Case Name: Lisa Graf v. Bay Club San Francisco, LLC, et al.
Case No.: 18CV327978

I. Background

This is an employment discrimination and wrongful termination action brought by plaintiff Lisa Graf (“Plaintiff”) against defendants Bay Club San Francisco, LLC (the “Bay Club”), Matthew Stevens (“Stevens”), and Mark Koorenny (“Koorenny”) (collectively “Defendants”).

According to the complaint, Plaintiff began working for the Bay Club in 1987. She progressed through the company and eventually was promoted to Executive Vice President in 2013. At that time, Stevens was President and CEO of the Bay Club.

In 2014, Stevens informed the Bay Club’s executives that he would be reorganizing the senior executive team and did not want pushback. He also stated he would be the main voice of the Bay Club and any executive that did not defer to him would be replaced with younger employees.

Stevens subsequently began to replace older executives with younger employees. He also frequently commented that he could pay two younger employees at the cost of one older employee. Additionally, he treated his older employees in an abusive manner and threatened their job security. Further, he began lashing out about Plaintiff to others. On conference calls and in meetings, he would make derogatory comments that the audience understood to refer to Plaintiff because of the surrounding circumstances. For example, Stevens commented that managers from the Western Athletic Clubs were lazy and self-interested. At a leadership training, Stevens stated that managers from the Western Athletic Clubs had their own agenda and were greedy. Because of the comments, listeners believed Plaintiff was unfit to work.

In April 2017, employee Megan Devlin-Preiksa reported Stevens for harassment and age discrimination to the Bay Club’s human resources department. In response, Koorenny was appointed to investigate. At that time, Koorenny was the Bay Club’s general counsel and also owned an equity interest in the company.

Before the investigation began, Plaintiff took a leave of absence from March 2017 to July 2017 to care for her ill mother. During her leave, Stevens hinted to other employees that Plaintiff would not be returning to the Bay Club.

In the spring of 2017, Plaintiff was interviewed by Koorenny for the harassment investigation, and truthfully described her experiences with Stevens. As Plaintiff was preparing to return to work, her leave of absence was unilaterally extended by the Bay Club to the end of August 2017. Koorenny then asked Plaintiff if he could interview her again as a complainant in her own right. Plaintiff consented and informed Koorenny of the harassment she experienced.

In September of 2017, Plaintiff again contacted the Bay Club about returning to work but was kept on leave. Plaintiff subsequently filed a harassment and retaliation complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”). DFEH invited Plaintiff to participate in mediation with Stevens and the Bay Club, which they all attended.

At the outset of the mediation, Plaintiff was informed by the Bay Club that her employment was terminated effective immediately because she had not been truthful with Koorenny during his investigation and had not signed the arbitration agreement distributed by the company in 2016. Plaintiff believes that Koorenny and the Bay Club purposely mischaracterized inconsistencies in her interviews as intentional misrepresentations in order to justify her termination.

Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1) harassment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) (against the Bay Club and Stevens); (2) retaliation in violation of the FEHA (against the Bay Club); (3) failure to prevent harassment and retaliation in violation of the FEHA (against the Bay Club); (4) wrongful termination in violation of public policy (against the Bay Club); (5) intentional interference with economic advantage (against Koorenny); (6) violation of Labor Code section 1198.5 (against the Bay Club); (7) defamation per se (against the Bay Club and Stevens); (8) defamation per se (against Koorenny); and (9) violation of Labor Code section 201 (against the Bay Club).

Defendants presently demur to the TAC and move to strike the request for punitive damages. Plaintiff opposes both matters.

II. Demurrer

Stevens and the Bay Club demur to the seventh cause of action, while Koorenny demurs to the fifth and eighth causes of action, on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

A. Seventh Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for defamation per se against Stevens and Bay Club alleges that Stevens made false and derogatory statements about her, causing listeners to believe she could not adequately perform her job duties.

Stevens and Bay Club argue no claim has been stated for defamation because the subject statements are not adequately pled and the claim is protected by the common interest privilege.

1. Defamatory Statements

“ ‘Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. The tort involves the intentional publication of a statement of fact which is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes special damage.’ [Citation.]” (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 27.)

Stevens and the Bay Club first contend the pleading is deficient because Plaintiff fails to identify to whom the alleged defamatory statements were made, and instead vaguely avers the statements were made to or heard by participants in meetings and conference calls, participants in a leadership training, and managers and executives.

