Filed 5/13/20 Pawlicki v. Pawlicki CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICK STANLEY PAWLICKI,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JUDY JOSOL PAWLICKI et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

D075243

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2012-00102295- CU-FR-CTL)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Judith F. Hayes, Judge. Affirmed.

Patrick Stanley Pawlicki, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Peter C. Giffin and Peter C. Giffin for Defendants and Respondents.

Patrick Stanley Pawlicki, representing himself in pro per, appeals from a judgment dismissing his lawsuit against Judy Josol Pawlicki (Josol) and Mary Ann Dorman (Dorman) for failing to bring the case to trial within a five-year period. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 583.310, 583.360.) He contends that on several grounds, the trial court improperly used the date of August 14, 2017, as the deadline by which he was required to bring the case to trial. Further, Pawlicki contends that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that it was impossible, impracticable or futile for him to meet the five-year deadline. We conclude that Pawlicki’s contentions lack merit, and accordingly we affirm the judgment of dismissal.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Pawlicki’s Complaint Against Josol and Dorman in This Action

According to his own allegations, Pawlicki has been incarcerated since November 2011 based on charges that he sexually abused his daughter, stepdaughter and stepson. On August 14, 2012, Pawlicki, represented by attorney Raymundo Pacello, Jr., filed a complaint against Josol, Dorman and Green Plastics-A.

The complaint alleged that Pawlicki’s wife, Josol, “sold Pawlicki’s assets for pennies on the dollar,” “raided Pawlicki’s valuable personal property,” “liquidated all of Pawlicki’s tangible assets,” and took the profits from his company Green Plastics, which she then sold to her “close friend[]” Dorman. The complaint also alleged that Dorman wrongfully took control of four antique oil paintings belonging to Pawlicki’s family trust, worth over $100,000. Against all of the defendants the complaint alleged causes of action for fraud; conversion; imposition of constructive trust; civil conspiracy; undue influence; intentional infliction of emotional distress; abuse of process; tortious interference with present economic relationships; and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. Against Josol alone, the complaint alleged causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and malicious prosecution.

B. The Timeline of This Litigation

As this appeal centers on whether Pawlicki was diligent in attempting to bring this case to trial within five years, the history of the litigation since the filing of the complaint in August 2012 is especially relevant. We according set forth the litigation history to the extent we understand it from the documents the parties have included in the appellate record.

After the complaint was filed in August 2012, Dorman filed both an answer and a cross-complaint on November 30, 2012. The cross-complaint alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation and common counts, based on alleged misrepresentations Pawlicki made to Dorman in connection with the sale of real property.

The next item reflected in the record is a motion that Pawlicki filed on January 6, 2014, in which he requested to relieve Pacello as counsel and to proceed in pro per, stating that he and Pacello were “embroiled in bitter disputes.” The trial court granted the motion on August 15, 2014, deeming it to be a notice of substitution of attorney.

A year later, the court held a case management conference on January 9, 2015, at which Pawlicki was represented by specially appearing counsel. The court set a trial date of November 6, 2015, and a discovery deadline of October 9, 2015.

At a hearing on August 7, 2015, at which Pawlicki appeared in pro per via telephone from prison, the trial court overruled Pawlicki’s demurrer to the cross-complaint and denied Pawlicki’s motion to compel discovery responses as moot. The court set a hearing on September 25, 2015, on an order to show cause why the unserved defendants should not be dismissed, and it vacated the upcoming trial readiness conference and trial date. On October 29, 2015, the trial court entered default against Pawlicki on Dorman’s cross-complaint.

Next, a case management conference was held on April 8, 2016, at which Pawlicki appeared in pro per via telephone from prison. The court set a trial date of February 10, 2017, and a discovery cut off of January 13, 2017.

