John Strumfler, et al. v. Stalwart Clean and Sober, Inc., et al.
Case No: 18CV01646
Hearing Date: Mon Jun 24, 2019 9:30

Nature of Proceedings: Motion Summary Judgment

CASE:

John Strumfler, et al. v. Stalwart Clean and Sober, Inc., et al., Case No. 18CV01646 (Judge Sterne)

HEARING DATE: June 24, 2019

MATTER:

Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Stalwart Clean and Sober, Inc.

ATTORNEYS:

Jonathan C. Teller for Plaintiffs John Strumfler and Tracy Morris

Jack H. Snyder for Defendant Stalwart Clean and Sober, Inc.

Paul D. Singer for Defendant Community Solutions, Inc.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion for summary judgment of defendant Stalwart Clean and Sober, Inc. is denied. The court finds that there are triable issues of fact as to plaintiffs’ claims in the matter.

BACKGROUND:

This is an action for wrongful death. Plaintiffs John Strumfler and Tracy Morris are the parents of the decedent, John Charles Strumfler, a parolee with a severe heroin addiction. On March 24, 2017, the decedent died from a heroin overdose while residing at a sober living facility owned and operated by defendant Stalwart Clean and Sober, Inc. (“Stalwart”). At the time of his death, the decedent was receiving drug treatment on an out-patient basis at a facility owned and operated by defendant Community Solutions, Inc. (“Community”). Plaintiffs contend that defendants were negligent in failing to supervise the decedent and allowing him to enter Stalwart on the night of March 23, 2017, with heroin on his person and to lock the door to his room where he overdosed. On April 3, 2018, plaintiffs filed their complaint against defendants for negligence and wrongful death. On August 14, 2018, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint for negligence, wrongful death, willful misconduct, and breach of contract. Pursuant to a stipulation and order entered on November 15, 2018, the only claims asserted against Stalwart are for negligence and wrongful death.

Stalwart now moves for summary judgment on the first amended complaint. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

ANALYSIS:

A trial court properly grants summary judgment when there are no triable issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Code Civ. Proc. §437c, subd. (c). “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide the courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite the allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Company (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843. A moving defendant is entitled to summary judgment if it establishes a complete defense to the plaintiff’s causes of action, or shows that one or more elements of each cause of action cannot be established. Code Civ. Proc. §437c, subd. (p)(2). A defendant’s burden of proof on summary judgment is substantial and if it fails to meet this burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.

Pursuant to the Stipulation and Order executed by the court on November 15, 2018, the only claims asserted against Stalwart in the first amended complaint are for negligence and wrongful death. (Stip. & Order, filed 11-15-18.) Code of Civil Procedure Section 377.60 governs wrongful death actions and provides:

“A cause of action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another may be asserted by any of the following persons or by the decedent’s personal representative on their behalf:

“(a) The decedent’s surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, and issue of deceased children, or, if there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the persons, including the surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would be entitled to the property of the decedent by intestate succession.

“(b) Whether or not qualified under subdivision (a), if they were dependent on the decedent, the putative spouse, children of the putative spouse, stepchildren, or parents.”

Plaintiffs John Strumfler and Tracy Morris are the parents of the decedent. Plaintiffs allege that the decedent died due to Stalwart’s negligence. To prevail on a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty of care, (2) that the defendant breached the duty, and (3) that the breach was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673. Stalwart contends that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the duty element because neither statutory nor decisional law in California imposes a duty on Stalwart, a sober living facility, to supervise or safeguard residents from the possible consequences of their addictions. Further, while Stalwart provides a place for recovering addicts to live, it never assumed any duty to supervise or safeguard residents while on its premises. Finally, even if the duty element can be satisfied, Stalwart has a complete defense because it is undisputed that the decedent caused his own death by overdosing on heroin.

In California, a legal duty of care may be established by statute. J’Aire Corporation v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 803. Where a statute establishes a party’s duty of care, proof of the party’s violation of the statute raises a presumption of negligence if the plaintiff was one of the class of persons the statute was intended to protect and the violation was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Spriesterbach v. Holland (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 255, 263. Under the doctrine of “negligence per se,” the plaintiff “borrows” a statute to establish a duty of care on the part of the defendant, though the plaintiff still has the burden of proving causation. David v. Hernandez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 578, 584. “[I]n negligence per se actions, the plaintiff must produce evidence of a violation of a statute and a substantial probability that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the violation of the statute.” Toste v. CalPortland Construction (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 362, 371.

