2017-00215345-CU-OE

Katherine Skaggs vs. The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of Ca.

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Form Interrogatories

Filed By: Spencer, Robert

Plaintiff Katherine Skaggs’ motion to compel Defendant The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California’s further responses to form interrogatories is ruled upon as follows.

In this PAGA action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant improperly classified store managers as exempt employees. At issue on this motion are Defendant’s responses to Form Interrogatories Nos. 12.2, 12.3, 12.6 and 15.1. Defendant interposed a laundry list of boilerplate objections to the interrogatories and did not provide any substantive response.

The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has failed to adequately meet and confer. The efforts were sufficient.

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff failed to set forth good cause for further responses. Defendant argues that Plaintiff must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand” and cites to CCP § 2030.310(b)(1). However, the quoted statement is found in CCP § 2031.310(b)(1) which governs motions to compel further responses to request for production. The instant motion to compel further responses to interrogatories is governed by CCP § 2030.300 which does not contain any similar requirement. Rather a party may seek further responses to interrogatories where “(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (CCP

§ 2030.300(a)(1)-(3).) In any event, the subject form interrogatories are judicial council approved interrogatories and are targeted at basic facts, witnesses, etc. Here, Defendant interposed objections to the subject interrogatories and Plaintiff has moved to compel further responses. As the party seeking to resist discovery based upon objections, it was Defendant’s burden to justify the objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 220-221].)

12.2, 12.3, and 12.6

The motion is granted. Form Interrogatories 12.2, 12.3, and 12.6 seek basic information as to whether Defendant has performed any interviews, obtained witness statements, and whether any reports were prepared. Defendant’s objection to the term “INCIDENT” on the basis that it is unintelligible, vague and ambiguous in the context of a PAGA action is overruled. Plaintiff indicated that “INCIDENT” refers to “the claims asserted in this action that arise out of Defendant’s alleged misclassification of store managers as exempt.” While perhaps this could be more clear, it is not so vague and ambiguous such that Defendant can decline to respond. While Defendant argues that it is not required to “comb” through the complaint to speculate from which allegations her claims arose, Defendant is under a duty to undertake a reasonable and good faith effort to interpret “INCIDENT” and respond accordingly. Indeed, where the question may be somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response. (See Cal. Civil Discovery Practice, (Cont. Ed.Bar 1975) § 8.54.)

Defendant then argues that Plaintiff is aware that it [defendant] has not interviewed witnesses or gathered statements because it told Plaintiff this during the meet and confer process. Even so, Plaintiff is still entitled to a verified response to the subject discovery. Defendant appears to concede as much as it indicates that it will supplement its responses. (See, e.g. Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 555.)

Defendant also argues that it was not required to create a privilege log for each and every communication with Defendant after the lawsuit was filed. The Court notes that Plaintiff has not made any specific argument to the effect that Defendant was required to create a privilege log for every piece of work product created in this action or every communication. Rather Plaintiff simply indicated the Defendant’s objection based on attorney-client privilege and work product appeared inapplicable with respect to the specific interrogatories and that no privilege log was provided. The Court simply notes that if and to the extent that Defendant withheld any information that was responsive to these specific interrogatories on the basis of attorney-client, work product, etc.

privileges, it must provide further responses that provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log. (E.g., CCP §2031.240.)

Defendant makes no other attempt to justify any of the numerous other objections set forth in its responses to the form interrogatories and they are overruled and must be removed from any further response.

Defendant must provide further responses to these interrogatories.

15.1

The motion is granted. This interrogatory asks for identification of facts, witnesses and documents supporting Defendant’s affirmative defenses. In arguing that it is not required to provide a further response, Defendant argues that all of its defenses rest on a future determination by the court or on the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims. Parenthetically, so does every case filed; in itself this is not a basis to deny discovery. In any event, for example, Defendant argues that many defenses will depend on what class of employees Plaintiff seeks to represent and that No. 15.1 is “premature” because Defendant has yet to determine and discover facts. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has not yet responded to its discovery and the question of her status as an aggrieved employee should be addressed first. First, there is no priority of discovery. Next, essentially, Defendant seems to suggest that Plaintiff must prove standing before engaging in any discovery. However, “the way to raise lack of standing is to plead it as an affirmative defense and thereafter to bring a motion for summary adjudication or summary judgment, not to resist discovery until a plaintiff proves he or she has standing.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2018) 3 Cal.5th 531, 558-559.) Indeed, the federal case cited in a footnote by Defendant involved a motion for summary judgment, not discovery. (Cabrera v. CVS RX Services, Inc. (N.D.Cal. Sept. 25, 2018) 2018 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 164625.) Defendant argues that Williams was only focusing on the representational standing aspect of PAGA, e.g, whether the plaintiff must show he or she suffered a violation to pursue representative PAGA claims, and not the “legal standing” issue of whether the plaintiff has any legal claim after abandoning her own individual claim as Defendant asserts Plaintiff has done here. The single unpublished federal case cited by Defendant for the proposition that Plaintiff’s individual status should be decided first prior to proceeding on representative claims involved an affirmative motion by a defendant for a stay, not discovery. ( Stafford v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (E.D. Nov. 20, 2014) 2014 U.S.Dist.LECIS 163458.) Defendant has made no such motion.

