Case Number: TS021012 Hearing Date: March 20, 2018 Dept: A

# 14. In re claims of Marco Contreras

Case No.: TS021012

Matter on calendar for: Petition for relief from claim filing requirements

Tentative ruling:

I. Background

Petitioner Marco Contreras petitions the Court for relief from the claim filing requirements of Government Code § 945.4. Petitioner was arrested for attempted murder and attempted murder in 1996 and convicted in 1997. After years of incarceration, Petitioner’s conviction was overturned on March 23, 2017. Petitioner was released from prison on March 28, 2017 and retained counsel one day later.

Petitioner then filed government claims with the City of Compton and County of Los Angeles alleging (1) False Arrest; (2) Malicious Prosecution; (3) Negligence; (4) Negligence in Hiring, Investigation, Training, Supervision, Policy-Making, Enforcement, and Discipline; and (5) Violations of State Constitution.

Petitioner filed a government claim with the City of Compton on June 14, 2017. The City of Compton rejected the claim as untimely on July 6, 2017. Petitioner filed an application to present a late claim on July 13, 2017. The City of Compton did not respond (and thereby denied the application by operation of law.)

Petitioner also filed a government claim with the County of Los Angeles on June 14, 2017. The County primarily rejected the claim as untimely on June 21, 2017, but investigated the claim to the extent it pertained to activities since “December 14, 2016.” Petitioner filed an application to present a late claim on July 14, 2017. The County responded with several letters indicating that Petitioner’s claims (1) do not implicate the County and (2) are untimely. (Sukhija Decl., Exhs. B, 7-9.)

The Court previously denied this petition for failure to give notice under Gov. Code § 946.6(d). Petitioner’s Amended Petition provides proper notice. A timely opposition has been filed by Defendants County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, Deputy District Attorney Peter Burke, City of Compton, and Frederick Reynolds.

Petitioner contends that (1) his claims were timely filed under Government Code § 911.2, but if they were not, (2) the Court should relieve him from California Government Code § 945.4.

Defendants argue in Opposition that (1) the claims are untimely, (2) affording Petitioner relief would be severely prejudicial to Defendants.

II. Government Tort Claims Act

Government Code § 911.2 requires claims relating to a cause of action for death of injury to a person to be presented within 6 months following the accrual of an action. An application for leave to present a late claim may be presented pursuant to Section 911.6. If such application is denied, a petition to relieve the petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.4 may be filed with the Court.

Section 946(c) states that the Court shall relieve the petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.4 if (1) the claim “was made within a reasonable time not to exceed [the time] specified in subdivision (b) of Section 911.4 [one year after accrual of the cause of action], AND (2) the “failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of Section 945.4.”

III. Accrual

The central question here is whether Plaintiff’s claims were timely presented to the City of Compton and County of Los Angeles. This requires looking at when the cause of action accrued. “For purposes of calculating these time limits [under the Government Tort Claims Act], the date of accrual is the same date that governs in the statute of limitations context.” (Loehr v. Ventura Cnty. Community College District (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1078.) “[A] cause of action accrues and a statute of limitations begins to run when a controversy is ripe – that is, when all of the elements of a cause of action have occurred and suit may be maintained.” [Citations omitted.] (Armstrong Petroleum v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388.)

IV. Malicious Prosecution

“The first element of a malicious prosecution cause of action is that the underlying case must have been terminated in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff. The basis of the favorable termination element is that the resolution of the underlying case must have been tended to indicate the malicious prosecution of plaintiff’s innocence.” (Daniels v. Robbins (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 204, 217.) This cause of action accrued when Petitioner’s conviction was overturned. The malicious prosecution claim was timely presented. Proposed Defendants fail to substantively argue otherwise in Opposition. The Court grants the Amended Petition as to the malicious prosecution claim.

V. False Arrest/False Imprisonment

The holding of Collins v. Los Angeles County (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451, 455 is premised on a false arrest/false imprisonment claim’s accruing “upon termination of the imprisonment…” (as opposed to the “time the proceedings under which plaintiff’s arrest occurred ended”). Further, “[i]t is settled that a cause of action for false imprisonment accrues on the person’s release from incarceration.” (Torres v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 848, citing to Scannell v. County of Riverside (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 596, 606.)

Under Collins, Torres, and Scannell, Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim accrued when his imprisonment ended, and his imprisonment ended when his conviction was overturned. The false arrest/false imprisonment claim was timely presented under Government Code § 911.2. The Court grants the Amended Petition as to the false arrest/false imprisonment claim.

Proposed Defendants cite to Asgari v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 15 Cal.4th 744, 757 for the proposition that a false imprisonment claim accrues at the time the petitioner/plaintiff is arraigned and confined to lawful process. But Asgari did not analyze when a false imprisonment cause of action accrues. In Asgari, the California Supreme Court narrowly held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a police officer’s liability for false arrest could include damages sustained by the arrestee after the filing of formal charges. The California Supreme Court interpreted Gov. Code §§ 820.4 and 821.6 to find that the Legislature intended to shield police officers from liability for a suspect’s incarceration after the “institution of lawful process.” Asgari, a damages case, not a statute of limitations case, did not overrule Collins, Torres, or Scannell.

