2018-00226407-CU-BC

Rhonda Sorrell vs. General Motors, LLC

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Protective Order

Filed By: Shugart, Jonathan M.

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s (“Defendant” or “GM”) motion for a protective order is DENIED.

In this lemon law action, plaintiffs Rhonda Sorrell and Lee Roy Sorrell III (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege their 2016 Chevrolet Suburban has non-conformities that GM failed to repair within a reasonable number of attempts.

Independent and wholly separate from the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiffs submitted to GM a claim for personal injuries on behalf of their minor daughter, whom they contend sustained an injury caused by the Suburban’s running boards in October 2017. GM responded to that personal injury claim and attempted to resolve it with Plaintiffs, but the parties could not reach an agreement.

This action does not involve a personal injury claim, and Plaintiffs’ minor daughter is not a party to this action. Plaintiffs’ counsel has indicated they are not representing Plaintiffs’ minor daughter and a personal injury claim will not be asserted in this action.

GM contends Plaintiff has served discovery related to the alleged personal injury claim in this lemon law action and GM now seeks a protective order that it need not respond to the allegedly irrelevant discovery requests. Specifically, GM moves for a protective order that it not be required to answer Plaintiffs’ requests for admissions, set two, numbers 14-29, 31, 32, 36-51, 78-85, 87-89, and 92, Plaintiff’s special interrogatories, set two, numbers 29-56, and Plaintiffs’ requests for production of documents, set two, numbers 45-55.

GM contends the foregoing discovery can be separated into two categories. Category

1 consists of Plaintiffs’ requests for admissions, set two, numbers 14-29, 31, 32, 36-51, 78-85, 87-89, and 92. These relate to the alleged personal injury claim to which GM seeks a protective order not to respond. GM contends a majority of these requests reference two proposed releases GM sent to Plaintiffs to resolve their daughter’s personal injury claim. These requests also seek information about the claims administrator who processed the claim, her relationship with GM, her scope of employment, and the decisions she made to try to resolve the claim.

Category 2 consists of Plaintiff’s special interrogatories, set two, numbers 29-56, and Plaintiffs’ requests for production of documents, set two, numbers 45-55. These relate to both the alleged personal injury claim and the lemon law claim, to which GM has objected in part and responded in part. GM seeks a protective order not to respond to the portion of these requests that may relate to the personal injury claim.

“The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other person from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (CCP § 2031.060(b).) The party asserting the privilege has the burden to establish “good cause” for the requested protection, e.g. burden, expense, or intrusiveness clearly outweighs the likelihood the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Merson Elec. Co. v. Superior Court (Grayson) (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1110.) In determining whether to grant a protective order, the Court considers whether a particular method of discovery is unduly burdensome and expensive. (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.020(a).) A motion for a protective order should only be granted if the Court “determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.020(a); Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 2019.030(a).) This is Defendant’s burden.

GM contends information regarding the attempted settlement of the separate personal injury claim is irrelevant to the lemon law claim at issue in this action. In support, GM contends offers to compromise are inadmissible to prove liability pursuant to Civil Code § 1152. However, any argument regarding admissibility is inapposite when the matter concerns discovery. Indeed, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) A party seeking discovery need only show that the information is unprivileged and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (CCP § 2017.010.) More specifically, in the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [citations omitted] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612.) Thus, whether or not any information regarding the attempted settlement is admissible is not a factor to be considered at this point. The test is “relevancy.” GM has failed to meet its burden demonstrating the information is not reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Further, GM has not set forth any argument has to how or why providing the requested information is unduly burdensome, expensive, or intrusive or would cause unwarranted annoyance or embarrassment.

Further, although not Plaintiff’s burden, in opposition Plaintiff contends that the information is reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiff argues when GM learned of injuries to Plaintiffs’ daughter, GM refused to honor the contractual warranty to repair the vehicle unless Plaintiffs would settle out their daughter’s potential personal injury claim. Plaintiff argues GM’s actions and conversations with the Plaintiffs in settlement negotiations regarding their daughter’s injuries show GM’s intent and actions regarding the subject vehicle’s repairs, or lack thereof, and may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence concerning GM’s willful and malicious intent in refusing to repair the vehicle. Plaintiffs contend the repairs being offered in exchange for a release concern the subject matter of the pending action, the running board issue. Plaintiffs argue whether any repairs were to be made was being directed by whether the potential personal injury claim was released.

The Court is persuaded that the information sought may be reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Any doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery. (Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct

.(1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.) Objections based on irrelevancy and immateriality to the issues of the case “cannot be used to deny discovery.” (Coy v. Super. Ct.(1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 217.) These standards are to be applied in accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures. (See Colonial Life, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 790; Greyhound Corp. v. Super. Ct.(1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 376.)

GM has failed to meet its burden to establish “good cause” for the issuance of the protective order. Accordingly, GM’s motion for protective order is DENIED.

Plaintiff also argues GM failed to meet and confer in good faith and requests monetary sanctions on that basis. However, there is no meet and confer requirement prior to filing a motion for protective order. (See CCP § 2017.020.) Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions is, therefore, DENIED.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.