Pawlicki, representing himself in pro per, filed a demand for the exchange of expert witness information on November 10, 2016. On the same day, Pawlicki filed a request for a 30-day continuance of certain unspecified deadlines. Apparently in response to that request, on January 12, 2017, the trial court held an ex parte hearing at which Pawlicki appeared telephonically, representing himself in pro per. Among other things, the court continued the trial date to March 24, 2017, and the discovery cut off to February 24, 2017.

On January 31, 2017, representing himself in pro per, Pawlicki filed a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories from Dorman and Josol. On the same day, Dorman and Josol filed a motion to invalidate service of certain discovery requests propounded by Pawlicki. At a hearing on February 24, 2017, at which Pawlicki appeared in pro per by telephone, the trial court denied the motion filed by Pawlicki and granted the motion filed by Dorman and Josol. The trial court also vacated the March 24, 2017 trial date and set a trial readiness conference for March 10, 2017.

At a case management conference on April 28, 2017, attorney Peter Borenstein appeared on behalf of Pawlicki as newly retained counsel. The parties discussed submitting a stipulation to consolidate the case with another case filed by Pawlicki in 2014. The trial court continued the trial date to July 28, 2017, with a discovery cut off of June 30, 2017, and it referred the case to mediation.

On May 24, 2017, the trial court approved the parties’ stipulation to consolidate, for trial purposes only, the instant case (the 2012 Action) with San Diego Superior Court Case Number 37-2014-000237-CU-CO-CTL, which Pawlicki filed against Josol and Dorman in January 2014, but subsequently dismissed against Dorman (the 2014 Action). The stipulation specifically provided that it was “not intended to extend the five[-]year period in which the 2012 Action must be brought to trial, nor shorten the five[-]year period in which the 2014 Action must be brought to trial,” and that “all complaints and cross-complaints in the 2012 Action and the 2014 Action shall be individually governed by California Code of Civil Procedure [sections] 583.310 et seq. or successor statutes.”

On June 30, 2017, Pawlicki filed a substitution of attorney which removed Borenstein as counsel and substituted pro per representation for Pawlicki.

On July 10, 2017, Pawlicki filed a motion, in pro per, seeking a 60-day extension of the upcoming court deadlines, including the trial date, in the consolidated cases. Although not expressly identifying that August 14, 2017, was the five-year deadline to bring the 2012 Action to trial under section 583.310, Pawlicki acknowledged that he was “on the brink of a five-year period.” Pawlicki explained that he had fired Borenstein because of the excessive amount of time that Borenstein required to prepare the case for trial. Pawlicki also stated that it was difficult for him to attempt to litigate in pro per from prison. Pawlicki proposed to use the 60-day extension “to secure his choice . . . of an attorney to streamline this case before the Court.” Although no such order is contained in the appellate record, the parties represent that on July 14, 2017, the trial court continued the trial date to September 15, 2017.

At a September 6, 2017 trial readiness conference, in response to a verbal request by Pawlicki to continue the trial for 60 days, the trial court granted partial relief by continuing the trial date to September 29, 2017, and setting a continued trial readiness conference for September 22, 2017.

On September 18, 2017, Pawlicki filed a “motion requesting ex parte hearing and order . . . on September 19, 2017,” which stated that Pawlicki was requesting a further 30-day extension. Pawlicki explained that he had many items to complete before he was ready for trial, including his statement of the case, a set of jury instructions, a joint trial notebook and joint exhibit binders, all of which he had recently discovered were required. He also stated that “[h]ad these two cases not been merged, they both would have been history a long time ago.” Pawlicki’s motion did not inform the trial court that the five-year period for bringing the case to trial had expired on August 14, 2017. The appellate record does not contain an order ruling on the request. However, the parties represent that on September 21, 2017, the trial court continued the trial date to January 5, 2018.

