Lynette Ancheta v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.		CASE NO. 113CV257368
DATE: 25 July 2014	TIME: 9:00	LINE NUMBER: 14

This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 24 July 2014.  Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 25 July 2014, the motion of plaintiff Lynette Ancheta to compel further responses to Request for Production of Documents (“RPD”), Set One, Nos. 2, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 30, 31, 33 and 42-46, Special Interrogatories (“SI”), Set One, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 and Request for Admissions (“RFA”), Set One, Nos. 4 and 5 was argued and submitted.  Defendant T-Mobile USA, Inc. filed formal opposition to the motion.

All parties are reminded that all papers must comply with Rule of Court 3.1110(f).

1. I.                  Statement of Facts

This is an action arising out of purported identity theft.  According to the allegations of the complaint (“Complaint”), an unidentified individual stole plaintiff Lynette Ancheta’s (“Plaintiff”) identity and fraudulently purchased a T-Mobile phone line in her name.  (Complaint at ¶ 1.)  Despite multiple communications, defendant T-Mobile USA, Inc. (“T-Mobile”) refuses to cease attempting to collect the debt on the phone account from Plaintiff, including reporting the fraudulent account to a third party debt collector to pressure her to pay.  (Id.)

On December 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed the Complaint against T-Mobile asserting the following causes of action: (1) California Identity Theft Statute (Civ. Code § 1798.92 et seq.); and (2) Violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Civ. Code, § 1788 et seq.) (“Rosenthal Act).

1. II.                Discovery Dispute

On January 21, 2014, Plaintiff served Defendant with RPD, Set One, SI, Set One and RFA, Set One.  (See Declaration of Ben Dupre in Support of Motion to Compel (“Dupre Decl.”) at ¶ 1.)  On March 17, 2014, after numerous extensions, T-Mobile served its responses to the foregoing requests.  (Id,. at  ¶¶ 2, and 3.)

On April 21, 2014, Plaintiff’s counsel met and conferred via telephone with opposing counsel, stating his belief that some of T-Mobile’s responses to discovery were insufficient.  (Dupre Decl. at ¶ 4.)

On May 29, 2014, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a detailed letter to opposing counsel articulating why further responses were warranted, as well as verifications.  That same day, T-Mobile served some supplemental responses to the first set of RPD and SI, but not the RFA.  (Dupre Decl. at ¶ 6.)

On June 16, 2014, believing T-Mobile’s responses to still be defective based on the assertion of non-meritorious boilerplate objections, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed opposing counsel and reiterated his belief that the responses were deficient and further supplemental responses were warranted.  (Dupre Decl. at ¶ 7.)  Plaintiff’s counsel further advised that a motion to compel would be filed if responses without objections were not provided by June 23, 2014.  (Id.) Opposing counsel did not respond to the email.  (Id. at ¶ 8.)

On June 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel further responses to RPD, SI and RFA.[1]  On July 14, 2014, T-Mobile filed its opposition.  On July 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed her opposition, stating that due to supplemental production by T-Mobile, it was withdrawing its motion to compel with respect to RPD Nos. 45 and 46.

1. III.               Discussion
2. A.     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPD

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to RPD, Set One, Nos. 2, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 30, 31, 33 and 42-44.  If a party demanding a response to a request for production of documents deems: (1) a statement of compliance with the demand as incomplete; (2) a representation of inability to comply as inadequate, incomplete, or evasive; or (3) an objection in the response to be without merit or too general, that party may move for an order compelling further response.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310.)

1)      Good Cause

On a motion to compel further responses to requests for production, it is the moving party’s burden to demonstrate good cause for the discovery sought.  (See Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4^th 92, 98.)  This requires demonstrating both (1) relevance to the subject matter and (2) specific facts justifying discovery.  (Id.)  Once good cause has been shown, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections or failure to provide a code-compliant response.  (Id. at 98.)

While Plaintiff does not make an explicit effort to demonstrate good cause, the relevancy of the materials sought with each of the subject RPD is otherwise readily apparent, barring RPD No. 2.  This request asks T-Mobile to identify “all key codes that explain [its] employee’s names.”  Plaintiff seeks to obtain this information in order to identify employees who have knowledge of T-Mobile’s debt collection and fraud investigation practices.  However, knowledge of the key codes is not necessary to obtain such information, which will potentially identify employees who have nothing to do with Plaintiff’s case.  Plaintiff can instead propound discovery specifically requesting the identity of those employees that worked on her case.  As there is no good cause for this request, a further response is not warranted.[2]

The remaining requests seek information relating to the substance of Plaintiff’s claims.  Accordingly, good cause exists for RPD Nos.10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 30, 31, 33 and 42-44.

