Filed 5/12/20 Lam v. Yalca CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

PHUONG LAM,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DENNIS YALCA,

Defendant and Appellant.

A158088

(City & County of

San Francisco Super. Ct.

No. CCH19581377)

In February 2019, respondent Phuong Lam (respondent) petitioned for issuance of a restraining order against appellant Dennis Yalca (appellant) (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6). The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and conducted a hearing on May 15, 2019.

The trial court questioned the parties at the May 2019 hearing. Respondent said appellant threatened him and his son and attempted to extort money from them. Respondent played a recording of appellant for the court; the court reported hearing the words “coming for you, war not going to be over, you’re going to pay me cash.” Respondent also said appellant tampered with surveillance cameras by spraying oil on them. Respondent showed the trial court a video of the incident depicting a hooded figure. Respondent also showed the court a video of a hooded figure doing something to respondent’s car. Respondent said his son chased down the person and identified him as appellant. Respondent’s son testified he chased down the person and got a good look at his face when the hood was raised. Appellant told the court he demanded money to repair damage respondent did to his fence; he denied he was the hooded figure in the videos.

Following the hearing, the trial court issued a civil harassment restraining order in favor of respondent and his son, prohibiting appellant from contacting them and requiring him to stay away from them. The court stated, “Based on the evidence before me, the testimony, my credibility determinations and my independent inquiries, I find that [respondent] has carried his burden of proof that [appellant] has been conducting himself in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed specifically at [respondent] that seriously alarms, annoys or harasses him.” This appeal followed.

Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides that “[a] person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” Section 527.6, subdivision (d) provides that a temporary restraining order may issue based on a petitioner’s declaration; the court shall hold a hearing on the petition within 21 or 25 days from the date a temporary restraining order is granted or denied. (§ 527.6, subd. (g).) “At the hearing, the judge ‘shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry. If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.’ [Citation.] An injunction restraining future conduct is only authorized when it appears that harassment is likely to recur in the future.” (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 496 (Harris).) Section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3) defines “harassment” as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.”

We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant a restraining order if it is supported by substantial evidence. (Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 497.) “ ‘Substantial evidence means evidence which is of ponderable legal significance—evidence which is reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘In general, in reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, “any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved in support of the determination of the trial court decision. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘We may not reweigh the evidence and are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations. [Citations.] Moreover, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment.’ ” (Lui v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 962, 969 (Lui).)

On appeal, appellant does not dispute that respondent’s allegations below, if believed, were sufficient to support issuance of the restraining order. Instead, appellant argues the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding of the truth of the allegations by clear and convincing evidence because respondent’s evidence was not corroborated by neutral witnesses or video clearly depicting appellant’s alleged misconduct. He argues, “While there is surveillance video, it … is unhelpful in establishing the identity of the hooded person. The only testimony available is that of [respondent’s son], one of the persons seeking a restraining order against [appellant].”

Appellant cites no authority for the proposition that the testimony of an interested party is insufficient to support issuance of a restraining order, or for the proposition that any such testimony must be corroborated. To the contrary, “Except where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact.” (Evid. Code, § 411; see also Lui, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 969.) Here, the trial court found credible the accounts of respondent and his son. Substantial evidence supported issuance of the restraining order.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent.

SIMONS, J.

We concur.

JONES, P.J.

BURNS, J.

(Lam v. Yalca / A158088)