The court is unaware of any statutory authority in California which establishes the legal standard of care for operators of sober living facilities. Under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code §15610 et seq.), recovering drug addicts and those struggling with substance abuse may be considered “dependent adults,” and thus entitled to added legal protection. Welfare & Institutions Code Section 15610.23, subdivision (a), provides:

“‘Dependent adult’ means a person, regardless of whether the person lives independently, between the ages of 18 and 64 years who resides in this state and who has physical or mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his or her rights . . . .”

The Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Act, however, was designed to protect elders and dependent adults from abuse, neglect, and/or abandonment by licensed health care providers and does not address the care and supervision required of residents at sober living facilities, like Stalwart.

A duty of care may also be found where one, either expressly or by conduct, voluntarily assumes a protective duty to another or where there is a “special relationship” between the parties that creates a duty to act. Crow v. State of California (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 192, 208. Stalwart argues that it never assumed a duty to supervise or care for the decedent, or any other resident at its facility. As detailed in the declaration of Steve Goralski, Stalwart’s owner, Stalwart is not a drug rehabilitation facility as it offers no medical oversight, counseling, or other related services. (Goralski Dec., ¶4.) It simply offers recovering addicts a place to stay and sleep, so long as they promise to remain substance free. (Ibid.) Residents are subject to random drug tests and must abide by a nightly curfew and other rules and regulations, but otherwise they are free to come and go as they please. (Ibid.)

The court is not persuaded. While Stalwart asserts that it is merely a place for recovering addicts to live and sleep with no further responsibilities or obligations towards its residents (i.e., it is no different than any other residential apartment building), Stalwart’s own membership agreement and house rules contradict this claim. On being admitted to Stalwart on December 29, 2016, the decedent was required to sign a “Temporary Membership Agreement,” which states:

“STALWART CLEAN & SOBER will provide its members with a clean, safe, and sober living environment. As a service to the community, Stalwart Clean & Sober attempts to offer its unwavering partisan services to as many people as space and resources permit. . . . To support the goal of sober living environments, drug and alcohol testing may be conducted without prior notice to any member where there is reasonable cause to believe or suspect that substance abuse by that member is taking place. . . . This is not done for any reason other than to assure a substance-free environment for all residents and guests of Stalwart Clean & Sober. . . .”

(Teller Dec., ¶5, Ex. D, Temporary Membership Agreement.)

In addition, Stalwart’s house rules and regulations provide that “rooms are inspected daily,” “all clients must participate in a 12-step program of his choice and have a sponsor in the program,” “curfew is at 10 p.m.,” and “house meetings are Tuesday 7 p.m. and Sunday 5 p.m.” (Teller Dec., ¶6, Ex. E, Stalwart House Rules.) Thus, in promising to provide its members with “a clean, safe, and sober living environment,” Stalwart expressly agreed to assume the duties of daily room checks, mandatory curfews, random drug testing, mandatory substance abuse programs, and twice-weekly house meetings. These strict house rules and regulations were clearly put in place because Stalwart understood that its members require supervision if they are to successfully transition back into regular society and avoid relapsing into drug or alcohol abuse. (Ibid.) Stalwart complains that it would have been impossible, except at an exorbitant cost that would have put it out of business, to provide constant supervision of all its members while on the premises, but that is not what is alleged here. Rather, plaintiffs allege that Stalwart negligently breached its duty to provide “a clean, safe, and sober living environment” by failing to follow its own rules and regulations.