2)      Sufficiency of Responses

A party responding to an inspection demand must respond separately to each item in the demand by stating one of the following: (1) an agreement to comply; (2) a representation of inability to comply; or (3) objections.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a).)

RPD No. 7

This request seeks documents evidencing T-Mobile’s internal communications regarding Plaintiff, the debt, this lawsuit, or any claims in the Complaint.  In its response to this request, T-Mobile objected that this request seeks irrelevant information, is compound, fails to describe a reasonably particularized category of documents, is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome and seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine.

A party that objects to a discovery request bears the burden of explaining and justifying its objection.  (See Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (200) 22 Cal.4^th 245, 255.)  In its opposing papers, the only objections that T-Mobile attempts to justify are those based on the attorney-client privilege and lack of particularity.  Consequently, its remaining objections are without merit.

In specifically requesting T-Mobile’s internal communications regarding Plaintiff, her purported debt and this lawsuit, this RPD comports with the requirement of reasonably particularizing each category of item.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.030, subd. (c)(1).)  Consequently, T-Mobile’s objection based on lack of particularity is without merit.

As for T-Mobile’s objection based on privilege, to the extent that it believes that items which are responsive to this request are in fact privileged, it must identify those materials in a privilege log.  (See Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4^th 110, 130; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240 [stating that an objection to a document request must identify with particularity each document to which the objection applies].)  Only then can Plaintiff and the Court evaluate the true merits of T-Mobile’s attorney-client privilege objection.  Therefore, a further response to this RPD is warranted.

RPD No. 10

This request seeks all agreements that T-Mobile has with any entity concerning the serving or collection of Plaintiff’s purported debt.  T-Mobile objected that this demand seeks irrelevant information, is compound, lacks sufficient particularity, is vague, unintelligible as to “agreements,” overbroad, oppressive, and seeks information that is confidential and protected by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine.  The only objection that T-Mobile attempts to justify in its opposition is that based on relevance; consequently, its remaining objections are without merit.

T-Mobile insists that these agreements are not relevant because they do not have a tendency to prove or disprove Plaintiff’s allegations of violations of the Rosenthal Act.  This contention is unavailing.  Such agreements may provide information regarding T-Mobile’s policies of what to do in a situation where identify theft is claimed or suspected.  This information, in turn, may shed light on the appropriateness of T-Mobile’s conduct in light of Plaintiff’s allegations of identify theft.  Consequently, T-Mobile’s relevancy objection is without merit and a further response to this RPD is warranted.

RPD No. 12

This request seeks all documents regarding the assignment of Plaintiff’s account for collection.  T-Mobile initially responded to this request solely with objections (lack of relevance, overbroad, burdensome, seeks confidential information and information protected by the attorney-client privilege) and then provided a supplemental response, subject to those objections, which states that it will comply by producing four specified items.

To the extent that T-Mobile’s identification of four specific items in its response is meant to be an agreement to comply with the request, it is not code-compliant.  Where a party agrees to comply with a demand for production, its response must state (1) that the production and inspection demanded will be allowed (in whole or in part); and (2) that the documents or things in the demanded category that are in responding party’s possession, custody or control will be produced (except to the extent of any objections). (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.220.)  Here, T-Mobile’s response does not comport with the foregoing requirements.  Consequently, a further response to this RPD is warranted.

RPD Nos. 13 and 14

These requests seek all correspondence regarding Plaintiff between T-Mobile and Enhanced Recovery, LLC, a collection agency (No. 13) and T-Mobile and SW Credit Systems (No. 14).  T-Mobile objected that these requests seek irrelevant information, are overbroad, oppressive, and seek confidential and proprietary information.  The only objections discussed by T-Mobile in its opposition are lack of particularity and relevance.  However, T-Mobile did not assert any objection based on a lack of particularity in its responses and therefore such an objection was waived.  (See Stadish v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4^th 1130, 1141 [party whose response fails to set forth a particular ground for objection waives its right to raise that objection later].)  Consequently, given the lack of justification for them, T-Mobiles objections, excluding relevance and overbreadth, are without merit.