For purposes of defamation, a “[p]ublication means communication to some third person who understands the defamatory meaning of the statement and its application to the person to whom reference is made.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that managers, executives, and participants in meetings, conference calls, and the Bay Club’s leadership training heard these comments. Stevens and the Bay Club cite no legal authority for the proposition that a plaintiff must specifically identify the third persons to state a cause of action. As such, their argument is unsubstantiated. (See People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282 [a point asserted without authority in support is without foundation and requires no discussion].)

Next, Stevens and the Bay Club argue the alleged statements did not directly or indirectly refer to Plaintiff or her ability to do her job, and consequently do not qualify as defamatory.
To be actionable, the alleged defamatory statements specifically refer to the plaintiff or concern him or her. (Vogel v. Felice (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1023; Blatty v. New York Times Co. (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1044.) “To allow a plaintiff who is not identified, either expressly or by clear implication, to institute [ ] an action [for defamation] poses an unjustifiable threat to society.” (Ibid.)

Stevens and the Bay Club analogize the present situation to one considered by the court in Silicon Knights v. Crystal Dynamics, Inc. (1997) 983 F.Supp. 1303. (Silicon Knights v. Crystal Dynamics, Inc. (1997) 983 F.Supp. 1303 (“Silicon Knights”).) In Silicon Knights, a plaintiff alleged that the defendants made “false, misleading, and commercially disparaging comments” about it, and made “false and defamatory statements” about the quality of plaintiff’s work, the competency of plaintiff’s employees, and the ability of plaintiff to work with customers. (Silicon Knights, supra, 983 F.Supp. at 1313-1314.) The court stated these allegations were too general because they did not “identify the substance of what was stated” by the defendants. (Id., at 1314.) Stevens and the Bay Club argue that Plaintiff also only makes general allegations and does not allege that Stevens made comments about her ability to do her job.

Here, Plaintiff adequately alleges that the defamatory statements concerned her. She alleges that Stevens referred to older managers as lazy, self-interested, greedy, and divisive. Though Stevens does not refer to Plaintiff by name, she alleges that the people who heard Stevens’ statements knew they were in reference to her because of the “facts and circumstances” around the statements. (Compl., p. 14:10.) Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the substance of Stevens’ statements and that his statements indirectly referred to her.

Lastly, Stevens and the Bay Club insist the defamation claim fails because Stevens’ statements were merely opinions about employees’ demeanor and performance. In opposition, Plaintiff argues the statements were factual given the context, as they were made by the CEO of the Bay Club about the integrity and honesty of employees, including herself.

If a statement is an opinion, it cannot be defamatory. (Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 254, 260 (“Baker”).) To determine if a statement is an opinion, the court considers the context within which it was made, including the “nature and full content of the communication and to the knowledge and understanding of the audience to whom the publication was directed.” (Baker, supra, 42 Cal.3d at 261; see Jensen v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 958, 970.) The court also considers whether the statement is “ ‘cautiously phrased in terms of apparency’…[Citation.]” (Baker, supra, 42 Cal.3d at 261.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Stevens told participants in meetings, conference calls, and leadership retreats that older managers were lazy, self-interested, divisive, and greedy. Moreover, the statements were not cautiously phrased. Considering the context within which the statements were made and their substance, the statements are not opinion statements evaluating the demeanor and performance of employees. For example, they did not take place within the context of a work evaluation. (See Jensen v. Hewlett-Packard Co., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at 970 [alleged defamatory statements made in the context of a work evaluation were opinion and not actionable.) Instead, they were made to various employees in multiple settings and were not cautiously phrased as opinions but firmly stated as fact. As a result, the statements are not opinions.

2. Common Interest Privilege

Stevens and Bay Club argue that Stevens’ statements are protected by the common interest privilege.

Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c) outlines the common interest privilege, which protects publications made, without malice, to an interested person “(1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information.” Because the privilege only arises where a communication is made without malice, it is considered qualified and can be defeated at the pleading stage if the plaintiff alleges malice. (Pavlovsky v. Board of Trade (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 110, 114.) In order to defeat the common interest privilege, the publication must be motivated by “actual malice,” which is demonstrated by “ ‘hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff or by a showing that the defendant…acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights. [Citation]’” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 721, overruled on other grounds.) The common interest privilege applies to statements made by an employer to employees about another employee’s conduct in the workplace. (Cuenca v. Safeway San Francisco Employees Fed. Credit Union (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 985, 995-996; Deaile v. General Telephone Co. of California (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 841, 847.)
Here, the allegations on the face of the pleading do not reflect the defamation claim is necessarily barred by the common interest privilege. Even assuming the privilege is generally implicated here, the allegations of malice are sufficient to overcome the privilege.