To the extent that Defendant argues that it does not yet have facts or information as to its affirmative defenses or that Plaintiff is aware of the information, Defendant still must provide a response to the interrogatory in accordance with CCP § 2030.220.

Defendant must make an attempt to respond to this fundamental interrogatory approved by the judicial council which seeks basic information regarding the very affirmative defenses set forth in its answer. While the court is aware of the general practice of setting out every possible affirmative defense which may apply, counsel ought to be prepared to respond, as possible, to interrogatories requesting facts upon which each affirmative defense is predicated, and the names and address (etc.) of persons with knowledge of such facts. (See, e.g. Deyo v Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, current information must be disclosed. Id. at p. 771, fn.8.) “Parties, like witnesses, are required to state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in

answering written interrogatories.” ( Hunter v. International Systems & Controls Corp. (W.D.Mo. 1972) 56 F.R.D. 617, 631.) Where the question is specific and explicit, an answer which supplies only a portion of the information sought is wholly insufficient. Likewise, a party may not provide deftly worded conclusionary answers designed to evade a series of explicit questions. (In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation (E.D.Pa. 1974) 63 F.R.D. 641, 650-654.)

Further, an interrogatory “is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or application of law to fact, or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial.” (CCP § 2030.010(b).). Discovery related to contentions is permissible. (Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 722, 728.) A defendant may be required to disclose whether he or she makes a contention and to disclose facts underling defenses and denials. (Burke v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 281-282.)

The objection to “INCIDENT” and any other term as vague and ambiguous is overruled for the reasons already set forth above.

Defendant makes no effort to justify any of the other multitude of objections set forth in the response and they must be removed from any further response. The same comments with respect to the attorney-client privilege, etc. set forth above apply equally here.

Defendant shall serve further verified responses to Plaintiff’s form interrogatories nos.

12.2, 12.3, 12.6 and 15.1 consistent with the above no later than March 14, 2019.

No sanctions were requested and none are awarded.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to notify Defendant’s counsel immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing, in person or by telephone, in the event Defendant’s counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.

Item 6 2017-00215345-CU-OE

Katherine Skaggs vs. The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of Ca.

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Production of Documents

Filed By: Spencer, Robert

Plaintiff Katherine Skaggs’ motion to compel Defendant The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California’s further responses to request for production is ruled upon as follows.

In this PAGA action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant improperly classified store managers as exempt employees. At issue on this motion are Defendant’s responses to requests 4-6, 11-13, 15, 18, 28, 40, 2017-00215345-CU-OE

Katherine Skaggs vs. The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of Ca.

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Form Interrogatories

Filed By: Spencer, Robert

Plaintiff Katherine Skaggs’ motion to compel Defendant The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California’s further responses to form interrogatories is ruled upon as follows.

In this PAGA action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant improperly classified store managers as exempt employees. At issue on this motion are Defendant’s responses to Form Interrogatories Nos. 12.2, 12.3, 12.6 and 15.1. Defendant interposed a laundry list of boilerplate objections to the interrogatories and did not provide any substantive response.

The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has failed to adequately meet and confer. The efforts were sufficient.

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff failed to set forth good cause for further responses. Defendant argues that Plaintiff must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand” and cites to CCP § 2030.310(b)(1). However, the quoted statement is found in CCP § 2031.310(b)(1) which governs motions to compel further responses to request for production. The instant motion to compel further responses to interrogatories is governed by CCP § 2030.300 which does not contain any similar requirement. Rather a party may seek further responses to interrogatories where “(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (CCP

§ 2030.300(a)(1)-(3).) In any event, the subject form interrogatories are judicial council approved interrogatories and are targeted at basic facts, witnesses, etc. Here, Defendant interposed objections to the subject interrogatories and Plaintiff has moved to compel further responses. As the party seeking to resist discovery based upon objections, it was Defendant’s burden to justify the objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 220-221].)

12.2, 12.3, and 12.6

The motion is granted. Form Interrogatories 12.2, 12.3, and 12.6 seek basic information as to whether Defendant has performed any interviews, obtained witness statements, and whether any reports were prepared. Defendant’s objection to the term “INCIDENT” on the basis that it is unintelligible, vague and ambiguous in the context of a PAGA action is overruled. Plaintiff indicated that “INCIDENT” refers to “the claims asserted in this action that arise out of Defendant’s alleged misclassification of store managers as exempt.” While perhaps this could be more clear, it is not so vague and ambiguous such that Defendant can decline to respond. While Defendant argues that it is not required to “comb” through the complaint to speculate from which allegations her claims arose, Defendant is under a duty to undertake a reasonable and good faith effort to interpret “INCIDENT” and respond accordingly. Indeed, where the question may be somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response. (See Cal. Civil Discovery Practice, (Cont. Ed.Bar 1975) § 8.54.)