With regard to relevance, the scope of discovery is broad and any information is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence- a rule that is applied liberally in favor of discovery.  (See Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4^th 1539, 1546.)  Here, correspondence between T-Mobile and a collection agency may provide insight into whether T-Mobile knew about the fraudulent nature of the account in Plaintiff’s name, i.e. whether she was the victim of identify theft.  Such information is certainly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims.  Moreover, these requests are not overbroad as they are tethered directly to matters specifically relating to Plaintiff.  Accordingly, T-Mobile’s relevance and overbreadth objections lack merit and further responses to these RPDs are warranted.

RPD No. 15

This request asks T-Mobile to produce any and all investigative reports prepared or obtained which reference Plaintiff, her alleged debts or the events alleged in the Complaint.  T-Mobile asserted only objections in response to this RPD, stating that the request seeks irrelevant information, is compound, fails to describe a category of documents with sufficient particularity, is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible, overbroad, oppressive, unduly burdensome and seeks information with is protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine.  The only objections T-Mobile attempts to justify in its opposition are those based on particularity and privilege; consequently, its remaining objections are without merit.

T-Mobile’s assertion that this request lacks sufficient particularity is unavailing as the request describes a particular category of documents, namely, investigative reports.  Thus, this objection is without merit. To the extent that T-Mobile believes that items which are responsive to this request are in fact protected by the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product doctrine, it must identify those materials in a privilege log.  (See Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc., supra, 59 Cal.App.4^th at 130; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240 [stating that an objection to a document request must identify with particularity each document to which the objection applies].)  Only then can Plaintiff and the Court evaluate the true merits of these objections.  Therefore, a further response to this RPD is warranted.

RPD Nos. 17 and 18

These requests ask T-Mobile to produce any documents concerning Plaintiff sent by it to any other person or entity or received by it since 2012.  T-Mobile objected that these requests seek irrelevant information and information which is protected by the attorney-client privilege and attorney-work product doctrine, and fail to describe a category of documents with reasonable particularity.

T-Mobile’s objections are without merit.  To the extent that it contends that there are items responsive to these requests which are privileged, T-Mobile must identify those items in a privilege log to enable the Court to evaluate the merits of its objection.  Further, any correspondence sent to or received by T-Mobile regarding Plaintiff are reasonably particular categories of documents, and ones that are clearly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims as such items may indicate what knowledge T-Mobile had about Plaintiff’s identify theft claims.  Accordingly, further responses to these RPD are warranted.

RPD No. 20

This request asks T-Mobile to produce all documents constituting its entire credit, collection and fraud investigation files which refer to Plaintiff or any account associated with her identifiers.  T-Mobile objected that this request seeks irrelevant, proprietary and privileged information, is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, oppressive and lacks sufficient particularity.  T-Mobile only attempts to justify its objections based on the attorney-client privilege and lack of particularity; consequently, its remaining objections are without merit.

To the extent that it believes that there are items responsive to this requests which are privileged, T-Mobile must identify those items in a privilege log to enable the Court to evaluate the merits of its objection.  This request otherwise describes categories of documents with sufficient particularity- documents which make up three specific types of files.  Consequently, T-Mobile’s objections are without merit and therefore a further response to this request is warranted.

RPD No. 30

This request seeks a copy of all complaints, judgments, and consent orders relating to T-Mobile’s conduct in the collection of consumer debt from 2011 to the present.  T-Mobile responded solely with objections, asserting that this request seeks irrelevant information, lacks particularity, is vague and ambiguous, overbroad, oppressive, unduly burdensome and seeks public records and/or information that is equally available to the propounding party.  T-Mobile only addresses its objections based on lack of relevance, overbreadth and equal availability; consequently, its remaining objections are without merit.

Contrary to T-Mobile’s assertions, the information being sought is clearly within the permissible scope of discovery as it may provide insight into whether T-Mobile knowingly committed or engaged in unlawful conduct with regard to its handling of Plaintiff’s account.  (See e.g., Stewart v. Colonial W. Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4^th 1006; see also Morfin v. State (1993) 12 Cal.App.4^th 812.)  This is especially relevant given the fact that T-Mobile has pleaded bona fide mistake as an affirmative defense.  Moreover, this request is not overbroad in scope, with the beginning of the period of time articulated in the request taking place only one year prior to when an account was purportedly opened in Plaintiff’s name.  Finally, as to T-Mobile’s objection that these materials are equally available to Plaintiff, while such an objection may be properly asserted in response to an interrogatory (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (c)), there is no authority which provides that it may be asserted in response to a production request.  As none of T-Mobile’s objections have merit, a further response to this request is warranted.

