Filed 10/27/20 Marriage of Decierdo CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of MARITES AND JULES DECIERDO.

MARITES DECIERDO,

Appellant,

v.

JULES DECIERDO,

Respondent.

E073720

(Super.Ct.No. IND1200774)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Kristi E. Hester, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of Iris Joan Finsilver and Iris Joan Finsilver, for Appellant.

Westover Law Group and Andrew Lee Westover, for Respondent.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Marites Decierdo owned a house with her former husband, Jules Jasson Decierdo. At the time of their divorce proceedings in 2012, they thought the house was worth less than they owed on the mortgage. Marites expressed no interest in the house, so they agreed that Jules would assume liability for it after the dissolution of their marriage. Based on the parties’ agreement, the family court entered a judgment of dissolution, which stated that the house was a community debt for which Jules alone was responsible.

In 2019, when Jules tried to sell the house, Marites asked the family court to adjudicate the house as community property. She claimed that the house was omitted from the judgment and thus remained unadjudicated. The family court found that the judgment accurately reflected the parties’ intent for Jules to assume ownership of and liability for the house after their divorce. The court therefore denied Marites’s request because the house was neither unadjudicated or omitted from the judgment.

Marites appeals from the court’s order denying her request to adjudicate the house as community property. We affirm.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Marites petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Jules in 2012. Marites filed a schedule of assets and debts form with her petition, which stated that she should indicate whether an asset or debt was “separate,” meaning that it was not community property. The schedule also directed her to state whether the separate asset or debt belonged to her or Jules. Marites indicated that a residential property in Cathedral City was separate property that belonged to Jules.

A few months later, the family court entered a judgment of dissolution. As part of the judgment, the family court incorporated an addendum signed and approved by Marites and Jules, which divided their community property and debts. The addendum provided that the Cathedral City property was a debt for which Jules was responsible. The addendum explained that the parties agreed Jules “shall pay and hold [Marites] harmless from” the obligations arising out of the property.

Almost seven years later, in May 2019, Jules filed a request for an interspousal transfer deed to the Cathedral City property from Marites. Jules wanted to sell the house, but could not do so without Marites’s consent because she was still on the deed and wanted half of the sale proceeds. In his supporting declaration, Jules explained that he had lived in the house since the parties’ divorce and had singlehandedly paid for all of the mortgage payments, property taxes, insurance, and maintenance. He also stated that during the divorce proceedings, he and Marites met with a paralegal, Gary Whitehead, to prepare their dissolution documents. During their discussions with Mr. Whitehead, Jules “offered for [Ms. Marites] to keep the house, but she declined,” and offered to help pay for the house if she decided to keep it, but she declined that offer as well.

In May 2019, shortly after Jules filed his request, Marites requested an order under Family Code section 2556 that the Cathedral City property was “an omitted or unadjudicated” community asset. Marites thus argued she still retained an ownership interest in the property because the judgment did not dispose of it.

In support of his opposition to Marites’s request, Jules filed a declaration from Mr. Whitehead. Mr. Whitehead stated that Marites told him that the only community property she and Jules owned was the Cathedral City property, which “had a negative equity position that she did not want to be stuck with if the house went into foreclosure, which she mentioned it might do.” Based on his “own research” and the “disclosed mortgage balance,” Mr. Whitehead thought that the Cathedral City property’s “mortgage balance was way above the then current estimated value” of the property. Marites told Mr. Whitehead that she agreed “that the house was in a ‘negative value position,’” and she “reiterated that she simply wanted to relinquish title to [Jules] and move on with her life.”

Jules also submitted a declaration supporting his opposition to Marites’s request. Jules explained that Marites stated she “wanted nothing to do with the [Cathedral City property]” when they met with Mr. Whitehead because “[i]t was upside down at the time and we owed move th[a]n it was worth.” Jules explained that he thought the “house was not an asset,” but “only a debt” at the time of the parties’ marriage dissolution. According to Jules, Marites “made it very clear that she did not want the house and that it would be [his] and [he] would be responsible for all the debt.”

