, Plaintiff’s response did not cite to this section. A party may indeed produce documents pursuant to CCP 2030.300 only if it shows that preparing a compilation would be the same amount of work for both parties, and specifically identifies the documents from which the information can be found. CCP 2030.230, Rutter Group, Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial section 8:1067. Further, here, Plaintiff made no attempt to show that providing basic information regarding dates of treatment, types of treatment and costs of treatment required her to provide a compilation, abstract, audit or summary of documents to answer this interrogatory, that such a compilation does not exist and that the burden of preparing the compilation would be substantially the same for Defendant. (CCP § 2030.230.) Nor did the response refer to the documents “in sufficient detail to permit the propounding party to locate and to identify, as readily as the responding party can, the documents from which the answer may be ascertained.” (CCP § 2030.230.) Instead, Plaintiff simply referred to her “medical records.” “A broad statement that the information is available from a mass of documents is insufficient.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 784.) Plaintiff did not even indicate that she would afford Defendant a reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect the records and to make copies, compilations, abstracts or summaries as required by Section 2030.230.

Plaintiff’s reliance on Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 801, is not persuasive. There a defendant hospital’s answer referring to the hospital’s medical records was a sufficient response to an interrogatory asking the hospital to state in detail all facts and circumstances leading up to the delivery of a child, the course and progress and labor, and the type of kind of delivery. There, however, the hospital specifically indicated in its answer that it would afford the plaintiff an opportunity to examine, audit or inspect the records and to make copies as required by § 2030.230. Further, the content of the interrogatory was far different than the standard interrogatory here which simply asks for dates of treatment, type of treatment and costs.

The fact that Defendant may have subpoenaed the medical records does not obviate Plaintiff’s responsibility to properly answer the interrogatory. At a bare minimum, to the extent Plaintiff intends to rely upon CCP § 2030.230, Plaintiff must provide specific identification of the documents that contain the requested information and must afford Defendant a reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect the records and to make copies, compilations, abstracts or summaries.

Special Interrogatories Nos. 15-18

Granted. These interrogatories asked Plaintiff to state the amounts paid for medical expenses, to identify all medical services for which she remains liable, identify all written off medical charges, and identify all liens. Plaintiff simply referenced CCP “20.230 [sic]” and referred to her answer to form interrogatory 6.4. Given that the answer to form interrogatory 6.4 was deficient as set forth above these interrogatory responses are similarly deficient and further answers must be provided.

Request for Production

No. 15

Granted. This request asked for documents evidencing income Plaintiff received in the five years prior to the accident. Plaintiff objected on the basis of attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. She responded that she has produced all documents regarding her injury and damages claim.

Defendant indicates that it needs the records to evaluate Plaintiff’s claim for loss of future wages and diminished capacity. Plaintiff claims that she has not made such a claim and it is unknown whether she will make such a claim for loss of future wages and diminished capacity and thus there is no good cause to require production of these records at this time. Plaintiff indicated in her response to form interrogatory 8.8 that it is “unknown” whether she will make a claim for future wages and diminished capacity. Here, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff must either agree to produce the requested records or amend her response to interrogatory 8.8 to indicate that she is not making a claim for future wages at this time. Plaintiff cannot simply resist the request for production because she contends that it is “unknown” whether she will seek future wages. Indeed, indicating that it is unknown whether Plaintiff may seek future wages leads to the conclusion that she might well make such a claim. Information regarding past income is relevant to a claim for future wages which Plaintiff may make and meets the broad standard of relevance for discovery. In the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [citations omitted] Admissibility is

not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612.)

Again, Plaintiff shall either provide an amended response agreeing to produce the information or amend her response to form interrogatory 8.8 that it is “unknown” whether she will make a claim for future wages and diminished capacity.

To the extent that Plaintiff interposed objections to the discovery based on privilege, e.g., attorney-client, work-product, she must provide further responses that provides sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including if necessary, a privilege log. (CCP § 2031.240.) Plaintiff may provide a privilege log.

No. 19

Granted. This request asked for the “itemized cellular telephone bill for each mobile telephone in [Plaintiff’s] possession at the time of the” collision. Plaintiff objected on the basis that the request was overbroad and invaded her right to privacy. According to Defendant, any claim to privacy in the cell phone records is outweighed by the competing right to discover whether Plaintiff was using her cell phone at the time of the accident. Defendant proposed limiting the request to one hour before and one hour after the accident. With that limitation in mind, the Court analyzes the request.