RPD No. 31

This request asks T-Mobile to produce all documents relating to complaints filed with the Better Business Bureau against T-Mobile regarding debt collection, credit reporting and identify theft from 2011 to the present.  T-Mobile asserted the same objections as those set forth in its response to the preceding request but then provided a substantive response, stating that “Responding party has conducted a diligent search and undertaken a reasonable inquiry in an effort to comply with this request but is unable to comply because no such documents which relate to Propounding Party are within its possession, custody or control.”

Plaintiff contends that T-Mobile’s objections are without merit, but provides no explanation for why she believes T-Mobile’s substantive response is deficient.

As a general matter, when a party represents an inability to comply with an inspection demand, their response must state: (1) that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to locate the item demanded; and (2) the reason the party is unable to comply (e.g., the document never existed, has been lost or stolen, has been destroyed, or is not in the possession, custody or control of the responding party … in which case, the response must state the name and address of anyone believed to have the document).  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.)  Here, T-Mobile’s substantive response comports with the foregoing requirements.  Consequently, no further response to this request is warranted.

RPD No. 33

This request seeks all documents regarding any complaints filed with the attorney general’s office against T-Mobile, including T-Mobile’s investigation and response to those complaints from 2011 to present.  T-Mobile responded solely with objections, asserting that the request seeks irrelevant information, fails to describe a reasonably particularized category of documents, is vague, ambiguous, unintelligible, overbroad, oppressive, unduly burdensome and seeks public records and/or information that is equally available to the propounding party.  T-Mobile only addresses its objections based on lack of relevance, overbreadth and equal availability; consequently, its remaining objections are without merit.

Contrary to T-Mobile’s assertions, the information being sought is clearly within the permissible scope of discovery as it may provide insight into whether T-Mobile knowingly committed or engaged in unlawful conduct with regard to its handling of Plaintiff’s account.  (See e.g., Stewart v. Colonial W. Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4^th 1006; see also Morfin v. State (1993) 12 Cal.App.4^th 812.)  This is especially relevant given the fact that T-Mobile has pleaded bona fide mistake as an affirmative defense.  Moreover, this request is not overbroad in scope, with the beginning of the period of time articulated in the request taking place only one year prior to when an account was purportedly opened in Plaintiff’s name.

Finally, as to T-Mobile’s objection that these materials are equally available to Plaintiff, while such an objection may be properly asserted in response to an interrogatory (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (c)), there is no authority which provides that it may be asserted in response to a production request.  As none of T-Mobile’s objections have merit, a further response to this request is warranted.

RPD No. 42

This request seeks all electronic data T-Mobile sent to any credit reporting agency regarding Plaintiff from 2012 to the present.  T-Mobile responded solely with objections, asserting that this request seeks information that is not relevant and public records and/or information that is equally available to the propounding party.

Neither of T-Mobile’s objections have merit.  First, items responsive to this request may reveal details about T-Mobile’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s identify theft and fraud allegations.  Second, as articulated above, the assertion that materials may be equally available to the propounding party is not a valid objection in response to a production request.  Accordingly, a further response to this request is warranted.

RPD Nos. 43 and 44

These requests seek all policy or procedure manuals and any other documents, from 2011 to the present, which address T-Mobile’s policies, practices or procedures in the investigation of identify theft/fraud (No. 43) and the situation when a  conclusion has been made that an account was created through identity theft/fraud.  T-Mobile responded identically to these requests, objecting to them as compound, overbroad, oppressive, unduly burdensome and seeking proprietary, confidential and privileged (attorney-client, attorney-work product) materials, and then provided a substantive response, stating “Not waiving the foregoing objections, Responding Party identifies its written Customer Care policy relating to identify theft.”

