CIV530285 RENEE GLOVER CHANTLER, et al. VS. FARIN NAMDARAN YEGANEH, et al.

RENEE GLOVER CHANTLER FARIN NAMDARAN YEGANCH
EMILY MAXWELL

DEFENDANT RAMIN YEGANEH’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION TENTATIVE RULING:

The Court reminds Plaintiff Chantler’s counsel that papers must include full citations to evidence. Plaintiff’s omission of the evidence on which she relies (See Opposing P&A at 20:23-24, 21:12, 22:16-17, 24:8, 25:21, places an unreasonable burden on the Court.

The Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s objection to Defendant’s purported attempt to file a moving Memorandum of Points and Authorities of excessive length by manipulating typeface size and line spacing. (Opp. P&A at 1 and n.1). The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s extensive use of footnotes brings her Opposing brief to a word-count nearly identical to that of Defendant.

The motion for summary adjudication is DENIED as to Issues 1, 2, and 3.

A. Issue 1 – Damages

1. The Motion Fails to Dispose of a Cause of Action.

Summary adjudication cannot be granted unless the motion completely disposes of a cause of action or a claim for punitive damages. Further, section 437c, subdivision (f)(1) does not permit summary adjudication of a single item of compensatory damage which does not dispose of an entire cause of action. (DeCastro W. Chodorow & Burns, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 410, 422.) Defendant is named in the third through seventh and ninth causes of action. The motion does not identify which cause(s) of action is/are addressed by this motion. The motion fails to meet its moving burden of establishing that any cause of action is entirely eliminated by a finding that Defendant owned no interest in any of the properties.

2. Yeganeh’s Argument Regarding Admissions Has no Merit.

A party may not use his own responses to Requests for Admissions as a sword. An admission is binding only against the admitting party, not the requesting party. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2033.410 subd. (a) & (b).) Yeganeh’s “admissions” that he owns no interest in the properties are not admissible evidence against Plaintiff.

3. Yeganeh’s Estoppel Argument Has no Merit.

The motion does not argue that the defense of estoppel bars any cause of action. Rather, it argues that Plaintiff is merely “estopped” from “contending” that Yeganeh owns/owned a property interest in any of the property. The argument does not warrant summary adjudication of damages, because Yeganeh does not identify what cause of action he is attacking. Further, the motion does not explain how estopping Plaintiff from “contending” that Yeganeh owns any interest in the properties disposes of any cause of action.

B. Issue 2 – 3rd Cause of Action (Conspiracy to Commit Fraudulent Transfers)

1. The cases addressing undue influence concern incidents in which one person used undue influence to gain an “unfair advantage over the other.” In the present case, there is no issue of Defendant Yeganeh gaining an unfair advantage over his parents. He contends only that he coerced them into signing documents to facilitate the transfers. The existence of undue influence, if any, does not obviate the allegation that Yeganeh entered into an agreement with his parents to commit the fraudulent transfers.

2. A conspiracy may exist notwithstanding one person’s use of coercion to force others into the conspiracy agreement. (See City of Vernon v. Southern California Edison Co. 955 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir. 1992) (“a conspiracy to monopolize may exist even where one of the conspirators participates involuntarily or under coercion”).)

3. Plaintiff raises a triable issue of fact by offering contradictory evidence that Yeganeh’s mother testified that she and her husband initially helped Yeganeh not because of threats, but based upon concern for their son and pleading and pressure from their son and his attorney. (Maxwell Decl., Ex. 3 (Yeganeh Declaration to Withdraw Admissions) para. 80; see also Maxwell Decl., Ex. 11 (Yeganeh Good Faith Settlement Declaration) para. 20 (same statement).)

Undue influence and coercion do not necessarily negate the formation of an agreement to commit civil conspiracy. Triable issues of material fact exist about whether Yeganeh coerced or otherwise caused his parents to enter into the civil conspiracy involuntarily.

C. Issue 3 – Fourth Cause of Action (Civil RICO)

1. A Triable Issue of Material Fact Exists About the Existence of an Enterprise.

Defendant Yeganeh’s initial argument is simply that the alleged wrongful acts “are not the actions of a member of an association-in-fact enterprise” and that his parents “were not participating in this ‘enterprise’ nor were they adding any ‘direction’ element to it.” (Moving P&A at 19:13-18.) The argument fails because “issues of ongoing organization, continuing membership and an enterprise existing apart from the underlying pattern of racketeering are factual questions for the jury.” (United States v. Sanders (10th Cir. 1991) 928 F.2d 940, 943; United States v. Irizarry (3d Cir. 2003) 341 F.3d 273, 286 [existence of enterprise must be resolved by jury].)

2. A Triable Issue of Material Fact Exists Whether a “Pattern” of Activity Existed. Existence of a pattern is a question of fact for the jury. (Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Stone (10th Cir. 1993) 998 F.2d 1534, 1543.) The motion fails to demonstrate that the facts lead to only one reasonable conclusion that a pattern of activity existed. Therefore, the question is one of fact for the jury.

3. A Triable Issue of Material Fact Exists About Causation.

“Causation … is ordinarily a question of fact which cannot be resolved by summary judgment. The issue of causation may be decided as a question of law only if, under undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.” (Ambriz v. Kelegian (2007) 146 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1531–32.) Yeganeh’s burden is to negate causation. Instead, he argues only that Plaintiff “does not explain” the causal link between the wrongful acts and Plaintiff’s damages. (See UMF 69 & 72.) Other arguments are mere conclusions without citation to any evidence. (See Moving P&A at 24:13-14 (“none of this ‘Extortion’ activity could have caused” harm); Id. at 24:20-21 (“YEGANEH is at a loss as to how Plaintiff Chantler has been harmed by these ‘Obstruction of Justice’ allegations”); Id. at 25:4-6 (“How Plaintiff Chantler could have been harmed by this activity is anyone’s guess”).) The motion fails to establish that none of the RICO acts caused damage to Plaintiff.

4. The Motion Fails to Show that the Statute of Limitations Bars the RICO Claim.

The statute of limitations does not bar a RICO claim if overt acts occur within the limitations period. The Ninth Circuit applies the rule of “separate accrual,” wherein a “cause of action accrues when new overt acts occur within the limitations period, even if … other acts were committed outside the limitations period.” (State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Ammann (9th Cir.1987) 828 F.2d 4, 5; Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Madariaga (9th Cir.1988) 851 F.2d 271, 275.) The motion does not demonstrate that none of the alleged RICO overt acts occurred within four years before the complaint was filed. Therefore, the statute of limitations argument does not dispose of the cause of action.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.