Counsel further stated that he was unable to provide this explanation earlier because all merger discussions were highly confidential until the details of the transaction were publicly released. With regard to the second session of the deposition, counsel requested that Glenridge (1) limit the scope of the deposition to those topics which Glenridge believes Bailey has unique and superior knowledge, (2) limit the deposition to a total of five hours, and (3) allow the deposition to take place in Orange County. Counsel warned that Questcor would file a motion for a protective order if these conditions were not met. On 6 May 2014, Glenridge’s counsel refused to accept these conditions.

On 9 May 2014, based upon counsels’ failure to reach an agreement as to the time, location, and scope of the deposition, Questcor filed its motions for a protective order and to seal documents lodged with the Court in support of its motion. On 14 May 2014, Glenridge filed its motion to compel Bailey’s deposition. Both parties filed their oppositions to the respective motions on 23 May 2014. On 30 May 2014, Glenridge filed its reply brief in support of its motion to compel Bailey’s deposition, and Questcor filed its reply briefs in support of its motions.

Discussion

I. Questcor’s Motion for a Protective Order

Questcor seeks a protective order limiting the scope, length and location of the deposition. It argues that such an order is warranted because Bailey is a high-level officer at the apex of a corporation. In opposition, Glenridge contends that the apex doctrine does not apply and good cause for the order does not exist.

A. Legal Standards

In general, “[a]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter … if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Before, during, or after, for good cause shown, a court may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense relative to discovery matters. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) Generally, the party or deponent seeking a protective order must show that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness involved in the taking of the deposition clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020; see also Emerson Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1110-1111.)

B. Request to Limit Scope of Deposition

Questcor moves for a protective order limiting the scope of Bailey’s deposition to the topics of which he has non-repetitive, first-hand knowledge on the ground that Bailey is an apex witness.

1. The Apex Witness Rule

Recognizing the potential for discovery abuse and harassment, the Court of Appeal in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1284 found that a head of a corporation could not be deposed when there is no showing that (1) he or she had any involvement in a lawsuit against the corporation, and (2) less intrusive means of discovery had been exhausted. The Court opined that such depositions raise a tremendous potential for discovery abuse and harassment as the head of a large corporation generally does not have knowledge of specific incidents or cases handled several levels down the corporate pyramid. (Id. at p. 1287.)

Federal cases have further expanded the scope of the apex witness rule beyond the prohibition of an apex deposition. In WebSideStory, Inc. v. NetRatings, Inc. (S.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007, 06cv408 WHQ (AJB) 2007 U.S.Dist. Lexis 20481, plaintiff WebSideStory, Inc. sought a protective order prohibiting the deposition of its former chief executive officer. (Id. at p. 10.) After determining that the official had non-repetitive, first-hand knowledge of facts relevant to the case and the defendant had exhausted less intrusive discovery methods, the federal district court ordered the official’s deposition to go forward. (Id. at p. 17.) Nevertheless, the federal district court ordered the plaintiff to limit the topics of the deposition to areas for which the defendant asserted that the official had unique, first-hand knowledge of facts relevant to the case. (Id.)

Similarly, in Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Unger (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 171 F.R.D. 94, 102-103, the federal district court ordered the deposition of a high-level corporate official to proceed, but limited the scope of the deposition. In Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., a third-party plaintiff sought to depose the senior vice president and general counsel of a third-party corporate defendant. (Id. at p. 100.) After the official provided approximately four hours of deposition testimony, the third-party plaintiff served a notice of continued deposition. (Id.) The third-party defendant refused to produce the witness for further testimony, because, in its opinion, there was no subject matter area remaining upon which he had non-repetitive, first-hand knowledge of facts relevant to the case. (Id.) The federal district court determined that the official did in fact possess such knowledge and ordered him to appear for his deposition. (Id. at p. 102.) Nevertheless, mindful that permitting unfettered discovery of corporate executives would threaten disruption of the corporation’s business and could serve as a potent tool for harassment in the litigation, the federal district court limited the deposition to the topics to which the official had personal knowledge of facts relevant to the action. (Id.)

With these authorities in mind, the Court will proceed to the merits of the motion.

2. Analysis

Here, Questcor does not deny that Bailey has unique, first-hand knowledge of facts relevant to the action or that Glenridge has exhausted less intrusive discovery methods. Instead, it merely requests, in line with the federal cases discussed above, that the Court limit the deposition to topics to which Bailey has unique, first-hand knowledge of facts relevant to the action.

