Case Number: BC637301 Hearing Date: March 07, 2018 Dept: 32

Richard “Richie” pAlmer,

Plaintiff,

v.

Gabriel Rueda, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: BC637301

Hearing Date: March 7, 2018

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

(1) Motion to coMpel answers to deposition questions

(2) motion for protective order

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Richard “Richie” Palmer brings this complaint against Defendant Gabriel Rueda (“Rueda” or “Defendant”) asserting causes of action for (1) breach of oral contract; (2) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing’ (3) false promise; (4) quantum meruit; (5) injust enrichment; and (6) declaratory relief.

Rueda is the plaintiff in an action (case no. BC611486) (“Underlying Action”) in which he seeks adjudication of his claim to a finder’s fee arising out of the May 2, 2015 boxing match between Floyd Mayweather and Manny Pacquiao. In the Underlying Action, Rueda alleges that he introduced CBS Network President, Leslie Moonves, and Pacquiao’s trainer, Freddie Roach, for the purpose of arranging the fight and with the understanding that he would be paid a finder’s fee of 2%. Plaintiff alleges that he facilitated the meeting between Moonves and Roach, and came to an agreement with Rueda that any finder’s fees would be equally split between the two.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The parties’ requests for judicial notice are GRANTED.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff Richard Palmer (“Palmer” or “Plaintiff”) moves to compel Defendant Gabriela Rueda (“Rueda” or “Defendant”) to answer certain questions propounded at deposition. Defendant moves for a protective order regarding said deposition.

“The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions. . . . (1) That the deposition not be taken at all. . . . (5) That the deposition be taken only on certain specified terms and conditions. . . . (9) That certain matters not be inquired into. (10) That the scope of the examination be limited to certain matters.”

Defendant Rueda moves for a protective order on the grounds that Plaintiff line of questioning at the deposition inquired into the validity of Rueda’s claims in the Underlying Action. Defendant’s motion is well-taken. Defendant accuses Plaintiff of conducting the deposition in bad faith, and is seeking to inquire into the validity of Rueda’s claims in the Underlying Action in order to assist his friend, Freddie Roach, who is a defendant in the Underlying Action. The Court finds it unnecessary to address these accusations, as the line of questioning at the deposition was clearly improper. The Underlying Action concerns a purported agreement wherein Moonves and Roach agreed to pay Rueda a finder’s fee. The instant action concerns a purported agreement between Palmer and Rueda wherein they agreed to split the finder’s fee alleged in the Underlying Action. Thus, the actions involve two separate and distinct agreements. Granted, if Rueda is unsuccessful in pursuing his claims in the Underlying Action, Palmer will not be entitled to any recovery in this action. However, Rueda’s ability to prove his claim in the Underlying Action has absolutely no relevance to the claim in this action. Palmer is not a party to the Underlying Action, and thus has no involvement in proving Rueda’s claims. In the motion to compel, Palmer argues that he “has a right to evaluate the strength of Rueda’s claims. If Rueda’s claims are weak, Palmer would reevaluate this litigation and consider settlement as it is not his desire to seek half of nothing.” (Sep. Stmt. at 7.) The Court finds this argument unconvincing. If Palmer was truly concerned with Rueda’s ability to prove his claims, he would seek a stay of this action and wait for the outcome of the Underlying Action.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds good cause to issue a protective order. Accordingly, the motion for protective order is GRANTED, and the motion to compel is DENIED.