On October 6, 2017, Pawlicki filed a motion, in pro per, seeking an order compelling defendants to produce certain documents. On November 3, 2017, Pawlicki filed a motion for relief from default against him on Dorman’s cross-complaint. On November 22, 2017, Pawlicki, in pro per, filed a motion “for appointment of counsel to help prepare the required exhibits and lists for trial.” The trial court’s ruling on that motion, if any, is not in the appellate record.

On December 6, 2017, the trial court issued an order denying Pawlicki’s motion to compel production of documents. The trial court explained that the motion was untimely because the discovery cut-off deadline had already passed, and that Pawlicki had not provided authority for his request. On December 15, 2017, the trial court issued a minute order stating that Pawlicki had informed the court he had filed “a writ” with the Court of Appeal. The trial court accordingly stayed the matter and vacated the January 5, 2018 trial date. In fact, Pawlicki had not filed a writ, but rather acting in pro per, he had filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order denying his motion to compel the production of documents. On March 27, 2018, we dismissed the appeal because it was from a nonappealable order. The remittitur issued on June 6, 2018.

Prior to issuance of the remittitur, Pawlicki filed a request for a 60-day extension in the trial court, explaining that he was in the process of attempting to hire an attorney. The appellate record contains no record of a ruling on that request.

C. The Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Bring the Case to Trial Within Five Years

On August 1, 2018, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 2012 Action for failure to bring it to trial within five years as required by section 583.310. Pawlicki responded to the motion on August 21, 2018, by filing a substitution of attorney, which stated that he would be represented by attorney Russel Myrick, along with an opposition prepared by Myrick.

In his opposition, Pawlicki argued it had been impossible, impracticable or futile to bring this action to trial for a time period of at least three years because he was incarcerated and because the defendants “avoided service” until late 2014 and early 2015. Pawlicki also cited the fact that he had been incarcerated during the course of the litigation and, although he had several attorneys in that period, the lack of continuity in counsel had caused difficulties. Further, Pawlicki argued that in calculating the five-year period for bringing the case to trial, the court should include an additional two-year period based on the two-years added to the statute of limitations under section 352.1 for prisoners who file lawsuits.

By stipulation of the parties, due to Pawlicki’s delayed receipt of the motion, Pawlicki, represented by Myrick, filed a supplemental opposition on August 29, 2018. Pawlicki argued that the stay of proceedings due to his appeal did not end until June 6, 2018, when the remittitur issued, and that under section 583.350, he had a period of six months following the remittitur to bring the case to trial. He also continued to argue that being in prison made it impossible, impracticable or futile to bring the case to trial, citing as an example the two weeks it took him to receive defendants’ motion to dismiss.

On September 13, 2018, the trial court issued a tentative ruling granting the motion to dismiss. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court took the matter under submission and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing within two days. Pawlicki filed a supplemental brief that set forth a timeline of events in the case, which, according to him, showed he had been diligent in prosecuting the case and bringing it to trial. Defendants’ supplemental brief set forth a more detailed timeline of the litigation, reflecting Pawlicki’s multiple requests to continue the trial date.

After considering the supplemental briefing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss and entered a judgment of dismissal in the 2012 Action. The court stated, “Plaintiff has not met his burden. Plaintiff, in opposing the motion, relies on the difficulties attendant to incarceration as a reason it was ‘impossible, impracticable, or futile’ for him to bring the action to trial within five years. Plaintiff does not acknowledge that he chose to replace his counsel twice and that he actively litigated the matter on his own for years. Plaintiff’s further briefing points to the Court’s continuance of the trial about a month before the 5-years ran. This continuance does not excuse Plaintiff from the requirement to use reasonable diligence at all stages of the proceedings. Plaintiff had ‘a continuing duty to correctly compute the statutory five years and to advise the court of the impending deadline.’ (Wale v. Rodriguez (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 129, 133.) ‘It is precisely when the five-year deadline looms that the greatest diligence is demanded.’ (Id. at p. 133.) ‘The duty is on the plaintiff to obtain a trial within the time required by section 583, subdivision (b). A plaintiff may not avoid the operation of the statute by simply saying he acquiesced in the trial date set by the court or clerk beyond five years from the commencement of the action.’ (Central Mutual Ins. Co. v. Executive Motor Home Sales, Inc. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 791, 795.) Plaintiff fails to demonstrate he had acted diligently to prosecute his case and to have it set within the five-year period.”