T-Mobile, offering no justification for its objections, insists that no further response to these requests are warranted because its responses comply with the pertinent portions of the Discovery Act.  However, to the extent that T-Mobile’s responses are meant to be an agreement to comply with the requests, they are not code-compliant.  Where a party agrees to comply with a demand for production, its response must state (1) that the production and inspection demanded will be allowed (in whole or in part); and (2) that the documents or things in the demanded category that are in responding party’s possession, custody or control will be produced (except to the extent of any objections). (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.220.)  Here, T-Mobile’s responses do not comport with the foregoing requirements.  Consequently, further responses to these RPD are warranted.

1. B.     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to SI

If a party demanding a response to an interrogatory deems: (1) an answer to a particular interrogatory as evasive or incomplete; (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 as unwarranted or devoid of the requisite specification of documents; or (3) an objection in the response to be without merit or too general, that party may move for an order compelling further response.  (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (a).)

SI No. 1

This request asks T-Mobile to identify by name and various other identifying information each of its employees who investigated and responded to Plaintiff’s allegation that she was a victim of identity theft.  T-Mobile responded only with objections, asserting that this request is overbroad, oppressive, seeks irrelevant information and information protected by the attorney-client privilege, invades its right to privacy and the privacy rights of third parties, and violates Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060, subdivisions (d) and (f).  T-Mobile makes no effort to justify its objections based on the right to privacy and the attorney-client privilege; consequently, these objections are without merit.

T-Mobile’s remaining objections are also without merit.  With regard to the objection as to whether this question is impermissibly conjunctive and disjunctive, the prohibition against such questions applies where only more than a single subject is covered by the question.  (See Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4^th 1277, 1291.)  Here, only one subject is involved- the identification of employees involved with investigating Plaintiff’s identity theft allegations.  Consequently, the request is not objectionable on the ground that it violates subdivision (f) of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060.  The request is also not overbroad or oppressive nor requests irrelevant information, as it simply seeks to identify those individuals who may have knowledge of Plaintiff’s representation to T-Mobile that the account opened in her name was the result of identity theft.

Accordingly, a further response to this SI is warranted.

SI No. 2

This request seeks identification of each director, partner, shareholder, employee, officer and manager of T-Mobile who “authorized, approved, or was aware of defendant’s attempt to collect on the [subject debt].”  T-Mobile’s response to this request was identical to its response to the preceding SI.  For the same reasons as articulated with respect to SI No. 1, T-Mobile’s objections to this request are without merit.  The individuals sought to be identified by this request are clearly those who may have knowledge about Plaintiff’s identity theft allegations and thus are discoverable.  Consequently, a further response is warranted.

SI No. 3

This request seeks the names and contact information for all current and former T-Mobile employees and agents who worked on Plaintiff’s alleged account.  T-Mobile responded to this request the same way it responded to SI Nos. 1 and 2.  As with those requests, its objections are without merit.

Given the broad scope of discovery, this interrogatory unquestionably seeks relevant information in requesting the identification of individuals who have knowledge of Plaintiff’s account, i.e., potential witnesses.  As potential witnesses, though disclosure may invade their privacy, there is generally no protection for their identities and contact information.  (See e.g., Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4^th 1242, 1251-1252.)  Moreover, T-Mobile fails to demonstrate how responding to this interrogatory would be unduly burdensome or oppressive.  A party asserting such an objection must demonstrate that the amount of work required to answer the request so exceeds the utility of the information sought that it would defeat the ends of justice to require the responding party to answer.  (See Columbia Broadcasting Ssytem, Inc. v. Superior Court (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 19.)  This demonstration must be made by detailed evidence showing precisely how much work is required to answer.  (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 419.)  Here, no such demonstration is made by T-Mobile.

T-Mobile’s remaining objections are also without merit for the reasons articulated in the preceding SI.  Accordingly, a further response to this request is warranted.

SI No. 4

This request asks T-Mobile to identify each communication/attempted communication between T-Mobile with Plaintiff or any other person made in connection with collection and/or fraud investigation of her account and for each communication identified, to provide certain information.  T-Mobile responded to this interrogatory in the same exact way as the preceding requests and then subsequently provided a supplemental response, subject to its objections, exercising its option to respond pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230.  T-Mobile identified the documents produced in its supplemental responses to RPD, Set One, as containing information responsive to the interrogatory.

Contrary to the preceding requests, this SI is clearly compound in asking T-Mobile to not only identify all relevant communications between itself and Plaintiff and itself and others, but then to also provide detailed information regarding the substance of each communication.  This type of question is not permitted by Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060, subdivision (f).  Accordingly, this objection is sustained and no further response to this SI is compelled.

