Case Name: Professional Collection Consultants v. Krystal G. Lauron
Case No.: 1-11-CV-213127

Currently before the Court is the motion by defendant and cross-complainant Krystal G. Lauron (“Cross-Complainant”) to strike the answer of plaintiff and cross-defendant Professional Collection Consultants (“PCC”) and cross-defendants Todd Allen Shields, Wireless Receivables Acquisition Group, LLC, and Clark Garen (collectively “Cross-Defendants”) to the first amended cross-complaint (“FACC”).

Cross-Complainant moves to strike the answer to the FACC in its entirety or, in the alternative, paragraphs 21, 28, 33-43, 52, and 62 and paragraphs 1-5 of the prayer for relief. (See Notice of Motion, pp. 1:24-28, 2:1-3.)

A court may strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted into any pleading or strike all or part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) As with a demurrer, the grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from matters of which the court may take judicial notice. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1913.) In ruling on a motion to strike, the court reads the complaint as a whole, all parts in their context, and assuming the truth of all well-pleaded allegations. (See Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63, citing, Clauson v. Super. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

As in initial matter, Cross-Defendants contend that Cross-Complainant did not comply with Santa Clara County Superior Court, Local Civil Rules, rule 7C because counsel for Cross-Complainant did not contact their counsel to clear the hearing date for this motion. However, there is no requirement that the moving party clear a hearing date with the opposing party. (See Santa Clara County Super. Ct., Local Civil Rules, rule 7C [a party scheduling a hearing on the law and motion calendar should obtain agreement to the date from all opposing parties “if possible”].) Moreover, Cross-Defendants do not articulate what remedy, if any, exists for the purported noncompliance and they do not cite any legal authority indicating that noncompliance with Local Civil Rule 7C is a basis for denying a motion to strike.

In addition, Cross-Defendants’ argument that Cross-Complainant did not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(a), regarding the contents of a notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading, is without merit because: the specifications are numbered consecutively; and Cross-Complainant is moving to strike the answer in its entirety or, alternatively, entire paragraphs and under those circumstances Cross-Complainant is not required to quote in full the portions it seeks to strike. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(a) [“A notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading must quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count, or defense. Specifications in a notice must be numbered consecutively.”].) Moreover, Cross-Defendants do not articulate what remedy, if any, exists for noncompliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(a) and they do not cite any legal authority indicating that noncompliance with that rule is a basis for denying a motion to strike.

The motion to strike the answer to the FACC in its entirety is DENIED. In her moving papers, Cross-Complainant argues that the answer is deficient only with respect to paragraphs 21, 28, 33-43, 52, and 62 and paragraphs 1-5 of the prayer for relief. Thus, it would be wholly improper to strike the answer in its entirety when only a portion of it is purportedly deficient.

The motion to strike paragraphs 21, 28, 33-43, 52, and 62 of the answer to the FACC is DENIED. Cross-Complainant argues that the Court should strike paragraphs 21, 28, 33-43, 52, and 62 because they “[contain] irrelevancies and legal conclusions that are improper for pleadings.” (Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:20-21.) Cross-Complainant only specifically addresses paragraph 21 and contends that even though “a simple denial [of paragraph 17 of the FACC] would suffice[,]” paragraph 21 also contains “half-baked legal theories, unsubstantiated factual claims, and unfounded legal conclusions.” (Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:20-26.) With respect to paragraphs 28, 33-43, 52, and 62, Cross-Complainant states only that those paragraphs “[contain] similar irrelevancies, and each irrelevancy begins with the phrase, ‘By way of further answer …’” (Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:26-27.) Cross-Complainant’s conclusory arguments lack merit. First, paragraphs 21, 28, 33-43, 52, and 62 cannot be stricken in their entirety because they each generally deny specific allegations asserted in the FACC and, therefore, contain relevant matters. Moreover, many of the additional allegations in paragraphs 21, 28, 33-43, 52, and 62, beyond the express general denials, are factual denials (see Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (Rutter Group 2013) ¶ 6:415, p. 6-110 [“Defendant can also effectively deny allegations in the complaint by alleging contrary or inconsistent facts.”] [emphasis omitted]) and/or pertain to affirmative defenses such as the statute of limitations or statute of frauds. (See Martin v. Van Bergen (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 84, 91 [a party may assert a statute of limitations defense by alleging facts showing that the action is time-barred and stating that the untimely filing is being raised as a defense]; see also Civ. Code, § 1624 [statute of frauds].)

The motion to strike paragraphs 1-5 of the prayer for relief is GRANTED, with 10 days’ leave to amend, because Code of Civil Procedure section 431.30, subdivision (c) prohibits requests for affirmative relief in an answer. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30, subd. (c); see also McLarand, Vasquez & Partners, Inc., v. Downey Savings & Loan Ass’n. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1450, 1452.)