Defendant then argues that Plaintiff is aware that it [defendant] has not interviewed witnesses or gathered statements because it told Plaintiff this during the meet and confer process. Even so, Plaintiff is still entitled to a verified response to the subject discovery. Defendant appears to concede as much as it indicates that it will supplement its responses. (See, e.g. Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 555.)

Defendant also argues that it was not required to create a privilege log for each and every communication with Defendant after the lawsuit was filed. The Court notes that Plaintiff has not made any specific argument to the effect that Defendant was required to create a privilege log for every piece of work product created in this action or every communication. Rather Plaintiff simply indicated the Defendant’s objection based on attorney-client privilege and work product appeared inapplicable with respect to the specific interrogatories and that no privilege log was provided. The Court simply notes that if and to the extent that Defendant withheld any information that was responsive to these specific interrogatories on the basis of attorney-client, work product, etc.

privileges, it must provide further responses that provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log. (E.g., CCP §2031.240.)

Defendant makes no other attempt to justify any of the numerous other objections set forth in its responses to the form interrogatories and they are overruled and must be removed from any further response.

Defendant must provide further responses to these interrogatories.

15.1

The motion is granted. This interrogatory asks for identification of facts, witnesses and documents supporting Defendant’s affirmative defenses. In arguing that it is not required to provide a further response, Defendant argues that all of its defenses rest on a future determination by the court or on the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims. Parenthetically, so does every case filed; in itself this is not a basis to deny discovery. In any event, for example, Defendant argues that many defenses will depend on what class of employees Plaintiff seeks to represent and that No. 15.1 is “premature” because Defendant has yet to determine and discover facts. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has not yet responded to its discovery and the question of her status as an aggrieved employee should be addressed first. First, there is no priority of discovery. Next, essentially, Defendant seems to suggest that Plaintiff must prove standing before engaging in any discovery. However, “the way to raise lack of standing is to plead it as an affirmative defense and thereafter to bring a motion for summary adjudication or summary judgment, not to resist discovery until a plaintiff proves he or she has standing.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2018) 3 Cal.5th 531, 558-559.) Indeed, the federal case cited in a footnote by Defendant involved a motion for summary judgment, not discovery. (Cabrera v. CVS RX Services, Inc. (N.D.Cal. Sept. 25, 2018) 2018 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 164625.) Defendant argues that Williams was only focusing on the representational standing aspect of PAGA, e.g, whether the plaintiff must show he or she suffered a violation to pursue representative PAGA claims, and not the “legal standing” issue of whether the plaintiff has any legal claim after abandoning her own individual claim as Defendant asserts Plaintiff has done here. The single unpublished federal case cited by Defendant for the proposition that Plaintiff’s individual status should be decided first prior to proceeding on representative claims involved an affirmative motion by a defendant for a stay, not discovery. ( Stafford v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (E.D. Nov. 20, 2014) 2014 U.S.Dist.LECIS 163458.) Defendant has made no such motion.

To the extent that Defendant argues that it does not yet have facts or information as to its affirmative defenses or that Plaintiff is aware of the information, Defendant still must provide a response to the interrogatory in accordance with CCP § 2030.220.

Defendant must make an attempt to respond to this fundamental interrogatory approved by the judicial council which seeks basic information regarding the very affirmative defenses set forth in its answer. While the court is aware of the general practice of setting out every possible affirmative defense which may apply, counsel ought to be prepared to respond, as possible, to interrogatories requesting facts upon which each affirmative defense is predicated, and the names and address (etc.) of persons with knowledge of such facts. (See, e.g. Deyo v Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, current information must be disclosed. Id. at p. 771, fn.8.) “Parties, like witnesses, are required to state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in

answering written interrogatories.” ( Hunter v. International Systems & Controls Corp. (W.D.Mo. 1972) 56 F.R.D. 617, 631.) Where the question is specific and explicit, an answer which supplies only a portion of the information sought is wholly insufficient. Likewise, a party may not provide deftly worded conclusionary answers designed to evade a series of explicit questions. (In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation (E.D.Pa. 1974) 63 F.R.D. 641, 650-654.)

Further, an interrogatory “is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or application of law to fact, or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial.” (CCP § 2030.010(b).). Discovery related to contentions is permissible. (Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 722, 728.) A defendant may be required to disclose whether he or she makes a contention and to disclose facts underling defenses and denials. (Burke v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 281-282.)

The objection to “INCIDENT” and any other term as vague and ambiguous is overruled for the reasons already set forth above.

Defendant makes no effort to justify any of the other multitude of objections set forth in the response and they must be removed from any further response. The same comments with respect to the attorney-client privilege, etc. set forth above apply equally here.

Defendant shall serve further verified responses to Plaintiff’s form interrogatories nos.

12.2, 12.3, 12.6 and 15.1 consistent with the above no later than March 14, 2019.

No sanctions were requested and none are awarded.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to notify Defendant’s counsel immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing, in person or by telephone, in the event Defendant’s counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.

Item 6 2017-00215345-CU-OE

Katherine Skaggs vs. The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of Ca.

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Production of Documents

Filed By: Spencer, Robert

Plaintiff Katherine Skaggs’ motion to compel Defendant The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California’s further responses to request for production is ruled upon as follows.