Plaintiff alleges that Stevens’ statements were hostile and abusive towards older managers, including herself. Plaintiff points to her allegations of Stevens’ repeated comments of how older managers were lazy, greedy, self-interested, and divisive, along with his comments that he would be replacing older managers with younger ones.

In opposition, Stevens and the Bay Club argue that those statements do not demonstrate malice, but are a director’s perceptions of his former employees. However, this argument is not persuasive. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that she was a current employee at the time the statements were being made and that the audience understood the statements to refer to her. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges malice to overcome application of the common interest privilege.

3. Conclusion

In consideration of the foregoing, the demurrer to the seventh cause of action on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts is OVERRULED.

B. Eighth Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for defamation per se alleges that Koorenny made false and derogatory statements to the Bay Club about Plaintiff’s honesty and character.

Koorenny argues that no claim for defamation has been stated because the defamatory statements are not adequately alleged and the clam is barred by both litigation and common interest privileges.

1. Defamatory Statements

Plaintiff alleges that Koorenny “made false and derogatory comments regarding [her] character and honesty…including statements that characterized [her] as being dishonest and untruthful during his investigation.” (Compl., p. 14:24-27.)

Koorenny argues these allegations are not specific enough under the applicable pleading standard.

The general rule is that a plaintiff must specifically identify the defamatory statement and must plead the substance of the statement. (Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 224, 235; see Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 948.)

Plaintiff clearly does not satisfy that standard. But she argues in opposition that such specificity is not here since she was not present when the statements were made and Koorenny has superior knowledge of the facts. In support, she relies on Okun v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.3d 442.

In Okun, the plaintiff alleged, upon information and belief, that the defendants made a slanderous statement stating that it had entered into a corrupt relationship with a city councilman, who then improperly influenced the city planning commission, staff, and city council to favor the plaintiff for the private gain of plaintiff. The defendant in that case alleged the statement was inexact as to time and place. The court there disagreed, stating that “[l]ess particularity is required [in pleading] when it appears that defendant has superior knowledge of the facts, so long as the pleading gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense.” (Okun v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 458.)

Okun is analogous to the present case. Here, it is clear from Plaintiff’s pleading that she was not present when the statements were made and that Koorenny has superior knowledge of when, where, how, and to whom the statements were made. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges what is within her knowledge at this time; that Koorenny made statements about her truthfulness and honesty to her employer. Those statements were partly the basis of her termination.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations as to Koorenny satisfy the excep
tion to the pleading standard under Okun.

2. Litigation Privilege

Koorenny argues that his statements are protected by the litigation privilege.

The litigation privilege attaches to a “publication or broadcast” made in any “judicial proceeding.” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) If the privilege is found to attach, it is absolute, meaning that the protected communications cannot be used as the basis for a tort action other than malicious prosecution. (Ramalingam v. Thompson (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 491, 491.) “The usual formation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.)
Here, Koorenny argues the litigation privilege attaches to his comments because he made them to his client in anticipation of litigation. In opposition, Plaintiff insists the statements were not made in anticipation of litigation because no litigation was imminent when they were made.

Courts have applied the litigation privilege to “certain discrete categories of communications made in advance of actual litigation.” (Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 30 (“Edwards”).) A prelitigation communication covered by the privilege must further the goals of litigation and “relate[ ] to litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251.) A judicial proceeding cannot be a “bare possibility. [Citation]” (Edwards, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 35.)

In this case, Koorenny contends he made the statements to his client after his investigation in anticipation of litigation to be filed by Plaintiff or Megan Devlin-Preiksa. This argument is not persuasive. There are no allegations on the face of the complaint that the workplace investigation was necessarily in anticipation of litigation filed by either Plaintiff or Megan Devlin-Preiksa. Thus, according to the complaint, litigation was still a bare possibility at the time of the workplace investigation.

In sum, the allegations on the face of the pleading do not reflect the eighth cause of action is barred by the litigation privilege.

3. Common Interest Privilege

Koorenny contends that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that his statements were malicious. As previously stated, if the privilege “appears from the face of the complaint, that pleading must allege malice in fact in order to state a cause of action.” (Pavlovsky v. Board of Trade, supra, 171 Cal.App.2d at 114.) Koorenny argues that Plaintiff only concludes that his statements were malicious, which is not enough to defeat application of the common interest privilege.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the privilege does not attach because she sufficiently alleged that Koorenny made his statements with actual malice. Specifically, she alleges Koorenny deliberately mischaracterized her inconsistent interview responses as “intentional misrepresentations” to create justifiable reason to terminate her. (Compl., p. 8:1-6.) She further alleges that Koorenny knew his false representations would disrupt her employment. Thus, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads ill will or at least reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s rights. (See Taus v. Loftus, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 721.)

