2015-00187496-CU-PO

Narendra Prasad vs. APL Business Logistics Services, LTD

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Filed By: Kuhne Jr., James F.

** If any party requests oral argument, then at the time the request is made, the requesting party shall inform the court and opposing counsel of the specific issue(s) on which oral argument is sought. **

The motion of Defendants APL Co. PTE Ltd. (APL PTE) and American President Lines, Ltd. (Pres. Lines), sued as APL aka American President Lines Ltd., (collectively “Defendants”) for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of a dictionary definition of the term “shipping container,” and of facts related to the Bureau International des Containers et du Transport Intermodal, is denied as irrelevant.

Overview

This is a personal injury case under California law. The plaintiffs are Narendra Prasad (Narendra) and Sushila N. Prasad (collectively “the Prasads”). According to the Prasads, Narendra was seriously injured when the door on a shipping container located in a recycling facility ruptured and fell on him. The Prasads allege that Defendants are among the entities that manufactured, assembled, designed, exported, tested, inspected, labeled, advertised, sold and/or leased the container and its components. The complaint contains causes of action for strict products liability [defective design and manufacture], strict products liability [failure to warn], negligence, breach of express and/or implied warranty, and loss of consortium.

Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Plaintiffs’ causes of action are preempted by federal law. Plaintiffs oppose.

Discussion

Pres. Lines’ Motion

The motion is DENIED.

The court’s files do not contain an answer from Pres. Lines. A defense motion for judgment on the pleadings may only be made after the defendant has answered. (CCP § 438(f)(2).) As a result, Pres. Lines’ motion is premature and must be denied. Even if Pres. Lines’ motion were before the court, however, it would be denied on the merits for reasons discussed below.

APL PTE’s Motion

The motion is DENIED.

APL PTE argues that the International Convention for Safe Containers (Convention) as well as implementing provisions in the International Safe Container Act (ISCA) [46 U.S.C. § 80501 et seq.] and federal regulations [49 C.F.R. § 450 et seq.] preempt all of the Prasads’ state law claims. According to APL PTE, these sources of federal law impose exhaustive standards for the design, manufacture, testing, maintenance and inspection of shipping containers such that the Prasads’ claims based on standards under California law are preempted. Although APL PTE does not cite any case holding that the Convention, the ISCA and/or related regulations preempt state law, it analogizes these sources of law to others that have been accorded preemptive effect.

APL PTE observes that national and international maritime commerce historically have been subjects of federal control. APL PTE contends that the Prasads’ state law claims would subvert the pervasive federal scheme if allowed to advance in this action.

At this juncture, the court need not wade deeply into the field of preemption. On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court is limited to the pleadings themselves and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. Where the pleadings and judicially noticeable materials support contrary inferences, the court must draw those favoring the challenged pleading, i.e., the Prasads’ complaint. Hence, unless the pleadings and judicially noticeable materials compel a conclusion that the shipping container described in the complaint is within the purview of the Convention, the ISCA and/or federal regulations, the court must deny the motion. (See Hi Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey (3d Cir. 2004) 382 F.3d 295, 305-309 [conduct outside the definitions in federal rail carrier statute was not preempted].)

The Prasads allege that Narendra suffered injury when a “shipping container bearing registration markings of ‘AMFU 883360 45GI’…[¶¶]…failed when one or more of the four pins holding one of the rear doors” broke. (Compl., ¶¶ 22, 27.) They further allege that the container was located at a recycling facility at the time of injury, and that the facility “was used to gather and sort recycling materials and load them onto trucks with shipping containers mounted to them for export and/or distribution and/or recycling of various materials.” (Id., ¶ 24.) The container allegedly was used “for the purposes of placing the recycling materials, and thereby the [container], into the stream of commerce.” (Id., ¶ 25.) Finally, the Prasads allege that Narendra’s employer, a trucking company, used the container. (Id., ¶ 28.) There are no allegations that the container was used in interstate or international commerce, or that Narendra’s employment with the trucking company involved interstate deliveries. Nor is there not much of a physical description of the container.

The ISCA defines the containers within its purview as those within the Convention’s definition of “container.” (See 46 U.S.C. § 80501(1), (2).) The Convention, in turn, contains the following definition:

“Container” means an article of transport equipment:

(a) of a permanent character and accordingly strong enough to be suitable for repeated use;

(b) specially designed to facilitate the transport of goods, by one or more modes of transport, without intermediate reloading;

(c) designed to be secured and/or readily handled, having corner fittings for these purposes;

(d) of a size such that the area enclosed by the four outer bottom corners is either:

(i) at least 14 sq.m. (150 sq.ft.) or

(ii) at least 7 sq.m. (75 sq.ft.) if it is fitted with top corner fittings[.] (Conv., Art. II-1, emphasis added.) The allegations do not establish that the shipping

container in question was specially designed to transport goods without intermediate reloading. Nor do they establish the container’s size, or whether the container has corner fittings. This alone bars an order granting judgment on the pleadings on the theory that the Prasads’ state law claims are preempted.

The court further notes that both Article III of the Convention and 46 U.S.C. § 80502 limit the Convention’s application to “containers used in international transport.” As with the container’s physical features, the complaint does not establish that the subject container is or was used in international transport.

In the opposition and reply, the parties dispute at some length whether the allegations and judicially noticeable materials establish that the shipping container described in the complaint is an “intermodal” container, i.e., a container amenable to different modes of transport. As noted above, the Convention and ISCA are directed only at containers that are “specially designed to facilitate the transport of goods, by one or more modes of transport, without intermediate reloading.” Nonetheless, because the motion must be denied for reasons stated above, the court need not resolve the issue of intermodality.

Disposition

The motion is denied.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Counsel for moving party is directed to contact counsel for opposing party forthwith and advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the court’s tentative ruling procedure. If counsel for moving party is unable to contact counsel for opposing party prior to hearing, counsel for moving party shall be available at the hearing, in person or by telephone, in the event opposing party appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC 3.1312 or further notice is required.