In this PAGA action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant improperly classified store managers as exempt employees. At issue on this motion are Defendant’s responses to requests 4-6, 11-13, 15, 18, 28, 40,2017-00215345-CU-OE

Katherine Skaggs vs. The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of Ca.

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Form Interrogatories

Filed By: Spencer, Robert

Plaintiff Katherine Skaggs’ motion to compel Defendant The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California’s further responses to form interrogatories is ruled upon as follows.

In this PAGA action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant improperly classified store managers as exempt employees. At issue on this motion are Defendant’s responses to Form Interrogatories Nos. 12.2, 12.3, 12.6 and 15.1. Defendant interposed a laundry list of boilerplate objections to the interrogatories and did not provide any substantive response.

The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has failed to adequately meet and confer. The efforts were sufficient.

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff failed to set forth good cause for further responses. Defendant argues that Plaintiff must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand” and cites to CCP § 2030.310(b)(1). However, the quoted statement is found in CCP § 2031.310(b)(1) which governs motions to compel further responses to request for production. The instant motion to compel further responses to interrogatories is governed by CCP § 2030.300 which does not contain any similar requirement. Rather a party may seek further responses to interrogatories where “(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (CCP

§ 2030.300(a)(1)-(3).) In any event, the subject form interrogatories are judicial council approved interrogatories and are targeted at basic facts, witnesses, etc. Here, Defendant interposed objections to the subject interrogatories and Plaintiff has moved to compel further responses. As the party seeking to resist discovery based upon objections, it was Defendant’s burden to justify the objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 220-221].)

12.2, 12.3, and 12.6

The motion is granted. Form Interrogatories 12.2, 12.3, and 12.6 seek basic information as to whether Defendant has performed any interviews, obtained witness statements, and whether any reports were prepared. Defendant’s objection to the term “INCIDENT” on the basis that it is unintelligible, vague and ambiguous in the context of a PAGA action is overruled. Plaintiff indicated that “INCIDENT” refers to “the claims asserted in this action that arise out of Defendant’s alleged misclassification of store managers as exempt.” While perhaps this could be more clear, it is not so vague and ambiguous such that Defendant can decline to respond. While Defendant argues that it is not required to “comb” through the complaint to speculate from which allegations her claims arose, Defendant is under a duty to undertake a reasonable and good faith effort to interpret “INCIDENT” and respond accordingly. Indeed, where the question may be somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response. (See Cal. Civil Discovery Practice, (Cont. Ed.Bar 1975) § 8.54.)

Defendant then argues that Plaintiff is aware that it [defendant] has not interviewed witnesses or gathered statements because it told Plaintiff this during the meet and confer process. Even so, Plaintiff is still entitled to a verified response to the subject discovery. Defendant appears to concede as much as it indicates that it will supplement its responses. (See, e.g. Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 555.)

Defendant also argues that it was not required to create a privilege log for each and every communication with Defendant after the lawsuit was filed. The Court notes that Plaintiff has not made any specific argument to the effect that Defendant was required to create a privilege log for every piece of work product created in this action or every communication. Rather Plaintiff simply indicated the Defendant’s objection based on attorney-client privilege and work product appeared inapplicable with respect to the specific interrogatories and that no privilege log was provided. The Court simply notes that if and to the extent that Defendant withheld any information that was responsive to these specific interrogatories on the basis of attorney-client, work product, etc.

privileges, it must provide further responses that provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log. (E.g., CCP §2031.240.)

Defendant makes no other attempt to justify any of the numerous other objections set forth in its responses to the form interrogatories and they are overruled and must be removed from any further response.

Defendant must provide further responses to these interrogatories.

15.1

The motion is granted. This interrogatory asks for identification of facts, witnesses and documents supporting Defendant’s affirmative defenses. In arguing that it is not required to provide a further response, Defendant argues that all of its defenses rest on a future determination by the court or on the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims. Parenthetically, so does every case filed; in itself this is not a basis to deny discovery. In any event, for example, Defendant argues that many defenses will depend on what class of employees Plaintiff seeks to represent and that No. 15.1 is “premature” because Defendant has yet to determine and discover facts. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has not yet responded to its discovery and the question of her status as an aggrieved employee should be addressed first. First, there is no priority of discovery. Next, essentially, Defendant seems to suggest that Plaintiff must prove standing before engaging in any discovery. However, “the way to raise lack of standing is to plead it as an affirmative defense and thereafter to bring a motion for summary adjudication or summary judgment, not to resist discovery until a plaintiff proves he or she has standing.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2018) 3 Cal.5th 531, 558-559.) Indeed, the federal case cited in a footnote by Defendant involved a motion for summary judgment, not discovery. (Cabrera v. CVS RX Services, Inc. (N.D.Cal. Sept. 25, 2018) 2018 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 164625.) Defendant argues that Williams was only focusing on the representational standing aspect of PAGA, e.g, whether the plaintiff must show he or she suffered a violation to pursue representative PAGA claims, and not the “legal standing” issue of whether the plaintiff has any legal claim after abandoning her own individual claim as Defendant asserts Plaintiff has done here. The single unpublished federal case cited by Defendant for the proposition that Plaintiff’s individual status should be decided first prior to proceeding on representative claims involved an affirmative motion by a defendant for a stay, not discovery. ( Stafford v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (E.D. Nov. 20, 2014) 2014 U.S.Dist.LECIS 163458.) Defendant has made no such motion.