In opposition, Glenridge contends that the apex doctrine does not support Questcor’s proposed limitation. First, it argues that it is undisputed that Bailey has first-hand, personal knowledge of facts critical to the central issues in dispute, and Glenridge has exhausted all less intrusive discovery methods. It concludes that it has met the standard set forth in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra, and Bailey is therefore subject to deposition just as any other witness. Glenridge is correct that it has met the standard set forth in Liberty Mutual Insurance, Co., supra. Nevertheless, as the above-cited federal authorities make clear, a court may limit the scope of the deposition to those topics for which the opposing party asserts the official has unique, first-hand information relevant to the action. (See WebSideStory, Inc., supra; Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., supra.) Thus, this argument lacks merit.

Second, Glenridge contends that Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra, applies only when a plaintiff, as opposed to a defendant, seeks to depose a corporate official. Glenridge submits that it wishes to depose Bailey in connection with its defense against Questcor’s claim. Thus, as Glenridge indicates that it is acting as a defendant for the purposes of the deposition, it concludes that Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra, does not apply. Glenridge provides no support or authority for the proposition that the apex witness rule applies only to the deposition of a high-level official of a corporate defendant, as opposed to a corporate plaintiff. In addition, the federal decisions applying the apex witness rule have not confined the rule to corporate defendants. (See, e.g., WebSideStory, Inc. v. NetRatings, Inc. (S.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007, 06cv408 WHQ (AJB) 2007 U.S.Dist. Lexis 20481 [limiting deposition of official of plaintiff corporation]; Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory Inc. (N.D. Cal. Sep. 6, 2006, C03-5340 JF(RS)) 2006 U.S.Dist. Lexis 67284 [limiting deposition of official of plaintiff corporation].) Accordingly, Glenridge’s argument is without merit.

Third, Glenridge asserts that the limitation of topics is unworkable. It reasons that it cannot definitively know whether Bailey has unique, first-hand knowledge concerning a particular subject without first asking him at his deposition. Here, the Court sees no reason that an order limiting the deposition to the topics Glenridge itself identifies would prove unworkable. Glenridge has propounded over 550 written discovery requests, has deposed 17 individuals and received over 116,000 pages of documents concerning the issues involved in this action. (See Kohli Decl., ¶¶ 6-12.) It should therefore have at least a rough idea of the issues upon which Bailey will likely have unique, first-hand knowledge. In addition, in response to requests from Questcor, Glenridge has had no difficulty in identifying these topics. (See Kohli Decl., Exs. 4, 10.) Accordingly, the Court is confident that a limitation of the scope of the deposition will prove workable, and Glenridge’s argument is therefore without merit.

Finally, Glenridge asserts that good cause does not exist for the proposed order. In this regard, it submits that Bailey’s participation in a normal deposition would not cause any specific harm or prejudice to Questcor.

The purpose of the apex witness rule is to prevent disruption to a corporation’s business and to prevent harassment by permitting an official’s deposition only when necessary. (See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287 (depositions of high-level corporate officials raise a tremendous potential for discovery abuse and harassment); Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., supra (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 171 F.R.D. at p. 102.) Nevertheless, Glenridge is correct that Questcor must make a particularized showing of facts demonstrating that the purported disruption and harassment involved in Bailey’s deposition clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020; Emerson Electric Co., supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 1110-1111; West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417-418.)

Here, Questcor makes no particularized showing of facts indicating that the continuation of Bailey’s deposition without the limitation proposed would disrupt Questcor’s business or constitute harassment. Thus, it has not met its burden, and a protective order limiting the topics for deposition is unwarranted. Accordingly, the request to limit the scope of Bailey’s deposition is DENIED.

C. Request to Limit Duration of Deposition

Questcor moves for a protective order limiting the length of Bailey’s deposition to a total of five hours because it contends that Glenridge has likely exhausted its line of questioning for the topics on which he may possess unique, first-hand information. In opposition, Glenridge argues that Questcor offers no evidence in support of its request to limit the duration of the deposition, and good cause does not therefore exist for such an order.

Questcor has put forward no specific evidence indicating that the continuation of Bailey’s deposition without the time limitation proposed would disrupt Questcor’s business or constitute harassment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020; Emerson Electric Co., supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 1110-1111; West Pico Furniture Co., supra, 56 Cal.2d at pp. 417-418.) Accordingly, Questcor has not met its burden to establish that a protective order limiting the duration of the deposition is warranted, and its request is therefore DENIED.

D. Request to Limit Location of Deposition

Questcor moves for a protective order requiring Glenridge to depose Bailey in Orange County at or near Questcor’s offices because it will minimize any disruption to Bailey’s work schedule.