Pawlicki, representing himself in pro per, appeals from the judgment of dismissal.

II.

DISCUSSION

“[S]ection 583.310 . . . requires an action ‘be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced against the defendant.’ Otherwise, dismissal of the action is ‘mandatory and not . . . subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly provided by statute.’ (§ 583.360, subd. (b).)” (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 721 (Bruns).) As applicable here, those statutory exceptions are as follows: “In computing the time within which an action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article, there shall be excluded the time during which any of the following conditions existed: [¶] (a) The jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended. [¶] (b) Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined. [¶] (c) Bringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.” (§ 583.340.)

A. The Calculation of the Five-Year Period

We first consider a series of arguments made by Pawlicki in an attempt to establish that the five-year period extended beyond August 14, 2017, due to (1) the statute of limitations applicable to his causes of action; (2) the consolidation of the 2012 Action with the 2014 Action; and (3) the stay in proceedings caused by Pawlicki’s appeal of the denial of his motion to compel production of documents.

1. The Statute of Limitations Provisions Cited by Pawlicki Are Inapplicable Here

Pawlicki relies on two statutory provisions concerning the statute of limitations, which he contends should have been applied to extend the five-year period during which he was required to bring the case to trial.

First, because the complaint in this action alleges Dorman wrongly took control of certain fine art, Pawlicki cites section 338, subdivision (c)(3), which provides a six-year limitations period for bringing a cause of action for certain fine art theft. Although Pawlicki is not clear about how this provision should apply here, he refers to it as “an exception to the five year statute,” apparently believing either that it gives him a six-year period rather than a five-year period for bringing the case to trial or, alternatively, that it tolls the five-year period for another six years.

Second, because he is a prisoner, Pawlicki cites section 352.1, subdivision (a), which, in effect, provides an extension of up to two-years on the statute of limitations for persons who are imprisoned when a cause of action accrues. As in the trial court, Pawlicki contends that the two-year extension should also be applied to the five-year period for bringing a case to trial, which would give him seven-year deadline.

We reject Pawlicki’s arguments because the statute of limitations provisions that he cites are not relevant to whether the trial court properly dismissed this lawsuit. The statute of limitations controls the time frame in which a plaintiff must file a lawsuit. (§ 312 [“Civil actions, without exception, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued, unless where, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute.”].) There is no dispute that Pawlicki timely filed his lawsuit within the applicable limitations period. In contrast, the five-year period set forth in section 583.310 addresses a different issue, namely the time frame in which a plaintiff must bring a case to trial after it has been timely filed within the applicable limitations period. (See General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1966) 65 Cal.2d 88, 91 [contrasting the purpose of a limitations period with the purpose of the five-year deadline to bring a case to trial].) Therefore, the statute of limitations provisions that Pawlicki relies upon here have no bearing on whether this action was properly dismissed on the ground that Pawlicki inexcusably failed to bring the case to trial within a five-year period.

2. The Consolidation of the 2012 Action and the 2014 Action Did Not Extend the Five-Year Period

Next, Pawlicki contends that because of the consolidation of the 2012 Action and the 2014 Action, the trial court should not have required that he bring the 2012 Action to trial within a five-year period. Pawlicki argues that the dismissal was improper because after the consolidation of the two actions he “restructured his legal efforts” according to “a deadline aligning to the [2014 Action].”

