Case Name: RIGOBERTO SANCHEZ v. JUAN ROBERTO MAGALLANES, ET AL.
Case No.: 16CV293515

This is an automobile collision case. Currently before the Court is the motion for Summary Adjudication on the issue of punitive damages brought by Defendants Juan Roberto Magallanes and Guillermina Magallanes (“Defendants”). As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff expressly states in his opposition that he does not oppose the motion as to Defendant Guillermina Magallanes, who was not involved in the subject accident and simply owned the vehicle driven by Defendant Juan Magallanes. The motion is accordingly GRANTED as to Defendant Guillermina Magallanes without further discussion. What remains for analysis is the motion as brought by Defendant Juan Magallanes.

The pleadings limit the issues for summary judgment or summary adjudication and such a motion may not be granted or denied based on issues outside the pleading. (See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98; Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258; Nieto v. Blue Shield of Calif. Life & Health Ins. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 73 [“the pleadings determine the scope of relevant issues on a summary judgment motion.”].) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (See CCP §437c(f)(1).)

Summary adjudication may be granted as to a request for punitive damages even though it does not dispose of the cause of action the request for such damages arises from. (Catalano v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 91, 96.) A claim for punitive damages requires “clear and convincing” evidence that the defendant has been guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice” in the commission of a tort. (Civil Code § 3294(a).) “[W]here the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proof will be by clear and convincing evidence, the higher standard of proof must be taken into account in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, since if a plaintiff is to prevail on a claim for punitive damages, it will be necessary that the evidence presented meet the higher evidentiary standard.” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullen, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1049.) Although the clear-and-convincing evidence standard is stringent, it does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to “prove” a case for punitive damages in the summary adjudication proceeding. (Id.) That said, to defeat summary adjudication on a claim for punitive damages, the burden is on a plaintiff to produce “clear and convincing evidence” of malice, fraud or oppression. (Basich v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1121.) “‘Clear and convincing’ evidence requires a finding of high probability.” (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919; see also CACI 201 [Highly Probable—Clear and Convincing Proof].)

There is no allegation in the operative Complaint that Defendant Juan Magallanes committed fraud, so the request for punitive damages can only be based on clear and convincing evidence that he acted with either “malice” or “oppression.”

“Malice” is defined in Civ. Code §3294(c)(1) as: “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Emphasis added.) “Oppression” is defined as despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (Civ. Code, § 3294(c)(2).) “Despicable” conduct is conduct that is “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched, or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715; See also Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 899-900 [ordinarily, routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws does not justify an award of punitive damages].)

The motion for summary adjudication of the punitive damages request is GRANTED as to Defendant Juan Magallanes.

The statements in Defendant Juan Magallanes’ declaration denying any intent to harm Plaintiff and asserting that he did not see Plaintiff’s vehicle until just before the collision when he was already in the intersection are admissible evidence sufficient to meet his initial burden to show that there is no basis for punitive damages as he did not intend to harm anyone and did not act with malice or oppression as defined by Civil Code § 3294.

When the burden shifts Plaintiff is unable to raise any triable issue of material fact on this issue under the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard applicable to a request for punitive damages. To begin with, there are no allegations of “malice,” “oppression” or despicable conduct by Defendant Juan Magallanes in the operative form complaint. The sole basis for the request for punitive damages appears to be that Defendant Juan Magallanes negligently caused the accident and violated the Vehicle Code in doing so, which is not disputed. Even if this were expressly pled in the Complaint this is not enough to support a request for punitive damages.

“The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages.” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1051.) “Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or ‘malice,’ or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton.” (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 716, internal quotation and citation omitted.) “Conscious disregard of rights is conduct by a defendant who is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of such conduct to plaintiff’s interests and willfully and deliberately fails to avoid those consequences.” (Id., citing Smith v. Brown–Forman Distillers Corp. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 503, 516.)

The clear and convincing evidence standard that must be satisfied to defeat the motion “requires a finding of high probability …. ‘so clear as to leave no substantial doubt’; ‘sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1211–1212, internal citations omitted.) The admissible evidence submitted by Plaintiff with the opposition to the motion, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, at best suggests that a trier of fact could reasonably infer that it was more likely than not that Defendant knew there was a stop sign at the intersection on the day of the accident. Plaintiff does not offer “clear and convincing” evidence that Defendant Juan intended harm to Plaintiff (or was even aware of him until just before the collision), acted with malice or oppression as defined by Civil Code § 3294, or engaged in any “despicable” conduct that would support a request for punitive damages.