An essential element of an objection based on the right to privacy is that the defendant’s discovery impacts a specific, legally protected interest, such as informational privacy. (See, e.g. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35.) When relevant evidence sought to be discovered impacts on a person’s constitutional right to privacy (Cal. Const., art. I,§ 1), limited protections come into play for that person. (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656.) The protections extend to both a person’s personal and financial matters. (Ibid.) In ruling on discovery motions, the court must balance competing rights–the right of a litigant to discover relevant facts and the right of an individual to “maintain reasonable privacy.” (Id. at p. 657.) (Shaffer v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 999.) The balancing test standard compares the specifically identified privacy interests of the Plaintiff with legitimate, competing and countervailing, nonprivacy interests asserted by Defendant.

The Court finds, in weighing Plaintiff’s right to privacy in her cell phone records for the limited time period from one hour prior to one hour after the accident, the claim to privacy is outweighed by the competing right of the Defendant to discover the relevant facts of whether Plaintiff was using her cell phone while driving. The degree of intrusion appears, to the Court, to be slight in this context, the Defendant’s motives for seeking such information appears clear and related to the litigation and the real issue of liability is not frivolous or punitive. (See, e.g. Miller v. National Broadcasting Co, (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1483-1484.)

Plaintiff argues that the request assumes that there is a dispute as to whether she was using her cell phone at the time of the accident and that no party has asked that foundational question such that Defendant can now obtain her private cell phone records. Given the minimal intrusion, the Court does not find that this precludes Defendant from seeking the documents. Indeed, whether Plaintiff may have been

distracted at the time of driving is a central issue in this automobile case and is directly relevant to the issue of liability or comparative fault. Further, the fact that Defendant may have propounded RFAs to Plaintiff asking her to admit that she was using her cell phone at the time of the incident does not preclude Defendant from seeking this information. The discovery statutes permit various discovery devices to ascertain relevant information.

In summary, the Court therefore finds that there is good cause to discover the records, as limited. The privacy right of Plaintiff in the records is outweighed by Defendant’s interest in obtaining the documents to discover if the phone was in use around the time of the accident. Plaintiff may redact names and phone numbers from the records as Defendant makes clear that she is not interested in this information.

No. 22

Denied. This request asked for copies of all postings, messages, emails, entries, notices, notifications, tweets, and photos that Plaintiff sent, received, or uploaded to any internet website regarding any matter referenced in the complaint. Plaintiff objected on the basis that the request sought materials equally available to Defendant and to the extent that they are not, sought matters that were private. Plaintiff invited Defendant to narrow the request to specify what exactly she was looking for but Defendant did not do so.

Defendant argues that Courts have recognized that social networking site content is “neither privileged nor protected by any right to privacy.” (Mailhiot v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2012) 285 F.R.D. 566.) California Courts have held, for example, that information posted on MySpace was not entitled to privacy protection since it was available to any person with a computer even if the person posting expected a limited audience. (Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1130.) Moreno, however, noted that information disclosed only to a few people “may remain private.” (Id.) Moreno was dealing with information posted on social media that available widely to the public and did not involve private social media information (e.g. where the audience was restricted).

Here, the Court finds that even assuming that the request seeks information as to which there is no privacy right, the request as phrased is not described with reasonable particularity. Indeed, the request seeks social media content regarding the matters referenced in the complaint. It is simply not clear how Plaintiff can intelligently comply with this request without essentially disclosing everything she has posted on social media. Defendant argues in the motion that she only seeks information posted by Plaintiff regarding the lawsuit for example, pictures of Plaintiff engaging in physical/recreational activities. But this is not reasonably inferred from the request nor is it clear what exactly the response would entail. Further the complaint references numerous matters, for example wage loss. Literally read, the request might require Plaintiff to produce any postings regarding any job she has ever had. Indeed, even the non-binding federal case cited by Defendant denied a request for production of social media information where the demand was insufficiently particular stating that the description must put a “reasonable person of ordinary intelligence” on notice of what specific information is requested. (Mailhiot, supra, 285 F.R.D. at 572.) Defendant’s reply does not address the issues raised with respect to the phrasing of the request.

The request as phrased is simply too broad. Nothing in this ruling precludes

Defendant from propounding a more narrowly tailored request.

Both parties’ requests for sanctions are denied as each side was partially successful.

In any event both the motion and the opposition were substantially justified.

No later than February 1, 2018, Plaintiff shall provide further, verified responses to Defendant’s form interrogatory 6.4, special interrogatories 15-18, and request for productions 15 (or amend form interrogatory 8.8) and 19.