The family court held a hearing on the parties’ requests on May 13, 2019. The court found that the parties intended for Jules to assume ownership of and responsibility for the Cathedral City property. The court reasoned that Marites’s schedule of assets identified the property as separate property belonging to Jules and Mr. Whitehead’s declaration indicated that Marites wanted “nothing to do with the property.” The court further found that the property was “clearly addressed in the judgment” given that it ordered Jules “to pay all of the obligations on the residence.” The court therefore denied Marites’s request because the Cathedral City property had been awarded to Jules—and thus had been adjudicated—as the judgment reflected.

III.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue Marites raises on appeal is whether the family court erroneously denied her request under section 2556 to adjudicate the Cathedral City property as a community property asset. We conclude that the family court did not err.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
B.
Section 2556 provides that “‘the court has continuing jurisdiction to award community estate assets or community estate liabilities to the parties that have not been previously adjudicated by a judgment in the proceeding.’” (In re Marriage of Huntley (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1053, 1059) Put another way, “section 2556 applies to community property not actually adjudicated in the previously entered dissolution judgment.” (Id. at p. 1061.) But “‘“[t]he mere mention of an asset in the judgment is not controlling. [Citation.] ‘[T]he crucial question is whether the [community property] benefits were actually litigated and divided in the previous proceeding.’”’” (Ibid.) If the family court “‘“was not called upon to award it, and did not award it, as community property, separate property, or any property at all” [citation], then [it] is a missed asset subject to a postdissolution claim.’” (Id. at p. 1060.)

As the parties agree, we review the family court’s findings for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Duncan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 617, 625.) If substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings, then we review the trial court’s order denying Marites’s request for an adjudication of the Cathedral City property for an abuse of discretion. (See In re Marriage of Stitt (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 579, 586 [trial court’s characterization of property in a dissolution proceeding reviewed for abuse of discretion].)

Under the substantial evidence standard, our authority “‘“begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination.”’” (Rupf v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, 429-430, fn. 5.) When substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision, we must affirm even if substantial evidence also would support a different conclusion. (Ibid.)

C. Analysis
D.
At the outset, we reject Jules’s contention that Marites forfeited her arguments on appeal by failing to support them with appropriate authority and record citations. In her opening brief, Marites sufficiently cites the record and provides adequate authority for her positions.

We also reject Jules’s argument that the family court lacked jurisdiction because the parties did not reserve the court’s jurisdiction in their addendum to the judgment. Section 2556 applies “even in the absence of an express reservation of jurisdiction.” (2 Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2006) ¶¶ 8:1520, 8:1521, pp. 8:365, 8:366, citing Brunson v. Brunson (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 786, 787-788; Bowman v. Bowman (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 148, 156-157; Miller v. Miller (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 366, 369-371.) The family court therefore had jurisdiction to rule on Marites’s request to adjudicate the Cathedral City property under section 2556.

We also need not address Marites’s argument that the family court erroneously relied on Mr. Whitehead’s declaration. Even without that declaration, substantial evidence supports the family court’s finding that the dissolution judgment adjudicated the Cathedral City property. (See Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216 [appellate court may affirm on any ground in the record].)

Jules explained in his declaration that the Cathedral City property was a debt, not an asset, because it was worth less than what he and Marites owed on their mortgage when they filed for divorce. According to Jules, this is why Marites “wanted nothing to do with” it at the time. As the family court correctly observed, the judgment provided that the property was a community debt—a “community estate liability” under section 2556—that Jules would assume after the parties’ divorce. The judgment therefore adjudicated the property. It was not omitted from the judgment or left unadjudicated. As a result, section 2556 did not apply, so the family court rightly denied Marites’s request for a post-dissolution order adjudicating the property. (In re Marriage of Huntley, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1061 [“[S]ection 2556 applies to community property not actually adjudicated in the previously entered dissolution judgment.”].)

III.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Jules shall recover his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

Acting P. J.

MILLER

J.