VI. Petitioner’s remaining claims; Heck and Yount

Petitioner’s remaining claims are Negligence; Negligence in Hiring, Investigation, Training, Supervision, Policy-Making, Enforcement, and Discipline; and Violations of State Constitution.

Proposed Defendants argue that Petitioner’s negligence claims allege various actions or inactions by employees of the City of Compton and County of Los Angeles leading up to Petitioner’s conviction in 1997, therefore these claims accrued “as soon as the County and City employees brought about petitioner’s criminal conviction in April 1997.” (Opposition, 13-15.) Proposed Defendants do not cite to any authorities.

Petitioner relies primarily on Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477 and Yount v. City of Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885, 893-894, where the California Supreme Court stated:

Our discussion begins with Heck, supra, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383, which first established that a section 1983 claim calling into question the lawfulness of a plaintiff’s conviction or confinement is not cognizable until the conviction or confinement has been invalidated. (Heck, supra, at p. 483, 114 S.Ct. 2364.) Heck analogized a section 1983 claim in such circumstances to the common law cause of action for malicious prosecution, which similarly includes the termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused as an element of the cause of action. “This requirement ‘avoids parallel litigation over the issues of probable cause and guilt … and it precludes the possibility of the claimant [sic] succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.’ [Citation.] Furthermore, ‘to permit a convicted criminal defendant to proceed with a malicious prosecution claim would permit a collateral attack on the conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit.’ [Citation.] This Court has long expressed similar concerns for finality and consistency and has generally declined to expand opportunities for collateral attack [citations]. We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the *894 plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution.” (Heck, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 484–486, 114 S.Ct. 2364, fns. omitted.) Thus, “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus [citation].” (Id. at pp. 486–487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, fn. omitted.)

Neither Heck nor Yount moves the needle here because these cases:

· Deal with whether a plaintiff was barred from bringing certain causes of action (not negligence, negligent hiring, or violation of California Constitution claims) before a conviction was overturned;

· Do not analyze when a negligence, negligent hiring, or California Constitution violation claim accrues under Government Code § 911.2;

· Specifically mention only Section 1983, malicious prosecution, and civil battery claims;

· Primarily focus on a Section 1983 claim analysis; and

· Are factually distinguishable from Petitioner’s case.

In sum, Petitioner has not shown that Heck or Yount broadly hold that any state law claim (including any of Petitioner’s remaining claims) accrues at a time when bringing the claim would no longer “imply the invalidity of [Petitioner’s] conviction or sentence.”

However, Petitioner’s remaining claims may be viable if the continuing violation doctrine operates to preserve these claims.

“The context of continuing – that is, periodic – accrual for periodic breach is to be distinguished from that of a single breach or other wrong which has continuing impact.” (Armstrong Petroleum, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 1388; see also Cutujian v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1387.) Such “continuing violation doctrine… aggregates a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 1192.) “Allegations of a pattern of reasonably frequent and similar acts may, in a given case, justify treating the acts as an indivisible course of conduct actionable in its entirety, notwithstanding that the conduct occurred partially outside and partially inside the limitations period.” [Citations omitted.] (Id.) The continuing violation doctrine “renders an entire course of conduct actionable.” (Id. at 1199.)

Neither party addresses the continuing violation doctrine, but the Court believes it may apply here. Petitioner’s allegedly wrongful conviction constituted a single wrong which had continuing impact, through Petitioner’s incarceration, until the date his conviction was overturned. Petitioner’s claims therefore accrued upon the sufferance of the last wrong: the moment before his conviction was overturned. Within six months of the overturning of his conviction, Petitioner appeared to present timely claims to the City of Compton and County of Los Angeles under Government Code § 911.2 and the continuing violation doctrine.

The Court will continue this matter to allow both sides to brief whether the continuing violation doctrine applies here.

If the parties wish, the Court will also allow both sides to brief further whether Heck or Yount affect the accrual analysis.

VII. Government Code § 946.6(c)

A Government Code § 946.6(c) claim based on mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect must be made within a reasonable time frame not exceeding one year. Whether Petitioner’s (alternative) reliance on Government Code § 946.6(c) is proper depends on whether Petitioner’s claims are preserved by the continuing violation doctrine. (It may well be that the Court need not analyze Petitioner’s claims under Section 946.6 if Plaintiff’s claims are timely under Section 911.2.)

VIII. Ruling

The Court will grant the Amended Petition as to the malicious prosecution and false imprisonment claims.

Final resolution of this matter will be continued to allow both sides to submit additional briefing regarding whether the continuing violation doctrine operates to preserve each of Petitioner’s remaining claims. The Court also allows both sides to brief further whether Heck or Yount affects the accrual analysis. One brief per side will be allowed; no brief may exceed 10 pages.