The house rules, for example, indicate that room inspections are to be conducted daily and that members are supposed to be out of the facility by 10:00 a.m., yet the decedent was in his room all day on March 24, 2016, and his room was not inspected until 5:00 p.m., when he was found dead. (Teller Dec., ¶6, Ex. E, Stalwart House Rules; ¶8, Ex. G, Deposition of Marlin Goralski, pp. 25:12-18, 83:2-5.) The on cite manager, Marlin Goralski, apparently did not check on the decedent for over 20 hours, though curfew and bed checks were two of his regular duties. (Teller Dec., ¶8, Ex. G, Deposition of Marlin Goralski, pp. 12:10-16, 37:2-7, 39:24-25, 40:17-41:8, 44:4-24, 83:2-5, 98:10-15.) By accepting the decedent into its sober living facility, Stalwart undertook a duty to act with reasonable care to implement its policies and procedures, all of which were intended to safeguard residents. Accordingly, triable issues of fact remain regarding whether Stalwart breached any of the duties it expressly assumed.

As discussed above, a duty to protect another person from harm may also arise in the context of a special relationship. “Such a special relationship is typically [found] where the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, has some control over the plaintiff’s welfare.” Kockelman v. Segal (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 491, 499. In Klein v. BIA Hotel Corporation (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1133, the court extended the special relationship rationale and the duty to exercise reasonable care and supervision to a residential care facility. The decedent in that case committed suicide while a resident of defendant’s facility. In holding that there existed a special relationship and that the defendant owed a duty of care to the decedent, the court stated:

“Although defendant is not a mental institution and apparently does not operate a psychiatric ward,it nevertheless assumed a special relationship with decedent when it agreed to have her as a resident in its facility for the care of the elderly, and thereby expressly, or at least impliedly, agreed to execute the duties imposed upon it, by the regulations, to monitor her and report changes and conditions in her physical and mental health. Obviously, besides simply monitoring the decedent and reporting changes and conditions, defendant would also have the duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent decedent from harming herself if it had knowledge or notice of facts from which it might reasonably conclude that decedent was likely to harm herself unless protective measures were taken, even if exercising such reasonable care meant only that defendant took measures to keep decedent safe until decedent’s responsible person could move her to a more secure facility.”

Id., at 1142.

Here, it is a question for the jury whether Stalwart assumed a special relationship over the decedent, with its attendant duties of reasonable care and supervision, when it accepted him into its living facility. At the time of his admission to Stalwart on December 29, 2016, the decedent underwent a “level of service” assessment, which determined that his probability of recidivism was 90%, that the maximum level of supervision and service was recommended, and that a halfway house was not appropriate unless intensive supervision and treatment were also provided. (Teller Dec., ¶4. Ex. C, Level of Service Inventory – Revised.) Clearly, Stalwart was aware of the level of supervision needed for the decedent when he was accepted as a member of its sober living facility and therefore it voluntarily assumed a duty to keep a watchful eye on him when he was on the premises.

Stalwart next argues that even if it can be established that it owed a duty to supervise and safeguard the decedent, and that it breached that duty, it has a complete defense because the decedent caused his own death by overdoing on heroin, thus negating the element of causation. (Snyder Dec., ¶10, Ex. 8, Santa Barbara Police Department Report; ¶11, Ex. 9, Santa Barbara County Sheriff Coroner’s Bureau Report.) Civil Code Section 1714, subdivision (a), provides:

“Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself . . . .”

It is not disputed that the decedent died as a result of a drug overdose. He was found in his room, slumped over on the floor, with a syringe still in his arm and drug paraphernalia, including heroin, on a nearby dresser. (Snyder Dec., ¶10, Ex. 8, Santa Barbara Police Department Report.) However, it remains a triable issue of fact whether greater supervision or control of the decedent in the form of more frequent room inspections and/or searches of his person when he returned home in the evening would have prevented his death. Causation is always a question of fact for the jury. Staats v. Vintner’s Golf Club, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 826, 832. By holding itself out as a sober living facility, Stalwart obligated itself through its own rules, regulations, and membership agreement to take some action to safeguard its members from relapse by conducting drug tests, room inspections, bed checks, resident searches, and house meetings. Stalwart is not just a place for recovering addicts to sleep, as it contends. Rather, it is a sober living facility that assumed a duty to provide its residents with a clean, safe, and sober living environment. The jury must decide whether Stalwart breached that duty.

Based on the foregoing, Stalwart’s motion for summary judgment will be denied. There are triable issues of fact as to whether Stalwart breached its duty of care to the decedent, and causation.