To the extent that Defendant argues that it does not yet have facts or information as to its affirmative defenses or that Plaintiff is aware of the information, Defendant still must provide a response to the interrogatory in accordance with CCP § 2030.220.

Defendant must make an attempt to respond to this fundamental interrogatory approved by the judicial council which seeks basic information regarding the very affirmative defenses set forth in its answer. While the court is aware of the general practice of setting out every possible affirmative defense which may apply, counsel ought to be prepared to respond, as possible, to interrogatories requesting facts upon which each affirmative defense is predicated, and the names and address (etc.) of persons with knowledge of such facts. (See, e.g. Deyo v Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, current information must be disclosed. Id. at p. 771, fn.8.) “Parties, like witnesses, are required to state the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in

answering written interrogatories.” ( Hunter v. International Systems & Controls Corp. (W.D.Mo. 1972) 56 F.R.D. 617, 631.) Where the question is specific and explicit, an answer which supplies only a portion of the information sought is wholly insufficient. Likewise, a party may not provide deftly worded conclusionary answers designed to evade a series of explicit questions. (In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation (E.D.Pa. 1974) 63 F.R.D. 641, 650-654.)

Further, an interrogatory “is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or application of law to fact, or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial.” (CCP § 2030.010(b).). Discovery related to contentions is permissible. (Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 722, 728.) A defendant may be required to disclose whether he or she makes a contention and to disclose facts underling defenses and denials. (Burke v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 281-282.)

The objection to “INCIDENT” and any other term as vague and ambiguous is overruled for the reasons already set forth above.

Defendant makes no effort to justify any of the other multitude of objections set forth in the response and they must be removed from any further response. The same comments with respect to the attorney-client privilege, etc. set forth above apply equally here.

Defendant shall serve further verified responses to Plaintiff’s form interrogatories nos.

12.2, 12.3, 12.6 and 15.1 consistent with the above no later than March 14, 2019.

No sanctions were requested and none are awarded.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to notify Defendant’s counsel immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing, in person or by telephone, in the event Defendant’s counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.

Item 6 2017-00215345-CU-OE

Katherine Skaggs vs. The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of Ca.

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Production of Documents

Filed By: Spencer, Robert

Plaintiff Katherine Skaggs’ motion to compel Defendant The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California’s further responses to request for production is ruled upon as follows.

In this PAGA action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant improperly classified store managers as exempt employees. At issue on this motion are Defendant’s responses to requests 4-6, 11-13, 15, 18, 28, 40, 42, 46 and 49.

The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has failed to adequately meet and confer. The efforts were sufficient.

No. 4-6

Granted. These requests ask Defendant to produce Plaintiff’s pay records for the period of her employment with Defendant, documents regarding Plaintiff that Defendant is required to maintain pursuant to Labor Code § 226, and documents that concern compensation paid to her. Defendant interposed a number of boilerplate objections and then responded that it would produce her payroll records from July 11, 2016 to present.

Further responses are required. Plaintiff began her employment in October 2013 and provides no reason as to why it limited its response temporally. In opposition, Defendant argues that no good cause exists for a further response because it needs to request documents from a third party wage statement provider and will give the documents to Plaintiff once it receives them and that it will produce documents in response to no. 5. However, the response contains boilerplate objections that must be removed and also inappropriately limits the timeframe.

The Court notes that while Defendant objects to the definition “YOU” because it includes entities affiliated with Defendant not named in the complaint, this is no basis to refuse to respond. The fact that other entities may not be named in the complaint is irrelevant to the extent that the other affiliate entities have responsive information.

No. 11

Granted, in part. This request asked for all documents “analyzing or discussing the physical activities or requirements” of any exempt position that Defendant has classified in California including “documents created in connection with a claim for compensation.” Defendant interposed numerous boilerplate objections including relevance, vague and ambiguous, overbreadth, Civil Code § 3295, third party privacy, lack of a manageable trial plan.

Defendant is correct that this request as phrased, goes beyond Plaintiff’s own position. She alleges that Defendant misclassified California managers as exempt. (FAC ¶ 7.) The instant request, however, seeks all documents related to the classification of any employee as exempt, not simply managers. The Court will limit Defendant’s response to exempt managers. The Court will also limit the request to the time period Plaintiff was employed with Defendant.

While Defendant argues that the phrase “documents created in connection with a claim for compensation” would require it to search every document in its possession to determine whether it was created in connection with a claim for worker’s compensation, the Court is not persuaded. Defendant appears to be arguing that the request creates an undue burden. Defendant failed to substantiate any objection based on undue burden. Indeed, undue burden objections must be accompanied by a specific factual showing setting forth the amount of work necessary to respond to the subject discovery. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417-418.) There is no declaration from Defendant setting forth any facts to support any claim of burden in this case. Defendant’s opposition is devoid of any factual showing whatsoever and any objection based on undue burden is therefore overruled. Further, the Code only requires that a responding party make a reasonable inquiry when responding to discovery.