SI No. 5[3]

This request asks T-Mobile to identify each person who has knowledge of the relevant facts in this matter not listed in the preceding interrogatories and for each to provide certain identifying information and a description of the facts of which they have knowledge.  T-Mobile objected that this request violates subdivisions (d), (e) and (f) of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060 and seeks both irrelevant information and information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product doctrine.  T-Mobile than provided a substantive response, subject to its objections, that it was not aware of any other persons responsive to the request at the time and that discovery was ongoing.

T-Mobile’s assertion that this request violates subdivision (f) of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060 is well-taken as this request not only seeks identifying information for individuals who have knowledge of this matter, but then also requests the substance of their knowledge.  More than one subject is addressed by this request.  Consequently, a further response is not compelled.

SI No. 12

This request asks T-Mobile to identify any “mistakes” that it made in the handling of Plaintiff’s allegedly fraudulent account.  T-Mobile objected that request violates subdivisions (d), (e) and (f) of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060, seeks information which is irrelevant or protected by the attorney-client privilege and is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible as to what Plaintiff intends “mistakes” to entail.  T-Mobile than provided a substantive response, stating “Not applicable.”  In its opposition, T-Mobile provides no justification for its objections based on privilege, relevance or that the request is vague, ambiguous or unintelligible; consequently, these objections are without merit.  Its remaining objections that this request violates various portions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060 are also unavailing.

Plaintiff insists a further response is warranted because T-Mobile pleaded bona-fide error as an affirmative defense and she is entitled to know what mistakes and errors were made by the company.  Mistake is a defense to liability under the Rosenthal Act.  Plaintiff insists that by stating “not applicable,” T-Mobile has not provided a sufficient response to this request.

T-Mobile acknowledges pleading bona fide error as an affirmative defense but asserts that its response is appropriate because based on its investigation thus far, it does not believe it made any mistakes.  Therefore, it asserts, this question is not applicable.  As a general matter, each answer to an interrogatory must be “as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.  If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.”  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subds. (a) and (b).)  T-Mobile insists that the meaning of its response is clear and straightforward- the Court agrees.  In stating that this question is inapplicable, the clear implication is that T-Mobile does not have any mistakes to identify in response to the question.  Accordingly, no further response to this request is warranted.

SI No. 13

This request asks T-Mobile to identify the dates that it or its agents furnished or reported information about Plaintiff to a credit reporting agency.  T-Mobile objected that this request violates Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060, subdivisions (d) and (e), is overbroad, oppressive, burdensome, seeks information that is privileged, irrelevant and equally available to the propounding party.  T-Mobile than provided a substantive response, stating “a report regarding Propounding Party’s delinquent account was made to credit bureaus on April 4, 2013 and subsequently reported as “Delete” on October 24, 2013.”

Plaintiff argues that a further response to this request is warranted because she is entitled to knowing “all’’ responsive dates.  T-Mobile contends that its response is complete and therefore code-compliant.  Essentially, Plaintiff’s assertion that a further response should be compelled is based on her belief that there were other dates on which information was reported about her to credit reporting agencies.  This belief is not supported by any evidence.  In other words, there is nothing presently before the Court which suggests that T-Mobile’s response is not complete.  Consequently, a further response to this request is not warranted.

SI No. 14

This request asks T-Mobile, for each instance it or its agent furnished or reported about Plaintiff to a credit reporting agency, to identify all of the data/information that it furnished or reported.  T-Mobile provided the same response to this request, both objections and the substantive response, as its response to the preceding interrogatory.

Plaintiff insists that a further response to this request is warranted because the response does not identify the data/information that was furnished/reported by T-Mobile to credit reporting agencies.  Indeed, T-Mobile’s response to this request does not respond to the substance of the interrogatory.  Plaintiff is clearly seeking information in response to this SI, and not merely dates, which is all that T-Mobile provided.  Consequently, a further response to this SI is warranted.

SI No. 15

This request asks T-Mobile to identify all individuals that were “disciplined, reprimanded, or terminated” as a result of how Plaintiff’s matter was handled.  T-Mobile objected that this request violates Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060, subdivisions (d) and (f), is overbroad, oppressive, burdensome, seeks information that is privileged, irrelevant and violates the privacy rights of third parties and is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible as the meaning of “how [Plaintiff’s] matter was handled.”  T-Mobile than provided a substantive response, stating “Not applicable.”