In opposition, Glenridge indicates that the deposition should go forward at its counsel’s office in downtown Los Angeles. It asserts that it has complied with the Code of Civil Procedure, and the location is convenient because it will allow counsel to consult with associates, paralegals, and staff during breaks.

Here, Questcor asserts that “[t]here is no reason for the CEO of a multi-billion dollar company to spend two to four hours in traffic commuting to and from Los Angeles for a deposition.” (Mem. Ps & As., p. 11:14-15.) Nevertheless, it provides no specific evidence that the deposition of Bailey in Los Angeles will unduly disrupt the business of the corporation and/or constitute harassment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020; Emerson Electric Co., supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 1110-1111; West Pico Furniture Co., supra, 56 Cal.2d at pp. 417-418.) Accordingly, Questcor has not met its burden to establish that a protective order to change the location of the deposition is warranted, and its request is therefore DENIED.

E. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Questcor’s motion for a protective order is DENIED.

II. Glenridge’s Motion to Compel Bailey’s Deposition

Glenridge seeks an order compelling Questcor to produce Bailey for his deposition.

If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action, without having served a valid objection under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410, fails to appear for the examination, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).)

Here, Questcor does not dispute that Bailey failed to appear for the 26 March 2014 deposition, and acknowledges that he must appear for a second deposition session. Therefore, an order compelling Bailey to appear for his deposition is warranted. Accordingly, the motion to compel Bailey’s deposition is GRANTED.

III. Questcor’s Motion to Seal

Questcor moves to seal pages 113-119 and 128-133 of the 13 March 2014 deposition transcript of Bailey, lodged with the Court in support of its motion for a protective order, on the ground that the documents reveal confidential commercial information.

A. Legal Standards

Court records are open to the public unless confidentiality is required by law. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(c).) A party may not file a record under seal without a court order, and a court may not permit a record to be filed under seal based solely on the agreement or stipulation of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(a).) The court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts establishing that: (1) there exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) the overriding interest supports sealing the record; (3) there exists a substantial probability that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(d).)

While those rules apply to discovery materials that are used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication of matters other than discovery motions or proceedings, they do not apply to “discovery motions” or “records filed or lodged in connection with discovery motions or proceedings.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(3); see also H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 893 [given policy favoring broad disclosure during discovery and fact that discovered materials are not part of the court record until filed in connection with a motion or trial, right of public access is “favored neither by tradition nor by functional analysis”]; Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 100 [rationale behind right of public access to civil proceedings does not support generalized presumption of access to all court-filed discovery material].)

Although the sealing rules do not apply to materials filed in connection with discovery motions, the Sixth Appellate District, in dicta, interpreted that exemption as imposing a less stringent standard for sealing in the discovery context, and not as implying an utter lack of limitations. (H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 894.) Specifically, a “reasoned decision” regarding the sealing of records relative to a discovery motion must: (1) identify specific information claimed to be entitled to such treatment; (2) identify the nature of the harm threatened by disclosure; and (3) identify and account for any countervailing considerations. (Id.)

B. Analysis

Questcor contends that excerpts of Bailey’s deposition testimony contain confidential information concerning its business practices, which would be of value to its competitors. In particular, it argues that the testimony reflects its internal strategic deliberations before raising the price of Acthar, and its new marketing strategy for the drug.

In opposition, Glenridge argues that an order sealing Bailey’s deposition testimony is not warranted. First, it contends that the public has a heightened interest in learning why a drug company increased the price of a drug used to treat infants. Glenridge acknowledges that the presumptive right to public access generally does not apply in the discovery context, but suggests that the material to be sealed is of such deep and public concern that the public must have the right to access this testimony. (See Opp’n., p. 2:15-18.)

The Court of Appeal addressed this very argument in H.B. Fuller Co., supra. In H.B. Fuller Co., the Court of Appeal reasoned that in order to protect the legitimacy of the judicial branch, a court should not rule on a matter of deep and public concern based on sealed evidence. (Id.) Therefore, it held that, when a discovery motion involves a question of great significance to members of the public, the public’s right to access weighs against the sealing of discovery materials. (Id.) Here, the motion for protective order at issue concerns the scope, duration and location of a deposition, which does not implicate matters of deep and legitimate public concern. (Id. at p. 893 [no right to access material lodged with court to decide whether and under what conditions materials must be produced in discovery].) Accordingly, this argument is without merit.

