Case Name: State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Caterino, et al.
Case No.: 17CV316048

Defendants Charles Caterino (“Charles”) and Meghan Caterino (“Meghan”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move to quash service of summons purportedly effectuated by plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This is an action for subrogation arising out of a motor vehicle accident. According to the allegations of the Complaint, on August 22, 2016, Meghan, while driving a vehicle owned by Charles and used with his consent, collided with a parked, unoccupied vehicle owned by one of Plaintiff’s insureds, causing property damage. (Complaint. ¶¶ 11-14.) As a result of the damage caused by Meghan’s negligence, Plaintiff paid its insured, Marcel Frangieh, $24,017.56 under its policy of insurance and became subrogated to that amount. (Id., ¶ 15.) Despite demand from Plaintiff, Defendants failed and refused, and continue to fail and refuse, to pay this sum. (Id., ¶ 17.) Consequently, Plaintiff filed the instant action on September 18, 2017, seeking to recover the foregoing amount, plus interest and costs of suit, from Defendants.

On August 14, 2018, Defendants filed the instant motion to quash service of summons and complaint, based on their contention that they were not properly served with these items. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

II. Motion to Quash

Defendants move to quash service of summons pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, which provides that a defendant, on or before the last day of his time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a).)

“When a defendant challenges the court’s personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process the burden is on the plaintiff to prove … the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.) The plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that proper service of the summons and complaint was effectuated. (Boliah v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 984, 991.)

Plaintiff asserts that proper service was made, and directs the Court’s attention to the very proof of service reflecting substitute service that Defendants dispute. The filing of a proof of service that complies with applicable statutory requirements by itself creates a rebuttable presumption that service was proper. (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441.) According to these proofs of service, Charles was served by substitute service with the summons and complaint on November 12, 2017 at 4308 Belvedere Drive in San Jose, and Meghan was served by substitute service with the summons and complaint on January 16, 2018 at 1966 Robinson Lane in Santa Rosa. (See Declaration of Andrew Dorr in Support of Opposition to Motion to Quash (“Dorr Decl.”), ¶¶ 8-9 and Exhibits C and D.) In Charles’ case, a copy of the summons and complaint was purportedly left with “Jane Doe” resident, a Caucasian female, while a copy of these items were left with “Molly” as it related to service on Meghan. (Id.)

In an effort to rebut the presumption of proper service occasioned by the filed proofs of service, Defendants assert that they were not properly served because Meghan has not lived at 1966 Robinson Lane for more than one year and never gave “Molly” permission to accept service on her behalf. (See Declaration of Meghan Caterino, ¶¶ 4-5.) Moreover, Meghan purportedly no longer resides in this state. (Id. at ¶ 6.) As for Charles, Defendants explain that as of November 12, 2017, the date upon which Charles was allegedly served, he had not lived at 4308 Belvedere Drive for more than one year and “Jane Doe,” whom Charles never authorized to accept service on his behalf, informed the process server that “Charles used to live here a long time ago….” (Declaration of Charles Caterino, ¶¶ 4-5.) By supplying declarations attesting to the foregoing information, the Court finds that Defendants have sufficiently rebutted the presumption of proper service. (See Rancho Santa Fe Pharmacy, Inc. v. Seyfert (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 875, 882 [when opposing party produces evidence casting doubt on the truth of the presumed fact, the other party is no longer aided by that presumption and “the presumption disappears, leaving it to the party in whose favor it initially worked to prove the fact in question”].)

Plaintiff explains that it confirmed that the aforementioned addresses were proper by submitting requests to the U.S. Postal Service for any change of address on file for either defendant. (Dorr Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.) Plaintiff was advised by the post office that no such change orders were on file. (Id.) After several unsuccessful efforts were made to effectuate personal service on Defendants, substitute service was utilized instead. Substitute service is a secondary method of service on a defendant in lieu of personal delivery and is permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20, subdivision (b), which provides that if a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered, service may be perfected by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, with a person of at least eighteen years of age. Where such a manner of service is made and challenged, it is critical that a connection be shown between the address at which substitute service is effectuated and the party alleged to be served. (Zirbes v. Stratton (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1416-1417.) Plaintiff explains that it obtained the subject addresses from several “idiCore” reports run on Defendants and thus a clear connection is established.

Despite Plaintiff’s evidence, the Court ultimately finds that proper service was not effectuated. While it may be true that the addresses obtained by Plaintiff were the locations of Defendants’ residences at one time, Defendants proffer evidence which establishes that they have not lived at those locations for a while, did not authorize the individuals at those locations to accept service on their behalves, and Plaintiff otherwise offers nothing which demonstrates that these remain Defendants’ usual mailing addresses at present. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to quash is GRANTED.