Case Name: Li v. Cole Haan LLC
Case No.: 18CV328984
Defendant Cole Haan LLC (“Defendant”) moves to strike portions of the Amended Complaint (“AC”) filed by plaintiff Lin Li (“Plaintiff”).
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This is an action for negligence arising out of an incident that occurred at the Great Mall in Milpitas. According to the allegations of the AC, on October 7, 2017, Plaintiff was injured while shopping at the Cole Haan store when an unsecured shoe box dislodged by another customer fell from the top of a shelf and struck her on her head and lower back. Plaintiff initiated this action on May 29, 2018, asserting claims for premises liability and negligence, and seeks to recover punitive damages.
On September 20, 2018, Defendant filed the instant motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive/exemplary damages. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 435 and 436.) Plaintiff opposes the motion.
II. Motion Strike
Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive/exemplary damages from the AC based on its contention that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts which entitle her to recover such damages.
The right to exemplary or punitive damages requires proof of “oppression, fraud, or malice” on the part of the defendant by “clear and convincing evidence.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) For pleading purposes, in order to support a prayer for punitive or exemplary damages, the complaint must allege “ultimate facts of the defendant’s oppression, fraud or malice.” (Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 306, 316-317.) Simply pleading the statutory terms “oppression, fraud or malice” is insufficient to adequately allege punitive damages, but only to the extent that the complaint pleads facts to support those allegations. (Blegen v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 510-511.) Therefore, specific factual allegations demonstrating oppression, fraud or malice are required. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) However, the complaint will be read as a whole so that even conclusory allegations may suffice when read in context with facts alleged as to the defendant’s wrongful conduct. (Perkins v. Super. Ct. (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7; Clauson v. Super. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255).
Here, malice serves as the foundation for Plaintiff’s punitive damages request. Under the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294, “malice” is defined as conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) ).) “Despicable conduct,” in turn, has been described as conduct that is “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.)
Given the foregoing standards, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts which demonstrate malicious conduct on its party. Instead, Plaintiff has simply utilized the buzzwords and phrases used to define when punitive damages are warranted in a conclusory fashion, which is insufficient to establish an entitlement to punitive damages. The alleged awareness on the part of Defendant of the dangerous condition of high shelves containing unsecured merchandise does not, as currently pleaded, qualify as conduct that is “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched, or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Mock, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at 331.) Thus, Plaintiff’s request for punitive/exemplary damages is stricken. However, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend the AC relative to this request.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.