We reject the argument because the stipulation and order consolidating the two actions clearly specified that the 2012 Action would still be subject to the five-year deadline for bringing that action to trial. The stipulation specifically provided that it was “not intended to extend the five[-]year period in which the 2012 Action must be brought to trial” and that “all complaints and cross-complaints filed in the 2012 Action and the 2014 Action shall be individually governed by California Code of Civil Procedure [sections] 583.310 et seq. or successor statutes.” Pawlicki, through his counsel, expressly agreed to the terms of the stipulation, and the trial court thus properly followed the terms of the parties’ agreement in applying the five-year deadline to the 2012 Action based on the date it was filed regardless of the subsequent consolidation with the 2014 Action. (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 623 [“[W]hen a party enters into a voluntary stipulation, he generally is precluded from taking an appeal claiming defects in the stipulation.”]; Baskin v. Hughes Realty, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 184, 197, fn. 6 [“an appellant forfeits the right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing at trial to the procedure objected to on appeal”].)

3. The Five-Year Period Had Already Expired When the Action Was Stayed Due to Pawlicki’s Appeal

On appeal, Pawlicki continues to pursue an argument he made in the trial court regarding the stay in the proceedings caused by Pawlicki’s appeal of the order denying his motion to compel the production of documents. Specifically, Pawlicki contends that the five-year period for bringing this action to trial was tolled during the period that the action was stayed, and that it was then extended by statute for an additional six-months after the tolling period ended, with the result that his deadline to bring the case to trial was extended to December 6, 2018.

Pawlicki’s argument relies on section 583.340, subdivision (b), which states that in calculating the five-year period for bringing an action to trial, the court should exclude the time during which “[p]rosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined.” As Pawlicki points out, the action was stayed during his appeal from December 15, 2017 to June 6, 2018. Further, Pawlicki relies on section 583.350, which provides, “If the time within which an action must be brought to trial . . . is tolled or otherwise extended pursuant to statute with the result that at the end of the period of tolling or extension less than six months remains within which the action must be brought to trial, the action shall not be dismissed pursuant to this article if the action is brought to trial within six months after the end of the period of tolling or extension.” (§ 583.350.) Pawlicki contends that this provision applies to add an extra six months to the five-year period after the stay of proceedings was lifted on June 6, 2018, and thus extends the deadline to December 6, 2018.

Pawlicki’s argument fails because it overlooks a crucial fact: the stay of proceedings between December 15, 2017, and June 6, 2018, could not have operated to toll the five-year period to bring the action to trial because that five-year period had already expired on August 14, 2017. Put simply, because the five-year deadline expired on August 14, 2017, the subsequent stay of proceedings that took place beyond the five-year period could not have tolled any part of the five-year period.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Determining That Pawlicki Failed to Show It Was Impossible, Impracticable or Futile to Bring the Case to Trial Within the Five-Year Period Ending in August 2017

Pawlicki’s remaining arguments concern the exception to the five-year period that applies when “[b]ringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.” (§ 583.340, subd. (c).) Pawlicki contends that it was impossible, impracticable, or futile for him to bring the action to trial within five years. Although Pawlicki’s arguments are not well focused, he appears to contend that it was impossible for him to comply with the deadline because of the difficulties of litigating a lawsuit while in prison and because of the time-consuming nature of attempting to obtain discovery from defendants.

1. Applicable Legal Standards

Our Supreme Court has explained the standards that apply in determining whether it was impossible, impracticable, or futile for a plaintiff to bring a case to trial within five years. “[T]he trial court must determine what is impossible, impracticable, or futile ‘in light of all the circumstances in the individual case, including the acts and conduct of the parties and the nature of the proceedings themselves. [Citations.] The critical factor in applying these exceptions to a given factual situation is whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in prosecuting his or her case.’ . . . A plaintiff’s reasonable diligence alone does not preclude involuntary dismissal; it is simply one factor for assessing the existing exceptions of impossibility, impracticability, or futility. . . . ‘ “[E]very period of time during which the plaintiff does not have it within his power to bring the case to trial is not to be excluded in making the computation.” [Citation.]’ . . . ‘Time consumed by the delay caused by ordinary incidents of proceedings, like disposition of demurrer, amendment of pleadings, and the normal time of waiting for a place on the court’s calendar are not within the contemplation of these exceptions.’ . . . Determining whether the subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends ‘on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.’ . . . ‘ “[I]mpracticability and futility” involve a determination of ” ‘excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,’ ” in light of all the circumstances of the particular case.’ ” (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th 717, 730-731, citations omitted.)