Second, Glenridge asserts that the testimony concerning Questcor’s pricing and marketing strategies in 2007 does not relate to trade secrets. The deposition testimony at issue concerns Questcor’s unique pricing and marketing strategies. “Courts have found that, under appropriate circumstances, various statutory privileges, trade secrets, and privacy interests, when properly asserted and not waived, may constitute overriding interests” that warrant the filing of records under seal. (In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 298, fn. 3.) A corporation’s unique cost and pricing strategies generally qualify as trade secrets. (See Whyte v. Schlagle Lock. Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1456.) Thus, Bailey’s testimony concerning potential trade secrets constitutes an overriding interest warranting the filing of the transcript under seal, and thus argument is therefore without merit.

Finally, Glenridge argues that the proposed sealing is not narrowly tailored. A review of the deposition testimony to be sealed indicates that the proposed sealing is as narrowly tailored as possible to prevent the disclosure of Questcor’s unique cost and pricing strategies.

In sum, Questcor has sufficiently identified the nature of the harm threatened by disclosure. As the presumptive right of public access does not apply in the discovery context and no significant countervailing considerations are applicable, an order sealing these records is warranted.

C. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Questcor’s motion to seal pages 113-119 and 128-133 of the 13 March 2014 deposition transcript of Bailey, lodged with the Court in support of its motion for a protective order, is GRANTED.

IV. Requests for Monetary Sanctions

A. Questcor’s Requests for Monetary Sanctions

Questcor requests monetary sanctions in connection with its motion for a protective order and its opposition to Glenridge’s motion to compel Bailey’s depositions.

1. Motion for Protective Order

Questcor seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $6,000 against Glenridge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310.

Section 2031.310 provides that the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to a request for production of documents, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)

As Questcor did not make a motion to compel a further response to a request for production of documents, section 2031.310 does not provide a statutory basis for an award of monetary sanctions in this matter. Accordingly, an award of monetary sanctions is unwarranted, and Questcor’s request is DENIED.

2. Opposition to Motion to Compel Deposition

Questcor seeks sanctions in the amount of $3,550 against Glenridge and its attorneys in connection with its opposition to Glenridge’s motion to compel Bailey’s deposition, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, subdivision (j).

Section 2025.480 provides that the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel deposition answers or production of documents attendant to a notice of deposition, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (j).)

Here, Glenridge’ motion to compel Bailey’s appearance at deposition is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, not section 2025.480. Thus, section 2025.480 does not provide a statutory basis for an award of monetary sanctions in this matter. In any case, Glenridge prevailed on the motion, and an award of monetary sanctions to Questcor is therefore unwarranted. Accordingly, Questcor’s request is DENIED.

B. Glenridge’s Requests for Monetary Sanctions

Glenridge requests monetary sanctions in connection with its motion to compel Bailey’s deposition and its opposition to Questcor’s motion for protective order.

1. Motion to Compel

Glenridge seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $10,000, but does not specify the person, party or attorney against whom the sanction is sought.

“A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanctions is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040 [emphasis added].)

Here, Glenridge fails to identify the person, party, and/or attorney against whom the sanction is sought in its notice of motion. Accordingly, the request is not code-compliant, and Glenridge’s request is therefore DENIED.

2. Opposition to Motion for Protective Order

Glenridge seeks sanctions in the amount of $7,500 against Questcor in connection with its opposition to Questcor’s motion for a protective order, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420, subdivision (h).

Section 2025.420 provides that the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for protective order, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (h).)

Here, Questcor’s motion was unsuccessful and not substantially justified, and no other circumstances make the imposition of sanctions unjust. Therefore, Glenridge is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions against Questcor.

Glenridge’s counsel, Thomas E. Wallerstein, declares that he has spent well over 10 hours preparing Glenridge’s opposition at a billing rate of $400 per hour. While the hourly rate is reasonable, the amount of time spent opposing the motion is not. The Court finds 5 hours to be a reasonable time for counsel to draft the opposing paperwork. Accordingly, Glenridge’s request for monetary sanctions against Questcor is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $2,000.

Conclusion and Order

Questcor’s motion for a protective order is DENIED.

Glenridge’s motion to compel Bailey’s deposition is GRANTED. Bailey shall appear and be deposed within 20 calendar days of the filing of this Order, at a date and time that is mutually agreeable to the parties.

Questcor’s motion to file records under seal is GRANTED.

Questcor’s requests for monetary sanctions are DENIED.

Glenridge’s request for monetary sanctions against Questcor in connection with its motion to compel is DENIED.

Glenridge’s request for monetary sanctions against Questcor in connection with its opposition to the motion for protective order is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $2,000. Accordingly, Questcor shall pay $2,000 to Glendridge’s counsel within 20 calendar days of the filing of this Order.