Defendant also appears to argue that the request seeks “irrelevant” information because documents discussing physical activities of store managers has no relevance to her classification claim. However, that information may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as to whether the store managers were properly classified as exempt. Indeed, in the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [citations omitted] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 [emphasis in original]; Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) “Any doubts regarding relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” ( Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98.) To be clear, absent privacy concerns, “relevance to the subject matter” is broader than relevancy to the issues which determines admissibility of evidence at trial. Weil and Brown, Cal Prac. Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial 8 (TRG 2010) 18:66 citing Bridgestone-Firestone Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1384, 1392.)

With respect to privacy, Plaintiff has made clear that any employee identifying information may be redacted and thus the privacy objection is no basis to decline to respond.

Defendant’s boilerplate objections premised on vague, ambiguous, Civil Code § 3295, etc. are overruled and must be removed from a further response. Further, Defendant made no attempt to justify its objection based on a lack of a manageable trial plan in the PAGA action. As the party seeking to resist discovery based upon objections, it was Defendant’s burden to justify the objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 220-221].)

Defendant shall provide a further response consistent with the above.

Nos. 12-13

Granted. These requests asked Defendant for documents related to how it classified store managers as exempt. Defendant interposed the same boilerplate objections.

In opposition, Defendant simply argues that the decision to classify the store manager position occurred over a decade ago and that it likely does not have any responsive documents. If that is true, Defendant must provide a further response consistent with its understanding, in accordance with CCP § 2031.230.

Defendant also argues that it has already produced documents showing the actual duties of managers. This may be true but these requests ask for documents regarding the decision to classify the position as exempt.

The same comments regarding the objections discussed above apply here.

No. 15

Granted. This request asked for documents concerning when an exempt store manager filed an unemployment claim from February 16, 2016 to present.

Plaintiff has agreed to limit the request to instances where an employee was found to be non-exempt as long as Defendant produce documents it intends to rely on in its defense of this action. In opposition Defendant simply argues that it has yet to determine which documents it tends to rely on.

A further response must be provided as the current response only contains the objections which have been rejected above. To the extent that the parties have agreed to the scope of the request, Defendant must indicate in a further verified response that it will produce those documents.

No. 18

Granted. This request asked Defendant to produce any documents that concern any rulings within the United States finding that an individual with store manager responsibilities was misclassified as exempt.

Defendant argues that such rulings would be public and equally accessible to Plaintiff and that in any event rulings from anywhere in the United States outside California have no relevance to a PAGA action in California governed by California law.

However, Defendant did not interpose an objection based on the information being publicly available. Further, rulings from jurisdictions outside California could lead to information as to the information Defendant relied on in classifying an employee as exempt.

Again, Defendant failed to substantiate any of its boilerplate objections.

No. 28

Granted, in part. The request asked for documents regarding measures taken by Defendant to ensure each exempt job position met the criteria for overtime exemption under California law. Again, Defendant interposed boilerplate objections.

As with request 11, this request as phrased, goes beyond Plaintiff’s own position. The Court will limit Defendant’s response to exempt managers. The Court will also limit the request to the time Plaintiff was employed with Defendant. In addition, the Court will limit the geographical scope to California.

While Defendant contends that the phrase “any actions or measures taken….to ensure” a job meet the criteria for exemption is vague and ambiguous, Defendant is required to make a reasonable effort to interpret the phrase and form a response.

The remaining boilerplate objections are overruled for all the reasons stated above.

No. 40

Granted. This request asked Defendant to produce documents regarding any policies, guidelines, or procedures regarding staffing levels at Defendant’s California locations.

While Defendant argues that the request seeks irrelevant information, Plaintiff contends that this information could lead to information as to whether stores are understaffed. She reasons that if a store is understaffed than exempt managers would have to perform the non-exempt tasks which could support the misclassification claim. This information meets the broad definition of relevance in the discovery context as set forth above.

Finally it argues that Williams v. Superior Court (2018) 3 Cal.5th 531 cannot support the broad requests. To that end, though Defendant seems to be arguing that Williams was only discussing employee contact information not employee records and made clear that discovery in a PAGA action should be treated the same as discovery in a class action. It reasons that Williams made a distinction between interrogatories and requests for production noting that further responses to requests for production must be supported by a showing of good cause. However, none of the subject requests are seeking the discovery of employee records. Further, the moving papers are sufficient to establish good cause for further responses to the requests.

The fact that the parties are close to completing the Belaire-West notice process does not affect the outcome of the motion.

The remaining boilerplate objections are overruled for all the reasons stated above.

No. 42

Granted, in part. This request asked for all complaints, lawsuits, etc. filed against Defendant in connection with the failure to pay overtime between February 16, 2012 to present. Once again Defendant simply interposed objections.

In opposition Defendant simply argues that the request is overbroad as to time and is not limited to claims filed by store managers. It reasons that overtime claims filed by anyone other than store managers is not relevant. The Court agrees that the request should be limited to claims filed by store managers but does not agree that the request is overbroad as to time.