“[C]ase law . . . has long held that ‘[f]or the tolling provision of section 583.340[, subdivision] (c) to apply, there must be “a period of impossibility, impracticability or futility, over which plaintiff had no control,” ‘ ” because the statute is designed to prevent avoidable delay. (Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1102.) ” ‘A plaintiff has an obligation to monitor the case in the trial court, to keep track of relevant dates, and to determine whether any filing, scheduling, or calendaring errors have occurred.’ ” (Id. at p. 1104.)

“[T]he law is clear that applicability of the section 583.340, subdivision (c) exception ‘is generally fact specific, depending on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.’ . . . For this reason, ‘[t]he question of impossibility, impracticability, or futility is best resolved by the trial court, which ‘is in the most advantageous position to evaluate these diverse factual matters in the first instance.” ‘ ” (Alpha Media Resort Investment Cases (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1129-1130, citations omitted.)

2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

Here, after closely considering the chronology of the litigation, including obtaining additional briefing from the parties expressly directed to the timeline of the case, the trial court concluded that Pawlicki had not met his burden to establish that it was impossible, impractical or futile for him to bring the case to trial within five years.

As the trial court pointed out, although Pawlicki attempted to make much of the fact that he is a prisoner subject to the difficulties of litigating a case from prison, Pawlicki had three different attorneys during this action. Moreover, the trial court was in the best position to evaluate whether Pawlicki’s status as a prisoner had made it impossible for him to bring this case to trial. As the trial court observed, during the periods that Pawlicki was self-represented he actively and effectively engaged in the litigation, filing numerous motions, propounding discovery, and even pursuing an appeal. Therefore, the trial court reasonably concluded that Pawlicki’s reliance on his status as a prisoner to show that it was impossible for him to comply with the five-year deadline was not persuasive, and that, had he exercised reasonable diligence, Pawlicki could have complied with the five-year deadline.

Although he did not stress the issue in the trial court, on appeal Pawlicki focuses on the time-consuming nature of his attempt to obtain discovery from defendants in arguing that he should be excused from failing to bring this action to trial within five years. We reject the argument. As our Supreme Court has explained, ” ‘[t]ime consumed by the delay caused by ordinary incidents of proceedings . . . are not within the contemplation of these exceptions’ ” to the five-year deadline. (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 731.) Discovery is part of the ordinary incidents of proceedings, and Pawlicki has not provided evidence of any extraordinary circumstance concerning discovery in this case that would require the time he spent on discovery matters to be excluded from the five-year period.

In sum, we conclude that the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that Pawlicki failed to establish that it was impossible, impracticable or futile for him to bring this case to trial within five years. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing this action pursuant to section 583.360.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

HUFFMAN, J.

Parties and Attorneys
Pawlicki v. Pawlicki et al.
Case Number D075243
Party Attorney

Patrick Stanley Pawlicki : Plaintiff and Appellant
Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility
480 Alta Road (D-17 106)
San Diego, CA 92179 Pro Per

Judy Josol Pawlicki : Defendant and Respondent
Peter C Giffin
11665 Avena Pl., Ste 106
San Diego, CA 92128

Mary Ann Dorman : Defendant and Respondent
Peter C Giffin
11665 Avena Pl., Ste 106
San Diego, CA 92128

Green Plastics-A : Defendant and Respondent
Peter C Giffin
11665 Avena Pl., Ste 106
San Diego, CA 92128