Consequently, the allegations on the face of the pleading do not reflect the eighth cause of action is barred by the common interest privilege.

4. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Koorenny’s demurrer to the eighth cause of action for failure to state sufficient facts is OVERRULED.

B. Fifth Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; she alleges Koorenny intentionally interfered with her economic advantage of employment with the Bay Club by falsely representing her statements were dishonest.

Koorenny contends this claim fails because Plaintiff does not adequately plead that he engaged in independently actionable conduct or that he was a stranger to the economic relationship.

1. Independently Actionable Conduct

To state a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must plead the defendant engaged in an independently wrongful act. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1158.) “An act is independently wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.” (Id. at 1159.)

Koorenny argues Plaintiff fails to plead he took part in any independently actionable conduct because she did not adequately plead defamation per se. As discussed above, however, the demurrer to the defamation claim is overruled. Koorenny’s contention that no independently wrongful conduct has been alleged is therefore fundamentally flawed.

2. Stranger to the Business Relationship

Koorenny argues Plaintiff’s interference claim is not actionable because he is not a stranger to the business relationship between Plaintiff and the Bay Club.
An essential element of a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage is the defendant’s interference with the relationship. (Kasparian v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 242, 262.) Such interference gives rise to liability only if the defendant is a “stranger” to the relationship, meaning that the defendant has no legitimate interest in the scope or course of the parties’ relationship. (PM Group, Inc. v. Stewart (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 55, 65.)

Here, Koorenny argues that an attorney is a corporate agent and therefore cannot be considered a stranger to the economic relationship.

Koorenny cites Mintz v. Blue Cross of California (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1594 to support his argument. (Mintz v. Blue Cross of California (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1594 (“Mintz”).) The court in Mintz discusses that corporate agents and employees acting on behalf of the corporation cannot be liable for inducing breach of the corporation’s contract. (Id., at 1604.) A party is an agent if it is vested with the power to act for the employer, which cannot act except through those agents. (Ibid.) Here, Koorenny argues that he was the Bay Club’s agent because he was vested with the power to act on behalf of his client in legal matters as general counsel and as the investigator. As a result, because he is corporate agent, he cannot be considered a stranger to the economic relationship.
In opposition, Plaintiff first argues that Koorenny is a stranger because she is suing him in his capacity as a neutral investigator, not as the Bay Club’s attorney. This argument is unpersuasive. It is obvious from the face of her complaint that Koorenny is the Bay Club’s general counsel and therefore he is a corporate agent acting on behalf of the corporation.

Plaintiff’s second argument is that people who are not strangers to the contract but hold an ownership interest in the company can be held liable for interference with a prospective economic relationship. Plaintiff relies on Woods v. Fox Broadcasting Sub. Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 344, which stated that an person with an economic interest in a company could be liable for interference with a contract right if the company’s contract is subject of the litigation. (Woods v. Fox Broadcasting Sub. Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 344, 356 (“Woods”).) In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Koorenny holds an equity interest in the Bay Club. Therefore, she argues, he can be held liable for interference in the Bay Club’s prospective economic relationship with her based on that interest.

However, the court in Mintz distinguished the reasoning applied by the court in Woods. There, the court in Mintz stated that “Woods merely concludes that a shareholder is not automatically immune from liability for interfering with the contractual obligations of the company in which it holds shares [Citation]; Woods does not stand for the proposition that the agent of a contracting party may be liable for interference with its principal’s contract.” (Mintz, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at 1604, fn. 3.) Thus, Plaintiff’s argument is not persuasive. Because Plaintiff pleads that Koorenny is an agent of the Bay Club, Koorenny cannot be liable for interference with the Bay Club’s contract.

3. Conclusion

Accordingly, the demurrer as to the fifth cause of action on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend after service of this order on the sole basis that Koorenny does not appear from the pleading to be a stranger to the relationship between Plaintiff and the Bay Club.

III. Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike punitive damages allegations from Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, subdivision (a), which in pertinent part authorizes a court to strike out improper and irrelevant matter from a pleading.

A. Preliminary Matters

1. Meet-and-Confer Requirement

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ motion to strike should be denied for failure to file a meet-and-confer declaration with the motion.

A party must meet and confer with the opposing party prior to filing a motion to strike in an informal attempt to resolve objections to the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) If such efforts are unsuccessful and a motion is filed, the moving party must file and serve a declaration describing the meet-and-confer process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(3).)