The remaining boilerplate objections are overruled for all the reasons stated above.

No. 46

Granted. The request asked for all documents regarding any statements from aggrieved employees in connection with the lawsuit. Again Defendant simply interposed objections.

Defendant argues only that the request is moot because it has no such documents and that it agrees to supplement its response. The motion is not moot as to this request as Defendant’s current response only contains boilerplate objections that must be removed from a further response.

No. 49

Granted. This request asked for documents supporting Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff is an inadequate representative of the aggrieved employees. Defendant interposed objections only.

Defendant argues that a further response is premature because Plaintiff has not yet responded to its discovery or sat for a deposition. Again, this is no basis on which to refuse to respond. Defendant further argues that the request is vague because it relates to an ultimate fact to be determined by the Court and need not be answered. The cited case dealt with an objection to an interrogatory. Though this is not an interrogatory, the Court would nevertheless note that an interrogatory “is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or application of law to fact, or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial.” (CCP §

2030.010(b).). This request seeks documents supporting a contention and discovery related to contentions is permissible. (Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 722, 728.) A defendant may be required to disclose whether he or she makes a contention and to disclose facts underling defenses and denials. (Burke v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 281-282.)

Defendant then repeats its arguments which were rejected in connection with its opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories. That is, that Plaintiff is aware of the of the facts supporting its contention that she is not an adequate representative and that Plaintiff’s status should be addressed before discovery. As set forth in the ruling on the motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories on this day’s calendar, “the way to raise lack of standing is to plead it as an affirmative defense and thereafter to bring a motion for summary adjudication or summary judgment, not to resist discovery until a plaintiff proves he or she has standing.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 558-559.) Indeed, the federal case cited in a footnote by Defendant involved a motion for summary judgment, not discovery. ( Cabrera v. CVS RX Services, Inc. (N.D.Cal. Sept. 25, 2018) 2018 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 164625.) Defendant argues that Williams was only focusing on the representational standing aspect of PAGA, e.g, whether the plaintiff must show he or she suffered a violation to pursue representative PAGA claims, and not the “legal standing” issue of whether the plaintiff has any legal claim after abandoning her own individual claim as Defendant asserts Plaintiff has done here. The single unpublished federal case cited by Defendant for the proposition that Plaintiff’s individual status should be decided first prior to proceeding on representative claims involved an affirmative motion by a defendant for a stay. (Stafford v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. (E.D. Nov. 20, 2014) 2014 U.S.Dist.LECIS 163458.) Defendant has made no such motion.

A further responses must be provided and the remaining boilerplate objections are overruled for all the reasons stated above.

In addition, while Defendant interposed objections based on privilege, e.g., attorney client, work product, etc., it failed to indicate whether any documents were withheld on this basis. To the extent that Defendant withheld any documents on the basis of any privilege, it must provide further responses that provides sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including if necessary, a privilege log. (CCP §2031.240.)

As a result, Defendant shall provide further verified responses to the requests for Production consistent with the above no later than March 14, 2019.

No sanctions were requested and none are awarded.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to notify Defendant’s counsel immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing, in person or by telephone, in the event Defendant’s counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.

Item 7 2017-00215345-CU-OE

Katherine Skaggs vs. The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of Ca.

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Special Interrogatories

Filed By: Spencer, Robert

Plaintiff Katherine Skaggs’ motion to compel Defendant The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California’s further responses to special interrogatories is ruled upon as follows.

In this PAGA action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant improperly classified store managers as exempt employees. At issue on this motion are Defendant’s responses to special interrogatories nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 25-26, and 42-44.

The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has failed to adequately meet and confer. The efforts were sufficient.

Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff was required to show good cause in connection with a motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories was already addressed in connection with the Court’s ruling in item 5 on Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories.

No. 1

Granted. Plaintiff asked Defendant for the total number of exempt store managers that worked for Defendant in California from February 16, 2016 to present. Defendant interposed numerous boilerplate objections which have been extensively analyzed in the Court’s rulings on the other two motions to compel on today’s calendar. Subject to the objections Defendant provided a response for the time period of July 11, 2016 to present.

Defendant argues that it appropriately limited its responses because the statute of limitations for a PAGA claim is one year measured from one year prior to July 11, 2017 Plaintiff filed the complaint. However, Defendant agreed in opposition to supplement its response to reflect a time period and 65 days prior to the date Plaintiff filed the complaint and Plaintiff indicated in reply that she agrees to this time period. A further response shall be provided in accordance with this time period.

Defendant’s various boilerplate objections are overruled and must be removed from any further response. These objections have been addressed in Plaintiff’s other motions on this day’s calendar and Defendant made no effort to justify any of the objections. As the party seeking to resist discovery based upon objections, it was

Defendant’s burden to justify the objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 220-221].)