Plaintiff insists that a further response is warranted because “not applicable” is not responsive.  However, the clear implication of T-Mobile’s response is that there were no employees who were disciplined, reprimanded, or terminated in connection with the handling of Plaintiff’s account.  Consequently, as this response is straightforward and complete, no further response to this request is warranted.

SI No. 16

This request asks T-Mobile to identify any mistake that was made regarding the handling of Plaintiff’s matter and certain information relating thereto (i.e., who made the mistake, when the mistake was identified, who made that identification).  T-Mobile responded in the same way to this request as to SI No. 15, asserting both objections and then providing a substantive response stating “Not applicable.”

Both parties’ arguments as to why a further response to this request is or is not warranted are identical to those asserted in connection with SI No. 12, above.  For the same reasons articulated with respect to that interrogatory, the Court finds that T-Mobile’s response to this request is code-compliant and therefore a further response is not warranted.

1. C.     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFA

If a party demanding a response to a request for admission deems: (1) an answer to a particular request as evasive or incomplete; or (2) an objection to a particular request as without merit or too general, that party may move for an order compelling further response.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (a).)

RFA No. 4

This request asks T-Mobile to admit that it instructed a collection agency to collect the alleged debt against Plaintiff, despite Plaintiff’s prior statements that she was a victim of identity theft.  In its response, T-Mobile objected to this request as vague, overbroad and that is violated Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.060, subds. (e) and (f).  It also provided a substantive response, stating “Not waiving the foregoing objections, responding party understand this request to seeks [sic] an admission that Plaintiff requested Responding Party cease trying to collect the past due amounts owing on Plaintiff’s account from Plaintiff and responds as follows: Responding Party admits contacted [sic] responding party, claiming to be a victim of identity theft.”  Plaintiff argues that a further response to this request is warranted because T-Mobile has not specifically admitted or denied whether it instructed a collection agency to collect on the debt from Plaintiff, despite her communicating to them that she was a victim of identity theft.

In its opposition, T-Mobile argues that the request violates subdivisions (e) and (f) of Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.060.  Subdivision (e) provides “[a]ny term specifically defined in a request for admission shall be typed with all letters capitalized whenever the term appears,” while subdivision (f) prohibits requests which “contain subparts, or a compound, conjunctive or disjunctive” unless otherwise approved.

Contrary to T-Mobile’s assertion, this request is not compound.  T-Mobile is simply asked to admit whether it instructed a collection agency to collect on Plaintiff’s alleged debt after she communicated to it that she was the victim of identity theft.  T-Mobile’s attempt to parse out multiple components to this request is unavailing.  Accordingly, this objection is overruled.

As for the remaining objection, the “you” in the request was not capitalized, despite it being specifically defined in RFA No. 1 for all of the RFAs.  T-Mobile insists that it is therefore not certain if the special definition applies or not to this request.  Indeed, the “you” to whom this question is directed is uncertain, making it impossible for T-Mobile to appropriately respond.  Consequently, this objection is sustained, and T-Mobile is not compelled to provide a further response.

RFA No. 5

This request asks T-Mobile to admit that it never informed the collection agency that Plaintiff informed it (T-Mobile) that she was the victim of identity theft.  T-Mobile objected to this request as seeking irrelevant information, vague, overbroad and that it violated Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.060, subds. (e) and (f).  T-Mobile then provided a substantive response that is identical to the substantive response provided to RFA No. 4.

As with RFA No. 4, T-Mobile’s assertion that this request is compound or contains subparts is unavailing.  However, Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.060, subd. (f), makes it unclear whether the special definition of “you” applies to this RPD and thus to whom this request is directed.  T-Mobile’s objection is therefore sustained and a further response to this RFA is not compelled.

1. IV.              Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.  The motion is GRANTED as to RPD, Set One, Nos. 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 30, 33, 42, 43 and 44; and SI, Set One, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 14.  The motion is DENIED as to RPD, Set One, Nos. 2 and 31; SI, Set One, Nos. 4, 5, 12, 13, 15 and 16; and RFA, Set One, Nos. 4 and 5.   Plaintiffs shall respond to the discovery without objection and within 20 days of the date of the filing of this Order.