Here, Defendants admit they did not file a meet-and-confer declaration with their motion. But the failure to file a meet and confer declaration is not a basis upon which a court may deny a motion to strike. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a)(4) [“A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient is not grounds to grant or deny the motion to strike.”].) Incidentally, Defendants state they did attempt to resolve the issues raised by their motion prior to the filing it, and Plaintiff does not dispute this attempt to meet and confer.
Thus, the Court will reach the merits of the motion. Defendants are expected to fully comply with section 435.5 in the future.

2. Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion to strike is accompanied by a request for judicial notice. Plaintiff requests judicial notice of Defendants’ notice of demurrer and demurrer pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), which states the court may take judicial notice of court records. However, Plaintiff does not rely on the demurrer in advancing any arguments in support of her opposition to the motion to strike. Therefore, the demurrer is not relevant to resolving the motion to strike. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [a “precondition” to the taking of judicial notice is that the documents “must be relevant to a material issue”].)

Consequently, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is DENIED.

B. Merits of the Motion

Defendants move to strike punitive damages allegations from paragraphs 35, 42, 51, 57, 67, 77, and 82 of the complaint. Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages in paragraph 85 of her complaint.

If a claim for punitive damages is not properly pleaded, it may be stricken. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164.) In order to plead a claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the defendant was guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud and the ultimate facts underlying such allegations. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) Conclusory characterizations of conduct as malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent are insufficient standing alone. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042; see also Mahoney v. Corralejo (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 966, 973.)

Here, the punitive damages allegations are predicated on malice, oppression, and fraud. “‘Malice’ is defined in the statute as conduct ‘intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’ ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. ‘Fraud’ is ‘an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.’” (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 [internal citations omitted].)

The Court will address the allegations against the Defendants as addressed by the parties.

1. Stevens and the Bay Club

Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s punitive damage allegations as to Stevens and the Bay Club from paragraphs 35 and 77, and the prayer for punitive damages in paragraph 85. The argument in support is not a model of clarity.

Defendants first quote large blocks of general law on punitive damages. While the law is correctly recited, the analysis that follows does not apply the quoted standards to Plaintiff’s allegations.
Defendants argue that “[t]he alleged statements attributed to Defendant Stevens are also not discriminatory nor defamatory on their face as they do not refer to Plaintiff (either directly or indirectly) to warrant punitive damages.” (Motion to Strike, p. 7:15-17.) Defendants seem to be arguing that Plaintiff’s allegations as to Stevens and the Bay Club are not sufficiently specific. However, this is not the standard governing punitive damages and Defendants cite no authority in support of the contention that Plaintiff must specify that the statements were related directly or indirectly to her. In fact, the Court believes Defendants are confusing the standards of proof and pleading with respect to punitive damages. Moreover, Plaintiff does plead that the allegations quoted by Defendant refer to her. She states that the listeners of the comments understood them to refer to her because of the circumstances in which the comments were made. (Compl., pp. 13:20-22, 14:10-14.) Therefore, the Court is not convinced by this argument.

Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient because they “clearly do not describe any conduct which could be considered vile, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that would be looked down upon as despised by ordinary, decent people.” (Motion to Strike, pp. 7:28, 8:1-2.) Yet Defendants only conclude as much. They do not identify how Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient under the applicable standards, nor do they cite case law to support such conclusions. Therefore, the arguments are unsubstantiated.

Consequently, Defendants’ motion to strike the punitive damages allegations in paragraphs 35, 77, and 85 of the complaint is DENIED.

2. Koorenny

Defendants’ move to strike Plaintiff’s punitive damage allegations as to Koorenny from paragraphs 67 and 82, and the prayer for punitive damages in paragraph 85. The argument as to Koorenny suffers from the same lack of analysis as the arguments raised by Stevens.

Defendants argue that the allegations against Koorenny are “based on nothing more than conclusory allegations and unreasonable inferences.” (Motion to Strike, p. 7:3.) Defendants then list Plaintiff’s allegations as to Koorenny. To that end, Defendants state “Defendant Koorenny’s alleged statements to his client Defendant Bay Club regarding his impression of Plaintiff from the work place investigation, even if presumed to be true, do not constitute ‘cruel and unjust,’ ‘vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome,’ conduct required for punitive damages.” (Compl., p. 7:9-12.)

Again, Defendants’ analysis is lacking. Defendants provide no legal support for their argument. They simply conclude the cited statements are not adequately pled but do not explain how.
Consequently, Defendants’ motion to strike the punitive damages allegations in paragraphs 82 and 85 of the complaint is DENIED. Because the Court sustained the demurrer as to the fifth cause of action, the motion as to paragraph 67 is MOOT.

The Court will prepare the Order.