No. 2

Denied. This interrogatory asked Defendant to provide contact information for the aggrieved employees. Defendant’s response states that it “will meet and confer with Plaintiff about the disclosure of appropriately limited contact information consistent with the opinion in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.” Plaintiff simply argues that Defendant has delayed in the Belaire notice process. Defendant counters that it has accepted most of Plaintiff’s suggestions regarding the Belaire notice and simply requested to keep language in the notice that management employees should not violate existing agreements and disclose confidential and proprietary notice which Plaintiff refused. Here, the Court will not compel a further response without an agreed upon Belaire notice. Plaintiff provides no authority that Defendant’s requested language was inappropriate and in fact does not analyze it at all. To the extent that the parties cannot agree upon a proposed notice, they may seek relief from the Court. The Court will not, approve Plaintiff’s Belaire notice on this motion. Such a request is made in a single line at the conclusion of the voluminous motion. The notice of motion does not request such relief and Plaintiff provides no analysis of her proposed language of the notice. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s attempt to argue for the first time in reply that Defendant’s proposed language is inappropriate and attempting to provide redline versions of an updated Belaire notice and also seeking approval of a thrid party vendor for the notice.

No. 4

Granted. This interrogatory asked Defendant to state the date on which it classified store managers as exempt. Defendant stated that the store manager “position has been classified as exempt prior to and during the entire relevant time period of this action.” Defendant’s response is vague and evasive. Defendant must make a reasonable effort to respond. While Defendant indicates that it has informed Plaintiff in the meet and confer process that the decision was made likely over a decade ago and beyond any statute of limitations, Plaintiff is entitled to a verified response with a specific date.

Defendant’s boilerplate objections are overruled as again it made no effort to justify them.

No. 5

Granted. This interrogatory asked Defendant to identify the individuals involved in the decision to classify store level positions as exempt from February 16, 2016 to present.

Defendant argues that the interrogatory is compound because it might relate to multiple positions. That objection is overruled. First, Plaintiff’s motion indicates that she is only interested in store managers. In any event, case law interpreting CCP § 2030.060(f) governing interrogatories suggests that a practical approach be taken to such an objection and that the prohibition against compound, conjunctive, or disjunctive interrogatories should likely only apply where the interrogatory covers more than a single subject. The interrogatory at issue only covers a single subject.

The argument that the interrogatory is impermissibly vague because there is no way to identify everyone that may have been involved in a classification decision made over a decade ago is rejected. Defendant is required to make a good faith and reasonable effort to respond.

The argument that the information is irrelevant is rejected. The identity of individuals that were involved in a classification decision in a case alleging that employees were improperly classified as exempt is plainly relevant under the broad discovery standard even if, as Defendant argues, that decision was made long ago.

Defendant’s remaining objections are overruled as again it made no effort to justify them.

No. 25

Granted. This interrogatory asked for the identity of store managers that have made a claim, formal or informal, for overtime compensation in the prior four years. Defendant argues that the interrogatory is unduly overbroad and burdensome because it exceeds the relevant time period for the action and relates to “formal or informal” claims and it cannot respond because it does not know what an “informal” claim means. Defendant failed to substantiate any objection based on undue burden. Indeed, undue burden objections must be accompanied by a specific factual showing setting forth the amount of work necessary to respond to the subject discovery. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417-418.) Defendant was required to make a reasonable effort to interpret the terms and form a response. Defendant is not, as it suggests, required to search every communication of every manager. It is only required to make a reasonable search. While Defendant argues that any formal complaint for overtime would be public record, the Court rejected that same argument in connection with the motion to compel further responses to requests for production.

Defendant also argues that the definition of “YOU” refers to third parties affiliated with Defendant is inappropriate. The court rejected this argument in the ruling on the other motions to compel further responses.

Defendant’s remaining objections are overruled as again it made no effort to justify them.

No. 26

Granted. This interrogatory asked Defendant to provide information regarding the resolution of any overtime claim for each person identified in No. 25. Defendant’s arguments in opposition are identical to those raised in opposition to No. 25 and are rejected for the same reasons.

Nos. 42-44

Granted. These interrogatories asked Defendant to provide facts and identify documents and individuals with knowledge supporting any contention that Plaintiff is not a suitable representative of the aggrieved employees. Defendant, as it did on the other motions, again argues that these interrogatories are premature because Plaintiff has not completely respond to its discovery or been deposed, that the interrogatories call for legal conclusions, that Plaintiff is aware of supporting facts and that her status should be addressed before discovery. The Court rejected these identical arguments in its ruling on Plaintiff’s other two motions to compel and reject them here as well.

It bears emphasizing that an interrogatory “is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or application of law to fact, or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial.” (CCP § 2030.010(b).)

Defendant’s remaining objections are overruled as again it made no effort to justify them.

No. 44

Granted. This interrogatory asked for identification of individuals with knowledge supporting Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff is not an appropriate representative.

To the extent that Defendant withheld any information that was responsive to these interrogatories on the basis of attorney-client, work product, etc. privileges, it must provide further responses that provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log. (E.g., CCP §2031.240.)

As a result, Defendant shall provide further verified responses to the special interrogatories (except for No. 2) consistent with the above no later than March 14, 2019.

No sanctions were requested and none are awarded.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to notify Defendant’s counsel immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing, in person or by telephone, in the event Defendant’s counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.